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ABSTRACT

The goal of this dissertation is to increase our understanding of
domestic policy responses to initiatives and expertise as provided by
international health organizations. Although following international
recommendations often improves domestic public health, in certain
circumstances resistance to adopting them persists. My core theoretical
argument suggests that a strong societal agreement about what
constitutes the ―common good‖ served by state (e.g., ―social purpose‖)
informs how domestic policy-makers evaluate the benefits of adopting
international recommendations. This agreement also affects how
governments frame the provision of treatment, decide which
subpopulations should benefit from the consumption of public good,
and choose their partners in policy implementation. To demonstrate
the impact of social purpose I examine how, why and with what
consequences Russia and South Africa adopted the external best case
practices, guidelines, and recommendations in regard to the HIV/AIDS
treatment. In doing so, I investigate how major international health,
developmental, and financial organizations formulated the global
HIV/AIDS policy, and devise a set of indicators operationalizing this
policy. Then, I use these indicators to design a structured, focused
comparison of the domestic HIV/AIDS policy responses and

empirically demonstrate that governments in both states created policy
environments sanctioning a highly selective approach to international
policy guidelines and recommendations. Rather than responding to the
epidemic as a pressing public health issue Russia‘s ―Sovereign
Democracy‖ prompted the government to respond to HIV/AIDS as the
issue of demographic survival and criminal drug abuse. This choice
subsequently eroded the human rights component from the official
policy, overcommitted the government financially, and frustrated the
cooperation with private sector and civil society. The imperatives of
―African Renaissance‖ reframed the HIV/AIDS epidemic as a local
developmental problem. As a result, the Cabinet supported
substandard biomedical treatments and indigenous healing practices,
consistently resisted the universal and free rollout of treatment in order
to avoid the undesirable governmental expenditures and redistributive
strategies. In both countries, these policy choices resulted in the
adverse consequences for public health and prompted a protracted
contestation among various state and non-state actors around the
principles of the desired public health policies.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

In the early 2000s international journalists and academics exposed
South African HIV/AIDS policy to the international audiences. They
put forth evidence that President Thabo Mbeki questioned the relation
between the human immunodeficiency virus and the acquired
syndrome of opportunistic diseases, as well as evaded rolling out
almost universally adopted life-saving antiretroviral treatment therapy.
These actions went against the key recommendations and guidelines of
the core international health actors, including the World Health
Organization and the professional health care community. While this
critical exposure proved to be eye-grabbing, many outside observers
remained puzzled why Mbeki chose to pursue these counter-intuitive
and, as it turned out later, disastrous policies. Mass media and general
public reasoned that it must have been Mbeki‘s complex personality
and leadership style that could explain what at the time was going on
in South Africa. This major theme took on many variations. Criticallyminded scholars and political observers underscored Mbeki‘s personal
contrarian streak with a taste of going against the prevailing notions
and ideas, his injudicious use of internet resources of dubious
expertise, and his beliefs in conspiracies surrounding contemporary
1

South Africa. Health policy scholars and domestic treatment activists
kept raising the degree of an outrage, if not an undiluted hatred, to the
president and his policies.
Mbeki‘s supporters continued perceiving him as a brilliant
political leader, committed to the intellectual sophistication and always
making a thoughtful analysis of complex issues a case in point while
crafting domestic policies. In their eyes, President‘s health
policymaking amply confirmed his reputation of an independent
thinker in a search of sensitive, innovative, and unorthodox health
policies, all breaking the western monopoly on scientific truth. In 2007
Ronald Suresh Roberts offered a book-length justification of this
approach. In this book Roberts reinvented the President as a very
insightful politician, whose complex sensibilities and intricate
policymaking are bound to be misunderstood. Mbeki is indeed a
person of many colors: his stress on the African return to the roots
does not preclude him from including the profusely long quotes from
the assorted Victorian poets in his political speeches and having his
wardrobe stocked with the standard British business suites. Thus, there
always will be some confusion, about who the ―enigmatic‖ Mr. Mbeki
truly was.

2

I agree that Mbeki contributed to the country‘s inconsistence
with international best practices. At the same time, I assert that the
unqualified stress on his personality as a key explanatory factor
simplifies and obscures a more complex story of HIV/AIDS policy in
South Africa. Indeed, Mbeki‘s specific policy blunders included his
public denial of the causal links between the HIV and AIDS and an
overt courting of AIDS dissidents. Yet other persistent deviations from
the international consensus originated and evolved beyond the scope
of his direct control. Local healers offered various alternative
medications, indigenous concoctions, and dietary supplements.
Provincial-level health administrators kept restricting the use of the
antiretroviral therapy, in several cases refusing to prescribe it.
Generally, ―[a] persistent tolerance or even acceptance of heterodox
view of HIV and AIDS among the party‘s leadership‖1 complicated
bringing domestic practices in consistence with the global
prescriptions.
Even the sharp turnaround in the top political leadership in
2008 did not imply that all the tribulations with South African health
policy would be over for good. Two years after Mbeki‘s ousting, a
prominent treatment activist Nathan Gaffen warned that South African

1

Lieberman 2009: 140

3

policies were still sidetracked from the international best practices. 2
The following presidents Kgalema Motlanthe and Jacob Zuma
understandably distanced themselves from Mbeki‘s health policies and
appeared to be more in a policy mainstream. On the other hand,
Zuma‘s prior policymaking and influence on AIDS policy had been far
from exemplary. For instance, while Zuma served as a head of the
South African National AIDS Council (SANAC), this organization
turned into a rubber-stamp institution and defied its own purpose.
Zuma personally put together a colorful performance in front of the
Union Building, during which the HIV-infected teenagers cheerfully
claimed that despite their seropositive status, they had been healthy,
happy, and productive. This performance intended to lure those
members of the parliament, who, like Barbara Hogan and Pregs
Govender, expressed distrust in the official health policy. While
defending himself against the rape charges, Zuma offered highly
controversial insights about his particular choices in preventing from
getting infected with HIV. This blunder prompted a famous South
African cartoonist Zapiro to draw Zuma‘s satirical character with a
showerhead protruding from his cranium.
Mbeki, of course, is not the only leader who heavily influenced
domestic health policies. George Bush, Kofi Annan, Yoweri
2

See Gaffen 2010

4

Museveni, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula da Silva, and Vladimir
Putin put their stamp on the HIV/AIDS campaigns and initiatives in a
variety of ways. Yet, as Evan Liberman insightfully observed, we
often tend to attribute the success and failure in HIV/AIDS policies to
those individuals, whose ―presidencies postdated aggressive action on
HIV/AIDS.‖3 Thus, attributing the development (or stagnation) of
national HIV/AIDS policies to leadership as primary explanatory
variable is not always warranted. Simply put, pointing fingers at some
leaders‘ policy triumphs, failures, mistakes, or breakthroughs is not a
compelling explanation.
If not solely individual and personal, what factors drove these
strange approaches to a seemingly straightforward and technical
HIV/AIDS policy as promoted by various international agencies? A
broad range of variables can feasibly appear on the list of potential
explanations. The legacies of the apartheid, the rise of neoliberal
governmentality, the lack of proper disease identification and
statistical data, the overwhelming burden of other problems, and
simply the lack of health care professionals could feasibly contribute
to the state‘s inability to respond to the epidemic in accordance with
the international recommendations. Not surprisingly, many policy
articles and edited volumes either blend all these variables into a single
3

Lieberman 2009: 140

5

explanation, or toil to sort out their distinct effects on the HIV/AIDS
policy.4 In order not to get lost in the gamut of all these accounts, it is
useful to take a step back and remind ourselves that HIV/AIDS goes
well beyond any ordinary health crisis. The scope and nature of threat
pushes domestic elites to realize that the physical survival of
population as well as the future of the state as autonomous political
organization are at stake. In this context, curbing HIV/AIDS becomes
a question of ―ontological security.‖ This demands that elites view
what needs to be done to curb HIV/AIDS from the vantage point of
their conception of common good. Moreover, from an outset of my
research, I observed that that in South African the resistance to the
core international HIV/AIDS guidelines happened during the time
when the country‘s political and cultural elite actively sought to find,
or build, a new social purpose – a conception of common good served
by the post-apartheid state. This project examines whether or not this
plausible connection indeed should be considered as an explanation for
cross-national variation of HIV/AIDS policies.

ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

4

For a recent example of an eclectic approach, see Ndinga-Muvumba and Pharaoh
2008.

6

My dissertation contributes to the study of deep-seated and socially
legitimate conception of common good served by state (e.g. ―social
purpose‖), examining its effects on the content of national responses to
policy crises, such as rapid spread of emerging infectious diseases.
Domestic policy-makers (the extant elite in-group) may interpret the
crucial questions of public policy through the conceptual lenses of the
common good they embody. Providing common good means to
address such core policy issues as how to frame the provision of a
particular public good, which populations should benefit or be
excluded from the consumption of public good, and who gets to
participate in shaping the policy. The strong societal agreement about
conception of common good can potentially shape the overall
domestic policy environment and even dominate it. In this case wider
audiences are likely to perceive and support the official policies as
inherently unproblematic. In terms of theoretical development, today
we have an insightful literature to build on, especially the work of
John Gerard Ruggie, Christian Reus-Smit, and Rawi Abdelal.5
Today intergovernmental organizations and professional health
community play increasingly important role in formulating
sophisticated policies, providing expertise and service. In this context,

5

Abdelal and Ruggie 2009: 151; Johnston 2005: 1032-1033; Abdelal 2001: 1; see
also Reus-Smit 1999: 31; Ruggie 1982: 198.

7

international prescriptions become almost universally recognized as
instrumental to improve domestic policies, including public health.
Under certain circumstances this can lead to policy convergence. 6
Under a different set of circumstances, a strong domestic commitment
to the particular conceptions of common good might politicize
international public policy, or even become hostile to it. In this
research project I examine how, why and with what consequences
social purpose affected domestic adoption of the external best case
practices, guidelines, and recommendations. Answering this question
is helpful to explain variation in cross-national responses to the
emerging infectious diseases, otherwise attributed to a plurality of
situational and individual-level factors. In this dissertation I use the
metaphor of ―filtering‖ which indicates the domestic selection of and
change in the internationally prescribed substantive components of the
health policy. Rather than testing a set of particular hypotheses this
project endeavors to document and map out various ways how social
purpose factors in the provision of public good to be delivered in the
domestic arenas. Ascertaining the explanatory power of social
purpose is relevant not only to explain the kinds of actions the existing
elite (in-group) considers appropriate, but also to take stock of the

6

On the policy convergence thesis, see Drezner 2001. On the production of global
public goods at transnational arena, see Ruggie 2004.

8

broader policy environment which this conception of social purpose
underpins.
Why HIV/AIDS? Presumably there are several policy issueareas which might be profoundly influenced by intervening social
purpose. First, HIV/AIDS is a very special case. It is argued here that
the spread of HIV/AIDS threatens the very existence of the state, the
physical survival of their populations, and inhibits necessary
prerequisites for general well-being. All this makes the antiretroviral
treatment a fundamental common good, providing which is likely to be
mediated by the broader country-contingent conceptions of common
good as expressed in elite‘s political obligations and legitimized
among wider public. Today very few political leaders would deny that
curbing HIV/AIDS is connected to some broader political, economic,
and cultural concerns.
Second, there are clear international policy guidelines and set
of international best practices, which allow us to establish how
HIV/AIDS policy should look like domestically. Breaking down the
general HIV/AIDS policy in a set of core components and indicators
allows to increase the number of observations and make more detailed
claims about the impact of social purpose on the health policy as
transferred into domestic political contexts. The international
9

consensus urges domestic political leaders to provide a particular
biomedical solution (Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Therapy, HAART,
most commonly referred to as antiretrovirals—ARVs), to commit to
the principle of universality of access that everybody should benefit
from the consumption of public good, and to ensure a meaningful
inclusion of international actors, private sector, and civil society for a
mutual productive improvement of the public policy. All these
components either in combination, or individually, may turn the global
consensus is a potentially contested policy, and may result in
observable policy variations at cross-national level.
To evaluate these ideas, my dissertation empirically examines
how, why and with what consequences the strong commitment to the
newly emerging social purpose in Russia and South Africa politicized
and sometimes challenged the external best case practices, guidelines,
and recommendations in regard to the HIV/AIDS treatment
(antiretroviral therapy). My argument proceeds in several steps. First, I
trace how major international health, developmental, and financial
organizations came to envision the HIV/AIDS treatment as a
fundamental common good to be provided by states. I document the
key components of this vision and devise a set of indicators
operationalizing the global HIV/AIDS consensus (independent
10

variable). Second, my dissertation offers a generalizable model of
social purpose (intervening variable), traces how domestic political
elites constructed their conception of common good and made it
attractive to wider audiences to influence domestic policy
environment. Third, utilizing a previously devised set of indicators of
global health policy, I design a structured, focused comparison of the
domestic HIV/AIDS policy responses in Russia and South Africa
(dependent variable). I demonstrate how governments in both states
changed the content of the prescribed international policy in
accordance with the socially legitimate conception of common good as
embraced by political elites and accepted among wider audiences.
Fourth, in my concluding chapters I sharpen my theoretical focus by
locating social purpose into three causal mechanisms of policy transfer
and summarize the effects of social purpose on public health policy.
External influences, coalition-building and learning each have strong
explanatory logic of how external prescription of change and
innovation are adopted domestically to solve local problems. I assert
that the strength and consistency in political elites‘ commitment to the
formulated social purpose may alter or sharpen the theoretical
predictions of policy transfer, otherwise being viable baseline
explanations for transformation of the international policy in domestic
politics.
11

My empirical findings strongly suggest that in responding to
the domestic epidemic of HIV/AIDS the key decision-makers in both
countries have significantly transformed the international standardized
policy prescriptions to the pandemic in accordance with the social
purpose‘s content. Rather than treating the epidemic as a pressing
public health issue, Russia‘s Sovereign Democracy prompted the
government to respond to the domestic epidemic as the issue of
demographic survival. The imperatives of African Renaissance
reframed the HIV/AIDS epidemic as an African developmental
problem to be best addressed by African solutions. In both countries,
these policy choices resulted in the adverse consequences for public
health and prompted a protracted contestation among various state and
non-state actors around the principles of the desired public health
policies. While I am not claiming that social purpose to be treated as
the single explanation of the variation in national responses to the
emerging infectious diseases, on balance it tells us an important and
previously overlooked story about the political determinants of
domestic policy responses.
Table 1.1 Variables and cases

WHY HIV/AIDS?
12

The global spread of HIV/AIDS raised pivotal concerns about how to
control the epidemic both at international and domestic levels. The
baseline consensual policy measure revolves around the provision of
anti-retroviral therapy, which international actors came to understand
as a common good. More specifically, the global consensus indicated
governmental responsibility to provide the antiretroviral treatment,
ensure the universality of access, and bring all relevant stakeholders in
the policy-making process. Antiretrovirals or ARVs is a blanket name
for different combination of drugs and therapeutic cocktails. In this
study the global consensus on the HIV/AIDS treatment policy is the
independent variable, which is disaggregated into set of three general
components and nine more specific policy indicators (listed in Table
1.2). From the empirical standpoint, my dissertation contributes to the
current debates about the cross-national variation in responses to the
emerging infectious diseases in the context of health crises, which
transcend boundary, authority, and capacity of nation-states. In this
section I briefly operationalize international consensus on the
HIV/AIDS policy and spell out how it compares to domestic variation
of HIV/AIDS policy in Russian and South African public policies. At
this point I do not discuss how and why the domestic conceptions of
common good factor in domestic health policy variations.
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The stress on universal treatment and health as a fundamental
human right followed the Alma-Ata spirit, yet was undermined by the
lack of effective biomedical solutions.7 The invention of Highly Active
Antiretroviral Treatment (HAART) in 1996 stimulated the
international consensus on HIV/AIDS treatment as a common good.
Although curbing AIDS obviously requires a variety of health
interventions, the biomedical solution is a necessity in order to have a
set of policy initiatives with tangible indicators of success. The
lessening prices of life-saving medications reinforced the importance
of ARVs as a consensual biomedical intervention. The dropping costs
of treatment made it possible to provide treatment almost universally,
without resorting to any severe restrictive measures. The simplicity of
the fixed-dose combination regimen made it relatively simple for
governments to procure and distribute these drugs. 8 It also enabled
international health bodies to provide the uniform technical expertise
and advice. Simultaneously, the new generation of AIDS organizations
began assisting countries with limited resources to provide treatment
and motivating them. Thus, the biomedical innovation of 1996 flagged
the emergence of ARVs as a key policy solution, conjoined with the
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stress on the universality of access to treatment, and necessitated the
involvement of all the relevant stakeholders in formulating and
implementing the domestic policy. In other words, without the ARVs
there is no clear policy baseline.
Breaking down the general HIV/AIDS policy realm in a set of
components and indicators allows ascertaining how this policy looks
like and what it is not supposed to be. The first core component of the
international policy is to provide the antiretrovirals to mitigate a public
health crisis. If policy-makers do not respond to HIV/AIDS crisis as a
public health problem, they are likely to be at variance with the
international vision of treatment as a particular public good.
Substituting or skewing basic policy response by giving a political
priority to other issue-frames, such as demographic crisis, military
security, human rights, poverty and inequality, property rights, is the
first signal that the HIV/AIDS policy got invested with situational and
local conceptions of common good. A strong adherence to any
alternative issue-framing choices may potentially lead to further
deviations from the international consensus, including a public denial
of the epidemic, underscoring the uniqueness of the domestic
characteristics of the epidemic (see Indicator 1a), attempts to enforce
various substandard treatment protocols (see Indicator 1b), or simply
15

inaction in securing the price-saving generic pharmaceutical products
(see Indicator 1c). Whether or not these alternate frames are ―justified‖
to meet the specific conditions on the ground will be discussed later.
The second core component is the universality of access to
treatment. It intends to stress both the moral imperative and economic
cost-efficiency in providing access to ARVs to all the infected and
vulnerable populations and thus reflects the notion that nobody should
be intentionally excluded from the consumption of public good.
Additionally, prioritizing the access to treatment even to the negatively
constructed populations is cost-efficient as it lowers the virus
transmission to the generalized population and thus will likely to
diminish public health spending in the long run. At the face value,
universality is very costly. Yet with the technological breakthroughs in
biomedicines achieved in 1996 even a small increase of average yearly
costs of treatment allowed to increase the number of treated patients
significantly. Since the costs of treatment are becoming relatively low,
scaling-up is attainable even in the countries with lower GDPs. The
first potential challenge to the global policy consensus consists of
policy-makers choosing to provide only a selective access to treatment,
either excluding any vulnerable subpopulation or, in contrast,
including any societal group at the expense of the others (see Indicator
16

2a). The second potential challenge is to resist ―scaling up‖ (see
Indicator 2b). Third, the notion of universality presumes that providing
the access to treatment will go together with aggressive prevention
campaigns. While the appropriate balance between these two health
interventions has been long in the center of controversy, at this point
suffice to say that prevention should not become a dominant substitute
for the antiretroviral therapy, nor should it be completely ignored as
irrelevant for curbing HIV/AIDS (see Indicator 2c).
The third core component of the internationally recommended
policy is building partnerships between governments and all relevant
stakeholders. The idea that the most effective health policy responses
depend on inclusive participation in health policy formulation and
implementation underpins this recommendation. This recommendation
is especially relevant for the countries that either lack requisite
financial and infrastructural capacities to curb the epidemic on their
own, or require assistance to increase the capacity of public health care
sector, institutionalize and routinize financial flows, or have to
improve service quality and outreach. For the purposes of this
dissertation, the group of relevant stakeholders is analytically divided
to private sector, international organizations, and domestic civil
society sector, including various issue-advocacy and health service
17

groups. When governments start selectively including or excluding
certain stakeholder partners which get to participate in policy process,
it signals that the international consensus on partnership becomes
invested with situational and local characteristics.
From the health policy perspective, the described HIV/AIDS
policy was desirable as it provided both international and domestic
policy-makers with clear [technocratic] policy goals of how many
people should receive treatment within certain time period, as well as
straightforward guidelines what the standardized treatment protocol is
and how to manage the logistical control of drugs. 9 It was attainable
because the post-1996 ARV treatment indeed proved to be very
effective and increasingly cheaper a biomedical invention supported
by some uniform biomedical expertise and in various forms sponsored
by international health, financial, and developmental organizations and
pharmaceutical sector, especially its generic-producing segment.
Although international health community eventually elevated these
three core policy components to a common intersubjectively held
understanding, for a long time they were either actively contested, or
simply ignored. In the second chapter I trace global convergence
around HIV/AIDS as a specific public policy realm and discuss how
the international actors set to agree on them. Despite some occasional
9
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relapses in observing the mainstream approach (for instance,
protecting human rights and reintroduction of restrictive measures,
such as travel bans for persons with HIV), governments commonly
follow the global consensus. All this does not mean that the
international consensus as I describe it here will remain intact forever,
but it was clearly more or less attainable and desirable for the period I
am interested in.
Table 1.2 The HIV/AIDS policy baseline indicators

SOCIAL PURPOSE: A BRIEF DISCUSSION
Social purpose as a concept
Social purpose is the core concept of this dissertation. I define social
purpose as a socially legitimate and politically contingent conception
of common good. Since the unit of analysis is nation-state, the
adjectives ―national‖ and ―social‖ are used somewhat interchangeably.
This definition builds on a conventional constructivist insight that no
conception of common good can exist independently from political
actors which develop and uphold it. Thus, the primary focus is on
those social groups which are adequately positioned to develop
politically meaningful conceptions of common good and can commit
19

significant amount of resources to act on it (domestic political elites).
Committing to social purpose reaffirms elite‘s sense of self-efficacy
and self-esteem; casting it as a necessary condition for the country‘s
sustainability makes elites indispensable for the country‘s survival. On
the other hand, not providing this common good might jeopardize their
reputation and political survival. Of course, elites do not exist in a
political and social vacuum: they are likely to face domestic actors
which embrace alternative conceptions of common good. As the
members of extant elite strongly attach the conception of common
good to its own identity, reputation, sense of worthiness, and political
fate, its opponents are most likely to be designated as the Other with a
spate of negative characteristics attached. Since they challenge the
advocated conception of common good, the Other is cast as
undermining the country‘s political sustainability and survivability.
Since social legitimacy of social purpose notably depends on its public
acceptance, the further attention goes beyond the exclusive emphasis
on elites (for details on three types of agency see Chapter 3). In sum,
social purpose describes the broader interactive policy environment,
through which the global flow of policy initiatives and
recommendations is filtered.
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Social purpose should not be confused with the notion of state
ideology. Contrary to state ideology, social purpose does not exist
independently from contesting political actors, their identities, and
outside of the contending domestic discourses about common good.
This also implies that its causal effects, while strong in the short-term,
might be not lasting in the long haul. This explains why scholars and
political observers who tried to ―fit‖ Putin‘s and Mbeki‘s political
regimes in the tenets of any universal ideology soon realized the
futility of the task. These political leaders‘ behavior and policy choices
clearly fell outside the ideological divisions and were not informed by
them without strong qualifications.
What elements count as substantive components comprising a
social purpose in a given country, where do they come from, and how
they become politically meaningful? The earlier (and perhaps still
dominant) literature describes domestic elites‘ political obligations as
being attached to the value of the ethnic self. Thus, national purpose is
equated with the goals of ethnic nationalism, i.e. ―a principle which
holds that the political and national unit should be congruent.‖10
Another set of literature stipulated possibility that ―the reasons that
historical agents hold for organizing their political life into centralized,
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autonomous political units‖11 may go well beyond the value of
maintaining an ethnic state. It indicates that specific goals for the
nation can be attached to the self, which is a result of a more
contingent political debate.12 In South African context, for instance,
the ruling elite (the African National Congress, ANC) maintained the
inclusive South African identity, trying not to politicize it along the
ethnic lines (although it was frequently viewed as the Xhosadominated). This dissertation follows the latter approach, as it allows
registering wider variation in proposed national purposes, especially
when politicization of ethnicity is not available for elites as a nationbuilding option due to complex ethnic composition.
The starting point of social purpose formation is the
exogenous shock –the collapse of the previous political regime or the
whole international system, sometimes aggravated by protracted
transitional periods. During these transitional periods, political elites
and smaller sub-national policy entrepreneurs (following Brudny, I
define them as ―articulated audiences‖) embark on searching,
formulating, and later disseminating a new conception of common
good for the country. In Chapter 3 I discuss in greater details how to
turn social purpose from a significantly underexplored factor to a

11
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Reus-Smit 1999: 31.
Abdelal 2006: 698.
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variable, which may potentially explain variation in the content of
cross-national domestic responses to the international policy
prescriptions. In the next section I give an overview of social purpose
as an explanation.

Social purpose as an explanation
While finding core substantive components might be seen as relatively
easy inductive work, other aspects of social purpose, including its
explanatory power, are much less theorized and demonstrated.
Problems arise when scholars start making broad claims about social
purpose‘s causal impact or its lack. The wide-spread research practice
is the underspecified conjecturing about social purpose‘s impact on
behavior.13 Often, studies cognizant of the problem of tautology
remain somewhat indeterminate and evasive about making specific
and falsifiable claims. This approach comes short of explicit
discussion about causality, and merely chronicles the emergence of
social purpose as an independent variable and its loose temporal
connection to dependent variables (hence stress on conjecturing). Both
in Russia and South Africa there are many specific public policies,
which might have been profoundly influenced by the emerging social
13

See for instance, Hopf 2002, pp. 81–82; 209–210.

23

purpose. In Russia, for instance, its internal political commitment to
reestablish the great power status stimulated its more assertive role in
creating regional alliances to balance NATO, partnership with Iran in
the nuclear sphere, and even a regional war with Georgia.14 In South
African context, the elite‘s commitment to provide continental
leadership was central in emergence of the New Economic Partnership
for African Development (NEPAD). In the cases above social purpose
remains compounded with the subsequent political choices, leaving
almost no space for considering behavioral alternatives. Descriptively
illustrative, this account can benefit from stronger research design.
First, examining the explanatory role of social has to keep
social purpose and policy outcomes separate. To deal with these
issues in this dissertation I start my work empirically examining how
HIV/AIDS treatment policy looks without the impact of social purpose
(at the international arena, see Chapter 2) and with such an impact (the
structured focused comparison the domestic HIV/AIDS policies in two
selected countries). In both countries social purpose was formulated
separately from the international standardized recommendations about
the HIV/AIDS treatment and for the most part prior to the policy
entering domestic arenas. Therefore it is possible to separate social
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purpose as an intervening variable from its presence in the domestic
policy of treatment as a dependent variable. Second, and more
importantly, I demonstrate how distinct graspable substantive
components of social purpose impact on the specific components and
indicators of HIV/AIDS policy (my dependent variable in process of
HIV/AIDS policy transfer). Thus, in general, doing so will enable us
not only to claim, but to demonstrate and sort out the constitutive
impact of social purpose on public policies. The summary of my
empirical findings is given in the Table 1.3.
Second, examining the explanatory role of social has to capture
variation in measuring (ranking) social purpose. In chapter 3 I
delineate between absent, fractured, restrained, and consolidated
rankings of social purpose. This ranking builds on Abdelal‘s insights
that social purpose is has to be examined not only by revealing its
content, but also by the degree of contestation around it. His National
Purpose in the World Economy tentatively delineated between absence
and presence of such political contestation.
Elites habitually legitimize a new social purpose by spreading
the belief that country‘s political sustainability depends on providing
it. In essence, this activity shapes domestic policy environment,
making some policies to be held as ―natural‖ and self-evident, while
25

alternative behavioral choices to be either delegitimized, not
considered as viable alternative options, or even chastised as criminal
among the wider audiences. As a result, for the political opponents of
the extant elite it will be more difficult to effectively challenge and
change the enacted public policies. At the same time, wider audiences
might inherently disagree with the promoted conception of common
good, but for a variety of reasons might conform to it and if chooses to
dispute it publicly, does so in a very subdued manner. At the margins,
other sub-elite groups and political parties keep advocating radically
different set of political obligations, engrained in a different set of
values.
Third, this study of social purpose directly responds to the
current empirical debates (often very heated) whether or not the
official formulation of social purposes is simply a public relations
stunt, a strategic popular eye-grabbing device with a little real meaning
beyond it. Even though the discourses of the African Renaissance and
Sovereign democracy were deployed by key political leaders and their
advisers, many observers remained very skeptical about whether these
concepts had any profound policy implications. Peter Vale and Sipho
Maseko, for instance, questioned African Renaissance impact on
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public policy.15 Similarly, the liberal critics of Russia‘s current
political regime flatly claimed that Sovereign Democracy was a thin
veil over Putin‘s autocratic turn, institutional underdevelopment,
clientelism, and corruption.16 In principle I agree that simply stating
social purpose to be politically relevant is neither irrefutable, nor
compelling a claim. In my empirical chapters I go into further details
how and why social purpose is more than a mere propaganda.
Fourth, obviously many factors continue to inform and shape
domestic HIV/AIDS politics. In Russian case, for instance, the issues
of state capacity, state efficiency, and corruption might and do explain
a lot. In Africa, these factors might include the incapacitating role of
traditional patriarchy, the dependence on international financial
resources, the lack of political and economic commitments, and the
inability to design and implement long-term treatment and prevention
programs.17 This list, of course, can be easily expanded to include
many other regional and national factors. Since it is not easy to fold all
these diverse factors into one explanation, the literature often questions
whether a parsimonious explanation is warranted. A typical article
from Social Science and Medicine, for example, evades
generalizations and talks only about very specific variables even when
15
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looking at the regional dimension of public health in general.18 The
explanation offered in this dissertation seeks to overcome this
limitation and cover previously overlooked domestic determinants of
HIV/AIDS politics.
Finally, in terms of health policy, strong societal agreement
about what constitutes the ―common good‖ served by state (e.g.,
―social purpose‖) under certain circumstances profoundly influences
the overall domestic policy environment, which might politicize
international public policy, or even become hostile to it. My core
theoretical argument suggests that social purpose informs how
domestic policy-makers evaluate the benefits of adopting international
recommendations and underpins the kinds of actions domestic policy
environments are likely to sanction. More specifically, it affects
decisions how to frame the provision of a particular public good
(treatment in the case of health policy), who should benefit or be
excluded from the consumption of public good, and who gets to
participate in shaping the policy. On balance, however, I do not claim
that social purpose is superior to any other explanations of how, why
and to what extent the global consensus on the HIV/AIDS policy was
adopted in Russia and South Africa. In the relevant empirical chapters
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I will briefly discuss which health policy indicators are not explained
by social purpose and why.

Social purpose and constructivism
Since my research project sprung from the constructivist turn in
International Relations, in this section I spell out how studying social
purpose contributes to the [still] burgeoning literature on norm
diffusion derived from constructivist international relations. In fact,
social purpose is an interesting and underexplored dimension of
identity. Probing it also contributes to our understanding of what
constitutes domestic logic of appropriateness.
A significant portion of constructivist literature asserts that the
process of norm diffusion in one way or another is driven by norm
congruence. Different accounts explore building purposeful norm
congruence by means of framing, evoking prior similar norms, as well
as grafting, pruning, and transplantation.19 Intentional and purposeful
match-making, captured in these gardening metaphors, may lead to
either radical, or partial local norm displacement. In turn, normative
clash, if not alleviated, can lead to domestic opposition to an
international norm. Amitav Acharya called attention to the so-called
19
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―localization,‖ a process of an active reconstruction of a foreign norm
to meet domestic standards, which are part of legitimate domestic
order: ―… processes of reconstitution to make an outside norm
congruent with a preexisting local normative order… in which some
key characteristics of the preexisting normative order are retained
rather than displaced wholesale.‖20 Yet as Ted Hopf correctly
indicates, making claims about normative congruence or mismatch
requires a solid theory about what constitutes the domestic
appropriateness and why. 21 Without this theorizing, it would be
tempting to select on dependent variable and simply ―assign‖ some
domestic political, economic, or social circumstances as the factors
determining this appropriateness. In addressing this analytical gap, the
examination of social purpose helps establishing what constitutes the
legitimate social order in a given polity and provides the framework of
cross-national and cross-regional comparisons. More specifically, it
gives us conceptual lenses to answer two interrelated questions. First,
what specific set of specific obligations in providing common good
elites uphold as the core political and social values, i.e., it specifies
what normative features which reconstitute a foreign norm. Second, to
what degree there is a societal consensus (measured via ranking social
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purpose) and how deeply it is embedded in the collective articulations.
Thus, the examination of social purpose helps ascertaining what
constitutes general domestic appropriateness, which under different
conditions may frustrate or facilitate norm diffusion.
Another broad strand of constructivist research on international
norms broadly indicated that bringing domestic norms and policies in
consistence with international prescriptions is linked to domestic
actors‘ identity.22 Michael Zürn and Jeffrey Checkel, for instance,
noted that identity can either facilitate norm diffusion, or hinder it.23
Yet, in the same International Organization volume, Alastair Iain
Johnston admitted that identity remained too blunt of an instrument
and was often used to make sweeping claims without specifying the
concrete ways how identity can make a difference. 24 In general, it is
feasible that external norms, policies, and policy recommendations are
strongly associated with the political imagery of the Other, are less
likely to be adopted at the domestic level. In this context, we may
conjecture that identity as an intervening or explanatory variable can
filter international norms, providing a political rationale to challenge,
resist, cherry-pick, or adopt some best case practices if compatible
with it.
22
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Acharya started exploring this relation in greater depth, noting
that for successful norm diffusion ―[t]here must be willing and credible
local actors (insider proponents). These actors should not be seen as
―stooges‖ of outside forces.‖ 25 This analysis definitely invites us to
think about the impact of self-Other dichotomy on the process of norm
diffusion. The question persists: How, why and to what extent some
domestic proponents of change are viewed as foreign-inspired Others,
while other actors that pursue policy change are received more
favorably? Moreover, in his model local elites become active
borrowers of foreign ideas and norms in order to fulfill the domestic
demand of boosting legitimacy. But are domestic political elites
always likely to be unconditionally supported when they pursue this
kind of change? In other words, the question here is about the
determinants of domestic actors getting treated and publicly perceived
as either the credible upholders of local values and identity, or as
―agents‖ of outside forces. As the notion of social purpose in large part
is based on the political imagery of who the contending political actors
are (see the previous section), I assert that domestic self-Other
dichotomy generated by social purpose can be helpful in providing an
analytical, rather than purely empirical, response to the question how,
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why and to what extent identity might factor in norm diffusion
processes.
Another version of self-Other dichotomy is implicit in the
socialization research program. Socialization is a compliance with
outside norms in the context when entering international political
communities, intergovernmental institutions, or a new regulative
regime is highly desirable.26 In essence, socialization is an ideal casescenario, when domestic actors take legitimacy of international norms
and practices as granted and start emulating them instantly. 27 This
analysis was exceptionally successful in empirically explaining how
and why Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries eventually
adopted the European Union‘s policies in the process of democratic
transition, as they envisioned themselves as a part of European self.
While it is conceivable that CEE would not see its principal
norm-giver as the Other, it is less likely, first, that regional hegemon
can find an external Self with the same ease. Here I argue that studying
social purpose (as a promising dimension of identity) can potentially
explain global or regional leaders‘ behavior in regard to taking
external norms. Second, this explanation has a hard time capturing the
26
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potential dual role of domestic leaders as both norm-givers and normtakers. This explanation generally tends to gloss over the relationship
between multiple domestic agents of change and may overlook
broader political processes behind multiple entrepreneurs struggle to
spread their interpretation of norm.

Social purpose and identity
It can be argued that social purpose in fact is an interesting and
underexplored dimension of identity, as well as the determinant of the
domestic logic of appropriateness. My theoretical analysis of social
purpose builds on a conventional constructivist insight that no
conception of common good can exist independently from domestic
political actors. Thus social purpose is likely to be based on the
political imagery of who the contending political actors are. When
actors strongly define themselves through their commitment to
common good, they also compete with other groups promoting
different conception of common good. This generates self-Other
dichotomies, which can be found in the discursive formations.
My presentation here overcomes still existing tendency to
essentialize and reify identity. For example, preexisting patriarchal
gender norms, intolerance to religious adherence, or xenophobia to
34

migrants in host societies may be considered to imply inherent identity
positions with fundamental and universally recurring political
implications. My theoretical and empirical analysis, on the contrary,
presents identity as politically contingent way for domestic elites to
assert their self-efficacy and self-esteem through their commitment to
common good, which later may or may not strongly inform domestic
policy choices.
On the other hand, many previous accounts of identity
generated sometimes intuitive, sometimes almost trivial findings. It is
not (or should not be) surprising, for example, that negatively
constructed target populations would fight against stigma,
discrimination, and injustice. Consider, for instance, the Lesbian, Gay
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) community opposing the ban on
the same-sex marriage in the United States, or People Living with
HIV/AIDS (PLWA) promoting HIV/AIDS awareness in the Russian
Federation or South Africa. In other words, previous studies of social
purpose remained somewhat limited to examining how actors define
the purposes of the existing in-group relevant to the kinds of actions
the group considered appropriate.28
The final general consideration concerns studying identity
politics as related to the HIV/AIDS issue-area. This dissertation also
28
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calls for innovative ways to look at identity in the context of
HIV/AIDS. So far, studying identity politics as related to HIV/AIDS
issue-area was limited to investigating how policy makers constructed
the individual characteristics of vulnerable sub-populations and how
this construction affected public-health interventions. This research
was closely connected to international health activism, aimed at
overcoming stigma as related to the etiology of HIV/AIDS. The
prescriptive outcome of this research agenda was to devise policies
boosting the global agenda of human rights to health and access to the
affordable medicines for anybody who needs them. So far, only a few
scholars delved in exploring the links between national HIV/AIDS
policies and variables loosely resembling what might be identity-like
factors on a national level.29 Ascertaining the role and place of social
purpose in HIV/AIDS politics provides a framework for taking stock
of the factors which shaped the commitment to fight HIV/AIDS, as
insights for the future of sustainable and robust partnerships between
governments and the proliferating domestic and transnational nonstate
organizations.

A FURTHER LOOK AT CASES AND COMPARISONS
29
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This study examines South Africa and Russia. Since this study is an
exploratory account of social purpose, first and foremost I choose my
cases on the expectation that social purpose indeed influences public
policy and generates tangible implications for public health. This
insight builds on those scholars, who tend to claim that identity-related
variables in Russia and South Africa are of special political import.
This study pushes this insight further: It tries to explain how and why
identity informs and inhibits certain kind of policy choices, while not
compounding identity with subsequent policy choices. Here I did not
consciously select on the dependent variable, although my empirical
results show that public policies in both countries got diverted from
best international practices. In fact I claim that social purpose in
principle might help implementing global policy initiatives
domestically.
Second, during the 1990s both countries underwent major
transition from post-communist and post-colonial regimes, which
challenged elites to articulate new conceptions of common good.
Among the universe of transitional cases, these two countries do not
qualify for the unconditional ―embrace of the West,‖ nor for a
complete ―aloofness‖ from or hatred to it. This makes them standing
out of the majority of other post-communist and post-colonial states.
Furthermore, I consciously select two countries from different regions,
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continents with an expectation of the content of national purpose in
Russia and South Africa to be very different. This will allow me to put
social purpose in comparative perspective and theorize its causal
importance not resorting to some contingent explanations.
Moreover, examining South Africa and Russia can tell us
important things about social purpose as well. In the recent years both
countries have undergone the processes of dramatic political transition
with considerable political struggle and traceable political discussions
about the nature of common good. These discussions were consciously
triggered by extant political elites. Thus, these two cases give ample
material to examine the formation of social purpose in greater details.
This part of my dissertation work helps expanding traditional
academic focus placed on subnational, smaller identity entrepreneurs
and social movements as the agents of change to the exploration of
elites‘ purposeful attempts to link the idea of the nation to specific
political goals and prescriptions pinned on the vision of self and the
Other.
Looking at Russia and South Africa through the conceptual
lenses of social purpose can significantly contribute to the existing
explanations of the HIV/AIDS politic. I have started this chapter
discussing President Thabo Mbeki‘s allegedly imposing presence in
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South African health policy. I made a case that we can benefit from
reexamining of a broader spectrum of HIV/AIDS policies pursued
under Mbeki‘s leadership. Let us glance at the Russian case.
Russian scholars tend to pinpoint the broad processes of
securitization dominating the Russian health agenda. 30 The nub of this
view is correct. The question persists, however, where this
securitization is coming from. One explanation points out the
Millennium Summit and the United Nations General Assembly
Security Session (UNGASS) as major driving forces behind this
reformulation.31 However, securitization is not necessarily linked to
the global prescriptions and formulations. First, the links between
HIV/AIDS and military (state) security have been the focal concerns
of many leaders even before the human security perspective gained its
global momentum. For instance, Yoweri Museveni‘s fear to lose
Ugandan military force prompted him to learn from Cuban example of
early detection of and response to the disease. 32 Second, securitization
of AIDS—whether or not states have genuine concerns for the military
preparedness—may become a discursive tool governments with
limited resources use to put the issue higher on international agenda in
30

Sarah E. Mendelson, Julie Sawyer and Celeste A. Wallander, The Security
Implications of HIV/AIDS in Russia, PONARS Policy Memo No. 245, February
2002
31
For the broader account of the links between HIV/AIDS and security, see, Garrett
2005; McInnes and Rushton 2010
32
See, for instance, Behrman 2004: 43, 113.
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order to attract international attention, financial resources and
logistical assistance.33 This means that the security frame is used
strategically with the realistic expectation to gain certain benefits, even
though getting funding from major international donors in not
contingent on framing HIV and security issue. Thus, reexamining
HIV/AIDS policies in Russia is still of importance. In Chapter 6 I will
demonstrate that the Russian case of AIDS securitization was an
instance of deploying its historically contingent social purpose.34
In this case selection, I will hold constant two important things.
First, since 1996 policy-makers in both countries had an abundant
exposure to the global consensus on HIV/AIDS and the set of
international best practices. In other words, exposure to the
international best practices does not vary. Both in Russia and South
Africa the epidemic unraveled after its devastating epidemiological
consequences became obvious elsewhere. In essence, they are
―second-wave countries‖ which can learn about the successful choices
with very tangible results of the ―first-wave countries,‖ including
Brazil, Uganda, and Thailand.35
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See, for instance, Altman 2003: 422.
The general warning here is again not to conflate a generic international process of
issue-framing and a set of specific domestic responses. In this sense, I strongly
disagree with Sjöstedt‘s (2008) argument about securitization of AIDS in Russia.
35
The caveat here is that I am not talking about the contained versus generalized
pandemic, see for instance, Schneider and Moodie 2002. The consequences of these
countries‘ decision to promote free and universal access to the ARVs are succinctly
34
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Second, both countries possess significant but not
extraordinary material capacities. This is important since wealthier
countries potentially can act as leaders, norm-givers at the
international arena. Higher health spending, more developed
infrastructure, and better pharmaceutical sector can lead to the
diversity of policy options. Less affluent countries which lack the
requisite amount of material resources, suffer from insufficient
technical expertise, and do not benefit from an advanced
pharmaceutical sector, are more likely to act as followers, norm-takers
at the international arena. Where does it leave us in terms of Russia
and South Africa? Both are middle income countries; both are less
dependent on the international community as compared to any heavily
indebted, failing, or failed state. At the same time, comparing to
Thailand, Brazil, and India, neither of them possesses the requisite
material characteristics so that they can convincingly launch a
successful large-scale independent challenge and contribute to the
international consensus. Russia is in especially precarious position.
Despite its temporary petrowealth, the general health care
infrastructure and medical-industrial capacities have been constantly
deteriorating. The rapidly increasing governmental spending in most

described in the relevant academic literature and professional brochures. Without
further qualifications, they have been touted as success stories and model cases.
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cases lagged behind the need to renovate the infrastructure, purchase
up-to-date medical equipment, and tangibly improve the health care
services (majority of people remain highly dissatisfied with their
quality). South Africa, while boasting some degree of wealth,
especially compared to the rest of the continent, has feeble public
health sector with dismal health care capacities. Although both
countries are expected to be sensitive to the external recommendations
and assistance, even in the context of the lack of direct pressures, both
Russia and South Africa chose to act as international leaders in
response to HIV/AIDS. As this leadership was not founded on material
capabilities or technological advantages, it gives us at least initial
reasons to believe that domestic choices were influences by some
domestic political determinants, other than material and financial
power.

DISSERTATION STRUCTURE (THE REST OF THE ARGUMENT)
My dissertation investigates how, why and when did Russian and
South African governments challenge the international norms of the
HIV/AIDS treatment. In these two countries the generalized epidemic
occurred simultaneously with the advent of a new conception of
common good (national purpose), which domestic elites presented as
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vital for the existence and survival of the state as an autonomous
political organization. Exploring the effects of social purpose on the
adoption of global policy prescriptions and norms is novel in political
science. From the empirical standpoint, my dissertation offers a
comprehensive analysis of the political processes leading to the advent
of a consolidated and publicly accepted national purpose, as well as
the HIV/AIDS policies in Russia and South Africa. From the policy
analysis perspective, it helps understand which domestic factors can
potentially facilitate or frustrate the global governance of health crises
and why.
The dissertation structure reflects the evolving logic of the
questions asked. This introductory chapter introduces the core themes
and debates in the study of both social purpose and cross-national
HIV/AIDS politics, and gives an overview of the core argument as
substantiated in the empirical body of the dissertation. It justifies the
selection of cases, international policy issue-area, and the time-frame.
In essence, this chapter makes connections between variables, explains
the links between projects‘ various parts and introduces general
readers to the broader theoretical literatures.
International consensus on HIV/AIDS is as an independent
variable in my dissertation. In Chapter 2 I discuss the international
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view on HIV/AIDS treatment as a common good and spell out key
indicators of HIV/AIDS treatment policy. I discuss how the
independent variable looks like without social purpose factoring in it.
To do so, I historicize international approaches to AIDS policy to
establish the variance in the variable (absence/presence of the
consensus), as well as demonstrate that it heavily hinges on the
biomedical innovation of effective ARVs.
Chapter 3 defines and advances the usage of social purpose as
an analytical tool. I build on the insights originally spelled out by
Christian Reus-Smit, who conceived social (moral) purpose as a deepseated and socially legitimate ―conception of common good served by
autonomous political organization.‖36 The subsequent empirical
chapters demonstrate how Russian and South African elites formulated
and promoted their conceptions of common good. Social purpose is an
interesting but often overlooked dimension of identity, which captures
both the kinds of actions elites consider appropriate and the kinds of
actions domestic policy environments underpin. The latter explains
what kind of policies will be publicly held as ―natural‖ and selfevident and why. The overall intention of this chapter is to make social
purpose specified, valid, and analytically useful. The chapter provides
a necessary analytical framework for the following cross-national
36

Reus-Smit 1999: 31.
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comparisons of various historically and country-contingent contents of
national purpose. The minor point of the chapter is to refute the typical
claim that content of various identities/social purposes is incomparable
in principle.
Chapters 4 and 5 explore the national purposes in the Russian
Federation and South Africa separately from the HIV/AIDS policy,
using the model advanced in Chapter 3. In the context of these
empirical chapters, I do not make a claim that there is an innate,
undisputable, and long-lasting public consensus on Russian or South
African social purpose. Quite the opposite, it is likely that social
purposes in these two countries will change once extant elites fall out
of power.
Russia‘s elite (Chapter 4) strongly committed to the strong
state as an ultimate political value, emphasized the primacy of state in
economic delivery and regulation, and trumped up a vision of Russia
as a great power in global politics. All these components of common
good are sometimes subsumed under the heading of Sovereign
Democracy and attest to the revival of the autocratic myth and the
delusion of grandeur. Subsequently, Putin‘s entourage painstakingly
strove to embed this conception of common good by holding the
democratic politics of the 1990s responsible for the collapse of the
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state, loss of national self-efficacy and self-esteem. As a result, the
obsession with strong state created a policy environment, which
delegitimized liberal approaches to the looming health crisis. In South
Africa (Chapter 5) the notion of the African Renaissance gained some
political currency. In all its fuzziness (which also might be viewed as
its richness) the notion can be narrowed down to three core organizing
prescriptions. They include indigenousness (sometimes labeled as
Nativism, or Africanism) as the ideology of returning to the roots and
revitalizing the genetic resources and traditional practices;
marketization as the strategy of economic empowerment; and the quest
for shared humanity and communal solidarity interpreted as the
country‘s exceptionalism (ubuntu) in the context of globalization. I
explore how a particular proposal for nation was pinned on elite‘s selfunderstanding, linked to the broader collective understandings of the
nation, outreached to broader audiences, as well as whether elite‘s
formulation of national purpose was congruent with meanings
transmitted by the popular culture.
In both countries, social purpose significantly affected the
content of the HIV/AIDS policies. In Chapters 6 and 7 I examine the
HIV/AIDS policy and document these effects. I capture how national
policy responses challenged and ―filtered‖ the internationally
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prescribed range of choices. In other words, I document and explain
when, how and why the domestic policy choices became inconsistent
with the mainstream international health consensus. On balance, I do
not contend to explain all minute details of the domestic HIV/AIDS
policies, yet I claim that provided analysis both contributes to the
existing explanations and covers important elements of the domestic
HIV/AIDS politics not covered before. The comprehensive summary
of social purpose‘s impact on domestic HIV/AIDS policy is provided
in Table 1.3 at the end of this section.
Chapter 6 argues that Russian HIV/AIDS policies were shaped
by the deployment of the Sovereign Democracy--the historically
contingent and country-specific content of social purpose. The most
important outcomes of this impact include three broad clusters of
effects. First, the commitment to the strong state affected the general
political understanding and framing of the domestic epidemic and
linked it to the highly desired demographic security as the major tool
in having a strong state. It also impinged on the human rights
principles in providing ARVs to the key vulnerable populations and
limited the permissible role of civil society in combating against
HIV/AIDS. Second, the emphasis on the state-led development
contributed to the significant increase in public spending for healthcare
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and infectious diseases and efforts at universal and free medical
coverage, and shunning the private sector as a potential partner. Third,
bearing down on the vision of great-power status stimulated the
Kremlin to act like a donor/leader on the international arena, fend off
the expertise and resources of well-established international health
organizations, and attempting to revamp the country‘s position in the
pharmaceutical markets.
Chapter 7 argues that South African HIV/AIDS policies were
shaped by the deployment of the African Renaissance--the historically
contingent and country-specific content of social purpose. The most
important outcomes of this impact include three broad clusters of
effects. First, indigenousness (Africanism) impinged on the
standardized protocol in treatment, stimulated the production of
traditional medicines, and subsequently institutionalized their national
governance. It also contributed to the politicization and filtering the
desirable pool of partners, as well as shaping their permissible role in
curbing HIV/AIDS. Second, marketization (economic neo-liberalism)
undermined the universal rollout of the antiretrovirals in public health
sector and protected the private sector from sharing the burden of
health response. Third, exceptionalism (ubuntu) led to the general
politicization of the domestic epidemic, putting it in the context of
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colonialism. It empowered and legitimized the counter-epistemic
community of AIDS dissidents. Not only the government acted on
these core components of social purpose, but it also empowered
multiple domestic and international actors to express their radicalized
political views, as well as promote and apply their substandard
biomedical convictions.
While I see my argument about social purpose as helpful to
advance the conventional constructivists‘ take on norm diffusion, this
dissertation is more concerned with another cluster of explanations. In
Chapter 8 I will continue this discussion in the context of policy
transfer models derived from comparative examination of the Eastern
European transformation.37 To sharpen my theoretical focus this
research locates social purpose in the context of relevant literatures. I
also examine whether and to what degree my emphasis on social
purpose as an intervening variable is robust to major alternative
explanations derived from policy transfer models. In Conclusion I
summarize my empirical and theoretical results, systematize and spell
five major effects of social purpose on public policy.
Table 1.3 Summary of comparisons and explanations

37

In Chapter 8 I employ Wade Jacoby‘s classification of mechanisms of policy
transfer, including learning, coalition-building, and external pressures.
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CHAPTER 2. INTERNATIONAL POLICY INITIATIVES
AGAINST HIV/AIDS: OPERATIONALIZING THE CONSENSUS

From the empirical standpoint, my dissertation contributes to the
current debates about the cross-national variation in responses to the
emerging infectious diseases in the context of health crises, which
transcend boundary, authority, and capacity of nation-states. Before
thinking about this variation, we need to analyze and operationalize
what constitutes an international mainstream for HIV/AIDS policy
response. I define this mainstream consensus as governmental
responsibility to provide the antiretroviral treatment, ensure the
universality of access to it, and bring all relevant stakeholders in the
policy-making process. In this study the global consensus on the
HIV/AIDS treatment policy is the independent variable, which is
disaggregated into set of three general components and nine more
specific policy indicators (listed in Table 1.1).
The international policy consensus around HIV/AIDS would
not have been achieved without effective antiretroviral drugs (ARVs).
Multiple accounts of AIDS history lament about the ―quiescence‖ in
international responses to AIDS due to the lack of an effective and
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relatively cheap biomedical product. In fact, most international players
talked about the necessity to provide the HIV/AIDS treatment, yet
perforce were unable to promote it globally as the solution to the
pandemic.1 Starting from 1996, intergovernmental organizations and
the professional health community gained momentum in formulating
sophisticated policy initiatives in response to HIV/AIDS and spreading
them across the globe. The creation of new generation of AIDS
organizations in the early 2000s proved to be an additional step in
cementing the global consensus. The new generation of AIDS
organizations structured its financial assistance around AIDS first and
foremost as a public health crisis with a strong emphasis placed on the
universal access to the life-saving medicines. Thus, in the early 2000s
international recommendations have become almost universally
recognized as important tools in improving domestic policies,
including public health.
This chapter operationalizes this policy consensus and briefly
historicizes its evolution. The exact number, sequence, validity, and
substance of these indicators might not be accepted without
hesitation.2 Yet this operationalization is rather reliable as it broadly

1

See, for instance, Gordenker et al 1994; Behrman 2004: 59—116
Amy Patterson, for instance, uses the regime terminology indicating that
―principles for fighting the disease, institutions through which to facilitate
cooperation, and expanded…resources to achieve its goals‖ and the wide acceptance
2

51

reflects major points in the HIV/AIDS policy literature. Breaking
down the general HIV/AIDS policy in a set of components is
important to ascertain how this policy looks like and what it is not
supposed to be. It also helps to increase the number of observations
and set up a template for the structured focus comparison of domestic
HIV/AIDS policies. At this point I do not discuss how and why the
domestic conceptions of common good factor in health policy.
Table 2.1: Global policy consensus on HIV/AIDS

TREATMENT
The first core component of the international policy is to provide the
approved antiretroviral treatment as a biomedical response to an acute
public health crisis. Most importantly, policy-makers should respond
to HIV/AIDS crisis as a public health problem--a preventable
communicable disease and a manageable chronic infection.
Substituting or skewing basic policy response by giving a political
priority to other issue-frames, such as demographic crisis, military
security, human rights, poverty and inequality, property rights, is the
first signal that the HIV/AIDS policy got invested with situational and
of the norm of providing ARV treatment in poor countries came into being by 2006,
see Patterson 2007 in Harris and Siplon 2007: 203, 212. This chapter does not use
this terminology. Instead, I define it as an ―international standardized AIDS policy
prescription.‖
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local conceptions of common good. A strong adherence to any
alternative issue-framing choices may potentially lead to further
deviations from the international consensus, including a public denial
of the epidemic, underscoring the uniqueness of the domestic
characteristics of the epidemic (see Indicator 1a), attempts to enforce
various substandard treatment protocols (see Indicator 1b), or simply
inaction in securing the price-saving generic pharmaceutical products
(see Indicator 1c). Whether or not these alternate frames are ―justified‖
to meet the specific conditions on the ground will be discussed later.

Indicator 1a: The pandemic as a public health crisis
The first indicator of the substantive component of treatment is
framing the issue as a public health crisis. The opposite of this
recommendation includes being in denial of the epidemic, pointing up
the uniqueness of the domestic epidemic, or linking the root causes of
the epidemic to the negatively constructed populations.
Important international actors not always addressed the
pandemic as a public health crisis. Conservative governments typically
framed AIDS in terms other than public health. President Ronald
Reagan‘s administration, for instance, understood AIDS in the context
of medical competition with France, ideological struggle with the
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USSR, and the diminishing role of Africa in the global power politics.
Reagan was generally reluctant to speak about the disease in public
and to request any HIV-related funds from the Congress. 3 At the same
time, intergovernmental cooperation was riveted to collecting better
evidence on AIDS from Africa and studying a variety of clinical
manifestations of the disease among different subpopulations.4 Thus,
National Institute of Health (NIH), Center for Disease Control (CDC)
and the Belgium Institute of Tropical Medicine (BITM), and the
Zairian Ministry of Health did not confront the disease as [global]
public health crisis. At the same time, many intergovernmental
programs helped overcome poor technical equipment and inadequate
provision of medical health care abroad. Multiple international
programs included the provision of mobile health care to the remote
rural areas (African Medical and Research Foundation, AMREF),
relief and development assistance (World Vision, Ford Foundation,
Rockefeller Foundation), health personnel training (Project HOPE),
assistance in blood transfusions and needle exchange (Prevention
Point, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies—
LRCRCS), and awarding small grants for innovative local initiatives

3

See, for instance, Behrman 2004; 17—21; Fox in Fee and Fox 1988: 327. On
details of his successor George Bush‘s understanding public priorities in fighting
AIDS, see Murphy 1994: 145—149.
4
On the epidemiological construction of AIDS, see Oppenheimer in Fee and Fox
1988: 267—292.
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(People-to-People Health Foundation, Human Rights and Governance
Program).
The history of cooperation in response to HIV/AIDS prior to
1996 demonstrates that the development of policy consensus for its
own sake was hardly sustainable. Major involved actors had little or no
incentives for the actors to reconcile their differences and agree on the
specific framing of AIDS. The arrival of effective antiretroviral
therapies in 1996 changed this. To use conventional constructivist
terminology, it was a tipping point, which signaled a shift towards
policy consolidation. The technological breakthrough of 1996 gave
international actors a new common ground to overcome seemingly
irreconcilable differences in their agendas and approaches. By the
early 2000s the health benefits of providing the universal ARV
treatment in public sector became clear due to internationally praised
success stories (model cases, best practices) from Brazil, Thailand,
Uganda, and so on. Applying the conventional constructivists‘
parlance, the norm cascade occurred at the XI International AIDS
Conference in Lusaka (Zambia), when the majority of African nationstates publicly committed to address HIV/AIDS as a public health
crisis and began deploying the life-saving ARVs. Furthermore, these
states turned things around by seizing the initiative in arguing for a
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broader international assistance from the global health organizations,
thus to a certain degree acting as norm entrepreneurs themselves.
The most recent challenge to frame the pandemic as a public
health crisis was embodied by the Agreement on the Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). TRIPS was often seen as a
vehicle to advance the profit-seeking behavior of the industrialized
world including giant international pharmaceutical corporations.5
These corporate actors understood treatment in terms of intellectual
property and trade to be regulated via the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Simultaneously, many developing states (including Brazil, India,
Thailand and South Africa), as well as advocacy organizations
(Oxfam, MSF) fought for subsuming the issues of treatment under a
public health rubric, which in turn implied only secondary importance
of intellectual property and trade. South African and Brazilian legal
disputes with 39 pharmaceutical manufacturing giants and the WTO
are well-documented.6 The Fourth Session of the Ministerial
Conference of the WTO (Doha, Qatar, November 2001) adopted the
foundational document, which reaffirmed the primacy of public health
5

International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (IFPMA),
Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), Merck,
Boehringer Ingelheim, La Roche, Bristol Meyers Squibb, GlaxoWellcome (GSK).
6
On Brazil‘s contestation against the companies providing brand name
pharmaceuticals, see Bermudez et al 2002; Orsi et al 2003; Galvão 2005; for South
African court case, see Barnard 2002
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frame in dealing with HIV/AIDS treatment.7 In essence, the
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health allowed developing countries
to adopt necessary measures to protect public health as long as it was
pursued through the TRIPS safeguards. Tracing the details of
international political contestation around TRIPS is outside the scope
and purpose of this chapter. Suffice to say that global treatment
activists were instrumental in making TRIPS more flexible and
generally permissive to the expansion of the international access to the
ARVs.8
Today international health and financial organizations signal
their continuing commitment to the public health policy approach
against HIV/AIDS. In 2007, the Institute of Medicine of the National
Academies of Science published a comprehensive report ―PEPFAR
Implementation: Progress and Promise.‖ According to this report,
PEPFAR—on of the most important international AIDS
organizations—treats HIV/AIDS as a preventable communicable
disease and a manageable chronic infection, rather than a terminal
illness generated by some contingent socio-cultural characteristics. 9
Similarly, in 2008 the WHO‘s regional branches, including its South7

DESA/DSD/PC3/BP3, See Article 8
On relationship between TRIPS and ―human rights to health,‖ or discussion of
―patients rights vs. patents rights,‖ see, for instance, Correa 2002; Cullet, 2003:
139—160; Heywood 2002; Lanjouw 2002.
9
Sepúlveda et al 2007
8
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East Asia Regional Office, reaffirmed their committed to HIV/AIDS
as a public health crisis.10 In sum, public health approach to
HIV/AIDS
…promoted by WHO underpins the successful
experiences of several countries in scaling up
HIV/AIDS services and is based on the principles of
simplification, standardisation, decentralisation, equity,
and patient and community participation, and has been
pivotal in unlocking the treatment agenda, and starting
to close the treatment gap between rich and poor
countries. 11
Today there is a legitimate plurality of frames and approaches
attuned to the nuances of the local epidemiological conditions. As the
understanding of the pandemic and its impact improved, for both
governments and international bodies it is acceptable to view
HIV/AIDS as a problem of socioeconomic issue related to
development, military or human security, human rights, intellectual
property, and so on. 12 The availability of multiple frames suggests
different emphases in health care responses, yet it does not imply that
10

SEA/RC61/12, available at <http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/RC61_12pa_Item-14.pdf>
11
Gilks et al 2006: 509, available at
<http://www.who.int/hiv/events/artprevention/gilks.pdf>
12
Jönssen and Söderholm 1995: 461-466.
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the epidemic ceases to remain an immense public health care crisis and
should be understood in other than biomedical and scientific terms. In
other words, there is nothing ―wrong,‖ puzzling, or unusual when
governments start talking about HIV/AIDS as a national demographic
issue exacerbated by widespread narcotic abuse (Russia), or a deeply
engrained socioeconomic problem with links to poverty and
malnutrition (South Africa). However, in some circumstances
governments jeopardize or thwart the provision of the standard
biomedical treatment (ARVs) as approved by international bodies,
they overexaggerate societal, rather than medical, conditions and start
addressing them outside the biomedical and scientific framework. This
selective approach is indicative not of governments‘ sensitivity to the
local epidemiological situation, but rather of their sensibility to other
non-medical factors in the policy environment.

Indicator 1b: Standardized protocol in treatment
The second indicator is the acceptance of the internationally approved
antiretrovirals (ARVs) as biomedically effective and cost-effective
intervention measure to address the public health emergency.
According to the WHO, two fundamental objectives for the proper
management of the ARV treatment include: ―Standardization and
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simplification of ARV regimens to support the efficient
implementation of treatment programmes in resource-limited settings;
[and ] Ensuring that ARV treatment programmes are based on
scientific evidence, in order to avoid the use of substandard treatment
protocols which compromise the treatment outcome of individual
clients and create the potential for emergence of drug resistant
virus.‖13 The opposite of this recommendation is either the rejection of
the ARVs as toxic and ineffective, stressing complementary and
alternative medicines as the primary substitution to ARVs, or selection
of the second-line regimens over the first line. From a public health
approach to HIV/AIDS, the use of subpar or substandard treatment
protocols and distribution services is very dangerous, as it could
compromise the treatment outcomes and even trigger the wide spread
drug resistance.
The public announcement of the discovery of the Highly
Active Anti-Retroviral Therapy (HAART) in 1996 at the 11th
International AIDS Conference in Vancouver established treatment as
the key in an effective and decisive response to the pandemic. The
efficacy of the earlier drug azidothymidine (AZT), which at first was
offered as a monotherapy, was confirmed in principle the late 1980s.

13

WHO 2004: 7 (―Scaling up antiretroviral therapy in resource-limited settings:
Treatment guidelines for a public health approach,‖ 2003 revision)
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Yet, while the drug‘s benefits outweighed its negative side effects, the
results of treatment with the AZT were not always efficient and
consistent. Moreover, the prices of medications remained very high.
The major biomedical difference of HAART from earlier treatments
was that a new drug was designed to contain the infected cell by
targeting a different enzyme and was also offered in a combination of
other medications, which diminished chances of developing drugresistance. In 1997 GlaxoSmithKline produced Combivir, the first
two-drug fixed-dose combination of AZT and lamivudine (3TC).
ARVs are retroviral inhibitors, which do not cure AIDS, yet
significantly delay the development of opportunistic diseases and save
human lives. The results were stunning: Observers captured the
excitement about the ARVs by noting that ―rapid uptake of
antiretroviral treatment gave rise to the so-called Lazarus syndrome,
with treatment almost miraculously restoring the health of many
people terminally ill with AIDS.‖ 14 The current regimen prescribes
lower dosages of the AZT in combination with other drugs as a part of
HAART.15 By December 2003, the WHO officially recommended

14

Schwartländer et al 2006: 541.
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) provides further guidelines for
Industry - Fixed Dose Combination and Co-Packaged Drug Products for Treatment
of HIV, available at
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125278.htm
15
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seven different three- and two-drug fixed dose combinations.16 The
importance of fixed dose combination is that it helped to alleviate
potential adherence problems and simplifies its distribution.
In general, all these breakthroughs contributed to a rapid
decrease in the cost of treatment. Although the actual costs of treating
patients with AIDS were difficult to estimate, in the early 1990s
reliable cost studies gave a colossal average sum of $147,000 per
person per year. Yet only several years later, by 1996, the cost of
therapy dropped down to $15,000. In 2001 the prices for combination
ARV therapy fell again from over $10,000 to less than $300 a year
(per patient).17 Between 2001 and 2005 the prices fell again for the
fixed two-dose medications.18 All this emboldened many international
organizations to endorse the norm of HIV/AIDS treatment with triple
antiretroviral therapy (ARVs) as feasible and cost-effective
centrepiece of international policy consensus how to respond to the
pandemic. This policy initiative, however, did not go unchallenged.
Two principal challenges to ARVs as a standardized biomedical
solution to HIV/AIDS sprung from AIDS reappraisal hypothesis and

16

WHO 2004: 60 (see Annex D).
Smith and Siplon 2006: 82.
18
The price of stavudine, lamivudine, and nevirapine decreased from $350
(annually) in 2001 to $132 in 2005. The price of combinations of
zidovudine-lamivudine and efavirenz also decreased.
17
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the political emphasis on traditional and complementary medicines
enrooted in the indigenous knowledge systems.
First, as early as in 1987 Dr. Peter Duesberg and his supporters
opened the controversial debate concerning the nature of the
retroviruses and their relation to AIDS. This triggered the AIDS
reappraisal movement, whose members described themselves as AIDS
dissidents, realists, rethinkers, heretics.19 The central point of their
self-proclaimed ―dissidence‖ from the majority of the professional
medical community was questioning the usefulness of ARVs in the
context when the HI virus allegedly did not cause AIDS as medical
condition. This position won them a pejorative tag of AIDS denialists.
Dissidents advocated the multifactorial etiology of AIDS, indicating
that the lifestyle issues and drug abuse could have been the primary
cause of the retrovirus.20 More specifically, the repertoire of
dissidents‘ arguments is as follows:
a.

the spread and implication of the epidemic has been overstated,
while the accuracy of the statistical data should be reevaluated;

19

Besides Duesberg, the movement included such individuals David Rasnik, Harvey
Bialy, Sam Mhlongo, and Mattias Rath . To a large degree it was shaped not by
professional medical community, but rather by a number of controversial journalists,
including John Lauritsen, Celia Farber, Russell Schoch, Jad Adams and others. For
the full critical and historical exposition of the AIDS denialism, see Kalichman 2009.
20
See Epstein 1996: 105—113.
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b.

―invested interests‖ hypothesis stated that the contemporary
biomedical research is not questioned because of the profits
generated by the drug companies, while individual ―virologists had
‗invested‘ in the HIV hypothesis—not just financially, though this
was true in some cases, but personally, professionally, and
psychologically;‖21

c.

―AIDS without HIV‖ argument referred to the idea that HIV is not
a sufficient condition for AIDS and thus the real cause of AIDS
has been misidentified. Furthermore, since AIDS included many
opportunistic diseases, the correlation between AIDS and HIV
was an artifact of the definition itself;22

d.

― drug-AIDS‖ hypothesis stated that ―AIDS is a collection of
chemical epidemics, caused by recreational drugs, anti-HIV drugs,
and malnutrition;‖23

e.

―poison by prescription‖ argument pointed out that the AZT is
toxic and dangerous, or at best useless; AZT also contributed to
immune overload and result in immune suppression, which it

21

Epstein 1996: 113; see also Jad Adams, Virus Hunters 1989, available at
<http://www.virusmyth.com/aids/hiv/javirus.htm>.
22
Epstein 1996: 132; Duesberg and Ellison 1990.
23
Duesberg, Koehnlein, and Rasnic 2003: 383.

64

should have prevented. Dissidents, for instance, attributed the
famous dancer Rudolph Nuriev‘s death to AZT. 24
The professional medical community does not endorse their
views. Since the early 1990s the founder of retrovirus Dr. Robert
Gallo, immunologist Dr. Anthony S. Fauci of National Institute of
Health (NIH) and many others repudiated all their claims with absolute
certainty.25 The heyday of the dissident skepticism was rather brief: it
peaked and waned before 1996, which in part was a result of their
physical extinction due to the refusal to take the life-saving
medications. The remnants of denialists still strive on Internet sites
with questionable legitimacy and in such obscure groups as ―Alive and
Well‖, ―HEAL‖, ―Perth Group‖, ―Group for the Scientific Reappraisal
of the HIV-AIDS Hypothesis.‖ 26 Despite their marginal status, the
AIDS dissidents in certain circumstances might be able to empower
various non-mainstream domestic perceptions of the pandemic and
legitimize some obscure local beliefs.27 In other words, they can
potentially offer certain expertise and justifications for those actors,
including governments, which chose to stall the ARVs and refuse to
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John Lauritsen, Did AZT Contribute to Nureyev's Untimely Death? New York
Native, 1 Feb. 1993.
25
Epstein 1996: 117—123.
26
The dissident bookshelf is available at
<http://www.virusmyth.com/aids/books.htm>
27
See, for instance, Sitze 2004; Youde 2007; Nattrass 2008; Kalichman 2009.
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accept the role international pharmaceutical sector plays in developing
life-saving drugs.
The second potential challenge to the ARVs stems from the
perceived necessity to preserve traditional medicines and promote
genetic medical knowledge in the context of indigenous knowledge
systems (IKS). The WHO defined traditional medicine as a
comprehensive concept including various forms of indigenous
medicines, both medication and non-medication therapies.28 An
Encyclopaedia of African Folklore states that:
Ethnomedicine is a component of a people‘s culture and
refers to the beliefs and practices relating to diseases that
result from indigenous cultural evolution… refer to medical
resources that are indigenous to the Africans, holistic
environments. This is the medicine that existed before the
introduction of Western medicine and was suited to the
needs of African cultures.29
All these topics recently became very popular at different
international and domestic venues. This revival of interests to
28

See WHO/EDM/TRM/2002.1: 1; for the broader discussion of terminology and
the concept of indigenous knowledge, see for instance Ellen, Parks and Bicker 2000:
1—33; 36—54.
29
For the succinct description of the African traditional medicines and their links to
African spirituality, see Mulemi 2003: 492—498, 500—506. For useful overviews,
see Bye and Dutton 1991; Edwards 1986; Cocks and Dold 2000; Cocks and Møller
2002.
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traditional medicines in part is based on the understanding that in the
developing countries there is likely to be a persisting challenge of
access to the modern health-care system and that only traditional
healing practices are likely to remain accessible and affordable for the
overwhelming majority of local populations. Hanspeter Reihling
underscored that international development organizations viewed local
knowledge as helpful in increasing bottom-up participation and
reducing the costs for health care in resource poor settings. 30
A closer look on the definitions, guidelines, and objectives as
formulated by several intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
demonstrates that nearly all international guidelines concerning
genetic medicinal knowledge were by and large vague, cautious, and
did not offer any definite answers how to integrate traditional
knowledge into the modern-day healthcare system. It is often
underscored that there can be different potential models of integrating
traditional healers into the health care system without going antitreatment. 31 Yet even smooth logistical integration of the two health
care systems is likely to generate grave problems related to regimen

30

Reihling 2008
See, for instance, the WHO-sponsored ―Resolution Promoting the Role of
Traditional Medicine in Health Systems: A Strategy for the African Region‖
(AFR/RC50/R3); on the problems of safety, efficacy and quality, see, for instance,
WBG IK Monthly Notes 26, 37, 65, 68; the broader discussion on the relations
between African traditional medical practices and international institutions, see
Langlois-Klassen, Kipp, and Rubaale 2008; Liddell, Barrett, and Bydawell 2005.
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adherence. At the very least traditional knowledge should not be
pitched against the Western medical profession, especially as a
substitution for internationally approved pharmaceuticals. 32
It is true that documents streaming from such international
bodies as the WHO, WBG, WIPO, and UNCTAD commonly welcome
regulation and protection of indigenous knowledge.33 Very often
intergovernmental organizations place genetic medicinal resources
under the broader rubric of preserving culture and heritage
(―Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources and Traditional Cultural
Expressions/Folklore‖).34 In this context, various ethno-medicines are
viewed more as an indigenous anthropological resource as opposed to
proper biomedicine. These recommendations do not imply substituting
contemporary biomedical products with either alternative or traditional
medicines.

Indicator 1c: Check on prices and the availability of generics

32

See for example, the 2003 PEPFAR/USAID the project ―The Saving Lives:
Biomedical and Traditional Healing Collaboration on HIV/AIDS‖ with an objective
to integrate traditional healing into health care system.
33
UNCTAD/DITC/TED/10, AFR/RC50/R3
34
See the set of documents prepared for the WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore,
2003—2008., especially WIPO 2003, WIPO 2006, WIPO 2006a.
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The third indicator is to keep the prices on the pharmaceuticals low
and broadly use generics in the resource-poor settings. This can be
achieved through the bilateral agreements, slashing prices for
individual countries, or achieving the differential pricing on drugs for
developing countries in general, and implementing the safeguards as
formulated in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS). The opposite of this recommendation is to
discard the relevance of the antiretroviral generics, while stressing
only the brand-name medications. On the other hand, the global
consensus does not imply developing a full ―pharmaceutical
sovereignty‖ (i.e., a full replacement of relevant medicines with
original domestic pharmaceutical products) as an ultimate goal in
resource-poor settings.
In July 2000—June 2001 generics became widely available.
First, the products produced in India, Brazil, and Thailand became
competitive with the brand-name pharmaceuticals. Second, the
international community reached an agreement on the standards for
approval of fixed dose antiretroviral combinations, as well as agreed
on their safety.35 Third, certain generic regimens proved to be highly

35

I refer to an agreement, reached on March 30th 2004 in Gaborone, Botswana.
Studies subsequently proved fixed-dose generic AIDS drugs effective, see
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/15/health/15aids.html>
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successful in suppressing the viral load.36 Fourth, the industrial
competition set forth by companies like Cipla drove the prices of drugs
down.
In the late 1990s—early 2000s TRIPS remained a major
roadblock for the access to generic pharmaceutical products in the
developing world. 37 Yet a group of developed countries in Draft
Ministerial Declaration (October 2001) accepted the importance of
TRIPS ―to ensure that medicines for treatment of HIV/AIDS and other
pandemics are available to their citizens who need them, particularly
those who are unable to afford basic medical care.‖38 A group of
developing countries, not surprisingly, pressed for the state control
over intellectual property rights. HIV/AIDS turned out to be is a
special case in TRIPS negotiations. TRIPS ―safeguards,‖ including
Bolar provision, compulsory licensing and parallel import, allowed
governments to enjoy larger flexibility in their national drug policies.39

See ―Effectiveness and safety of a generic fixed-dose combination of nevirapine,
stavudine, and lamivudine in HIV-1-infected adults in Cameroon: open-label
multicentre trial,‖ Lancet 364: 3-4; 29-34 (2004). As the authors explained, this
study was specifically designed to sway the major donor agencies, which refused to
deploy generic fixed-dose combinations in resource-poor settings due to scarcity of
clinical data on effectiveness, safety, and quality, despite the WHO
recommendations.
37
For the useful overviews of TRIPS impact on public health, see Lee, Buse and
Fustukian 2002: 84—85; Thomas 2002; Danzon and Towse 2003; Orsi 2003; May
2007 in Ostergard 2007: 171—193. For a detailed record of the protracted struggle
over the TRIPS agreements, see Sell and Prakash 2005; Sell 2007.
38
IP/C/W/313.
39
The use of safeguards had been previously backed up by the WHO‘s World Health
Assembly, see WHA 52.19
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70

Initially there was a lot of disbelief in the practical implementation of
these safeguards.40 Yet the subsequent governmental actions proved
otherwise. We have critical amount of evidence to suggest that
developing countries successfully implemented these safeguards. This
dynamic pushed the private sector to expand their political
commitments to fight HIV/AIDS: Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, BristolMyers Squibb began reducing the prices on the essential ARVs. They
slashed costs for the fixed dose combinations and offered the
differential pricing for drugs for select developing countries. Finally,
under the pressures of treatment activists, big for-profit corporations
joined the campaign for the access for the life-saving medicines.41 The
change in their strategies might have resulted from a perception that
loosing the developing the developing world market was inacceptable,
even taking into account the dwindling profits. For my line of
argumentation it does not really matter if the pharmaceutical sector
genuinely committed to mitigate HIV/AIDS. The point is that generics
gradually became part of the global consensus.
In 2004 the US government allowed the generic manufacturers
to apply for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. This
40

Sell (1999: 174 in Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999) reasoned that developing states
and governments posses less expertise in these highly technical questions comparing
to the private sector.
41
Smith and Siplon 2006: 125, 130—137. For the corporate human rights scrutiny,
see Joseph 2003.
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meant that the new generation of AIDS organizations was no longer
dependent on the brand-name drugs for their health programs. The
evolution of PEPFAR‘s approach to drug procurement illustrates this
point. At first, the drugs for Africa were to be purchased from the U.S.
pharmaceutical giants at the American price and cheap generics were
not allowed. Former administrator Randall Tobias, for instance, argued
that only safe and regulated drugs should be disbursed for the
PEPFAR needs. In 2007 the new U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator Mark
Dybul announced the reversal of the approach. He reported to the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs that PEPFAR ―increased its
purchasing of generic versus branded ARVs from 72 percent from
April to September 2006 to 88 percent (by volume) from January to
March 2007.‖42 The establishment of Supply Chain Managements
System (SCMS) as an integral part of PEPFAR provides continuous
flow of essential high quality cost-effective medications and supplies
generic ARVs.43 Thus, generics became fully allowed in PEPFAR‘s
operational plans. According to GFATM‘s purchase price report
mechanism, as early as in 2004 brand-name products comprised only
40.7% of the ARVs.44
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PEPFAR press release # 83466
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In the future the described achievements might be undermined
by the increasing demands of the newer lines of medicines in the
context of the diminishing incentives for the firms producing the
generic supply for the nations lacking industrial capacities,
overburdened by the incessant spread of HIV/AIDS and the increasing
drug-resistance.45

UNIVERSALITY
The second core component is the universality of access to treatment.
It intends to stress both the moral imperative and economic costefficiency in providing access to ARVs to all the infected and
vulnerable populations. It reflects the notion that nobody should be
intentionally excluded from the consumption of public good. Because
vulnerable subpopulations are tightly linked to general public, aiming
at universal treatment at country level is the most reliable undertaking
to curb the pandemic. Additionally, prioritizing the access to treatment
even to the negatively constructed populations is cost-efficient as it
lowers the virus transmission to the generalized population and thus
will likely to diminish public health spending in the long run.

45

On the future constraints to the sustainability of generic supply and the case study
of India as the largest producer of generics, see Shadlen 2007: 569—576.
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At the face value, universality is very costly. Yet with the
technological breakthroughs in biomedicines achieved in 1996 even a
small increase of average yearly costs of treatment allowed to increase
the number of treated patients significantly. Since the costs of
treatment are becoming relatively low, scaling-up is attainable even in
the countries with lower GDPs. The first potential challenge to the
global policy consensus consists of policy-makers choosing to provide
only a selective access to treatment, either excluding any vulnerable
subpopulation or, in contrast, including any societal group at the
expense of the others (see Indicator 2a). The second potential
challenge is the resistance to ―scaling up‖ (see Indicator 2b). Third, the
notion of universality presumes that providing the access to treatment
will go together with aggressive prevention campaigns. While the
appropriate balance between these two health interventions has been
long in the center of international health policy debates, at this point
suffice to say that prevention should not become a dominant substitute
for the antiretroviral therapy, nor should it be completely ignored as
irrelevant for curbing HIV/AIDS (see Indicator 2c).

Indicator 2a: Providing ARVs to key vulnerable groups
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The first indicator of the substantive component of universality is the
aggressive intervention to provide ARVs to the key vulnerable
populations. Dependent on the country, this category of individuals
may include intravenous drug users (IDUs), commercial sex workers,
prisoners, men who have sex with men (MSM), HIV-positive mothers,
women and girls, youth, people living in poverty, migrants and
migrant laborers, people in conflict and post-conflict situations,
refugees and displaced persons. Providing treatment to these and other
key risk groups is desirable for the long-term impact on decreasing the
infection prevalence in the general population and consequently saving
significant amount of resources and human lives. From the public
health perspective, these seemingly isolated and marginalized but
often overlapping groups typically transmit the disease to the
generalized population. Thus, treating these ―bridge populations‖ is
imperative. In the beginning of the outbreak, especially in the domestic
context of resource scarcity, these interventions can be particularly
successful. The opposite of this indicator is to deploy either severe
restrictive measures, or criminalize vulnerable populations, while
denying them treatment or access to it. Ordinarily stigmatizing
particular target populations is the first sign that the principle of
universality is being challenged.
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The described approach to the pandemic heavily hinged on the
biomedical understanding of the disease.46 The international
community travelled a long way before accepting this indicator as a
part of global consensus.47 At the outset of the epidemic the disease
was associated with deviant and promiscuous minorities with almost
100 percent mortality rate. In the 1980s AIDS was understood as ―gay
cancer.‖ These attitudes were succinctly captured in the first semiofficial, yet short lived, nomenclature of the disease as GRID—―GayRelated Immune Deficiency,‖ and an additional pejorative nickname—
―the four H disease‖ (homosexuals, hemophiliacs, heroin addicts and
Haitians).48 In this context, the US administration believed that the
epidemic should be contained through severe regulative measures,
including quarantine.49 One of the most high-profile restrictive
measures was barring the entry of affected foreign nationals into the
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On the history of epidemics and major controversies after the discovery of HIV
virus in 1981, see Shielts 1987; Grmek 1990; Cohrane 2003. For the historical
overview of the medical and debates about appropriate medical response to the
disease, Fee and Fox 1988; Epstein 1996; Finkel 2007: 31—54.
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Epstein 1996: 45—79.
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Siplon 2007: 175.
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United States.50 This regulation, adopted by Senate and passed by the
House of Representatives, had a profound international effect as it was
later followed by the similar legal provisions in more than 50
countries. As Murphy indicates, in 1987 ―this ban was supported by
some health professions organizations worried about the public health
of the nation and the costs of publicly supported care for people
with AIDS.‖ 51
On the other hand, travel restrictions led to the famous San
Francisco AIDS Conference boycott of 1989, during which AIDS
activists were able to mobilize international public opinion against
such restrictive measures and advocate medicalization of the disease.52
Jonathan Mann, the head of WHO‘s Global AIDS Programme (GPA,
1987—1990) backed up these mobilization efforts and advocated
human rights as a comprehensive framework to facilitate the
transnational effort against HIV/AIDS. 53 In essence, the most
important outcome of the boycott was the emerging understanding
among domestic and international decision-makers that key vulnerable
50
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groups cannot be excluded from treatment. It also demonstrated that
severe restrictive measures cannot be a solution around which
expectations how to fight the epidemic can converge. The greater
involvement of the key vulnerable populations in the International
AIDS Conferences (IAC) helped to promote this achievement even
further.
Treating key vulnerable groups cannot be implemented without
the governmental commitment to observe human rights, which also
had to be recognized as a cornerstone principle of the global
consensus. The majority of intentional financial and health
organizations confirm the necessity of providing a non-exclusive
treatment to vulnerable groups. In 1993 the World Bank indicated that
―the cost-effectiveness of interventions drops sharply when infections
cross firm high-risk groups to the general population.‖54 In 2005 the
World Bank called for comprehensive programs to include ―an
increased number of interventions targeted to virtually all groups in
society,‖ and ―address gender and other dimensions of equity such as
access for poor and marginalized groups and in rural areas.‖55 In
2004 the WHO‘s Regional Office for Europe‘s prepared the Dublin
Declaration on Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Europe and Central

54
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Asia, in large part stressing the fight against the local-level stigma,
discrimination of and prejudice to the vulnerable populations. The
declaration noted ―that the respect, protection and promotion of human
rights is fundamental to preventing transmission of HIV, reducing
vulnerability to infection and dealing with the impact of HIV/AIDS.‖ 56
In essence, its signatories reaffirmed that observing human rights and
treating vulnerable population is crucial for preventing HIV/AIDS to
move into the general population. European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control (ECDC) monitors the Eurasian countries‘
progress in the implementation of the principles and commitments as
expressed in this Declaration.57 GFATM uses the UNAIDS definition
of key affected populations in order to evaluate country‘s eligibility for
its funding.58
Providing the ARV treatment to the key vulnerable populations
rests on the assumption that targeting (or at the very least not
excluding) various marginalized high-risk populations can prevent the
spillover of the epidemic to the generalized population. Such measures
as providing the ARV treatment for the IDUs, stopping the
institutionalized prosecution and harassment of the narcotic users,
implementing harm reduction, medically assisted therapy (MAT),
56
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57

79

needle and syringe exchange programs (NSP), and opiate substitute
treatment (OST) with methadone as the most effective withdrawal
technique and hinge on observing human rights principles. For
instance, according to the study published in AIDS, ―[E]xclusively
treating non-IDUs provided the least health benefit, and was the least
economically efficient.‖59 Since recent, the Global Fund has been
promoting harm reduction programs.60
Today we witness the emergence of the new clusters of
vulnerable target populations and new links between AIDS and other
grave socio-economic problems, precluding or hindering development
and good governance.61 Expanding knowledge about particular target
populations helps upholding the universality of treatment as a key
component of fighting AIDS. Many activists and practitioners still
pessimistically talk about many complexities of overcoming stigma,
which negatively impact on domestic governments‘ efforts to launch a
broad-based response to AIDS. In many cases the issues of
discrimination, resentment, and hatred still endure.62 Nevertheless,
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excluding certain groups is a significant breach of the standardized
policy and put the general population at risk.

Indicator 2b: Scaling up as a proxy for universality
The second indicator of the substantive component of universality is
the aggressive intervention to rollout the ARVs to anybody who needs
it, or cover as much infected population as possible, depending on
local constraints. As achieving the 100% treatment coverage is hardly
attainable in the developing countries with limited resources, the
relevant international guidelines use the notion of the scaling up as a
proxy indicator of the commitment to achieve the universality of
treatment. According to the WHO 2003 revised guidelines, the term
―scaling up‖ refers to the process of increasing numbers of a target
audience with the ultimate objective to provide access to ARVs for all
those who need.63 The opposite of this indicator is either discontinuing
ARVs rollout for any other reasons than patients‘ death, or officially
rejecting the cost-efficiency of scaling up.
Over time, the number of key international health players used
different approaches to trigger domestic awareness about the urgency
of scaling-up. The UN provides general targets and guidelines how to
63
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evaluate the commitment to and achievement of the universality of
treatment.64 The agreement on scaling up is reflected in the following
documents and initiatives: UNGASS Declaration of Commitment on
HIV/AIDS; Guidelines on construction of Core Indicators; Millennium
Development Goal #6; WHO 3 by 5 initiative; Abuja Declaration on
HIV/AIDS, TB and other infectious diseases; UNAIDS intensifying
prevention guidelines.65 The United Nations Millennium Declaration
adopted at the Millennium Summit in September 2000 is typically
mentioned as the key among those. It clearly expressed its support for
the notion of universality of treatment.66 The Summit also set forth a
number of specific goals, including combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and
other diseases (Goal 6, Target for 2015: Halt and begin to reverse the
spread of HIV/AIDS and the incidence of malaria and other major
diseases). One of highest profile initiatives of scaling up belonged to
the WHO. In 2003, commissioned by UNAIDS an international panel
of the leading AIDS advocates, put together a report Access to HIV
Prevention: Closing the Gap. The GAP called for filling the estimated
$3.8 billion HIV-funding gap by 2005. The so-called ―3 by 5‖ program
is designed to accelerate delivery of ARV treatment to three million

64

A/60/262; A/60/737; HR/PUB/06/9.
UNAIDS/07.07E / JC1274E
66
A/RES/55/2, 18 September 2000; A/RES/S-26/2
65

82

people by the end of 2005 within 34 priority countries.67 Although the
initiative fell short of these targets, it nevertheless set scaling-up as a
feasible approach. Other optimistic advocates of scaling-up include
Accelerate Access Initiative (AAI), the Global HIV Prevention
Working Group (PWG), and Treatment Acceleration Project (TAP).
Scaling up, of course, was hardly possible without keeping the
prices on the life-saving medicines low. Thus, scaling-up is based on
maintaining the cost-efficiency of the ARVs. According to Marion
Rauner and Margaret Brandeau, the fundamental problem in relying on
pharmaceuticals in resource-limited settings was stipulated by a sheer
fact that as late as in 2001 ―large-scale antiretroviral drug treatment
was still not affordable in most developing countries.‖ 68 According to
Greg Behrman, the absence of the cheap pharmaceuticals precluded
the universality of access to treatment to be an integral part of
international action in response to the pandemic: ―The US global
effort, therefore, consisted entirely of prevention efforts…As an option
for fighting global AIDS, treatment was dismissed as not being cost
effective.‖69 Dwindling costs of therapy disable the arguments of those
who questioned the economic feasibility of rolling out treatment
67
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anywhere, save for the wealthiest countries. The harshest skeptics
typically indicate that the rollout of the ARVs should reflect the
particular capabilities of a given country, including the health care
infrastructure, percentage of the infected population, GDP and general
state of economy.70 Pushing this argumentation to the extreme, some
commentators insist that ARVs burden state budgets and in the long
haul hinder states‘ performance in health care. The nub of the
reasoning is that governments have to provide newer and newer lines
of pharmaceuticals to adapt to the domestic epidemiological conditions
and the increases in drug resistance.71 All these considerations
notwithstanding, the invention of HAART unburdens state budgets
and makes treatment economically efficient. Strong treatment
intervention is most efficient at the outset of epidemic (no drug
resistance and thus it requires only the cheapest first line regimen).
In 2002 the Policy Project and Merk, Inc. sponsored a special
conference on AIDS and economics, which summarizes the major
point of this subsection: the adverse economic impact of HIV/AIDS
outweighs the costs of treatment.72 The nature and scope of presentday massive international sponsorship also very tangibly shows that
70

For more general argument about cost-effectiveness analysis and HIV/AIDS, see
UNAIDS 1998; Kenneth Freedberg and Yazdanpanah 2002
71
―High Drug Costs Could Jeopardize Brazil's No-Cost Antiretroviral Program‖,
[Jan 03, 2007], available at <
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=1&DR_ID=41898>
72
See their report ―State of the Art: AIDS and Economics‖ (July 2002)

84

intensive scale-up efforts are likely to bear fruits. All these activities
add up to the governmental resolve for the universal coverage and
alleviate their financial and logistical inabilities to live up to the
promise of scaling-up.

Indicator 2c: Treatment as an integral part of prevention
The third indicator of universality of access to treatment is based on
the understanding that providing the antiretrovirals alone is not enough
to curb HIV/AIDS. In some circumstances treatment is prevention:
consider the vertical prevention, i.e., mother to child transmission
prevention programs (MTCTP). In most cases, access to treatment
should be combined and complemented with various locally-sensitive
preventive strategies. The opposite of this recommendation is either
the rejection of the importance of ARVs as an integral part of
prevention, or the hypothetical strategy to completely replace
treatment with education, abstinence, and so on.
Very recently the global medical community has reached a new
more decisive formulation which asserts the primacy of treatment in
comparison to prevention strategies. Prompted by continuous failures
in finding the AIDS vaccine, the co-discoverers of the HI virus Robert
C. Gallo and Luc A. Montagnier called for the universal testing and
85

universal treatment as the most reliable method of prevention.73 This
suggests that treatment in the observable future will remain the integral
part of prevention strategies. It is true that only treatment can
substantially prolong the lives of the 40 million people who already
carry the human immunodeficiency virus and allow them to return to
productive work. However, under certain circumstances treatment
alone, although crucial, is not a ―silver bullet.‖ In the highest
prevalence countries, only urgent expansion of treatment will forestall
continued catastrophic rates of illness and death and the attendant
social and economic devastation.74 Even strong proponents of
universal and free treatment agree that only a combination of
prevention, care, treatment, as well as efforts to embed HIV/AIDS
responses in the broader and longer-term work of strengthening public
health, promoting development, and respecting and protecting human
rights can mitigate the pandemic‘s effects.75 Global HIV Prevention
Working Group (PWG) suggested that approximately half of the
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newly infected people could be saved with adequate health services,
integrating preventive and treatment strategies. 76
More generally, balance in allocating funds between treatment
and prevention still remains a hottest topic of the current political
debates. PEPFAR, for instance, had been in the center of treatment vs.
prevention debate for a while. As activists point out, the former head
of PEPFAR Ambassador Tobias on many occasions noted that AIDS
is a fully preventable disease, which should be curbed by the so-called
ABC principle (abstinence, being faithful and condoms). Many critics
of PEPFAR claimed that the organization prioritized abstinence at the
expense of treatment due to President George W. Bush‘s stress on the
so-called evangelical approach.77 This argument has only a limited
credibility, as the provision of treatment was indeed an indispensable
part of PEPFAR‘s strategy. According to the Kaiser Family
Foundation (KFF) data, the Presidential emergency Fund (PEPFAR)
allocations for antiretroviral therapy in FY 2004/2005 reached $34
surpassing the funding for prevention and abstinence (funding up to
$20 million). In FY 2006, approximately $819 million were spent to
support ARVs, which consisted about 46% of total focus country
resources for AIDS. Number of people receiving treatment increased
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from less than initial 50,000 to more than one million people as of
May 2007. Additional PEPFAR funding also confirms its commitment
to ARVs‘ provision: PEPFAR funded training of 52,000 people to
provide ARV services and supported 1,912 ARVs sites.78 All these
figures indicate that PEPFAR takes funding for treatment seriously
and exercises a balanced funding between ABC (abstinence, be
faithful, correct and consistent use of condoms) and ARVs.
Bearing down on prevention and pro-life beliefs sometimes
result into serious funding restrictions. For instance, one of the most
effective programs in Africa—Marie Stopes International (MSI)—was
defunded because of its abortion advice. Subsequently, the White
House also overturned a Congressional award to the UN Population
Fund because of its joint work with MSI. Yet prioritizing ABC at the
expense of treatment remains relatively rare. For instance, Ugandan
officials attempted to draft and enforce the abstinence-only policy with
adverse consequences for curbing AIDS. 79 There is no solid agreement
on the outcomes of the ABC policy: Sometimes the possible reversal
of success in curbing HIV/AIDS is suggested, sometimes, on the
contrary, its practicality and success. 80 Independently of what exact
concerns observers, practitioners or treatment advocates might claim
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about the ABC policies, it is highly unlikely that it can undermine the
broader international consensus on the role of ARVs.

PARTNERSHIPS
The third core component of the internationally recommended policy
is building partnerships between governments on the one side and all
relevant stakeholders, on the other. The idea that the most effective
health policy responses depend on mutual efforts underpins this
recommendation. For the purposes of this dissertation, the group of
relevant stakeholders is analytically divided into private sector,
international health organizations, and domestic civil society sector,
including various issue-advocacy and health service groups. When
governments selectively exclude certain stakeholders from the policy
process, it signals that the international consensus on partnership
becomes invested with situational and local characteristics. This
recommendation is especially relevant for the governments that either
lack requisite financial and infrastructural capacities to curb the
epidemic on their own, or require assistance to increase the capacity of
public health care sector, institutionalize and routinize financial flows,
or have to improve service quality and outreach.
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Indicator 3a: Public-private partnership
The first indicator of partnership is the increasing the capacity of the
health care sector and the quality of response to HIV/AIDS via
fostering a Public-Private Partnership (PPP, P3s). The National
Council for Public-Private Partnerships (NCPPP) defines PPPs as
… a contractual agreement between a public agency
(federal, state or local) and a private sector entity.
Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each
sector (public and private) are shared in delivering a
service or facility for the use of the general public. In
addition to the sharing of resources, each party shares in
the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the
service and/or facility. 81
Since HIV/AIDS presents an enormous challenge for everyone,
governments are expected to invite private sector to fight the epidemic
jointly. The opposite of this recommendation is either intentionally
trying to safeguard the private sector by excluding it from solving
problems of common good, or purposefully over-committing to fight
the pandemic exclusively with the framework of the domestic public
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health sector. Both choices can turn out truly detrimental especially in
the countries operating in resource-poor settings.
Similar to the evolution of the other recommendations and
guidelines, PPPs were not part of the global consensus for the most
part of the 1990s. Prior to 1997, the focus of the professional medical
and developmental community was to make governments recognize
the gravity of the problem and provide necessary political leadership.
Without reliable treatment and vaccines, the World Bank focused on
providing information about the epidemiology, advocated prevention,
and projected the cost-effectiveness of treatment with AZT. 82
Immediately following the technological breakthrough, a number of
international actors stressed the importance of ARV treatment, as well
as distribution and logistical control of drugs at country level. The
staggering evolution of the World Bank‘s approach is the best
illustration of the shifting emphasis to understanding the priority of the
public health sector.83 It framed the provision of treatment as a
precondition to sustainable development, realizing that health
programs require a significant financing.84 Subsequently, the World
Bank became not only one of the largest international funders in the
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fight against the pandemic, but also a promoter of treatment and
advocate of governmental responsibility to provide drugs in public
health sector.85
With a 1997 seminal report, Confronting AIDS: Public
Priorities in a Global Epidemic framed AIDS as a public health
problem and stressed national governments‘ responsibility to provide
antiretroviral therapy, palliative care, and the treatment of
opportunistic infections. Governmental responsibilities also include 1)
setting national-level programs with clear priorities in resource-scarce
settings; 2) distribution and logistical control of drugs to alleviate
problems with non-adherence to treatment regimen and erratic supplies
of drugs; and 3) ensuring to the expanded, multisectoral response. The
last recommendation implies cooperation between governments and
non-governmental organizations, as well as strengthening cooperation
between states and major industrial pharmaceutical corporations. In
general, these guidelines intend to raise the level of political
commitment of the national governments and motivate them to
intervene more aggressively. In the most straightforward formulation,
―governments should ensure that HIV-infected patients benefit from
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the same access to health care as other patients with comparable
illnesses and a similar ability to pay.‖86
Circa 2000 the priority on governmental delivery shifted to
stress PPPs. The late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke galvanized the
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(GBC).87 This consortium of organizations mobilizes business to
sponsor public health emergencies and advocates a broader
involvement of business in HIV/AIDS as a matter of national and
human security. Merk & Co, for instance, joins and sponsors many
global and regional PPPs as well.88 Christer Jönsson captured the
increasingly important role of the private sector by noticing that there
is no one lead agency in coordination of all health-related actors, rather
the fight against HIV/AIDS is governed by diffused PPPs. 89
In sum, the emphasis on the public sector in the
implementation of the treatment policy is placed high on international
agenda. Most developing countries cannot fully exercise the
responsibility to provide access to treatment without entering PPPs.
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Indicator 3b: Partnerships with international health organizations
Governments are expected to follow guidelines and recommendations
provided by the international health organizations, and use the
financial and logistical aid of the international donors. For resourcelimited countries the success in curbing the disease is often directly
dependent on the quality of partnership with these international AIDS
organizations.90 This type of partnership is indispensable for having an
access to the modern epidemiological expertise, an uninterrupted
supply of effective medications, and simply various grants and
funding. The opposite of this indicator is either to challenge the
expertise and recommendations of these organizations, attempt to
proffer alternative health organizations, or to refuse any external
logistical support and financial aid. All this might result in truly
devastating consequences especially in the resource-limited countries.
Today, multiple international institutions provide international
recommendations and guidelines on the principles of resource
allocation, evaluation and monitoring of national health budgets,
adherence protocols, and so on. The biomedical breakthrough was
complemented with the inception of the United Nations Joint
Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS, 1996). UNAIDS was created to
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bring together a number of HIV/AIDS programs, run separately by
different UN agencies. The first important contribution of the
UNAIDS‘ secretariat was a yearly publication of unambiguous and
reliable epidemiological statistics, adequately capturing the state of
emergency and projecting the future epidemiological trends. Later on,
UNAIDS became also instrumental in developing relevant guidelines
for resource allocation, funding, budget control mechanisms in the
developing countries. In 2005, for instance, UNAIDS/UNGASS
presented new guidelines how to construct the core indicators for the
countries with generalized epidemic.91 The United Nations Millennium
Project also provides guidelines (a set of goals and targets) to track the
cross-national progress in curbing HIV/AIDS. The UNGASS uses
National AIDS Spending Assessment (NASA) as a resource-tracking
mechanism to measure commitment to the comprehensive framework
to achieve the MDG goals. Of course, there is some debate about the
UNGASS indicators, including the unrealistic expectation of success
in stopping the spread of the pandemic and sometimes unreliable
measurement of the achieved progress. Yet these concerns do not
imply that governments across the globe should ignore these
recommendations.
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The new generation of AIDS organizations provides direct
sponsorship for the ARV treatment and therefore gives strong
incentives for governments to follow the global consensus. Recently,
the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM,
the Global Fund) and President‘s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) became two most important global instruments of
providing treatment for the nations operating in recourse-limited
settings. These organizations help overcome the problem of the erratic
supplies of drugs, which undermines the outcomes of treatment and
spreads drug-resistance. For the developing nations, on the other hand,
gaining these resources is contingent on their well-articulated national
HIV/AIDS policies being put on paper and on the existence of special
domestic bodies as a precondition for receiving the transfers from
GFATM. Thus, the multilateral HIV/AIDS organizations become truly
indispensable as they provide mechanisms to translate some generic
political pledges of the developed nations to fight HIV/AIDS into
institutionalized and routinized behavior, which is not easily
reversible.92
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Many practitioners and activists have been habitually lamenting the insufficient
level of funding from the major international donors. But this concern does not imply
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For the remainder of this subsection I briefly discuss PEPFAR,
which is to date the biggest global program dealing with HIV/AIDS
pandemic. In his 2003 State of Union Address, President Bush
announced the commitment of $15 billion over five years to fight
AIDS globally. Targeted countries included 12 African (Botswana,
Cote d‘Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria,
Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia), 2 Latin
American and Caribbean (Haiti and Guyana) and 1 Asian state
(Vietnam).93 Note that although Russian Federation is not technically
PEPAFR‘s focus country, in 2006 it became the second tier of the five
additional ―countries of interest,‖ receiving additional bilateral
funding. The selected countries are estimated to account for
approximately 50% of the world‘s HIV/AIDS infections. Among these
countries, Uganda, Kenya, and South Africa are receiving the lion
share of contributions. In June 2007 President Bush pledged $30
billion more to support the Plan in the future. The emergency plan was
re-authorized by the Congress and signed into law in 2008. President
Barack Obama equally supported the Plan.
More specifically, PEPFAR purports to develop local
infrastructure to promote self-sustainable local health programs. The
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program helps create health infrastructure of central medical centers—
primary satellites—secondary satellites—rural satellites and remote
mobile units continuum, covering geographically the whole country.
There is a clear hierarchy and division of labor in conducted activities:
general HIV/AIDS expertise—treatment—test on infectious
diseases—distribution of treatment and medication pack refills,
respectfully. Primary satellites are envisioned as focal venues where
many private and public clinics run by faith-based groups and nongovernmental organizations will be in this category. Judged by its
general design, this infrastructure-building plan looks relevant for the
long-term combat against AIDS and helpful in scaling up states‘
capacities and the quality of their response.
From a more utilitarian viewpoint, governments in resourcelimited settings should be pleased to accept aid from the developed
industrialized nations. Yet accepting aid and expertise of international
actors should not be confused with donor-dependency, which
describes the processes of fully delegating logistical support and
responsibility to distribute drugs to international institutions, as well as
privileging foreign-sponsored programs over domestic ones.94 Rather,
it means maintaining good working relationship with organizations
providing and advocating ARVs, as well as coordination and
94

On the notion of donor-dependency see Patterson 2005: 12-13; 171—172.

98

integration of domestic and international programs. In contrast, under
certain conditions states might challenge the expertise and
recommendations of these organizations, institutionalize alternative
health organizations, and officially refuse to accept logistical support
and financial aid. This behavior, especially if these states do not
possess the requisite capacities and are constrained by the resourcelimited settings, provides a first signal of some societal challenge to
the global consensus.

Indicator 3c: Partnership with civil society sector
States are expected to support the work of transnational and domestic
NGOs in order to increase the number and diversify the types of health
organizations responsible for providing effective health care
interventions. The integral part of this indicator is to pursue closer
links with international and domestic civil society sector, which should
serve both as the linking-pin organizations for broader partnerships
with transnational health sector, and facilitate a more flexible rollout
of the ARVs. The opposite of this indicator is to restrict civil society
sector legally, exclude its members from the policy formulation and
implementation process, and undermine their role as AIDS service
organizations by either seizing the international grants earmarked for
99

them, or any other available ways. Restricting partnership, while
privileging governmental programs is a significant deviation from
international consensus on AIDS policy. Ultimately, this can impinge
of the success of domestic responses to HIV/AIDS.
First efforts to build sustainable partnership models belonged
to WHO‘s Global AIDS Programme (GAP, 1986—1995). GAP‘s
primary focus was on surveillance, the national AIDS plans, human
rights advocacy, and fund-raising. The literature praising GAP‘s
contribution to international effort against AIDS sees its primary
achievement in becoming an indispensable linking-pin to other active
organization in the health policy network, thus teaching governments
to be connected with other sub-national actors and civil society sector.
GAP was able to link international donor organizations (including
USAID) to domestic recipients.95 Another big contribution was GAP‘s
(and its head Jonathan Mann‘s personally) stress on the importance of
involving civil society to protect human rights as a pivotal element in
providing an adequate response to the widening health crisis. Despite
all these achievements, the absence of an effective medication
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triggered donor fatigue and lessened an interest in developing strong
partnership with civil society organizations. 96
The invention of HAART resulted in irrevocable commitment
to the partnership with civil society sector: the abstract principles of
cooperation got infused with into some tangible reasons to do so. On
the other hand, the discussed technological breakthrough empowered
activist advocacy organizations and the civil society in general. The
list of the most known and renowned organization includes ACT UP,
the Treatment Acton Campaign of South Africa, the Grupo Pela
VIDDA of Brazil, the Agua Buena Human Rights Association of
Costa Rica, the Kenya Coalition for Access to Essential Medicines,
Thai AIDS Treatment Action Group, Thai Drug Users Network. 97
Today, domestic civil society and AIDS service organizations
across the globe enjoy the generous financial support from GFATM.
In essence, GFATM‘s funding makes CSOs important partners for
governments (especially if these CSOs do not command any resources
of their own). This funding is based on merits of their proposals for
treatment and service, as well as their subsequent implementation.
―The Framework Document of the GFATM‖ indicates that this
96
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organization supports simplified, rapid, and bottom-up disbursement
mechanisms, which are intended to ―reflect national ownership and
respect country-led formulation and implementation processes.‖ 98
GFATM was launched in 2001 by the UN Secretary-General, the US
and Nigerian Presidents, based on UN General Assembly resolution
1308.99 It became operational in January 2002. GFATM is a financial
instrument ensuring a sustainable funding for the local projects and
leveraging additional financial resources form a variety of
governmental and private sources. The received funds are
subsequently disbursed to sponsor various domestic programs. The
core principle of the Global Fund is performance-based funding,
driven by the local needs.100 In this capacity, GFATM works primarily
to fund all the NGOs and ASOs that can do some decent ground work
that focuses on the creation, development and expansion of
partnerships, and thus strengthen the participation of communities and
people affected by HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. 101
The external evaluation showed that the Fund‘s spending on
ARVs is consistent with other UN and WHO initiatives. The
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expenditure targets to provide drugs and related commodities have
been consistently 48% of all granting commitments, which is by far
the largest spending priority over Rounds 2 to 6.102 In 2007 alone the
grand total of disbursed resources amassed to almost $4 billion.
According to treatment activists, the Global Fund is better positioned
than other funding mechanisms to scale up the AIDS response,
harmonize national efforts, and support a comprehensive approach to
AIDS that integrates development concerns and addresses the needs of
marginalized communities.103 Ironically, the local organizations and
activists will be never truly satisfied with GFATM, because the
financial volume of the multiple of local service organizations is
higher than GFATM can possible fill. Nevertheless, GFATM remains
pivotal in empowering civil society sector and thus creates incentives
for government to cooperate with it.
Besides funding, the GFATM operates through the Country
Coordinating Mechanisms (CCMs), which institutionalized
governmental partnership with the civil society sector. According to a
report prepared by the International Council of AIDS Service
Organizations (ICASO),
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…through the establishment of Country Coordinating
Mechanisms (CCMs), the Global Fund has affirmed
and legitimatized the critical importance of the
involvement of a full range of stakeholders in proposal
development, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation. Where the CCMs are working well, they
provide unparalleled opportunities - often not available
elsewhere - for the full range of stakeholders to work
together in partnership. These stakeholders include
governments, bilateral and multilateral donors, the
private sector and civil society (including NGOs,
affected communities and faith-based organizations). 104

CONCLUSION
From the health policy perspective, the described HIV/AIDS policy
consensus was desirable as it provided both international and domestic
policy-makers with clear [technocratic] policy goals of how many
people should receive treatment within certain time period, as well as
straightforward guidelines what the standardized treatment protocol is
and how to manage the distribution and logistical control of drugs. It
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was attainable because the post-1996 ARV treatment indeed proved to
be very effective and increasingly cheaper a biomedical invention
supported by some uniform biomedical expertise and in various forms
sponsored by international health, financial, and developmental
organizations and pharmaceutical sector, especially its genericproducing segment. Although international health community
eventually elevated these three core policy components to a common
intersubjectively held understanding, for a long time they were either
actively contested, or simply ignored. All this does not mean that the
international consensus as I describe it here will remain intact forever,
yet it definitely means that the policy consensus governs international
approaches to AIDS and strongly suggests the content of domestic
policy responses.
In the following chapter I devise an analytical framework to
examine societal agreements about what constitutes the ―common
good‖ served by state (e.g., ―social purpose‖), which under certain
circumstances might profoundly challenge the international consensus
on treatment as public good, including its major indicators as
described above.
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CHAPTER 3. SOCIAL PURPOSE: A FRAMEWORK OF
ANALYSIS

Social purpose is the core concept of this dissertation. I define social
purpose as a socially legitimate and politically contingent conception
of common good. Social purpose underpins the kinds of actions the
dominating elite considers appropriate and the kinds of actions the
domestic policy environment stimulates and sustains. Its impact can be
isolated, when examining how a policy environment in a particular
country ―filters‖ the international flow of policy recommendations and
initiatives.
This chapter theorizes the social purpose as the core concept of
this dissertation. To illustrate its core features, it supplies some
examples taken from the relevant literatures. Often, but not always,
these examples are directly relevant for the further discussion of my
cases. The first section briefly addresses the methodological debates
on identity. In the context of my work, these debates are analytically
relevant considering that social purpose is identity‘s dimension. My
discussion, however, contributes to and clarifies the elite-society
connections, commonly underdeveloped by this literature. In the
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second section I develop a general theoretical framework of social
purpose (visually represented in the Figure 3.1). It can be applied
cross-nationally and is subsequently used to structure two empirical
chapters on social purposes in Russia and South Africa. This
framework sorts out various discursive activities to facilitate
understanding how certain elite-driven conceptions of common good
become socially legitimate. I distinguish tree types of agency,
including domestic political elite, articulated audiences, and general
public. I also delineate between several types of activities, which help
understand relationship between elite and a society mutually
generating social purpose. Subsequently linking these dimensions
together will provide a coherent framework of political construction of
national purpose (see Figure 3.1).
In the final section I briefly spell out theoretical conjectures
about the effects of social purpose on policy actions (see Table 3.2). I
contend that policy-makers evaluate the benefits of international policy
initiatives from the vantage point of their commitment to a certain
conception of common good. This evaluation (or ―sorting through‖)
impacts on the flow of external policy recommendations through
domestic policy environment. At minimum, elites have an ability to
bring the content of the external recommendations in consistence with
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their vision of social purpose, thus investing them with the clearly
discernible local characteristics. Furthermore, the degree of public
contestation about the policy substance might be determined by the
degree of societal agreement or disagreement on the conception of
common good. Depending upon wider audiences‘ perception of this
social purpose as natural and self-evident, domestic policy
environment might ―immobilize‖ the proponents of alternative
conceptions of common good, which renders their policy proposals
inconsequential.

MUDDLING THROUGH THE CORE DEBATES
The overall intention of this section is to figure out whether my
emphasis on elites and intentional construction of social purpose is
warranted or should a methodological priority be given to the
inductive recovering of discursive formations. Going into the details of
these debates will help define the strength and limits of two
approached to identity formation. At the same time, I am not likely to
fill in all the lacunae of theorizing about identity here. The central
point of this section is that an emphasis on intentional elites does not
rule out the study of collective articulations.
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Theorizing elite-society connection is the first step in
understanding how elite-driven conception of common good becomes
socially legitimate and politically consequential. The literature is
divided into two camps. One group of scholars tends to concentrate on
the intentional and purposeful domestic elites, promulgating a
particular conception of common good, while paying only a superficial
attention to the study of deeply enrooted cognitive structures in which
all the members of society are socialized. Another group of scholars
pursues the opposite track. Both approaches seem to produce a
somewhat skewed picture of how national identity is generated. Both
approaches are empirically feasible, but they both have hard time in
unambiguously explaining whether the national identity is fully
enrooted, or remain a superficial edifice of public debates, or turn into
something consequential for the national policies. Currently available
middle-ground models leave too much of a space to speculate on the
relations between agency and structures in the process of developing
social purpose. The discussion below will clarify these limitations of
the both approaches, while the subsequent section will offer a decisive
framework to overcome their deficiencies.

Discourse and oversocialization
109

The first approach scrutinizes how discourses form a cognitive
structure, which constrains and/or enables elites to enact certain
political choices as legitimate and desirable.1 Scholars argue that a
detailed examination of the popular culture is helpful to start
conceptual and empirical work, because recovering domestic
discursive formations it safeguards scholars from imposing the outside
categories on the complex webs of meaning, which inform certain
kinds of actions and inhibit the others. As Weldes argues, ―official
representations depend on the cultural resources of society.‖ 2
This approach builds on hasty assumption elites and audiences
are invariably oversocialized.3 Agency is treated as a passive reader,
not an intentional producer of these discourses. First, this approach
rejects the possibility that identities and purposes are ―intentionally or
deliberately chosen, used, and/or strategically manipulated,‖4 or
―planned by intentional behavior.‖5 From my perspective it is
unwarranted to treat both elites and general public as incapable of
conscious and intentional interaction with available discourses. After
all, it is national elites and/or wider audiences which make some
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discourses politically consequential: common discursive streams can
be purely negative and thus not conducive to any socialization.6Some
empirical examples also suggest this possibility. In South Africa, for
instance, the broad discourse of ubuntu over the course of time was
deployed by elites to support the notions of reconciliatory justice,
market-friendly neoliberal orthodoxy, and even the South African
benevolent hegemony on the continent.
Second, with the exception of the pure totalitarian regimes, a
collective level of articulation is likely to comprise of more than one
discursive stream about identity and polity. Consider the following
examples directly relevant for the discussion in the subsequent
chapters. In South African context several overlapping and competing
principal discursive streams included South Africanism, Africanism,
pan-Africanism, black consciousness, and ethnic tribalism.7 In Russian
case, as Kathleen Smith has convincingly demonstrated, after the
demise of the USSR the formulation of the national identity (and thus
the universally accepted conception of common good) was trapped at
least in two mutually exclusive political mythologies. 8 Ted Hopf
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documents the presence of New Western Russian, New Soviet
Russian, Liberal Essentialist and Liberal Relativist identities, each
entailing alternative social purposes. Astrid Tuminez gives a detailed
description of five major contending variants of Russian nationalism in
the 1990s.9 From all these descriptions, it becomes clear that in the
1990s‘ Russia building a common social purpose was debilitated by
the multiple discourses, none of which had an exclusive hold on
agency.
The plurality of parallel discursive formations is not as rare as
it might seem. It most likely indicates that the nation/society embraces
a variety of alternative conceptions of common good, while its
national identity is fragmented or fractured. In a case of a highly
fragmented collective consciousness, political elites are expected to try
to transcend this fragmentation, offering a broader and more
encompassing imagery of the national purpose. Furthermore, with the
exception of states strictly exercising social control and censorship,
many alternative discoursers are likely to remain available for wider
audiences. For instance, while anti-communist sentiment today is
broadly articulated in the popular culture, including movies and
literature, so is the pro-communist stance (as the older soviet films and
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books still available and to a certain degree popular in Russia). Even if
submerged, or ―frozen,‖ alternative discursive formations might
permeate society and might hinder the official conception of common
good among wider audiences.
The availability of various parallel discourses and public
cultures, of course, is not a problem, unless we start making claims
about their political salience for constituting the logic of
appropriateness. If we claim that all these discourses simultaneously
shape the kinds of actions considered legitimate, then we are likely to
lose an analytical leverage in developing credible conjectures about
discourses‘ specific and falsifiable effects on behavior. If we claim
that only one out of many competing discourses becomes salient
politically, then we have to ascertain how and why this discursive
stream became dominant. Thus, instead of bracketing all non-dominant
discourses, we have to explore the reasons why particular discourses
about the nation become more attractive than others.
Third, Hopf indicates that reducing the study of national
purpose to the explicit (public) and internal debates about the goals of
the nation and power struggle inside domestic elite can be misleading
as it offers only a truncated version of the national purpose at best. In
other words, he argues against a very thin notion of societal collective
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self-understanding, in which discursive formations, historical
narratives, commemorative practices and collective memories are
reduced to a very specific proposal for the content of the national
identity/social purpose as offered by national (governmental,
parliamentary, bureaucratic) elite.10 In his view, the problem in all this
is losing the analytical protection from imposing the outside categories
on what appears to inform certain kinds of actions and inhibit the
others.
Yet taking stock of all potential discursive formations on the
basis of unsizeable number of texts, often containing complex,
contradictory, or even arcane meanings, seems to be unmanageable. It
will be always tempting to sneak in the questionable baggage of the
literary theory, offer highly idiosyncratic renditions of these texts, and
ascribe whatever meaning an analysts renders relevant. In the absence
of agency, using JM Coetzee‘s words, ―there is no dominating, central
authorial consciousness, and therefore no claim to truth or authority,
only competing voices and discourses.‖11 This means that excluding
agency from our analysis is prone of losing a grip on diverse and
multifaceted popular culture. A feared reduction, on the other hand,
might be a solution to avoid the massive work on collecting and

10
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interpreting popular culture texts and thus proves to be
methodologically more efficient.

Agency and intentionality
The second approach treats identity as intentional, which is helpful to
explain the selection among alternative discursive formations and an
increasing dominance of one of them.12 This perspective instructs us to
examine the direct political proposals for national/common good,
assessing how the public debates and political contestation shape the
resultant social purpose.13 This approach makes clear that individuals
and groups in authoritative positions in the political system are more
privileged at least in the initial spelling out and spreading their
versions of social purpose. Domestic political elites as such are able to
commit significant amount of resources, push their preferred policy
decisions, and override others. To refer to elites‘ primacy in building
politically suggestive discourses, Eric Hobsbawm, for instance,
brought out the notions of inculcation, semi-fiction, forgery, and
grafting.14 In her meticulously researched book Recovered Roots:
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For the further discussion on intentionality and identity, see Neumann 1999: 209,
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Neumann 1996, English 2000; Abdelal 2000.
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Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition, Yael
Zerubavel demonstrated that the articulations at a collective level were
straightforwardly authorized and legitimized by the Israeli state and
religious elite. 15 Thus, Zerubavel empirically found that ―the concept
of invented tradition suggests a more conscious attempt to produce
new cultural forms that seem as if they are of older origin.‖16
The major caveat here stems from the apparent tendency to
overestimate the power of elites in imposing the invented ―traditions‖
on their nations and manipulating their constituents. Scholars seem to
be conscious about this problem, yet often admit having no analytical
tools to qualify the limits of this alleged imposition of elite-generated
set of beliefs, symbols and traditions on society. 17 Many a scholar
working in the ―invented tradition‖ paradigm examined cases, in
which domestic contestation of alternative discourses was simply
lacking. Thus, they were empirically restrained from ascertaining
contending and equally suggestive ―traditions.‖ This limitation still
lingers. Achille Mbembe‘s argument is a case in point. He reasons that
political elites possess enormous power in creating and unleashing
politically meaningful discourses. Yet he remains quite elusive as to
how they make these discourses and concepts effective: ―...the
15

Zerubavel 1995: 79—137.
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champions of state power invent entire constellation of ideas; they
adopt a distinct set of cultural repertoires and powerfully evocative
concepts; but they also resort, if necessary, to the systematic
application of pain.‖18
Let us put these considerations in the context of my units of
analysis. In Russia circa 2000 President Vladimir Putin and his
entourage spend significant efforts to build the new social purpose,
styling it as the ―Sovereign Democracy.‖ In the similar way, South
African President Thabo Mbeki called to ―bring into being a unified
and common South African identity‖ under the label of African
Renaissance.19 While these two articulations are clearly intentional and
innovative, they nevertheless are grounded is some previous political
symbols and articulations. Russian political elite tapped into the old
―textbook‖ themes (strong state, state-led economy, and great power
complex), which had been abundantly represented in public culture.
Similarly the African Renaissance flatly drew on very broad and
variegated anti-colonial discourses of Pixley ka Isaka Seme, Frantz
Fannon, Sheik Anta Diop, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah,
Steve Biko, and Mahmood Mamdani. One thing remains clear so far:
the efficacy of offering unfamiliar (or highly innovative) political
18
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proposals and discursive resources to wider audiences is likely to be
costly and time-consuming. 20 In this sense, popular culture is so much
a pliable building-block, as a factor which increases or decreases the
appeal of elite‘s message to wider audiences.
The second principal limitation of this approach is its inability
to capture the role of wider audiences. Overstressing the role of elites
turns wider audience into mere recipients and carriers of some elitegenerated proposals for the nation. Audiences, however, possess a
capacity to collectively generate and maintain different proposals, as
well as select or reject the elite-driven conception of social purpose. In
doing so, audiences put significant constraints on elites: As persistent
as elites can be in promoting their narrow conception of common
good, in certain circumstances they have to ground their discourse into
what is available and popular at the level of collectivity. From these
shortcomings it becomes clear that without examining collective
articulations at a broader level of collectivity, we will be unable to
ascertain why a particular social purpose gains a wide-spread social
legitimacy.
Finally, to use this approach more effectively we have to define
what types of agency do we have and how various agencies are

20
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connected in their mutual shaping of social purpose (see Figure 3.1). I
distinguish domestic political elite, articulated audience, and general
public, each with its own particular type of discursive activity. Elite is
defined here as a small group of people with a very high position in the
political system (ruling class), which generally formulates the
conception of common good and triggers the process of its
legitimation. Elite is supported by those who make politics their
profession (e.g., ―articulated audiences,‖ ―political class‖). I use this
term to point up its meaning as ―a body of adherents,‖ acolytes and
devotees of domestic political elites, rather than a passive group of
spectators, listeners, and consumers. This category is an assemblage of
those scholars, journalists, belletrists, opinion leaders, TV hosts,
documentary producers, who are not free (or chose to not be) to
articulate any discourses, who accept the limits of officially sanctioned
formulations. The attention to articulated audiences helps properly
theorizing the connection between decision-making elites and
domestic society. Building on Yitzhak Brudny, I prefer this neutral
definition instead of rather pejorative tags such as court intellectuals
and ―spin-doctors.‖ 21

21
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Wider audiences ―participate actively in the formation of both
identity and interests,‖22 inasmuch as public culture (in its various
popular genres) supports of rejects the elite-generated conception of
common good (or any of its particular substantive components). In the
second section of this chapter I offer the framework overcoming the
limitations of both approaches, while building on their stronger sides.
Figure 3.1: Major processes in social purpose

THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
This section develops a general theoretical framework of social
purpose, which can be applied cross-nationally and is subsequently
used to structure two empirical chapters. I distinguish tree types of
agency, including domestic political elite, articulated audiences, and
general public, each connected to each other in mutually generating
social purpose. To facilitate understanding how certain elite-driven
conceptions of common good become socially legitimate I also
delineate between several types of activities. Subsequently linking
these dimensions together will provide a coherent framework to
analyze political construction of national purpose (visually represented
22

Neumann 1999: 223.
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in Figure 3.1).

The proposed framework is not only a template I use

to progress through next two empirical chapters of this dissertation,
but also a broader tool to make sense of a set of interrelated discursive
activities in a society (which previously have not been put together
into one comprehensive framework). This framework is helpful to
compare social purposes, overcoming many profound differences in
their country- and time-contingent contents. At the end of each
subsection I would provide four indicators, designed to rank each
discursive activity separately. In the last section of this chapter I will
bring all these rankings together in order to define possible variations
in social purpose as a variable. As social purpose varies in its domestic
acceptance, its various rankings imply different ramifications how
external policy prescriptions and initiative are likely to be filtered
through the domestic policy environment.
Because national purposes are constructed via discursive
activities, discourse analysis is the methodology employed in the
relevant empirical chapters. The so-called ―canonical texts‖ are very
importance since political actors anchor their understanding and
discussion of national identity to them. Canonical texts include
original texts elaborating on the desired conception of common good
for the purposes of generating the subsequent discussion. Most
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notably, they include presidents‘ addresses to domestic elite and key
statements of its chief ideologists. 23 More specifically, they comprise
available public statements, white papers, political party platforms,
parliamentary debates, newspaper articles. The sampling of supportive
texts is stipulated by the standard consideration of their position inside
political discourse as secondary to canonical texts and their timeextensive impact on wider audiences as the primary target. The
sampling allows the variation of sources, i.e., statements, interviews,
articles from different leading newspapers and journals, as well as
variation in authors. Other important sources may include various
debates among top political leaders, key intellectuals, highly acclaimed
public persons, and prominent political observers. For the following
two empirical chapters, I have drawn on 200 textual sources for each
case. Two other basic options used by the discourse analysts—either to
use the most controversial texts as the primary object of analysis, or
use ethnographic/anthropological approach in inductively
reconstructing the social identification—are not employed here. The
first option limits the scope of articulation and debates inasmuch as it
describes only the borderlines of public discourse. i.e., provides a list

23
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of necessary, but not sufficient texts for research. 24 The second gives
somewhat arbitrary aggregation of the individual discourses to the
collective level (it is also hardly falsifiable). 25 The canonical texts and
supportive materials embrace a wider spectrum of articulations than
either borderline or individual articulations. 26 My research is
especially interested in foundational proposals, which are centerpieces
of elite‘s thinking about national purpose.

Social purpose and elite‘s commitments
The notion of commitment to providing common goods is used here to
describe an extant elite‘s explicit articulation of a certain conception of
common good as a necessary condition for the country‘s sustainability
and even its survival as an autonomous political organization.
Commitments are expressed in publicly available discourses, political
programs, interviews, and so on. 27 Strong commitments and
[successfully] acting on them powerfully reaffirms elite‘s sense of
self-efficacy and self-esteem. At the same time, elites might become
ultimately vulnerable: Not providing this common good might

24
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jeopardize their reputation, sense of worthiness, and political fate.
Elite‘s commitment is a tip of the iceberg in terms of whether or not
this conception of common good truly becomes a socially accepted
and legitimate. Yet it is a good starting point to evaluate the
emergence of social purpose. As social purpose is intentionally
projected by elites onto domestic constituency as the primary target
audience, it might be erroneously viewed as a kind of governmental
propaganda.
As I empirically demonstrate in Chapter 4, Russian political
elite was spearheaded by siloviki, i.e. the members of the so-called
power ministries with law enforcement, military, and secret police
backgrounds.28 Siloviki unequivocally styled themselves as the
champions of the strong state as the core political value with a strong
state apparatus (vlast‘, gosudarstvennost‘), emphasizing the role of
state in economic delivery, and ensuring Russia‘s great power status in
global politics. Siloviki claimed these prescriptions were vital for the
existence and survival of the country. In South Africa (Chapter 5) I
discuss the concept of the African Renaissance. In this country, the
leading role in articulating social purpose belonged to the so-called
―Mbekiites,‖ or loyalists (who sometimes called themselves nativists,
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for the lack of the better term). This subset of domestic political elite
committed itself for indigenousness as a core political value, explicitly
promoted marketization with the increasing undesirability of spending
and redistribution, and unleashed the rhetoric of the country‘s
leadership role on the continent (ubuntu). Notwithstanding the
richness, complexity and diversity of the multiple societal
interpretations attached to the term, these three core organizing
prescriptions clearly stood out as the principal themes.
Where do these specific substantive components of social
purpose come from? In the framework of this research I will be able to
give only tentative answers (the summary of core substantive
components of social purpose in two countries is given in the Table
1.3 below). The starting point of social purpose formation is the
exogenous shock–the collapse of the previous political regime or the
whole international system, sometimes aggravated by protracted
transitional periods. During these transitional periods, political elites
embark on searching a new conception of common good for the
country. Certainly, political elites both draw on and respond to their
immediate global environments and to the backdrop of a dismantled
political regime. At the same time, their proposals in essence spring
from a range of contingent beliefs about common good as related to
the extant elite‘s identity.
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First, various forms of cultural and political homogenization—
which we often subsume under the rubric of globalization—trigger the
formulation of the primary political component of social purpose.
More accurately, the perceived threat of homogenization (or, in some
cases Westernization) stimulates domestic elites to reformulate and
reassert what makes their extant in-groups and polities distinct in the
world where the spheres of authority and borders are increasingly
blurred. In the context of South Africa, the national elite reclaimed the
meaning of being ―African‖ and imbued it with a new sense of pride.
This process was fundamentally similar to how many decolonizing
nations in the second half of the 20th century asserted their national
self-efficacy and self-esteem via innovative socio-political concepts.29
In Russian circumstances, political elites made ―stateness‖ the core
marker of their difference from the West with the value of the strong
state power (vlast‘, gosudarstvennost‘) at the core of the conception of
common good.
Second, social purpose has an economic dimension, which in
the developing world is formulated often in response to organizational
and normative models originating in the North. While the current
antiglobalization movement is spearheaded against economic
neoliberalism, the principles of marketization, deregulation, and
29
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privatization seem to have gained momentum after the global collapse
of administrative-planned economies.30 The strong emphasis placed on
social redistribution of wealth, among other principles touted by the
communist states, lost its legitimacy and was replaced by the so-called
Washington Consensus in the 1990s. In various domestic contexts,
however, the neoliberal policies had different fates. In South Africa the
impetus of global economic neoliberalism as promoted by
international financial institutions was intensified by negative
memories of state-led economic disempowerment during the apartheid
regime. Thus, not surprisingly, despite sharp domestic debate and
much criticism, a new South African identity embraced neoliberal
ideals, rather than social welfare principles.31 In Russian political
context, the reliance on marketization and deregulation was overturned
in favor of state-led economic development, after unpopular and not
always fully implemented economic reforms of the 1990s. The
problems in economic development were attributed to the negligence
and unwillingness to use the state to exercise its power as an economic
regulator.
Third, building social purpose necessitates an
international/global dimension as well. Elites are likely to formulate
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their conception of common good in the context of the world system,
which pressures states to define their own structural position in it.
Elites pitch themselves as the ultimate champions of the state‘s
desirable systemic position and imbue this position with a strong
feeling of self-esteem. Advocates for any other position in the system
are likely to get chastised as the promoters of the county‘s subordinate
role, entailing the inevitable loss of sovereignty. After the exogenous
shock of the late 1980—early 1990s, Russia‘s political elite
downplayed the discourse of Russia as a great power at the
international arena and instead talked about reentering the ―common
European house.‖ When siloviki came to power in the early 2000s,
they pledged to rectify the perceived loss of the nation‘s self-efficacy
and revamped Russia as a great power (derzhava). This strongly
implied that in any other international status Russia is likely to cease to
exist as an autonomous political organization. In South Africa, Mbeki
and his entourage also sought to boost the country‘s self-esteem as the
primary and the sole expresser of a continental solidarity, and to a
certain degree developed its image as a benevolent hegemon. In both
cases, elites rejected Western values and asserted their own importance
for the international system operating smoothly and for guaranteeing
regional and global stability.
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Table 3.1 National purpose in Russia and South Africa

In sum, I assert that exploring elite‘s commitments is a good
starting point to ascertain the presence or absence of elite-generated
self-reflective and intentional effort to develop national purpose. To
assert this emergence, in the following subsections I discuss how
domestic articulated audiences exercise their influence on policy
environment and to what extend the elite-driven articulations find the
support in the public culture. I would rank an extant elite‘s
commitment to the conception of common good as follows:


Elites do not commit to any definite country-specific
conception of common good (absent);



Contending elites strongly commit to alternative conceptions
of common good (fractured);



Elite strongly commits to a certain conception of common
good, while its potential contenders chose not to (or simply
cannot) challenge it overtly (restrained);



Elite is strongly consolidated around a certain conception of
common good (consolidated).
Yet from mere empirical description of domestic claims at the

top political level about the search or emergence of national identity at
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it is not always possible to arrive at a solid conclusion whether or not
elite-driven articulations indicate the emergence of national purpose.

Social purpose and its public legitimacy
Social legitimacy of an elite-generated conception of common good
depends on its public acceptance, as prompted by the so-called
articulated audiences. Articulated audience labors to turn elitegenerated conception of common good into broadly resonating and
recognizable, sometimes simplified, themes. In essence, articulated
audiences connect elites to general public.
Elites are likely to stimulate the emergence of articulated
audiences, which justify why certain kinds of action are appropriate
and why the others should be considered inappropriate. First,
articulated audiences enable or constrain the production of certain
resources shift the balance between previous discursive formations.
Second, as elites relate providing common good to the desired image
of the self as a primary or even sole carrier of its exact conception,
articulated audiences ground a promoted conception of common good
in particular self-Other dichotomies. If their efforts prove to be
successful, articulated audiences turn a specific conception of common
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good into simplified, broadly resonating and recognizable, perhaps
even undisputable, themes.
In the absence of intentional efforts to credibly inject social
purpose to the public intersubjective understanding, it is not likely to
take roots. Smith, for instance, convincingly demonstrated that
Yeltsin‘s failure in embedding pro-liberal social purpose stemmed
from his entourage‘s negligence towards the would-be highly
important symbolic national events, such as the resistance to the
August 1991 putsch. 32 In the 1990s‘ South Africa Archbishop
Desmond Tutu promoted the notion of ubuntu (the universal bond of
sharing that connects all humanity) and the idea of the Rainbow
Nation as the country‘s social purpose. These concepts were seen as
potentially accommodating all contending social values and thus
ushering a broad social consensus as an ultimate political goal.33 In
both cases it was the absence of decisive and consistent efforts to
stimulate the wider awareness and public acceptance of these
conceptions, rather than the unattractiveness of the proposals
themselves.
First, this thinking about the importance of providing
discursive resources to the society draws on and refines the earlier
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literatures on the ―invention of a tradition‖ as described in the previous
sections. Most commonly elite-friendly resources are carried out via
national educational systems, specific commemoration practices, and
museums. Other tools may include creating forests and parks,
codifying literary language, implementing architectural styles, touting
cultural heritage, establishing research institutes dedicated to a
particular topic, as well as preserving archeological sites, tombs,
monuments, and even mountains. 34 Although not exhaustive, this list
aspires to show the most important discursive resources, which can
become politically consequential in the context of contemporary
politics. In different regional, national, and subnational contexts, the
value of different discursive resources varies. One type of resource—
the past—deserves a special attention.
Since the advent of modern nationalism, the role of historical
narratives and the past was deemed to be especially effective in
legitimizing elites‘ political goals and political proposals.35 Ernest
Gellner, Terrence Ranger, and Eric Hobsbawm suggested the
importance of developing binding historical narratives, supported by a
single official language and spreading literacy as vehicles of providing
34
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elite-oriented discursive resources. Later on, scholars specified this
assertion by indicating that history was important inasmuch it allowed
securing the political meaning of some ―big,‖ or ―liminal‖ events. 36
Historical education has been broadly suggested as one of the most
common means get the political message ―outreached‖ to the society
to build a national identity and legitimize elites‘ mission.37
In Russia, for instance, national purpose has been embedded in
the politics of the past, which aimed at reshaping the political memory
of the XXth century and creating the discursive continuity among
imperial past, communist regime, and Putin‘s increasingly autocratic
rule. More specifically, Putin‘s entourage conducted intentional,
systematic and almost decade-long activities to stigmatize the
democratic politics of the 1990s, and glorify the Soviet role in the socalled Great Patriotic War. In South Africa, past was used to generate
an invented tradition too. Articulated audiences presented the past of
the continent as an incredibly rich resource to be reappropriated for an
intellectual and spiritual revival. They claimed that the continental past
meant as much for South African Renaissance as the Greek antiquity
meant for the Renaissance Europe.38 Building relevant discursive
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resources included the active role of the Human Sciences Research
Council (HSRC) and a Council for the Development of Social Science
Research in Africa (CODESRIA), which streamlined and valorized the
African intellectual traditions. In fact, their publications were targeted
to invent a tradition and generate a set of new canonic cultural
landmarks for the contemporary South Africa.
Yet stimulating discursive resources is not as trifle a task as it
seems: deploying potentially very powerful symbols and collective
images may be in vain. In Russia the new national holiday Day of
National Unity, for instance plugged into the pre-revolutionary holiday
of the Day of the Icon of the Kazan Mother of God and
commemoration of the overturning the Polish occupation of the
country in 1612.39 On the other hand, it was designed to move away
from communist commemorations and replace by and large
meaningless the Day of Accord and Reconciliation — Yeltsin‘s
substitute to the October Revolution day. As many political observers
explained, the true meaning of the day is was not really about history:
it was supposed to seal symbolically the official rendition of the ―wild
1990‖ by commemorating the ending of the protracted period of state
weakness and the undermined national sovereignty. Yet this resource
turned out not to be immediately successful, as during the first years of
39

See Nazarov 2004; Gromov 2005a; Ivanov 2005; Nikonov 2006; Borodina 2008.

134

its celebrations the radical ethnic movements successfully highjacked
it for their own purposes. Thus, simply tapping in what is readily
available in the pre-existing collective discourses might not be enough
for legitimizing social purpose: the discovery of and interest to some
resources, as it happened with Russia discovering its pre-communist
past, does not automatically convert these resources into politically
salient and consequential topics.
Second, elites do not exist in a political and social vacuum;
they are likely to face domestic actors which embrace alternative
conceptions of common good. Because the members of extant elite
group strongly attach the conception of common good to its own
identity and reputation, its opponents are most likely to be designated
as the Other. Since they challenge the advocated conception of
common good, the Other is cast as undermining the country‘s political
sustainability and survivability. Articulated audiences create a strong
national ―we‖ against sordid anti-national ―they.‖ The Other receives a
spate of negative characteristics and is suspected to play the subversive
role. In various circumstances, political Others may be pejoratively
labeled as turncoats, fellow travelers, public enemies, pessimists, antipatriots, and so on.
If the self-Other dichotomy is successfully deployed, a more
embedded (intersubjectively shared) national purpose is more likely to
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emerge. In different historical, cultural and temporal circumstances
building this Self/Other imagery may start with already available and
constraining perceptions of who the contending political actors are at
the level of broader audiences. Alternatively, this imagery may be the
result of a pure invention. Putin‘s entourage conducted intentional,
systematic and almost decade-long activities to embed his conception
of common good by holding the democratic politics of the 1990s
responsible for the collapse of the state, loss of national self-efficacy
and self-esteem. The newly found Other was a domestic liberal,
allegedly striving to ―dismember‖ the state, offer its ―juicy morsels‖ to
Russia‘s foreign rivals, and certainly make Russia get down on her
knees before the West. Similar dynamic can be traced in South Africa.
In developing African Renaissance, its chief proponents successfully
pitched it against Afro-pessimists, settlers and neo-colonialists, who
schemed to keep South Africa subjugated to the West, denying her
subjectivity, and treating the Native like a child.
I would rank the extent to which a certain conception of
common good is legitimized in domestic society as follows:


Conceptions of common good lack any definite legitimating
discourses , self-Other dichotomies blurred (absent);



All contending conceptions of common good enjoy are
supported by plurality of discourses (fractured);
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Only one conception of common good is explicitly supported
and intentionally promulgated (restrained);



Only one conception of common good is strongly legitimized
with a single dominant self-Other dichotomy (consolidated).

The caveat here is that the outcome of these legitimizing is not
predetermined. In the contexts of deeply split societies, alleviating
gulfs among diverse audiences is likely to be needed. Yet it is possible
that building resources intended to traverse the divide between various
separate identity formulations and discourses could make the appeal of
the elite‘s conception of social purpose rather weak and eclectic. In the
1990s‘ Russia, Yeltsin‘s task force in charge of formulating the
concept of ―national idea for Russia‖ on the basis of taking stock of all
discourses and ideas flowing in the society failed dramatically. 40 At
the same time, in some extraordinary cases, elites will try to constrain
dangerous or undesirable discourses.41 This may lead to the outright
criminalization of some political interpretations, or a variety of legal
penalties for public usage of certain not desirable articulations. 42 All
this suggests that the successful production of new national rituals and
40
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narratives should be attributed not to the forceful imposition from
above, but rather to the collaborative efforts of wider audiences.43 The
role of wider audiences is discussed in the subsection below.

Social purpose and public culture
Studying popular articulations is important inasmuch it is generally
acknowledged that if the formulation of national identity/purpose (no
matter how compelling inside an elite group) is not linked to the
principal popular discourses, it remains either limited to a particular
political group, or constricted to the elite. In other words, the emphasis
on the popular culture captures the idea that it is a ―vessel‖ expressing
and sustaining wider audiences‘ perceptions of a certain conception of
common good and makes it self-explanatory and not contestable. In
this subsection I address the ways to conceive popular culture as a
[re]source shaping social purpose. As there is much debate and even
confusion in the literature on how to employ popular culture without
making unfalsifiable subjective interpretations, addressing this
question is important.44 Detailed accounts showing how, why and
what type of resources can be best used to characterize national
purpose in two selected countries are provided in subsequent chapters.
43
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Popular culture is a ―vessel‖ expressing and sustaining wider
audiences‘ perceptions of what the nation is. It contains certain
discursive streams—distinct, coherent and fairly elaborate narratives
about national identity found at the level of collectivity, independent
from what elites want to inculcate. Popular culture is studied here to
tease out discernible overarching themes supporting or elite-driven
articulations related to national identity and social purpose. When
recovering identities from a collective level, scholars underscore that
national identity is a cultural product, expressed in variegated textual
sources and embedded at the level of collectivity. If national identity at
the collective level can be retrieved from popular culture, looking at
fictional works in principle can become useful. As Hopf—perhaps
one of the preeminent expressers of this approach—put it, ―popular
fictional works are an especially important source of identity and its
discursive practices‖.45
In certain cases, a discursive formation could contain a single
convincing elaboration of national imageries. On the other hand, there
can be multiple discursive streams at the level of collectivity,
embracing different understandings of the self. To make the study
manageable, I am specifically interested to see whether popular
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Hopf 2002: 35. Besides Hopf, Olcot (2001) provides a very insightful analysis of
the contemporary pulp-fiction.
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articulations contain the self/Other dichotomies similar to what elites
promote, whether popular articulations in general match the content of
elite-generated conception of common good, which would strongly
suggest the connection between elite and society and thus attest to the
strength of the national purpose. The proposed way to address these
questions culminates in my model of discursive activities shaping
national purpose (Figure 3.1). It suggests that wider audiences
generate these streams, while elites can tap into them to [re]generate
the desired self/Other dichotomies and enhance their political
proposals for the national existence. Thus, my approach requires
evaluating whether there are prominent narratives in which elites can
successfully tap into, rather than aspiring to cover all potential
collective articulations in the sample of popular culture.
In studying popular articulations, the first methodological
obstacle comes from the very nature of popular fiction, which may
either evade any straightforward interpretation, or offer even
conflicting messages —the quality that makes fictional works so
creative and interesting to consume and interpret.46 Thus, the clarity of
the message could be considerably blurred. For the purposes of this
study, it is necessary to explain how the multifaceted body of domestic
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For the particular examples of how malleable popular culture woks can be, see
Chait 2000, Hozic 2003, Diala 2003.
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popular culture can be used as a reliable indicator of a particular
national identity and national purpose. Evoking popular culture for the
analysis of the national identity can be suggestive if a scholar finds
widely accepted interpretation of the textual or visual sources instead
of deconstructing/interpreting them from scratch. One way to address
the issue is to examine secondary commentaries, which, of course,
may miss some minor point of any given item, but nevertheless may
signal certain societal sensibilities.
Furthermore, another challenge in examining popular culture
stems from its very nature, which is first and foremost about
entertainment, rather than intentional conveying politically meaningful
messages.47 In any case, an interpreter might be tempted to
overestimate the significance of some random, single textual or visual
quotes imbued with political points. Rather, I would try to retrieve
some broader core themes, which stand out among the multiple
artifacts of the popular culture, which may shape collective
consciousness, and which could become politically suggestive. Public
culture, thus, is studied here not only to tease out broad discernible
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In such cases, popular culture should be understood as dependent on articulated
audiences and thus an integral part of intentional attempts to build public legitimacy.
Popular culture should express and carry collective notions, while somehow
reflecting on the broad socio-political events and themes used by elites and
articulated audiences to substantiate their proposal for the nation. In this case, these
resources are more likely to receive public commentaries, so that my interpretation
can be supplementary reliable.
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themes, but to stipulate what themes and presentations are missing at
the level of collectivity (and thus presenting a challenge to providing
discursive resources). In sum, the tasks pursued in studying
articulation are quite modest. I am not trying to recover all the
available formations, or explain them in intricate details (a-la Hopf), or
precisely relate them to each other.
The second methodological issue concerns sampling. An
accurate sampling of domestic popular articulations is inevitably more
difficult than finding the elite-formulated proposals to the nations. As
the truly comprehensive survey of popular culture is hardly possible,
theoretically-informed selection of particular type of information and
kind of resources for national purpose is imperative. As the usage of
popular culture in political science remains debated and somewhat
confused, the methodological comments are imperative. Scholars often
make use of only the extremely popular and highly acclaimed cultural
items. The more recent groundbreaking studies employ a variety of
textual and visual sources, choosing them mostly on the basis of their
overall popularity. Among key examples are Harry Potter series, Star
Trek TV show, Big Brother, Hollywood war movies, and comic
books.48 While I agree with the use of popular movies as a
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For the analysis of these sources see, respectively, Nexon and Neumann 2006;
Weldes 2003; Dolby 2006, Gallager 2008, Hajdu 2008.
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representation of what is conventional and broadly shared in a given
collectivity, the implicit notion that popularity matters has to be
explained further. Moreover, in order to understand the limits of public
articulation of certain topics within the framework of discourse
analysis (acceptance of variation or degree within a certain narrative),
the sample of popular culture has to include both popularity and
marginal items. While the generic notion of being popular stands for
wider audience‘s cumulatively positive response to certain types of
articulations, it is also helpful to know at what point they start
responding negatively inside the same articulation/stream. The sample,
therefore, has to make use of both canonic, highly praised as well as
mainstream and even marginal or rejected resources.
Below I propose several additional considerations guiding my
sampling and interpreting collective articulations. First and foremost,
these popular sources should be diverse (in their themes, numbers,
producers, and targeted audiences) in order to contain, at least in
principle, more than one self-Other dichotomy. If we look at fiction,
the books we examine should not come out from the same publishing
house; if we examine films, they should not be produced by the same
studio, or directed by the same set of directors, screenwriters etc. The
selected genre should not target only one segment of society. Besides,
popular sources should not be dominated (censored) by domestic
143

political elite. This means, that the selected genre should be relatively
free from intentional manipulation and thus should be analytically
separate from elite-driven development of discursive resources.
Finally, what type of popular culture is most relevant and
insightful for the study of national identity? It is clear that the vast
field of popular culture should not be trimmed down, say, only to
books and films, even if assuming we can take stock of all relevant
sources. Eric Helleiner pioneered studies of currency iconography to
examine as a technique of ―nation-branding‖ and symbol of
nationalism use.49 Comparing to fiction and even feature films, these
artifacts may prove to be more important for expressing national
identities, as they are used on the daily basis almost by everyone, and
perhaps slowly but inadvertently percolating into the national
consciousness. However, it is methodologically advisable to use the
same genre of popular culture to have a stronger control, especially if
we want to recover identities over a longer time span. Also, using the
mixture of different genres and textual sources of popular culture can
be very confusing to the reader.50
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Helleiner 1998; Helleiner 2002. For more specific examples see, for instance,
Cusack 2005 for the study of the postage stamps of Portugal to transmit its
nationalist and colonial ideology; Fuller 2008 on Kwame Nkrumah‘s image minted
on Ghana‘s coins to serve the nationalist argument from sign; Hymans 2010 on the
study of Central and Eastern European banknotes to emulate the Western currency.
50
Hopf (2002: 34-35) includes academic journals, newspaper personal memoires,
pulp fiction, and textbooks in his sample.
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The remainder of this subsection briefly discusses why have
been selected feature films for the Russian Federation and fictional
prose for South Africa. [South] African fiction historically remained
very outward-oriented and speaks more directly to the Western
readership, as JM Coetzee asserts in his description of a fictional
Elizabeth Costello‘s pessimism about the quality and sensibilities of
African writing.51 Most importantly, South African popular fiction has
long operated in what can be described as a ―politically demanding
milieu‖ and thus initially qualifies to be become the resource to forge
the nation. It is well-suited to deal with the questions of morality, is
conducive to the purposes of political mobilization and restructuring
African identities, as Michael Chapman claims in his very important
and multidimensional treatise of the contemporary state of popular
culture in South Africa.52 Sam Durrant attributes to the postcolonial
literatures both the healing, therapeutic, transformative role and thus
capable of bringing the nation to the ―roots.‖ In general, because the
contemporary South African literature is highly politicized and has
stimulated a significant body of political commentaries it fits the
purposes of my discussion.

51
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Coetzee 2003: 35—58, ―Lesson 2: The Novel in Africa.‖
Chapman 2006: 43—46, 75, 87, see also Coetzee 2001:209.
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In Russian case there is no shortage of pop culture resources to
be used to study the country‘s identity. Since the early 1990s domestic
interest to national identity was abundantly supplied by quasi-accurate
novels of questionable literary merits, facsimile reprints of prerevolution historical narratives and grotesque historical pamphlets,
which flooded the bookstores and street kiosks. Circa the early 1990s
the sublime role of respected and influential historians, producing
narratives about the past and reopening the forgotten and heavily
censored histories was superseded by various segments of popular
culture, which should be considered much better expresser of Russian
identity. This dissertation makes use of domestic present-day feature
films. The importance of the political role films and TV plays in
contemporary Russia is widely acknowledged in literature.53 Indeed, in
the 2000s the role of domestic movies became evermore important as
evident by the increase of the number of filmed movies and their
relative box-office success versus foreign ones. Studying film industry
is warranted in the context of current semi-politicized claims of the
significance of film industry for the national consciousness. 54
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See, for instance, Swaffar 2000; Mickiewicz 1999; Mickiewicz 2008
For the detailed discussion, see Vsevolod Brodskij and Anna Starobinec. 2005.
Vyjti iz sumraka. Expert №3 (450).; Borusjak, Ljubov'. 2008. Opravdanie serialov:
Televizionnye zametki. Polit.ru, 19 ijunja 2008.
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I would rank the extent to which public culture supports a
certain conception of common good as follows:


Absence of discernible and elaborate discursive streams as related
to conceptions of common good (absent);



Public culture supports a plurality of contending articulations of
common good (fractured);



Public culture partially supports a dominant articulation of
common good, including some of its substantive components
(restrained);



Public culture strongly supports a dominant articulation of
common good, including its all substantive components
(consolidated).

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PURPOSE ON PUBLIC POLICY
This dissertation asserts that social purpose informs the kinds of
actions the ruling elite considers appropriate, and helps ascertaining
how domestic policy environment interacts with international
recommendations flowing through it (including HIV/AIDS policy
initiatives). In essence, when sorting through international policy
recommendations, elites answer the fundamental questions how to
define the guidelines of the provision of a particular public good
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(treatment), which populations should benefit or be excluded from the
consumption of public good (universality of access), and who gets to
participate in shaping public health policy (partnership). On the other
hand, as social purpose varies in its domestic acceptance, its various
rankings might shape the intensity and nature of the domestic
contestation around external policy prescriptions. Thus, this variance is
likely to affect how exactly the external initiative are likely to be
filtered through the domestic policy environment. While I am not
claiming that social purpose should be treated as the single explanation
of the variation in how governments and societies adopt external
international policy recommendations, on balance it tells us an
important and previously overlooked story about the political
determinants of domestic policy responses.
The biggest challenge is perhaps to provide a valid way to rank
national purpose. Giving ranking is important and might help
formulate and sharpen previously underspecified conjectures about the
effects of identity policy formulation and implementation. Scholars
using elite-oriented approach use several indicators to classify the
degree of elite consensus on national identity. These indicators include
how many political parties commit to the similar conception of
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common good.55 Another indicator is the endurance of a certain social
purpose even after particular individuals or the elite group, which
generated it, are no longer in power. In this case, the strongest
empirical evidence would be if multiple consecutive governments
share the same identity.56 The downside is that these indicators are
case-driven and have only limited validity. In this context, my
framework of analysis provides more straightforward guidelines to
rank social purpose and think about its effects of policy process (see
Table 3.2):
Table 3.2 Ranking social purpose

Generally, this ranking is based on evaluating the extent to which elitegenerated conception of common good get to shape the domestic
policy environment. These distinctions are important. Consider, for
instance, situation when powerful elites carry out certain kinds of
policy actions they consider legitimate, while society strongly
embraces alternative conceptions of common good. This can trigger a
profound societal contestation with different implications for policy
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Abdelal 2000: 94, 96. My ranking builds on Abdelal‘s insights that social purpose
is has to be examined not only by revealing its content, but also by the degree of
contestation around it. His National Purpose in the World Economy tentatively
delineated between absence and presence of such political contestation.
56
Schwartz 2005
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process. I delineate between absent, fractured, restrained, and
consolidated rankings of social purpose.
In case if elites demonstrate no strong commitment to a
conception of common good, all alternative kinds of actions are
legitimate; the policy environment is likely to be dominated by
different bureaucratic agencies, which are expected to pursue their
narrowly defined tasks. In the opposite case (social purpose
consolidated), it prompts a relatively coherent and elaborate policy
response, which brings together previous uncommitted domestic
public policy initiatives approaches.
At minimum, in case of fractured, restrained and consolidated
social purposes elites possess an ability to influence the content of the
external recommendations and policy initiatives, investing them with
the clearly discernible local characteristics. Reus-Smit, for instance,
offers an example from the contemporary American politics, where the
neoconservative conception of common good did not become a
national purpose, while nevertheless shaping American foreign policy
agenda.57 Furthermore, elites can achieve a success in getting their
particular iteration of common good to be supported by articulated
audiences and embedded in collective articulations, expressed in the
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Reus-Smit 2004.
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means of popular culture. This strongly implies a public acceptance of
a distinct social purpose and generally delegitimizes any alternative
conceptions of common good, which might be considered only with
serious reservations.
At maximum, domestic policy environment—if significantly
shaped by elite-friendly discourses—can simultaneously empower
various groups if favor of governmental policies, and disempower
various nongovernmental organizations, civil society groups, and
social movements with the set of demands conflicting and inconsistent
with the official policy responses. In this context, alternative
behavioral choices might be advocated either moderately, or might not
be consequential for the formulation and implementation of the public
policy at all. Overall, the strength and limits of political mobilization
in given societies is likely to be shaped by the extent to which
alternative behavioral choices become either delegitimized, or simply
not considered as viable in a given domestic policy environment. Thus,
the degree of public contestation about the policy substance might be
determined by the degree of societal agreement or disagreement on the
conception of common good.
As will be demonstrated in my empirical chapters, social
purposes in two countries remained restrained (leaning consolidated in
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Russia and leaning fractured in South Africa), yet combined with
elite‘s strong commitment to their conception of common good it
triggered certain policy responses (the kinds of actions) they
considered legitimate. This type of consensus emerges when one subelite group strongly espouses a conception of common good and is
able to act on and enforce it. At the same time, wider audiences might
inherently disagree with the promoted conception of common good,
but for a variety of reasons might conform to it and if chooses to
dispute it publicly, does so in a very subdued manner. At the margins,
other sub-elite groups and political parties keep advocating radically
different set of political obligations, engrained in a different set of
values. I roughly describe this as a power-based (restrained) consensus
on social purpose. The power-based consensus might be expected to
shape the policy environment, but in the long term remain inherently
weak and unstable. In this context, my most general empirical
argument is that the obsession with strong state and security in Russia
created a policy environment, which delegitimized liberal approaches
(with the strong focus on human rights and partnership with nonstate
sector) to the looming health crisis. In South Africa, the obsession with
local solutions and return to the roots delegitimized mainstream
western biomedical approaches to curbing HIV/AIDS.
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CONCLUSION
Chapters 4 and 5 explore the national purpose in the Russian
Federation and South Africa separately from the HIV/AIDS policy,
using the model advanced in Chapter 3. I am interested in ascertaining
whether or not social purpose provides a permissive environment for
the emergence of specific policy responses as informed by countryspecific and contingent conception of common good. These chapter
also examine the content of national identity in two selected countries
with their historically contingent labels are ―Sovereign Democracy‖ in
Russia and ―African Renaissance‖ in South Africa. The dissertation
strongly suggest that that in responding to the domestic epidemic of
HIV/AIDS the key decision-makers in both countries have
significantly transformed the internationally prescribed policy in
accordance with the substantive components of the domestically
accepted social purpose. In Chapters 6 and 7 I look at the HIV/AIDS
policy with the presence of social purpose affecting it. I capture how
national policy responses challenged and ―filtered‖ the internationally
prescribed range of choices. In other words, I document and explain
when, how and why the domestic policy choices became inconsistent
with the mainstream international health consensus. Rather than
treating the epidemic as a pressing public health issue, Russia‘s
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―Sovereign Democracy‖ prompted the government to respond to the
domestic epidemic as the issue of demographic survival and criminal
drug abuse. This choice subsequently eroded the human rights
component from the official policy, overstretched the public financial
commitments, and frustrated the cooperation with private sector and
civil society. The imperatives of ―African Renaissance‖ reframed the
HIV/AIDS epidemic as a local developmental problem. As a result, the
Cabinet supported substandard biomedical treatments and indigenous
healing practices, consistently resisted the universal and free rollout of
treatment in order to avoid the undesirable governmental expenditures
and redistributive strategies. In both countries, these policy choices
resulted in the adverse consequences for public health and prompted a
protracted contestation among various state and non-state actors
around the principles of the desired public health policies.
After I discuss social purpose in details, I will evaluate how,
why and to what extent Russia and South Africa responded to the
global policy consensus as described in this chapter.

154

CHAPTER 4. SOCIAL PURPOSE IN RUSSIA (SOVEREIGN
DEMOCRACY)

Kathleen Smith has convincingly demonstrated that after the demise of
the USSR the formulation of the national identity (and national
purpose) in Russia was trapped in the mutually exclusive pro-liberal
and pro-communist political mythologies. 1 At the same time, neither
proponents of the Western-style liberalism and democracy, nor the
champions of the revamped communism infused with
ethnonationalism, were able to outreach their respective vision of the
national purpose for the broader audiences. Although anti-communist
sentiment was broadly articulated in the popular culture, including
movies and literature, a profound ideological confusion precluded the
formation of a consolidated national purpose. At best, it remained
fragmented.2 Not surprisingly, after Boris Yeltsin stepped down from
the presidency, political elites in Russia began formulating a political
proposal for the nation once again.
The concept of Sovereign Democracy encapsulates three
important themes: the ultimate political value of a strong state power
1

See, for instance, Smith 2002
For general discussion of national identity in Russia, see Dunlop 1993; Tuminez
1998; Brudny 2000.
2
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(vlast) with a special stress on economic delivery in the context of
state-led economy, and its leading role in reasserting and actively
exercising Russia‘s great power status in global politics. Not only
these particular themes (strong state, state-led economy, and great
power complex) clearly stand out as three most important components
in the Russian political discourse, but they were turned into
prescriptions how to protect the country as an autonomous political
organization. An integral part of the Sovereign democracy--the
discourse of the ―wild 1990s‖--pulled together various collective
articulations together, while sustaining the differentiated
understanding of the Soviet past, transcending the boundaries of the
blame so customary in the previous decade. 3
In this chapter I ascertain whether or not social purpose truly
emerges in Russia. In doing so, I follow the framework of analysis as
laid out in Chapter 3. Throughout the whole chapter, I trace how elite
formulated social purpose as pinned on their identity and clearly
identified itself as the primary champion and embodiment of these new
obligations. Self-Other dichotomy permeates discourses at all levels.
This divide also shows the self/Other dynamic – Russian state-centric
and sovereign self is pitched against the subversive liberals, allegedly
3

For the most important collections of essays and debates on Sovereign Democracy,
see Remchukov 2007; Poljakov 2007; see also Migranjan, Andranik. 2007. O
suverennoj demokratii. Rossijskaja gazeta, 03.10.2007.
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striving to ―dismember‖ the state, offer its ―juicy morsels‖ to Russia‘s
foreign rivals, and certainly put Russia on her knees.4 In Chapter 6 I
demonstrate how all these efforts quickly politicized the responses to
the epidemic of HIV/AIDS and subsequently had adverse effects on
the adoption of global standards of the antiretroviral treatment.

ELITE‘S COMMITMENT TO SOVEREIGN DEMOCRACY
Elite‘s commitment to a certain conception of common good is the
first step ascertaining whether or not social purpose truly emerges in a
given country. In this section I spell out the core components of
Russian national purpose and ascertain the degree to which extant
elites are consolidated around it. In Russian context, the core
substantive components of the national purpose were tentatively
articulated as early as in 2000—2001 and got elaborated on throughout
the whole period of Vladimir Putin‘s presidency.
At first, Putin made disparaging remarks about the national
idea (read: national purpose) as the Russian pastime and thus was
branded as a pragmatist.5 Later on, a seeming eclecticism of his

4

See, for instance, Sergei Medvedev. 2004. ―Juicy Morsels: Putin‘s Beslan Address
and the Construction of the New Russian Identity,‖ PONARS Policy Memo 334,
November 2004.
5

R. Medvedev 2004: 93.

157

political statements made domestic political observers and journalists
believe that Putin‘s political program was overcoming the previous
ideological divisions.6 At the same time, many domestic political
observers expected a new proposal for the nation to emerge.7 In this
dissertation I use the term Sovereign Democracy to describe his
conception of social purpose, even though sometimes Putin himself
and several high-powered politicians (including future President
Dmitry Medvedev) superficially disagreed with this descriptive tag. 8
Scholars have abundantly noted that since Putin came to power, many
notable persons with military, security, and law enforcement
background (siloviki) started dominating Russian political elite.
According to some estimates, siloviki comprised up to 42% of the
federal elite as compared to 13% in the 1990s. This data is tentative,
since most of resumes of Russian bureaucrats are not readily available.
Scholars still dispute whether siloviki is a meaningful way to
aggregate individuals, given the abundance of internal conflicts,
variance in organizational culture, and outlooks among those who had
served in different agencies and ministries. These differences
notwithstanding, scholars agree that an emphasis on siloviki is

6

See respectively Parland 2005: 191—197; Allensworth 1998: p. 288; Hopf 2002:
157—158, 220, 223.
7
See, for instance, the roundtable in Literaturnaya Gazeta July11. 2001
8
On Putin‘s and Medvedev‘s reactions to the concept, see Evans 2008: 900;
Morozov 2008: 154, 157.
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instructive. Brian Taylor argues that siloviki ―have been at the center
of politics under Vladimir Putin. They have played a key role in
Putin‘s central project of strengthening the state, which has in reality
been more about establishing the dominance of the Kremlin than
creating the administrative capacity to run a well-functioning 21st
century government.‖9
The well-informed Russian political observer Olga
Kryshtanovskaia listed Sergei Ivanov, Viktor Ivanov, Igor Sechin,
Nikolai Patrushev, and Viktor Cherkesov as members of Putin‘s inner
circle and the true ideologues of the coming political changes. 10 All
these individuals shared the similar background and occupied various
key positions in the state hierarchy under Putin. Siloviki spearheaded
the formulation of the new conception of public good and linked it to
their identity. They excessively stressed the necessity to revive the
strong state, eliminate any alternative spheres of authority, enforce
law, and restore Russia‘s great power status. They also triggered the
obsession with the threats to the territorial integrity of the country and
its sovereignty. They attacked the liberal outlook and human rights as
inconsistent with their core beliefs. Siloviki explicitly styled

9

Taylor 2007: 41; For the detailed discussion of the concept, see Taylor 2007: 15-24
10
Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaja, Possijskaja jelita na perehode, Publichnye lekcii Polit.ru,
21 Avgusta 2008
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themselves as the national saviours and the sole champions for the
political existence of the country. The most noteworthy statement
belongs to Victor Cherkesov‘s newspaper article ―Warriors Should
Not Become Merchants,‖ where he argues that siloviki (chekisty)
saved the country after a prolonged economic crisis and political chaos
of the 1990s as inflicted on Russia by the liberal anti-statist forces.11
Domestic observers tended to downplay the importance of this article
as Cherkesov‘s attempt to get an upper hand in some nontransparent
internal conflicts. Nevertheless the principal metaphor used in this
public utterance was very clear. Cherkesov‘s portrayed the self as the
state-building Warriors and contrasted it to the subversive Merchants
(oligarchs), which had to be reined in. In a metaphorical form, this
statement confirmed of role the law enforcement agencies as Russia‘s
backbone, the primacy of state power over the free markets and
laissez-faire.
Throughout the 2000s this imagery percolated into the broader
political elites and slowly became dominant. At first, the dominant
party United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya, ER) pleaded not to inculcate
any ―official state ideology‖ at the expense of solving ―real‖

11

Cherkesov, Viktor. 2007. Nel'zja dopustit', chtoby voiny prevratilis' v torgovcev.
Kommersant-Daily, 09.10.2007.
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problems.12 United Russia openly proclaimed itself the only
champion of Russian national purpose, although its exact conception
was yet to be formulated. Party‘s leaders denounced both the radical
leftist ideology and the rightist liberal utopias as counterproductive
and divisive. The Chairman of the High Council of United Russia
Boris Gryzlov claimed that reiterating political mythologies was
useless for the political and economic development and hence should
be dismissed. He directly accused both ―so-called liberals‖ and ―socalled derzhavniki‖ pursuing their narrow parochial interests instead
of working for the betterment of the country. 13 Simultaneously,
Gryzlov described the Russian self as nationalist, evolutionary and
conservative, and the Other as foreign-inspired, revolutionary and
liberal.14
Around 2003, United Russia explicitly committed to the goals
of creating the strong state, state-led development and modernizations,
as well as the necessity to restore the great power status. The
commitment to the strong state laid down the basis for self—Other
dichotomy. A number of political journalists built on this theme: they
claimed that the subversive Other threatened the very existence of the
12

Gryzlov, Boris. 2003. Politicheskij doklad Predsedatelja Vysshego Soveta
Politicheskoj partii "Edinaja Rossija" B. V. Gryzlova pered delegatami III S"ezda
partii "Edinaja Rossija," 22.09.2003.
13
Put' nacional'nogo uspeha. Manifest Vserossijskoj politicheskoj partii Edinstvo i
Otechestvo-- Edinaja Rossija.23.04.2003
14
Boris Gryzlov. 2005. Partija — ot latinskogo slova Chast‘, Tribuna, 20.09.2005.
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strong state and thus should be excluded from the set of legitimate
political actors.15 The liberal ideology and the promotion of human
rights were presented as tools, purposefully used to undermine
Russia‘s very existence as an autonomous political organization. In
practice, defending this conception of social purpose implied the need
to eliminate any alternative center of authority, i.e., to limit domestic
political competition, impose political unity, and keep liberals out of
power.
The consolidation of political elite around this version of social
purpose became evident in 2003, when strictly Putin-oriented party
Unity (Edinstvo) merged with its former rival Fartherland/All-Russia
(Otechestvo-Vsya Rossia) into a mammoth ―United Russia‖ (ER).16
The internal political discussion in 2005—2008 remained confined to
State-Patriotic, Liberal-Conservative, and Social-Conservative (CSCP)
clubs. There are very few meaningful ideological distinctions among
these groups as demonstrated in their blurred titles. They all embrace
the similar conception of common good.17 Furthermore, during his
first terms as a president, Putin initiated a set of reforms, harshening
15

See, for instance, Pavlovskij, Gleb. 2005. Vlast' i oppozicija: kriterii jeffektivnosti.
Publichnye lekcii Polit.ru, 10.02.2005; Leont'ev, Mihail. 2004. "Sojuz mecha i
orala:" Novaja ob"edinennaja oppozicija za "Rossiju bez Putina". Izvestija, 25.02.04
16
For the detail account, see Remington 2005: 35—44 in Herspring 2005;
Remington 2008; For the overview of the formation of a new party system in the
2000s, see Gel'man 2008
17
Detailed information about these clubs is available on their websites:
http://cscp.ru/; http://gpclub.ru/; http://www.inop.ru
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electoral laws. This pushed the parties embracing the alternative
conception of common good, such as the Union of Right Forces,
outside the federal politics. All this suggests the consolidation of elites
around siloviki-generated conception of common good. In 2009,
however, one opinion poll revealed some growing disagreements
inside Russian political elite about what specific obligations they
viewed as central for social purpose.18

Strong state as an ultimate political value
Scholars and political observers agree that the focal point of Putin‘s
nation-building agenda was the value of the strong state power (vlast,
gosudarstvennost).19 Putin expressed his personal commitment to the
strong state in his early newspaper piece ―Russia at the Turn of the
Millennium.‖20 In principle, the notion of a ―strong state‖ might imply
preserving its territorial borders, increasing state capacity and
18

See Mikhail Afanas‘ev 2009. These findings may signal the coming end of the
consensus about Sovereign Democracy. For the purposes of clarity I would bracket
these minor intra-elite distinctions and preferences. For the broader overview of
changes in Russian elites, see Gaman-Golutvina 2008. Hale and Colton 2010
underscored that in 2008 the popular expectation for Medvedev to challenge statusquo.
19
See for instance, Nikonov, Vjacheslav. 2004. Strategija Putina: Stremlenie
predotvratit' raspad gosudarstva lezhit v osnove federativnoj politiki. Rossijskaja
gazeta, №3660, 22.12.2004; Surkov, Vladislav. 2004. Zamestitel' glavy administracii
Prezidenta RF : Putin ukrepljaet gosudarstvo, a ne sebja. Komsomol'skaja pravda,
28.09.2004; Chadaev 2005: 15; Klyamkin and Kutkovets 2006:32.
20
Godzimirski (2008) underscored Putin‘s personal role in developing Russian postsoviet identity; see also Gevorkjan, Timakova, and Kolesnikov (2000) a book-length
interview with Putin; Klyamkin and Kutkovets 2006: 11-12.
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efficiency, and protecting the government against being highjacked by
the special interests. For Putin personally and Russian political elite
this notion had different connotation. The strong state implied the
stress on the chain of command (edinonachalie) and the undesirability
of the plurality of spheres of authority. The absence of the strong state
threatened Russia‘s stability and survival as an autonomous political
organization. In this context, the restoration of the strong state became
a priority.
In 1999 Putin described state in Russia as ―the source and the
guarantor of the order, the initiator and the principal force behind any
change.‖21 Commitment to the strong state also signalled the
continuity between different domestic political regimes since the
Principality of Moscow. Similarly, Surkov asserted that
For 500 years Russians, since Ivan III time, have been
the state-building people. We are the nation which has
got used to statehood. And unlike our many friends
across Soviet Union and many other countries we
always have been the carriers of the statist idea.22

21

Putin, Vladimir. 1999. Rossija na rubezhe tysjacheletij. Nezavisimaja gazeta,
30.12.1999.
22
Surkov 2006. Surkov used both ethnic term Russkie, and more encompassing state
term Rossijane.
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The year of 2004 was a visible turning point in the
contemporary Russian political discourse, when the value of the
strong state became the dominant master-narrative. The terrorist
highjacking of a school in Beslan and the wave of the ―Color
Revolutions‖ across the soviet successor states were framed as
immediate existential threats to Russia as an autonomous political
organization.23 Political commentators abundantly exploited the scare
of Russia falling apart to justify the incredible political strengthening
of law enforcement agencies as the pinnacle of the strong state. Many
public intellectuals and TV personalities echoed these themes and
fleshed out the political necessity of the strong state for the decisive
survival of the Russian nations by referring to various periods of
Russian history. As the corollary, members of ER sometimes indicated
that stressing the values of the state was a good way to prevent the
politicization of the Russian ethnicity and the ethnic-based nationbuilding projects.24 ER launched Russian Project, aimed not at
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See, for example, S. Medvedev on the link between Beslan and domestic identity,
Malfliet and Laenen 2007 on the link between the institutional reforms and evolving
Russian identity; on the specific cultural context of the Beslan event, see Ó Tuathail
2009.
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Fonda jeffektivnoj politiki. Moskva: Gosudarstvennyj klub. 22.11.2006; Gromov,
Andrej, and Ivan Davydov. 2007. Fantom nacionalizma. Expert, 15.01.2007;
Osnovnye napravlenija dejatel'nosti Vserossijskoj politicheskoj partii "Edinaja
Rossija" v sfere nacional'noj politiki i mezhkonfessional'nyh otnoshenij. 03.2007;
Pligin, Vladimir. 2007. Russkij proekt. Strategija Rossii (№4); Sultygov, AbdulHakim. 2007. Mnogonacional'nost' kachestvennaja harakteristika edinoj Rossii,
10.07.2007. More generally, on the evolution of the Russian political debates about
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politicization of the Russian ethnic identity, but rather as a tool against
ethno-nationalists.25
In domestic political discourse, the theme of restoring the
strong state was embedded in the political imagery of the 1990s, as
―wild,‖ tumultuous, erratic, crime-ridden period of Russian history.
This imagery tapped into the popular disillusionment that the partial
political and economic reforms did not quickly fix all the problems.
However, instead of providing a careful balance sheet of the period,
state-sponsored the Institute of Social Engineering (INOP) essentially
branded it as lacking any conception of common good. Similarly, a
famous political commentator Andranik Migranyan noted that
democracy in the 1990s was just an illusion, a smokescreen protecting
those political forces, whose interests were at odds with country‘s
well-being.26 In his speeches Vladislav Surkov directly pointed at
these forces. In his so-called ―secret report‖ to the General Council of
ER on June 17, 2005 he asserted that liberals always failed to pull
Russia out of the political turmoil and only exacerbated the social
chaos (including the period directly preceding the Civil War and after
the role of ethnicity in domestic nation-building see Tishkov 1997: 138—175. On the
problems of politicization of ethnicity in RF, see Warhola 1996; Tishkov 1997a;
Ponarin 2005; Morozov 2008: 166—167.
25
See the minutes of the discussion in the Center of Social Conservative Politics, 03
February 2007 (Formirovanie rossijskoj nacii Centr social'no-konservativnoj politiki:
Stenogramma zasedanija Social'no-konservativnogo kluba, 03.02.2007)
26
Migranjan, Andranik. 2004. Chto takoe "putinizm"? Strategija Rossii v XXI veke
(№3).
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the collapse of the Soviet Union). Since the liberals were dubbed
proponents of the weak state and historically incapable of governance,
acknowledging them as legitimate political force was rendered
dangerous and inappropriate.27
The new president Dmitry Medvedev in his speeches stressed
the necessity of modernization and innovations. This, not surprisingly,
prompted a wide public discussion about the possibility of political
liberalization in Russia. From the liberal side Aleksandr Auzan (a
prominent member of the President‘s Council for Support of
Development of the Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights),
Evgeny Gontmakher and Igor Yurgens of Institute of Contemporary
Development (INSOR) argued for the liberalization of the state.28 At
the same time, from the conservative side Alexey Chesnakov, Vitaly
Ivanov, and the members of INOP argued that the liberalization and
democratization were not only premature, but simply did not reflect
the real need of state-building in the present-day circumstance.29 In the
midst of this discussion, Medvedev reaffirmed the value of the strong
state and did not dismantle Putin‘s political legacy. Thus, strong state
retained its status as a component of national purpose.

27

Surkov, Vladislav. 2005. My real'no schitaem, chto davat' vlast' liberal'nym
"druz'jam" opasno i vredno dlja strany, Gensovet "Delovoj Rossii," 17.05.2005.
28
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State-led development
Russian state officials staked the claim to promote the developmental
state for the betterment of Russia as a whole.30 Leon Aron summarized
this vision as follows: ― the reemergence of the state as the most
powerful actor on the economic stage, serving as both the initiator and
implementer of economic policy; <which causes> the slowing down or
freezing of structural liberal reforms; <and> rapid expansion of the
state sector of the economy.‖ 31
This vision was articulated prior to siloviki‘s ascension to
political power, and thus should not be viewed only as a vote-seeking
propaganda. Consider, for instance, Vladimir Putin‘s dissertation
thesis, which contained some key ideas regarding the use of minerals
for the economic and social transformation.32 By the end of Putin‘s
second presidential term, a bold political ambition to have a ―hard‖
developmental state came to its existence. Since the state sector

30

While there is no a single definition of the term ―developmental state,‖ in this
dissertation I refer to the preponderance of state bureaucracy, intervening in and
guiding the direction and pace of economic development, reallocating resources
across industries, and protecting national economic interests in the context of
capitalist political economy. See, for instance, Loriaux 1999: 235; Pérez Caldentey
2008: 28. Similar, but not identical, terms are ―hard state,‖ ―state capitalism,‖ and so
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swelled to about a half of the national economy, it fully reemerged as
the most powerful economic actor.33
In 2007 Surkov succinctly summarized this theme:
Strong central authority for centuries collected, bonded,
and developed a huge country, which was widely
spread in space and time. < Strong central authority >
implemented all the important reforms ... Today, as
power shifted to the center, it stabilized the society,
created the conditions for victory over terrorism, and
sustained the economic growth. 34
In general, Russian political elite claimed that economic
development and growth during the 1990s delayed because of rather
oversimplified grafting of the foreign policies and standards onto the
Russian soil. In this discourse uncontrolled free markets and the
laissez-faire ideology have invariably negative effects on economic
development and prosperity. The previous problems in economic
development were attributed to the negligence and unwillingness to
use the state to exercise its power as an economic regulator. Putin
stressed the role of government as ―the leader in creation and

33

According to then Vice-Prime Minister Sergei Sobjanin, about a half of Russian
labor workforce was employed by the state, which he deemed dangerous, cited in
<http://www.polit.ru/news/2010/09/09/sobyanin.htm>
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Surkov, Vladislav. 2007. Russkaja politicheskaja kul'tura. Strategija Rossii (№7).
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application of high technologies, in providing a high standard of
people‘s well-being, in ability to protect the safety and defend national
interests on international scene.‖35 The core emphasis was strongly
placed on the responsibility of the federal government to deliver while
restricting the independence of the private sector in general. 36 Private
sector was considered a minor partner: multiple the references to the
social responsibility of business became mainstream. The stress on the
crucial role of the state as the motor of economic growth and state‘s
obligation to deliver permeated the domestic political discourse. In his
political report to the United Russia‘s III Convention Boris Gryzlov
stated that ―the major factor of keeping the nation united is social
justice. The United Russia supports the creation not just a market
economy, but a socially-oriented type of economy.‖ 37 Since 2005 this
obligation becomes more salient in speeches of then first vice-Prime
Minister Dmitry Medvedev, 38 Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov, and
Sergey Mironov (Speaker of the Federation Council and the leader of
Spravedlivaya Rossiya). By the end of Putin‘s presidency, this
obligation was labeled ―Putin‘s plan,‖ or Plan 2020. In the fall of
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2007 United Russia ran its parliamentary campaign on the promise to
deliver, under the motto ―Putin‘s plan—Russia‘s victory.‖ 39
Practical measures accompanied this evolving discourse. In
2005 the Kremlin announced its decision to create a new governmental
institution under the direct patronage of the President -- the Council
for the Implementation of National Priority Projects and Demographic
Politics (CNPPDP). In essence, National Priority Projects were created
as a mechanism of an intense and ―smart‖ investment to prompt
economic development in certain areas and improve certain social
services. Putin formulated the core purpose of NPPs as follows:
Concentration of budgetary and administrative
resources on the improvement of quality of life of
citizens of Russia is a necessary and logical
development of our economic policy, which we have
been implementing over the last five years and we shall
be implementing in future. It is a guarantee from inert
spending means without any palpable feedbacks. It is a
policy of the investment into an individual, which
means an investment in the future of Russia.40
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ER 2007a.
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In 2007, Dmitry Medvedev asserted that the decision to create
NPP had been the most effective way to solve the most pressing
economic and social problems.41 In 2008 President Putin, while
summarizing the successes of the NPPDP, affirmed that all the
national projects were designed and implemented to fulfill the social
obligations of the state (or ―modern social politics‖ in his parlance).42
Both politicians, as if anticipating liberal critique and incredulity to
this initiative, determinedly noted that NPPDP was not a public
relations exploit, but a genuine tool to uphold social justice and a
vehicle of economic growth. They also juxtaposed NPPs to the 1990s,
when the government allegedly shied away from any social
obligations.
Imagining the state as both the initiator and implementer of
economic policy legitimized the creation at the end of 2007 several
―state corporations.‖ Envisioned as another vehicle of economic
modernization, they accumulate enormous amount of financial
resources and various industrial enterprises. State corporations hold
military-industrial sector, atomic and nuclear plants, shipbuilding and
aircraft industries, and transportation. These corporations combine
41

See, especially Medvedev‘s article Nacional'nye proekty: ot stabilizacii - k
razvitiju, Kommersant-Daily № 9 (3585), 25.01.2007 and the selection from his
speeches on the official cite of NPPDP -- on March 7, 2007 and 26 December 2007,
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private ownership with direct governmental and presidential control. It
is instructive that the idea of state corporations to implement state
economic policy belonged to Sergey Chemezov, yet another
representative of siloviki. Chemezov was a KGB officer in the 1980s,
Putin‘s subordinate in St-Petersburg, and currently is a DirectorGeneral of Russian Technologies State Corporation (Rostechnologii).
The development of medicines and biotechnologies fell under another
corporation--the Russian Corporation of Nanotechnologies
(RUSNANO) with Anatoly Chubais as its chief.43 On July 6 2010
Russian news agency RIAN reported that Rosnano would invest about
$40 million in biomedical projects, including developing treatment for
AIDS, hepatitis and cancer of the pancreas.44 Vadim Volkov argues
that in establishing state corporations
Russian authorities have invented a new formula for the
independent management of large state assets without
fully privatizing them. Powerful industrial lobbies and
Putin‘s cronies have now received formal rights to
control several sectors of the economy, but in exchange
they are expected to deliver tangible results and global
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competitiveness. The whole project, nonetheless, faces
the risk of inefficient use of funds and depends upon
personified mechanisms of control.45
The majority of Putin‘s liberal opponents simply did not
recognize the NPP as a meaningful vehicle of economic
transformation. Many commentators thought that the sole purpose of
NPPs was either to redistribute the revenues generated from the oil
sector, to ensure the political survival of Putin‘s entourage after his
second presidential term would expire in 2008, as well as the political
springboard for Medvedev to secure his presidency, to which he
allegedly had been previously shortlisted. Similarly, the creation of
state corporations was not universally approved. However, the notion
that state should act as initiator and implementer of economic policy
remains resilient as a core component of national purpose. Despite
palpable differences in presentation style from his predecessor,
President Medvedev reaffirmed his commitment to economic
modernization led by the state and threw his political weight behind
new innovative projects.

45
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Great power in the multipolar world
In the 1990s political elite preferred to downplay the discourse of
Russia as great power at the international arena and shied away from
touting its military exploits. This distancing was prompted by the
rapidly spreading popular awareness of the incompetence of the top
political leadership, unjustified military interventions in Afghanistan,
which tarnished the Soviet Union‘s image at the international arena
and delegitimized its global ambitions. Yet in 1998 Astrid Tuminez
insightfully expected a coming aggressive formulation of Russian
foreign policy as a reaction to the national humiliation of the 1990s.46
Consistent with this expectation, domestic elites claimed restoring
sovereignty and great power status (derzhavnost‘) at the international
arena as the third key element of common good. In 2000 the governor
of Kemerovo Aman Tuleev redeemed a more assertive exercise of
power instead of the repentance for the past sins.47
Alexey Chadaev, the author of Putin: His Ideology, former
member of the Public Chamber, and a chief ideologue at the United
Russia‘s propaganda unit, defined great power as a state‘s ability to
uphold and exercise its sovereignty. He explained that having
―absolute sovereignty‖ implied possessing an arsenal of nuclear
46

On the impact of national humiliation on Russian identity, see Tuminez 1998. For
the historical overview of Russian identity as great power, see Neumann 2008.
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weapons, blocking any foreign influences on domestic political affairs,
and behaving as a norm-giver on the international arena. The lack of
great power status implied that other great powers can easily intervene
to change domestic political regime and impose external governance
(vneshnee upravlenie).48 Deliberately adopting any foreign practices
meant to turn your sovereignty down. 49 In terms of policy transfer,
claiming great power status necessitated the resistance to any external
influences, as well as devising and exporting domestic norms and
standards.50
Chadaev‘s book presented a relatively neutral way to think
about sovereignty and great power as elements of common good. The
domestic discourse was less impartial and at times considerably livid.
On the aggressive side of the discourse, elite argued that in promoting
democracy and human rights, Western countries often use double
standards and undermine international law.51 The wave of the ―color
revolutions,‖ sweeping across the Soviet successor states, promptly
became one of the most discussed topics in the Russian media.
Domestic political elites and spin-doctors interpreted it as having
48
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serious ramifications for the national statehood. A prominent domestic
political observer Vyacheslav Nikonov argued that the color
revolutions were ―technologies, aimed towards weakening of the
country and building the mechanisms of influence on Russia, not at
democracy promotion.‖52 Similarly, the leader of the LiberalDemocratic Party of Russia (LDPR) Vladimir Zhirinovsky claimed
that democracy promotion is a tool of dismembering the polity and
prompting inter-ethnic conflicts.53 Such a misplaced emphasis
allowed political elite to claim that democracy promotion was only a
smokescreen to veil the US real geopolitical ambitions. As a corollary,
reclaiming sovereignty rules out accepting a subordinate position in
any international coalition, and on the contrary, embraces restoring its
authority ―on the canonic territories of her historical presence and
influence,‖ as Vitaly Tret‘yakov asserted.54 On this side of domestic
discourse, Russian political life turned to be replete with subversive
Others—enemies of the sovereignty. At the political rally to support
United Russia at the Luzhniki stadium in Moscow in 2007, Putin
lashed out as follows:
They need the weak, sick state. To fix their affairs
behind its back, to get gingerbreads at our expense they
52
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need the disorganized, disoriented, and divided society.
And, unfortunately, inside the country there still those
who are ―jackaling‖ at foreign embassies, foreign
diplomatic consulates, those who count on support of
foreign funds and governments, instead of seeking
support of their own people. 55
At the other discursive boundary, reasserting Russia‘s great
power status is consistent with a longer, historical trend of Russian inbuild ambivalence towards Europe.56 In the moderate, mainstream
discourse Russia is typically viewed as a European state, which shares
the common cultural and historical background, as well as the similar
set of values and legal doctrines. 57 Several prominent ER members
even lamented that the West does not fully understand Russia‘s
position, does not appreciate Russia‘s affinity with the West.58 Then,
the great power status implies neither political, nor economic isolation,
nor the anti-European sentiment. Rather, it means participating in
55
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international affairs on Russian terms and remain decisive in the
context of inevitably confrontational (both politically and
economically) power politics. Surkov, for instance, delineated Russian
great power status as an assertive participation in the global economic
and political competition. The economic comparative advantages
should be used to advance Russia‘s international political goals and
support her in geopolitical games (hence the additional concepts of the
―energy superpower,‖ the ―liberal empire‖ which briefly surfaced in
domestic political discourse).59

SOVEREIGN DEMOCRACY AND ITS PUBLIC LEGITIMACY
Public legitimacy of an elite-driven conception of common good is the
second step ascertaining whether or not social purpose emerges in a
given country. In this section I spell out how articulated audiences
legitimized the elite-generated conception of common good and
ascertain the degree it got imbued into society. In the mid-2000s
various explanatory journalists and public intellectuals converged
around the conception of common good dubbed ―Sovereign
Democracy.‖ Its originator, Vladislav Surkov, was a Deputy Chief of
President‘s Administration in charge with internal politics and
59
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jenergeticheskaja sverhderzhava. Russkij Zhurnal, 27.10.2006.

179

relations with the State Duma. He concisely captured all three
components of common good and gave the notion this eye-grabbing
label. In 2004—2008 Surkov delivered a set of speeches on Russian
national identity and national political culture, subsequently widely
published in newspapers, journals and in the collection of essays. 60
Public discussion in Russia revolves around Surkov‘s writings: both
the liberal critics and loyalists anchor their discussion to this canon of
discourse.
In general I delineate among three broad groups of articulated
audiences. The first once, following domestic liberal observers, can be
dubbed ―the Kremlin school of political science.‖61 It includes
representatives of the expert community, who catered to the
ideological needs of the new political elite. Former dissident turned
political analyst, Gleb Pavlovsky hosted the TV show Real Politics,
edited highly salient internet-based Russian Journal, and headed the
Foundation for Effective Politics (FEP). In 2000 Pavlovsky was
instrumental in building Putin‘s positive public image. In 2004—2008
his internet project served as the gathering place for many promising
young illiberal commentators. Valery Fadeev was a chief editor of
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analytical magazine Expert and the head of the Institute of Social
Construction (INOP), affiliated with United Russia. Vitaly Tret‘yakov
was a host of What is to be Done, an owner and editor of monthly
journal Political Class, an owner of Independent Publishing Group. He
frequently contributed to the governmental newspapers and authored
several monographs. Vyacheslav Nikonov is the editor-in-chief of
journal Strategy for Russia, head of foundation Politics, and a member
of the Public Chamber.
The second group of articulated audiences achieved high
visibility in various political shows dominating the federal TV in the
second half of the 2000s.62 Not by coincidence, many prominent
members of the United Russia (and Putin‘s loyalists) turned into TV
politicos, thus establishing a continuous flow of discursive resources to
the general audiences. Here I will list only a few further emblematic
examples. Political journalist Mikhail Leont‘ev hosted shows However
and Freedom of Speech and produced mini-series The Big Game,
describing Russia‘s geopolitical greatness. He‘s the editor in chief of
the analytical magazine Profile. Alexey Pushkov hosted Post Scriptum
show at TVC channel. Konstantin Zatulin hosted of Political Kitchen
at TVC channel and simultaneously served as the first deputy of the
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Committee on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and
relations with compatriots in the State Duma. These persons were also
frequent guests on Dmitry Kiselev‘s show National Interest and
participated in Vladimir Soloviev‘s To the Barrier and later Poedinok.
The third motley group of aggressive young journalists is
typically referred to as ―okhraniteli‖ (―guardians‖), including Pavel
Danilin, Alexey Chadaev, Vitaly Ivanov. The acolytes of Sovereign
Democracy typically assert that any alternative conceptions of
common good would inevitably cause adverse outcomes for Russian
as an autonomous political organization. Okhraniteli commonly praise
Putin‘s for saving Russia from collapse, portray the transformative
politics of the 1990s as the intentional abrogation of sovereignty, and
attack liberals ad hominem. Their contributions is typically scattered
over various newspapers, internet resources, and blogosphere.
All these groups were instrumental in projecting the official
vision of common good. Their activity overshadowed both liberals and
communists as generators of discursive resources.63 Their public
utterances were permeated with a strong national ―we‖ against sordid
anti-national ―they‖-- the subversive liberal Other, responsible for
Russia‘s loss of national self-efficacy and self-esteem in the 1990s. By
63
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the mid-2000s these political journalists invented a captivating image
of ―the wild 1990s‖ to juxtapose it to the ―well-fed‖ and ―stable
2000s.‖ The overarching idea of this discourse was that freedom,
democracy—at least in the Russian context—had clearly visible
negative effects on economic development and prosperity. As liberalminded Gontmakher summarized it:
… in the early 2000s I suddenly realized that somebody
on behalf of the state tried to brainwash me
ideologically in an easy going, but very systematic,
manner. TV masterfully created the image of the ―wild
1990s‖ with such attributes as the lack of patriotism,
kowtowing to the West, self-humiliation. It turns out
that to love your Motherhood is impossible without
hating her neighbors, the various antagonists from the
overseas, who dream Russia being dismembered… It
turns out that we were standing on our knees, while
only the strong state could help us up; thus the strong
state had to be served with an unflinching loyalty and
without any criticism…64
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These propaganda seeds fell on a fertile soil. By the late 1990s wider
audiences expressed generally favorable popular attitudes to
democratic ideals and simultaneous distrust in nearly all decisionmakers and political institutions.65 By the late 2000s public distrust in
domestic political institutions and law enforcement agencies only
increased. Recent polling data conducted by Russian Public Opinion
Research Center (VCIOM) in 1992—2007, for instance, showed the
persistently negative popular attitudes both to the notions of capitalism
and communism. At the same time, market economy, private property
and national sovereignty were perceived as positive values. 66

Strong state as an ultimate political value
I have previously argued that elites relate providing common good to
the positive imagery of the self, while articulated audiences ground
this imagery in the full-bloodied self-Other dichotomy. In Russian
context, the Other was created as early as in 2001. This sordid generic
Other lumped together quite dissimilar political actors, whose political
agenda was not truly compatible. The camp of Others included the
prominent mainstream politicians (Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Ryzhkov,
Grigory Yavlinsky), Yeltsin‘s political advisers and human rights
65
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watchers (Georgy Satarov, Sergey Kovalev), the former members of
government (Mikhail Kasyanov, Evgeny Yasin, Andrey Illarionov),
political activists of various persuasions (the world‘s chess champion
Garri Kasparov, a mediocre narcissistic littérateur Eduard Limonov,
among others). Not surprisingly, this diverse group of people
promoted a different set of ideas, which engendered multiple internal
conflicts.
Since liberals were believed to subvert the Russian state, they
had to be excluded from the pool of legitimate political actors.67 In the
similar vein, Surkov and Chadaev argued that the liberals distorted the
idea of democracy and undermined the genuine polity-building.68
Others claimed that ―limousine liberals‖ inspired the West to quarrel
with Russia and slavishly followed the external agenda.69 A
conservative commentator Aleksandr Tsipko pounded contemporary
liberals as impostors, not being ensconced in the true Russian identity.
In his view, liberals posed an ontological threat to the state as they
…cannot consent for Russia to remain Russia, because
their overall objective is directly opposite. It consists of
creation of Russia in which there will be nothing
67
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traditional, nothing Russian, except for the language.
The whole meaning of the Russian liberals‘ ideological
and political activity is to bury the remnants of the
national self-identification from consciousness of the
Russian Federation citizens, so that that Russia would
never were Russia.70

In Russia main political debates have been commonly riveted
to the contending perceptions of the past. Not surprisingly, in the early
2000s the Kremlin realized that teaching the elite-friendly version of
the past can strongly endorse the foundational value of a strong
developmental state and socialize youth into this perception.71 Another
major focal point of writing the ―proper kind of history‖ was to
buttress the thesis that liberal conception of common good had always
been at odds with the appropriate kind of common good. The process
of tailoring the past to certain political goals inevitably bowdlerized its
nuances and intricacies.
The Federal Minister of Education longed for a new mandatory
textbook to countervail the former Soviet republics, which kept
70
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blaming Russia for their historical misfortunes and generating
Russophobe historical narratives.72 Aleksandr Filippov‘s A
Contemporary History of Russia 1945-2006: A Book for the Teacher
was an obvious candidate for this position. Its authors directly
acknowledged that the textbook‘s
…purpose is to generate a precise civic position of each
graduate. As the citizen of the country he should
represent values and ethical imperatives of culture of
the state as the active participant of the open world
processes it should possess values of a modern civil
society and a sufficient set of representations for active
intercultural interaction.73
This book presented a very clear and comprehensible digest of
the history since 1945, offered from an undiluted state-centric
perspective.74 The book‘s beauty was in its simplicity: political
stability and economic prosperity depend on the strong state, while
state‘s weakness generates social hardships. This logic is easily
extendable to all periods of Russian existence: strong state meant the
end of Smuta in 1612 and the victory in the WWII; its weakness
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entailed the power vacuum of 1917 and the collapse of the state in
1991. Finally, the chapter entitled ―Sovereign Democracy‖ appeared in
this manual to describe the period of Putin‘s presidency, thus sealing
the doctrine‘s almost official status.75 The first draft of this textbook
was complete in 2007 and was a subject of an enormous public
attention and scrutiny. After some minimal editing, this manual was
turned into a typical history textbook.76 Despite the liberal outcry, the
State Duma made it illegal from September 2007 to teach history in
schools using unapproved textbooks, making the described version of
past almost mandatory. 77
Broader public debates also abused domestic history in order to
legitimize the notion that only a full-bloodied strong state can be at the
center of legitimate common good. For instance, at the seminar held at
the Russian State University for the Humanities on the occasion of the
90th anniversary of the liberal-bourgeois February revolution, the chief
ideologue Surkov claimed that it prompted social, economic, and
political chaos. Ultimately, despite the false pretext of freedom this
triggered the October coup d‘état. The former head of the pro-liberal
party Yabloko Grigory Yavlinsky rejoined that liberals injected the
ideals of freedom and democracy into Russian political life, yet failed
75
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to institutionalize them because of the Bolsheviks. This interpretation
did not find a positive response among political commentators.78 In
further publications articulated audience laboured to convince their
readers those self-styled liberals always failed in dealing with the
major historical challenges.79 This aggressive historical politics was at
variance with the practices of the 1990s. Pluralism of historical
interpretations and the availability of multiple textbooks used to be a
norm.
To countervail all this, some liberal politicians have tried to
promote their conception of common good by setting off the prodemocratic politics of the 1990s as a highly commendable political
experience. Yet they failed to do so very effectively. Moscow-based
foundation the Liberal Mission sponsors a range of conferences and
publishes books written from the liberal perspective, many of which
are available for free on-line. Another striking example is Andrey
Zubov‘s edited book, which brought out histories of persons and
collectivities in their pursuit of personal dignity, political and
economic freedoms. This is definitely a very notable attempt to write
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a liberal history textbook, yet it has to be advertized and marketed
more insistently.
Recently Nikita Belykh, Russia‘s only liberal governor in the
era of Sovereign Democracy, lamented that there was almost no
cultural remembrance and recognition of the rich tradition of Russian
XIX c liberalism at the level of wider audiences, which was an
obvious obstacle to promote liberal outlook.80 Yet he had no one to
blame but himself: Almost every Russian liberal thinker had been
previously published, yet liberals failed to actively promote and
interpret their writings for the general audience.

State-led development
In fleshing out the notion of state-led development, Putin and his
entourage hounded oligarchs and liberal economists as the regime‘s
Other. In the 1990s there was a lot of hostility towards all economic
reformers (most notably Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais) and their
foreign advisers (neoliberal economists such as Anders Åslund and
Jeffrey Sachs). Aggressive claims were abound. Communists, for
instance, asserted that the reformers were intentionally pushing the
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contemptible and ruinous economic reforms forwards to subjugate
Russia to the Western economic powerhouses.
In the 2000s political elites switched their attention to domestic
oligarchs as economically irresponsible and socially dangerous
actors.81 In 2003 a think-tank the National Strategy Council (SNS)
published a report usually referred to as ―The Oligarchic Revolution is
being Brewed in Russia.‖ Its authors, more than 20 well-known
political experts, claimed that liberals and oligarchs conspired to grab
political power in their own parochial interests. According to the SNS,
Mikhail Khodorkovsky inspired the alleged attempt of coup.82 In the
new public discourse, the main tycoons of the 1990s, including Boris
Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, were
chastised as socially irresponsible. Most importantly, this report
directly Othered liberals and oligarchs as an elite group, which
allegiance is not with Russia:
Families of the majority of oligarchs permanently live
outside Russia; their heirs are educated abroad. Much
evidence indicates that the majority of oligarchs do not
connect their individual and family strategic interests
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with Russia as a geopolitical and ethno-cultural
essence.83
Surkov‘s short pamphlet ostentatiously titled The Main
Tendencies and Perspectives of the Development of Contemporary
Russia is another important document of the period. In this text, he
described an oligarch as a parasite exploiting the backbone of the
economy—the oil-based export. Instead of making the state stronger
and people wealthier, oligarchs refused much needed wealth
redistribution. Nor did the liberal-oligarch economic policies rectify
the problems inherited from the Soviet economy.
In 2004 Khodorkovsky was able to sneak a piece of his
thinking entitled The Crisis of Liberalism in Russia out of the prison
and publish it in a prestigious newspaper. In this open letter he tried to
redeem liberalism and offer a public repentance. He lamented that
liberals ignored, ―first, some important national-historical features of
development of Russia, and secondly, the vital interests of the
overwhelming majority of Russian people.‖ 84 Khodorkovsky also
lamented that in the 1990s the values of self-gratification and quick
enrichment replaced any sense of social responsibility. In his manner
of speaking, liberals focused on ―sturgeon under horseradish‖ instead
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of Constitution. One can only speculate about the reasons behind this
open letter, yet Khodorkovsky definitely played into Putin‘s hands. In
essence, he confirmed Putin‘s evaluation of liberals as subversive and
irresponsible Others.85
The discourse of state as the indispensable economic regulator
builds on the widespread disappointment with the painful economic
reforms of the 1990s. To a certain degree, articulated audiences
intentionally misrepresented the course and outcomes of the economic
reforms. First, clearly overextended the relatively short period of
complete lawlessness and bandit capitalism of 1992—1994 to the
whole decade, and low-balled the economic costs of keeping the state
enterprises in business. Second, they blamed the young reformers‘
incompetence for the near economic collapse of the early 1990s,
conveniently forgetting that soviet administrative economy had failed
prior to the shock therapy.86 Third, they offered a rather superficial
explanation of the underlying reason of the soviet economic
malfunctioning. Instead of focusing on the inherent problems of the
Soviet commanding heights, they blamed incompetent party leaders
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dominating smart technocrats. Finally, more complex weighing out the
state as an economic actor got silenced.
Legitimizing the reemergence of the state as the only
appropriate initiator and implementer of economic policy had to be
exercised with extra caution to avoid traps of rolling back to glorifying
the communist regime. Anchoring the new social purpose only in the
Soviet past means to be praise socialism with the mainstream
communists (Communist Party of the Russian Federation, CPRF). Yet
the wholesale Othering of the Soviet past would bring the collective
articulations of national purpose too close to its liberal rendition. This
challenge made Putin and political elite move towards a differentiated
rendition of the soviet past. The communist past was rendered
negative inasmuch as it created an economically ineffective society
and was not able to deliver. The Filippov‘s history textbook, which I
introduced in the previous subsection, also used economic
performance as a secondary indicator to keep the Soviet past distinct
from Russia‘s historical self. (The authors note the lack of economic
freedom and private property, stagnation and lagging behind the
technological breakthroughs). Many other documents similarly
attributed the collapse of the Soviet regime to its poor economic
performance, failure to make people prosperous, and inability develop
decent standards of living. As Surkov explained, the Soviet system
194

collapsed due to inability of the state to perform and deliver as an
economic actor:
It also obviously lagged behind in satisfying the needs
of people in new quality of a life the Western countries
[enjoyed]. Well, who would want [to live in] such an
empire which could provide the citizens neither bread,
nor shows? Refusal to live in such society was
inevitable. It is not necessary to explain the wreck of
the Soviet Union as a result of CIA intrigues or the
party leadership conspiracy. This is an escape from
reality.87

Great power in the multipolar world
Articulated audience sought to embed the imagery of Russia as a great
power via two discursive streams. First, they mobilized the popular
support by warning that external meddling in country‘s affairs
unacceptable. Second, articulated audiences skilfully played public
emotions by applying the pain of severe human losses in World War II
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and appropriated the victory in it as the indisputable evidence of
Russian great power status.
Several famous politicians and experts warned that
―orangists‖ aspired simply to grab power and abrogate national
sovereignty. The so-called color revolutions (Orange in the Ukraine,
Rose in Georgia, and Tulip in Kyrgyzstan) triggered the scare of being
under a purposeful attack. According to this logic, the main
consequence of the color revolutions in all these countries was not the
success of popular resistance to the rigged elections, but simply a
lasting political turmoil. For instance, domestic political observers
projected the belief that the Ukrainian society was at the brink of
collapse, government was not governing but squabbling, and the
country‘ Russian-speaking regions in the East were on the verge of
secession. The flurry of these commentaries simply ignored the
staggering fact that the rate of economic development in the Ukraine
remained higher than in Russia.
Conservative commentators imagined that ―orangist
ideologies‖ were percolating into Russia.88 They surmised the strong
likelihood that the color revolutions would destabilize Russian
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statehood and undermine the country‘s territorial integrity. 89 Arkady
Mamontov‘s film Velvet, aired on the state-controlled TV channel, is a
case in point. Mamontov‘s narrative ―exposed‖ the liberals‘ secret
plot to subvert Russian political system and disintegrate it in 2012, as
well as attacked young Russian liberals as foreign spies. 90 This
response to the color revolutions was not just discursive. It had
immediate political ramifications as well. Western-sponsored NGOs
are the ideal promoters of the foreign interests.91 It also led to the new
legislation, significantly restricting the NGOs in Russia. 92 Extending
this logic, loyalists accused orangists of acting at the whim of the
US.93 In this picture, the cynical West was more interested in subduing
developing countries, rather than establishing a genuine democracy
there. Staunch communist Sergey Kara-Murza and his co-authors put
the ―color revolutions‖ into the broader historical context of uprisings
in former socialist camp (1956, 1968 and 1980), the velvet revolutions
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in the Eastern Europe (1989) as direct challenge to USSR‘s
geopolitical ambitions.
At the same time, those Western countries, which remain
uninvolved, are likely to remain partners and ―friends‖ (such as
Germany and Italy). Although ―Russia will not become soon, if at all,
the second edition of, say, either the USA or England, where liberal
values have deep historical traditions,‖ not all Western countries
automatically become Russia‘s others. As there is wide variation in
approaches to individual countries, I am skeptical of the viewpoint that
Russian political elite defines ―the West as unified democratizing
actor.‖
Another blanket theme of great power discourse was
glorifying Russia‘s role in the World War II, locally referred to as the
Great Patriotic War. Articulated audiences labored to restore Russia‘s
worth and honor as related to the victory over Nazism. More
specifically, this was intended to build the benign image of Russia as a
great power in historical dimension. Putin‘s administration widely
used the imageries of the WWII to connect to the broader public
sentiment. For instance, the Kremlin reclaimed the Soviet tradition of
pompous and costly military parades on the Red Square. Teddy
Uldricks correctly asserts that the myth of this war ―continues to be a
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key element in the national identity of the Russian people.‖94 In a
similar vein, a famous political pugilist Mikhail Leont‘ev claimed that
the Victory upheld the continuity of statehood and national unity. 95
Thus, since the remembrance of WWII remained deeply enrooted in
the domestic popular culture, reviving the great power imagery proved
to be relatively undemanding.
By producing and constraining discursive resources, such as
historical documentaries, articulated audiences tried to narrow the
socially acceptable public presentations of WWII. Some movies and
documentaries tarnishing the benign image of the great power were
banned from being aired on TV, or had only limited distribution in
theaters and DVD shops.96 Since 2005, various politicians and
journalists warned that in-depth critical scrutiny of the WWII will
challenge Russia‘s worth and honor as a sovereign power. 97 The
prominent members of ER in the State Duma (including Sergey
Shoygu) went as far as considering criminalization of questioning
Russia‘s benevolent role in the WWII. This restrictive approach

94

Uldricks 2009: 60.
See, for instance, Leont'ev, Mihail. 2007. Vse poslevoennoe vremja Pobeda byla
fundamentom nacional'nogo samosoznanija. Russkij Zhurnal, 08.05.2007.
96
Consider for instance, public response to The Soviet Story (Edvins Snore, 2008).
97
Putin, Vladimir. 2005. Uroki pobedy nad nacizmom: Cherez osmyslenie proshlogo
– k sovmestnomu stroitel'stvu bezopasnogo gumannogo budushego. Le Figaro,
7.05.2005; Kurginjan, Sergej. 2005. Pokushenie na Pobedu. Tribuna, 04.05.2005.
95

199

justified the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States in the 1940,98
deliberately obscured the discussion about political repressions,
glossed over the phenomenon of the Soviet collaborationism, and
scrapped any critical outlooks on the Soviet military preparedness and
effectiveness. Predictably, several Russian youth movements picked
the sentiment up and fuelled international scandals around the politics
of commemoration and war monuments in the former Soviet bloc.
Celebrating Victory Day is divested of any decisive communist
connotations, and yet communicates the nostalgic image of Russia as a
great power at the international arena.99 Generally, since Putin publicly
contended that the demise of the USSR was a great geopolitical
catastrophe, a flurry of commentaries incorrectly inferred that
communism to be re-envisioned as the historical self. The common
rendition (both from domestic liberals and scholars) is that Putin
embedded the proposal for the nation on the idealized presentation of
the Soviet period. Indeed, elites definitely toyed with the public
display of various stalinesque symbols, and even returned the old
soviet tune for the anthem. Yet accusations of the communist bend
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seem to be too far-stretched.100 Rather, it evoked the Soviet Union as
an undiluted ideal of the great power and reappropriated the image of
its external strength.101 It is true, however, that the official unqualified
glorification of the former military glory played into the hands of those
who were twisting the official discourse to support the communist-like
conceptions of social purpose. Among those, an amateurish stage
director turned political thespian Sergey Kurginyan claims attention.
In his frenzied political debates and unhinged political commentaries
he justified Stalinist atrocities, delved into multiple global conspiracies
against modernity and common sense, assailed postmodernism, and
claimed that rejecting the communist past altogether undermined
Russian proper place in the world.102

SOVEREIGN DEMOCRACY IN COLLECTIVE ARTICULATIONS
Examining collective articulation is the third step in ascertaining
whether or not a certain conception of common good becomes truly
legitimate and embedded in among the wider audiences. In this
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section I spell out how public culture discursively supported the core
components of Russian national purpose.
In order to sample identity at the level of collectivity I will use
domestic movies. Several methodological considerations are in order.
First, some scholars have already suggested the importance of movies
and film industry for studying national identity and nationalism. 103
What is beamed into big screens in movie theaters and into TV may
not only complement current belletristic textual sources (in a way that
the commemoration system, or architecture can), but in certain cases
can be viewed the better expresser of the intersubjective articulations.
Recently film industry became the symbol of national pride, perhaps
even more so than literature [had been]. The number of the films
soared, especially compared to the 1990s. Movies definitely generated
comparable amount of core themes and protagonists than any textual
sources did, which gives me a better and more diverse sample.
Generally, all the titles, plot descriptions, casting and box-office sales
are widely available on the industry-related websites and in the special
sections on culture in journals.104
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Second, my sampling of 150 movies was stipulated by the
consideration that picking only few emblematic exemplars can be
misleading. In order to aggregate movies into discursive formations
with clear and elaborate meanings, the sample should be large, but
manageable.105 To show the dynamic of collective articulations, it
includes movies produced both in 2000—2008, as well as refers to
some prominent examples to illustrate the popular articulations
throughout the 1990s. Unfortunately, unless the sample to be trimmed
down to a mere dozen, it is impossible to cover different periods
proportionately, primarily because the mass production of domestic
films and TV series in the 1990s decreased dramatically.
Third, I collected movies of all genres, excluding
documentaries. I treated documentaries as conscious political
statements. Empirically, in Russia the documentary-producing TV is
dominated by articulated audiences and thus excluded documentaries
from an unbiased sample of collective articulations. These
considerations made me using documentaries as a significant part of
the official discourse, explaining elite‘s obligations and proposal for
the nation (linkage). If the film industry in the USSR was totally
controlled during the communist regime, it became by and large free in
the 1990s.
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Fourth, talking about collective articulations we are talking
about popularity of certain singular cultural units. The commercial
success positively attests to the wider audience‘s acceptance of the
themes, characters and, perhaps, even messages conveyed in films. In
Russian case, however, financial hit it is not a valid indicator, as the
box office sales for the top movies of the year range dramatically,
while only very few movies enjoyed an undisputable financial
success.106 Movies almost immediately are aired on the federal TV
channels, sold on DVDs and get downloaded through multiple illegal
file-sharing websites and peer-to-peer networks (such as
www.scteam.ru). Thus my sample is based on a mixture of
commercial success, official ratings, responses from various sources,
as well as my own following film production trends since mid-1990s.
Although I deliberately concentrate on the new collective
articulations, produced in the 2000s, domestic discursive streams are
not fully confined to what was written, directed, and acted specifically
in the analyzed period. In Russian context, thus, a careful observer
should also comment on the unequivocal building on soviet resources
(in terms of remakes of and sequels to the iconic movies), as well as
continuous beaming of the older soviet movies on the TV screens. At
106
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the first glance, this indicates an increasing nostalgia about the Soviet
past. The seeming abundance of the soviet resources would entail the
continuing popularity and intersubjective sharing of the soviet
discursive resources, but for several considerations. Most importantly,
any direct glorifications of the soviet achievements are almost absent,
exemplars of do not contain politically meaningful pro-soviet
articulations, and thus do not attest to the strength pro-soviet
discursive stream. In fact many soviet films of the late 1970s—erly
1980s still praised today were tongue-in-cheek critique of the
deficiencies of the regime.
Symptomatically, in the era of Sovereign Democracy, many
observers, movie critics, and general public dismissed the fact that
popular articulations were shaped by the plurality of permissible
approaches how to envision and represent the Russian self.
Importantly, they lamented the low quality of the cinematographic
products, tagging the films of the 1990s under the rubric of
chernukha.107 In the Russian cultural context, this term could be quite
broad and imply not only the sense of being doomed, general
gloominess, negativity and depression permeating the movies, but also
trashiness and inferiority as the major characteristic of the Russian
film industry in the 1990s. New collective articulations seem to be
107
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intentionally avoiding chernukha, while the detectable discursive
streams were fleshed out and cemented in terms of consistency of the
themes and messages contained in these movies. In the 2000s three
overarching themes at the level of collectivity undoubtedly
predominated.
By the end of Putin‘s presidency, however, many prominent
cinematographers warned about the looming crisis in the industry.
Among them, several iconic and near-iconic directors, including
internationally acclaimed Nikita Mikhalkov and Fedor Bondarchuk,
made a public plea for more governmental money to produce more
patriotic films. They seemed to be willing to film what the government
would deem important for its own purposes (goszakaz, state order).
This demonstrates not only the filmmaking industry‘s recognition of
importance of movies for shaping political representations at the
collective level, but even directors‘ and producers‘ acceptance to be
engaged in intentional outreach as articulated audiences. Would this
trend fully gain its momentum, the films will no longer be true
collective articulations, but rather elements in intentional strategy of
deploying politically meaningful discursive resources.

Strong state as an ultimate political value
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The first broad discursive stream affirmed the commitment to the
strong state as a core component of common good. Film directors used
a broad range of historical material spanning the whole Russian
history, as if to reaffirm Putin‘s statement that stateness provides the
continuity of the national history.
At the more extreme side of popular articulations, the produced
films convey a clear message that any revolution, or abrupt political
change, or weakness of power could not only trigger an avalanche of
criminal activity, but also could endanger the very existence of Russia
as a coherent political unit. The bluntest exemplars of the themes
negatively portray characters, who intentionally promote ―liberal‖
ideology at the expense of Russia‘s strength. The historical truth and
justice is always embodied by the state servants, while liberal impulses
lead to the conspiratorial activity to destroy the very existence of
Russian polity. Notable examples include Tsar‘s Servant (in which
only freedom-seeking Polish peasants are represented as the bandits,
preventing Russia‘s rise), Alexander: The Neva Battle (in which the
faction of old Russian nobility seeks not freedom, as declared, but
rather to prevent consolidation and strengthening of the state), 1612 (in
which state-defending militia of the early XVIIth c., as well as
ordinary Muscovites, voluntary chose to protect the state as the their
solemn duty).
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Protagonists are always striving to make the state stronger (and
stronger here equals better), while its opponents pursue the opposite
goals under different disguises. The mini-series Demise of Empire and
The Empire under Strike offer a rich gallery of soulless monsters,
conspiring against the very existence of the state for no apparent
reason. Personal feelings and dislike of separate state officials have to
be sacrificed for the greater good of Russia. In State Councilor, for
instance, the principal character Erast Fandorin decides to accept the
position of the Moscow police head, despite his deep distaste for the
repressive practices of the state and intense personal dislike of his
immediate superior—Moscow general-governor. The last example is
actually very telling as the protagonists‘ choice (also the logical
dénouement of the film) was the opposite in the novel on which the
film was based on. The director‘s choice clearly meant to
accommodate the tastes of the film spectators. Boris Akunin, the
author of the novel, was not thrilled with such an ending, yet he
essentially agreed to have it. This positive imagery of serving the state
stands in the stark contrast of the overwhelming popular ridiculing of
domestic authorities (Soldier Ivan Chonkin), Russian international
affairs (Afghan Fissure) and mockery over the Russian way of life,
comparing to the West (White King—Red Queen). In the 1990s, being
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Russian was denounced as being indisputably inferior to foreigners,
especially Europeans.108
In developing the theme of the strong state, majority of the
films present state service which equals loyalty to the current political
regime as a high moral obligation to be carried out by every Russian.
In this context, even working for the communist regime is an
honorable choice, unless marred by the personal involvement in
political repressions. Thus, outright portrayal of communist and
socialist revolutionaries is blurred by these distinctions. Isaev, for
instance, demonstrates that the considerations of protection of the state
from its internal and external enemies are (and should be) superior to
the personal attitudes to the political regime. This by and large
exonerates the protagonists‘ doubtful choice of working for the
communists, whose overall image (both on personal and political
level) is far from idealized. The opposite choice, although allowing a
protagonist to retain high moral grounds and the sense of personal
dignity, inevitably incurs broader tragedies (Admiral, Demise of
Empire). This message that commitment to the strong state should
transcend ideological divisions could be easily applied to Putin‘s
Russia.
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Another striking example is the highly acclaimed film Pushkin:
The Last Duel (2006), featuring the first-rate Russian movie stars. The
film topples the traditional vision of Aleksandr Pushkin as an anti-state
and proto-liberal ―freedom-loving‖ poet, which was deeply inculcated
during the communist period. This XIXth c. famous man of letters is
portrayed as a victim of an international intrigue, aspiring to rob
Nicholas I off the intellectual resources of the emerging Russian
nationalism. The general message of the movie implies that the
subsequent economic and political stagnation in the mid-XIXth should
be blamed on the subversive outsiders, rather than any internal
problems. The film also shows that harmful forces often evade the
proper punishment by the skewed international norms. Pushkin‘s
killer, being a foreign subject, is exempt from hanging by the
international regulations.

State-led development
The second discursive stream exposed the ubiquitous violence and
lawlessness, the helplessness of the state, entangled with organized
crime and shady businesses practices in the 1990s. The stream in
general supports the notion of the ―wild 1990s‖ as the centerpiece of
Sovereign Democracy.
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In recreating the human experience of the period, many movies
pictured the protagonists‘ deep personal crisis and inability to realize
their potential in embarking on the service to the state as highly
rewarding career. In the films about the 1990s, main characters are
inevitably sucked into the organized crime and violence. (Consider
ubiquitous bloodshed and sadism in Dead Man‘s Bluff, which in
Russia was released under the title Squints, implying the shut eyes of
the dead). In a canonic movie Beemer, for instance, four small-time
crooks, strive to own a Beemer, which is presented as an ultimate
object of their desire, an affliction, which brings them only misery.
The mere task of surviving in the ―wild 1990s‖ presented
characters with harsh choices. In many cases personal survival in the
state of nature (as well as protecting their families and their significant
others) meant turning to violence. Multiple films explore an array of
possible repercussions of this harsh choice (Sisters, Angel on the
Sidewalk). Often even seeking seclusion and atonement would not
bring peace of the protagonist. Such is the story of an ex-killer, who
pursued an escape in a secluded and frosty Russian town only to get
hunted by an aspiring hit-woman (Garbageman). This theme was also
explored in the film Sisters, where the 13 year old girl dreams about
become a sniper in the Russian military and fight in Chechnya to
escape from the brutality and crime surrounding her family.
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The connections between the politicians of the 1990s and the
organized crime are best explored in a canonic mini-series Brigada. It
traces the epic history of four friends, who started their own business
at the end of perestroika. In this very popular mini-series the main
protagonist Sasha Belyi is able to succeed in business because he helps
the corrupt federal agents to transport narcotics to the West. Yet, once
asked to smuggle arms into Chechnya, Belyi declines the offer. Not
surprisingly the corrupt siloviki fight back killing his friends, family
and taking away his hard-earned prosperity. Quite a similar story is
told in Oligarch. Smart and innovative businessman, who knows how
to play the inefficient and corrupt system, is hunted by the corrupt
politicians, envying his financial success.109 In these movies, corrupted
state officials internalize the criminal rules to pursue personal wealth.
The mini-series Time of the Cruel shows even more saliently
how the dissolution of the state in the early 1990s pitched former
military officers against each other. First they fight against each other
in various local conflicts in the Soviet successor states. Later, some of
them become involved into the weaponry smuggling scheme, under
president‘s advisors and a vice prime minister. Others become
consigliore to the well-connected gangsters, while still serving in the
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power ministries. Similarly, in Hunting the Elk (2005) most of
presented banks owner, entertainers, and journalists have strong
connections with organized crime. Their goal is to acquire a highly
successful and profitable metallurgical plant for a fraction of a price,
using illegal means. Their long-term plans, obviously, have nothing to
do with the plants‘ and workers prosperity. At the same time pervasive
corruption, permeating all strata of Russian state and
commercialization of law-enforcing agencies is filmed very
infrequently (Flint, Oligarkh, Time of the Cruel).
According to Swaffar, in the major Russian films of the 1990s
characters unsuccessfully struggle to find a coherent identity. 110 In
sharp contrast, in the late 1990s a weak, erratic, and confused
protagonist turns into a decisive hero. In 1997 Russian TV aired the
first season of the phenomenally popular show The Streets of the
Broken Lanterns, portraying police officers, whose deep character
flaws and less than glamorous personal lifestyles, and sometimes not
irreproachable professional conduct were absolved by their service for
the greater societal good. Airing The Streets signaled the appearance
of the whole spate of TV shows dedicated to good ―cops‖ (menty), and
later to the heroic intelligence and especially counterintelligence
community. In the context of siloviki rise to power, such an emphasis
110
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on law enforcement seemed to imply that only service to the state
helps overcome deep personal and professional crisis.
Since the late 1990s, protagonists‘ behavior is shaped by their
Russianness and deep commitment to the Russian moral imperatives.
Even direct violence gets justified as an instrument of defending the
truth, national values, and reasserting Russia‘s greatness. This message
is best captured in tremendously popular Brother and Brother 2. In the
first movie Danila Bogrov, a youth with a shady past, is fully
committed to help and then protect his brother, even at great personal
expenses. In the second one, he is portrayed like a true national
protagonist, a hero of the Chechen war, bringing justice to his wronged
friends and punishing the immoral Westerners.111 According to
Larsen, the first decisive filmographic attempts to reassert Russian
unique and commendable values could be attributed to Nikita
Mikhalkov‘s Burnt by the Sun, Barber of Siberia and Alexei
Balabanov‘s Brat, Brat 2.
In Mikhalkov‘s attempt to reestablish a historical
connection to unjustly condemned military fathers and
Balabanov‘s reassertion of brother‘s obligations to one
another, both filmmakers invoke the metaphor of a
111
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―great family‖ united by shared moral certainties,
cultural values, and unconditional loyalties... Yet the
craving for the community remains, as does the
yearning for a heroic national image capable of defying
foreign threats and alien cultural influences (italics
added—V.K.).112
These newer themes break up with the previous
cinematographic trend of the 1990s, which put on screen ―useless‖
characters living in permanent personal crisis with no chance of
achieving anything positive in life (Genius, Sagittarius Lost, The Time
of Sorrow Hasn‘t Come Yet). Characters clearly did not have purpose
in life and had no firm and positive sense of belonging, many of them
wanted to escape the contemporary Russia, which itself suffered from
a deep identity crisis. The most acclaimed movies of the period
directed by Vladimir Khotinenko presented ordinary men crushed by
identity crisis and alienated from their communities. The main
character of Musulmanin converted to Islam and thus renounced his
Russianness, and later was rejected by his community. A not so
successful poet Makarov tries to build his identity around a newly
found affinity with a handgun, while being at odds with surrounding
society. Russian everyman were openly ridiculed as an alcoholic with
112
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no other positive interests in life: Fishing, hunting, travelling, and
politicking experiences were shaped by and subjugated to the drinking
purpose (Peculiarities of National Fishing). This gloomy uselessness,
attributed to being Russian stands in contrast with later articulations.

Great power in the multipolar world
The third broad discursive stream affirmed the commitment to
Russia‘s great power status in both military and moral dimensions.
After a long break, films directors returned to the war imageries of the
Great Patriotic War—the name clearly underscoring Russia‘s special
role in the World War II, as well as distancing from the pre-1941
military occupation of the Baltic States, and the Winter War with
Finland. The cinematographic theme dominated the industry, yet by
2010 is seemingly losing its emotional appeal and financial success.
Throughout the 1990s the filmmakers by and large ignored this
theme (the rare examples include Victory Day, General), in the 2000s
the war imageries swoosh the spectators. In general, WWII is an
excellent and abundant resource for pure entertainment and actionpacked films. The stress on the entertainment and avoiding any really
tough and potentially traumatic questions about the past often pushes
overt political arguments out of these films. Most importantly,
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however, the typical movie puts in the center of its narrative a story of
a heroic everyman‘s adventures, underscoring protagonists‘ superior
moral and physical characteristics.113
Even for the victims of regime, defending the state (Fatherland)
and working for its glory is presented as a moral obligation. The
conflict between protagonists and his oppressors is never glossed over,
but often used as an obstacle to prevail over in order to show the
strength of the will and character (Apostle, the Saboteur). Movies and
mini-series which explore the themes of repressions and inhumane
treatment of its own people are smaller in numbers and often become a
subject of public debate, rather than unquestionably accepted as a
shared articulation of the past (Penal Battalion, The Last Battle of
Major Pugachev, Bastards). Highly debated Penal Battalion, for
instance, meticulously exposed soldiers‘ lives under the repressive
military mechanisms. Equally, an ultra-realistic presentation of the
everyday hardships of the wartime is often ignored and rarely becomes
popular.114 Mikhalkov attributed the victory in WWII to the
Russianness and the Russian exclusive and highly rewarding
connection to the orthodox celestial spheres (Burnt by the Sun-2, see
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also earlier I am Russian Soldier), rather than specific and limiting
Sovietness. The focus on Russian uniqueness and great power status
seems to be devoid from communist undertones.

CONCLUSION: RANKING NATIONAL PURPOSE
Russian political elite expressed strongly commitment to Sovereign
Democracy as the conception of common good, while domestic
articulated audiences were very active in outreaching its components
to wider audiences. On balance, throughout Putin‘s presidency, this
conception of common good got strongly embedded/legitimized in
domestic policy environment. At the same time, public culture
strongly supports a dominant articulation of common good, including
all of its three substantive components. At the margins, other sub-elite
groups and political parties keep advocating radically different set of
political obligations, engrained in a different set of values. The
summary characteristics of Russian national purpose are provided
below:
Table 4.1 Indicators of national purpose
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CHAPTER 5. SOCIAL PURPOSE IN SOUTH AFRICA (AFRICAN
RENAISSANCE)

In the post-apartheid South Africa political elites discussed several
alternative programs for the South African national identity. During
the time of political transition to the majority rule in 1990-1994, there
were a lot of credible nation- and identity-building proposals, each
with its own specific focus. Solving the so-called national question
was intended to rebuild, reunite and heal the nation in the context of
profound ethnic, racial, gender, and class gulfs. 1
The prominent members of the African Nation Congress and
the participants of the liberation movement simultaneously engaged
the ideas of Pan-Africanism, Africanism, nonracialism, as well as
class- and ethnic-based conceptions of common good. The PanAfrican national identity coalesced into the core imagery of Africa for
the Africans from Cape to Cairo and was articulated by the PanAfrican Congress, based on the political writings of Steve Bantu Biko
and Black Consciousness Movement. Africanism envisioned the
common supra-ethnic nationhood of all black South Africans, and was

1

For the collection of earlier discourse on South African identity-building see, for
instance, van Diepen 1989.
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espoused by certain members inside both the African National
Congress (ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC). South African
non-racialism (South Africanism, ―the Rainbow Nation‖) was
promoted in Nelson Mandela‘s and Desmond Tutu‘s proposals for a
multi-racial, multi-cultural South African nation. Other proposals
included less politically feasible ethnic-tribal nationalism (Inkatha‘s
Mangosuthu Buthelezi). Last, but not least, the members of South
African Communist Party (SACP), including Jabulani Nxumalo
(Comrade Mzala), Joe Slovo, and charismatic Chris Hani promoted the
radical class-based nationalism.2 Among all those, the popular imagery
of the Rainbow Nation briefly peaked in popularity during the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), soon to be perceived as a less
attractive option.3
African Renaissance is a veritable salmagundi of themes,
meanings, and sensibilities. The three themes clearly jump out as the
most important.4 First, indigenousness is an outgrowth of Africanism
as the ideology of returning to the roots in the ANC. Second,
marketization is the strategy of economic empowerment, Third, ubuntu
is the notion of South African exceptionalism in the context of
globalization. Vale and Maseko drew attention the African
2

See, for instance, Neuberger 1990, pp. 54—77
See Nattrass and Seekings 2001
4
Vale and Maseko 2002; Ajulu 2001, Maloka 2002.
3
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Renaissance aiming at constructing a new African history, identity and
culture (culturalist interpretation which I will define as
indigenousness, or ―nativism‖) and the second one aiming at South
Africa‘s special role in the continental revival in the context of
globalization (globalist interpretation, which I define as ubuntu). To
these two I add the third component, marketization, which according
to WM Gumede was a single defining event in the battle for the ―soul‖
of the ANC in the late 1990—early 2000s.5 There is a seeming
inconsistence among all these components: indigenousness and
marketization seem to underpin different kinds of action. However, in
South African political context, both components are deployed to
countervail the global power structure. Indigenousness promotes local
solutions for local problems, while marketization economically
empowers certain subset of domestic political elite.
I have previously suggested that building public legitimacy
entails bonding with wider audiences and creating a strong national
―we‖ against sordid anti-national ―they‖--the Other--which is
presented as undermining the nation and therefore should be struggled
with. In sum, South African political elites created particular three
Others: the settler other, a disempowering deliverer, and the neocolonial Other, embedded in the European Renaissance. Over time,
5
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however, these set of others remained somewhat compounded in the
theme of two contending identities, Afro-optimist vs. Afro-pessimist,
embracing incompatible and contending political projects was the most
important trait of the loyalist discourse throughout Mbeki‘s
presidential terms.an innovative set of identities across racial, ethnic,
and cultural divides.
In this chapter I explore how the formation of a new
conception of common good and ascertain to what degree it got
embedded among wider audiences. In doing so, I follow the
framework of analysis as laid out in Chapter 3. In Chapter 7 I will
demonstrate how the pursued conception of common good politicized
the responses to the epidemic of HIV/AIDS and subsequently had
adverse effects on the adoption of global standards of the antiretroviral
treatment.

ELITE‘S COMMITMENT TO AFRICAN RENAISSANCE
Elite‘s strong commitment to a certain conception of common good is
the first signal that social purpose truly emerges in a given country. It
demonstrates what kind of action elite perceives as appropriate to
solve policy problems. In this section I spell out the core components
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of South African national purpose and ascertain the degree to which
extant elites are consolidated around it.
Mbeki‘s speech ―I am an African‖ signaled the desire to
generate a common social purpose.6 This speech is often quoted to
show what is meant by the notion African Renaissance in South
African political discourse. This is not entirely accurate: the content
and message of this highly poetic and emotional speech was closer to
the Rainbow Nation rhetoric than to what Pretoria would promote
under the heading of the African Renaissance. Nevertheless,
throughout his upcoming presidency in a series of speeches, addresses
and letters, President Mbeki elaborated his vision further, thus creating
a corpus of canonical texts, to which domestic elites and articulated
audiences anchored their discussion of social purpose. In general, for
Mbeki African Renaissance was the core marker of [South] African
identity: ―This is because to speak of an African Renaissance is to
speak of the coming into being of a new African identity, a new
resolve to take our future into our own hands and determine our own
destiny.‖7

6

―I am an African‖ speech delivered on behalf of the African National Congress, on
the occasion of the adoption by the constitutional assembly of "The Republic of
South Africa Constitution Bill 1996," in Africa: The Time Has Come: Selected
Speeches, pp. 31—36
7
Thabo Mbeki, Address to the National house of Traditional Leaders, Ulundi, 3
August 2001
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When elected to the presidency of the republic, Mbeki started
consolidating political elites around him by expanding and
strengthening the role of the presidency in particular and the executive
power in general. If under Nelson Mandela the presidential office was
rather small, Mbeki created additional internal bodies such as the
Coordination and Implementation Unit (CIU), the Policy Coordination
and Advisory Service (PCAS), the Presidential Support Unit (PSU). 8
Beyond their instrumental role in helping formulating and coordinating
domestic policies, these units also promoted presidential vision of a
new conception of common good among the domestic elite.9 Essop
Pahad, for instance, openly asserted that the office of the presidency
was the ministry of African Renaissance. According to Frank Chikane,
a team of senior advisors turned then Deputy President‘s vision of the
African Renaissance into an operational plan how to achieve this
objective.10
Informally, the strengthening of the presidency relied on the
growing role and power of President Mbeki‘s inner circle of advisors.
South African political columnist Richard Calland‘s list of the core
important individuals features Joel Netshitenzhe (the member of the
8

On the political role and functions of these policy units, see Calland 2006: 35—41;
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ANC National Executive Committee, NEC, and allegedly the chief
political strategist), Trevor Manuel (Minister of Finance, 1996—
2009), Mojanku Gumbi (legal advisor to the President‘s Office),
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngucka (Deputy President in 2005—2008), Essop
Pahad (the Minister in the Presidency, 1999-2008), Aziz Pahad,
(Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1999—2008, and allegedly
Mbeki‘s best personal friend), Smuts Ngonyama (a head of
communications for the ANC), Titus Mafolo (Mbeki‘s political
adviser in the presidency), Cunningham Ngcukana (Deputy Executive
Director, NEPAD),and Bheki Khumalo (presidential spokesman),
among others.11 These individuals constituted ―president‘s inner
circle‖ and sometimes were described as the powerful cohort of
loyalists.
Until 2008, Mbeki was quite successful in having a broad
power-based consensus on the major political goals inside the ANC.
Mbeki‘s loyalists attained this internal power-based consensus most of
the times through intricate apparat games and through firing the
―dissidents‖ from the executive positions, often through bitter personal
attacks in the media, and sometimes through direct persecution and
allegations of political conspiracy to overthrow the presidency. With
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On the background of these individuals, their political views and positions, see
Calland 2006: 27—35, 49—53, 61.
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less internal democracy inside the ANC, the core Mbeki supporters
were able to make African Renaissance a dominant proposal in the
party.12 ―African Renaissance‖ features prominently in the outlook of
the African National Congress (ANC). The 50th National Conference
in Mafikeng, the ANC adopted the ―African Renaissance‖ as a key
component of its ideological outlook, especially as related to economy
and international relations. 13 The language of the following statements
was also heavily imbued with references to the African Renaissance as
one of the core strategic tasks of the ANC.14 The concept of African
Renaissance also was fundamental for the documents discussing the
continent‘s future at the 51st National Conference in Stellenbosch
(December 2002).15
The ANC remains the unchallenged political party of power,
crowding and even marginalizing the rest of the smaller political
parties. In this context, the ANC‘s vision of national identity would
constitute at least a power-based (restrained) consensus. Indeed, the
role of potential challengers, such as South African Communist Party,
12
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15
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the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) remained
relatively minor. One indicator that the notion of African Renaissance
became accepted in domestic political elite beyonf Mbeki‘s circle of
supporters is that the leftist-oriented Vusi Maviembela (a current
leader of Congress of South African Trade Unions, COSATU) fully
endorsed and promoted this version of social purpose, especially
pertains to the country‘s role in continental leadership, continental
solidarity and common African heritage.

Indigenousness: return to the roots
Indigenousness pinpoints using local solutions and genetic resources
as a kind of action appropriate for addressing pressing policy
problems. ―A return to the roots‖ is a formula capturing major
interrelated themes, including the rediscovery of Africa‘s creative past,
taking the indigenous peoples‘ wisdom seriously, preserving and
promoting various indigenous customs transcending the present-day
political borders.16 Returning to the roots also aimed at the moral
regeneration to curb the present-day violence and stop the decline of
the moral standards.

16

See, for instance, The African cultural milieu and our common humanity, ANC
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Among all those themes, South African political elite placed a
special emphasis on the necessity to establish an African interpretation
of things, that is, producing and advancing indigenous science,
technology, and education. In his speech The African Renaissance,
South Africa and the World, Mbeki envisioned that indigenousness
would generate ―modern products of human economic activity,
significant contributions to the world of knowledge, in the arts, science
and technology, new images of an Africa of peace and prosperity.‖17
During African Renaissance conference in 1999, Githae Mugo called
for African education as a ―system of knowledge, theory and practice,
informed and shaped by a content and form that are definitive of
African space as well as the indigenous experiences of Africa‘s people
and diversity.‖18 Importantly, in 2002 one discussion document
defined indigenous knowledge as central for a new African identity:
―Citizens are not made by Acts of Parliament, but by a growing
common awareness emerging through politics, education, working
together, sport, entertainment, and religion. A new Indigenous
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Knowledge System (IKS) is arising which is not western, American,
European, but African.‖19
All this rhetoric signified something more profound than a
mere propaganda, or public relations exploit. Pretoria encouraged a
variety of institutions embodying the indigenous values and promoting
the contextualized systems of knowledge. The Cabinet supported
traditional leaders financially and logistically and recognized the role
of traditional governance in rural reconstruction and development, as
well as in sustaining cultural, linguistic and religious communities. 20
Early in his presidency, Mbeki and the President‘s Office helped
create National House of Traditional Leaders, Programme of Support
for the Institution of Traditional Leadership, the Traditional Leaders
Conference, and the African Renaissance Festival. Another, more
specific manifestation of indigenousness was the creation of the
National Research Foundation (NRF) to manage the governmental
funds directed to the study of indigenous knowledge and traditional
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healing practices.21 Throughout his tenure, Mbeki publicly extolled
traditional institutions and their leaders for their determining role in
the African Renaissance by developing communities and stimulating
the new common ground.22
In South African context the commitment to indigenous
knowledge systems and traditional institutions went beyond standard
declarative purposes. One practical implication directly relevant for
the subsequent chapters is related to African Traditional Medicines
(ATMs). The South African Health Ministry defined IKS as ―scientific
methodologies that stretch back thousands of years,‖ being ―essential
and irreplaceable component of the comprehensive care.‖23 From the
international vantage point, promoting TMs implies standardization
and commercialization of knowledge about plants, as well as
institutionalizing relationship between traditional healers, plant
gatherers, governments, biomedical researchers, and the private
sector.24 The global consensus on genetic resources is to make
ethnomedicines applicable for public health and to promote the
sustainable management of resources. This consensus does not imply
any of the far-reaching aspirations, as pursued by South African
21
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political leaders. While the World Health Organization (WHO) had a
particular interest in traditional medicine, it was very careful in its
evaluation of safety and efficacy of local knowledge about genetic
resources.
Generally indigenousness entails that the local innovations and
local solutions as policy action should be preferred to the Western
models, as employing the former only creates the negative image of
South Africa‘s backwardness and helplessness. At the more radical
side of the discourse, the participants of the African Renaissance
conference, the Foundation for the Global Dialogue, claimed that the
majority of Western institutions and structures on the African soil were
―promiscuously copied from the West,‖ proved themselves culturally
ineffective and irrelevant and thus should be boldly discouraged and
abolished.25

Marketization as the economic empowerment
Marketization prescribes the economic empowerment of South
Africans based on boosting the private sector and relying on market
economy strategies as a kind of action appropriate for addressing
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pressing policy problems, as opposed to the governmental delivery and
redistribution.26
In the late 1980s the ANC briefly planned to rebuild the
country‘s economy using soviet-style economic prescriptions. Some
powerful figures in the organization studied the Soviet, Chinese,
Cuban experiences and purportedly decided on nationalization as the
main economic strategy. In the early 1990s, however, Madela publicly
distanced himself from the ideas of nationalization so that the ANC‘s
economic policies could remain rather flexible. 27 The sharp
turnaround in the party‘s economic outlook got cemented in 1992—
1993, when socialist-inspired redistribution was categorically excluded
from the ANC policy documents. The agreement on the new economic
outlook superceded the strong contestation inside the future South
African elite. It had been fractured along the leftist and prodistribution (SACP, COSATU) and more centrist and promarketization proponents (the ANC, Trevor Manuel, Tito Mboweni,
and later Alec Erwin). WM Gumede implied that the strong consensus
about marketization at the level of political elite was borne out of the
successful transfer of assets and economic power to newly generated
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class of wealthy black entrepreneurs.28 Most importantly, for both
camps the choice of the path to growth was intricately connected to
their political identities and ideological outlooks.
Scholars still dispute the specific reasons why marketization
was embraced. Hein Marais, the author of perhaps most authoritative
account of the south African politics of economic reform, drew
attention to both structural and institutional factors, including global
communist collapse, learning from the overspending in Chile and
Peru, and the ANC‘s historical unpreparedness to debate economic
policy professionally. Zimbabwe‘s economic problems were attributed
to the lack of to the marketization principles the dedication to the land
redistribution and overspending.29 According to Gumede, the ANC
was simply seduced by the International Financial Institutions, most
notably the World Bank, whose representatives courted the ANC
members and in a course of a few years fully socialized them in the
neo-liberal orthodoxy. It could be also argued that these pro-market
policies were chosen simply out of overpowering fiscal constraints.
In any case, Mbeki‘s speech at the University of Transkei‘s
fundraising dinner on April 30, 1998 made abundantly clear that the

28

Tokyo Sexwale was one of the success stories of the Black Economic
Empowerment.
29
As in 2002 the ANC‘s Secretary-General Kgalema Motlanthe and Mbeki himself
argued.

233

stress on delivery was undesirable, since it overpowered the
government and disempowered the people:
What remains is for us all to invest the government with
the heavenly powers… Is it correct that we preach such a
message of disempowerment of the people, predicated on
the notion of a deliverer and a recipient? When we who, for
now anyway, occupy positions of political leadership speak
only of a record of achievement illustrated by statistics of
delivery, and do not address with the same vigour and
consistency the issues of what each of our citizens is doing
themselves to deliver to themselves and to society - are we
not thereby also contributing to the demobilisation and
disempowerment of the people and the inculcation among
them of a frame of mind of dependence on.30
The elevation of marketization as strong political obligation
was accompanied with the slow erosion of the socialist inspired
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). Simultaneously,
the ANC started underscoring economic growth through deficit
reduction, tight monetary policy, and trade liberalization, according
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the Washington Consensus.31 The final break away from the
redistribution to the neo-liberalism was sealed with the Growth,
Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR), the Accelerated and Shared
Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA). 32

Ubuntu in the context of globalization
Ubuntu emphasizes the continental solidarity, self-reliance, and
resistance the Western neo-colonial imperialism as the kind of action
appropriate to solve pressing policy problems. The more politicized
rendition of this concept strongly implied South Africa‘s role as the
primary and perhaps the sole expresser of a continental solidarity,
which also entails South African status as a benevolent hegemon. 33
Ubuntu is roughly defined as a universal bond of sharing that
connects all humanity, an intrinsic African outlook that places a strong
value on communal interests, underscores that human existence, gives
meaning to one‘s life through interactions with others, fosters spiritual
collectiveness, and promotes the ethos of reciprocity and mutual aid.
The Zulu saying ―umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu‖ is commonly
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translated as the person becoming self through interaction with the
Other. In this context, the political meaning of ubuntu implies that
South Africa can realize itself as a successful political project only if
shaping the future of the continent and playing an important global
role. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma
fleshed out the notion of continental solidarity as follows:
Our foreign policy is not only anchored in our domestic
policy, but on the responsibility that South Africa offers
hope for all humanity. We have to contribute to the
ongoing struggle for a better world. Internationally, we
continue struggle for a world with the following values:
democracy, good governance, people-centered
development, peace, stability and security, promotion of
cooperation, partnership and good neighbourliness.34
Some observers claimed that South African elites strategically
deployed the notion of continental solidarity in order to maximize
South Africa‘s foreign policy options in Africa—including the
country‘s quest to occupy Africa‘s permanent seat in the United
Nations Security Council.35 Yet political commitment to the social
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purpose captured in ubuntu goes beyond strategic considerations. In a
1997 discussion document prepared for the 50th national Conference in
Mafikeng ―African Renaissance‖ was mentioned 17 times in relation
to the South African foreign policy strategy.36 In 2007 political elites
continued extolling a strong and decisive leadership of South Africa in
ushering moral-political regeneration, economic revival, self-reliance,
and continental solidarity. In this context, ubuntu should be seen as a
politically meaningful program of action: many practical steps ensued
from this discourse.
The resolution of the 50th National Conference in Mafikeng
called for ―developing a theoretical framework and strategy to give
content to our vision of the African renaissance.‖37 The documents
flowing from the discussion indicated that the New Economic
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) will be such an
instrument.38 Heavy-weight members of the South African political
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elite Jacob Zuma, Essop Pahad, and Frank Chikane claimed the crucial
role of NEPAD in implementing the conception of common good. 39
Minister of Provincial and Local Government Sydney Mafumadi
asserted that NEPAD presented ―a framework for a break with the
unequal and exploitative economic and political relations that manifest
itself in the causal connection between development in the North and
underdevelopment in the South, of which our continent is an intimate
part.‖ 40 Frank Chikane, a member of the ANC National Executive
Committee and Director-General in the Presidency, claimed that the
deployment of NEPAD would put Africa on equal terms with the
West:
…is about restoring the dignity, respect, pride and ubuntu
of the African people... From a South African perspective,
NEPAD is seen within the context of the development of
the vision of the African Renaissance… NEPAD has
changed the nature of the relationship between the donor
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and the recipient, the developed and the developing
countries. It has contributed to a partnership of mutual
trust, respect and responsibility.41
Very similar, but more recent, initiative demonstrating the
commitment to self-reliance was the South African financial
contribution to the newly created the Pan-African Infrastructure
Investment Fund (PAIID). This fund combined exclusively Africangenerated $625 million in order to address the continental
developmental challenges.42 More generally, being a benevolent
hegemon implied that South Africa is likely to act as a norm-giver,
than a norm-taker. Next logical step was an attack on the global
pharmaceutical sector as undermining continental self-reliance and
solidarity.43

AFRICAN RENAISSANCE AND ITS PUBLIC LEGITIMACY
Public legitimacy of an elite-driven conception of common good is the
second step ascertaining whether or not social purpose takes root in a
41
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given country. Domestic articulated audiences select, enable, and
constrain the production of various discursive resources and thus
shape policy environment and constitute what kind of policy action is
likely to be perceived as legitimate. This means that the notions of
indigenousness, marketization, and ubuntu should be intentionally
disseminated and turned into the broader societal resources. In this
section I spell out how articulated audiences legitimized the elitegenerated conception of common good and ascertain the degree it got
imbued into society.
Given Thabo Mbeki‘s penchant for political writing, both his
critics and supporters anchor their discussion to this canon of
discourse. A large portion of the legitimation efforts revolve around
his letters, speeches, and addresses. In 2003—2007 Mbeki actively
contributed to the on-line ANC resource ANC Today with his almost
weekly section ―Letters from the President.‖ In these lengthy and
sometimes not very coherent contributions, he touched upon various
issues pertinent to history of slavery and liberation movement, national
identity, African solidarity, as well as aggressively engaged his
political opponents. Concurrently, a set of highly visible domestic
intellectuals and political leaders fleshed out Mbeki‘s vision of social
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purpose both in ANC Today and Umrabulo.44 The head of the
Government Communication and Information Service (GCIS) Joel
Netshitenzhe and the Minister of Arts and Culture Z. Pallo Jordan—
Mbeki‘s key supporters—headed Umrabulo‘s editorial board. The
journal also frequently gave the tribune to the Health Minister Manto
Tshabalala-Msimang to defend her controversial health policies. Eddy
Maloka, the Executive Director of Africa Institute of South Africa and
the President of the African Association of Political Science (AAPS)
also published frequently in Umrabulo. The journal‘s notable rubric
―Celebrating our heritage‖ recurrently explained what political actions
reflect the notion of indigenousness best and thus have to be nurtured.
The ANC‘s first attempt to publicly promoting the rhetoric of
African Renaissance was the discussion at the Foundation for Global
Dialogue (FGD). Although many notable and influential public figures
(including Moeletsi Mbeki) presented very engaging occasional
papers, this discussion was a false start. The ensuing large-scale
―African Renaissance‖ conference in Johannesburg turned out to be
way more decisive initiative in influencing the national political
environment. This conference was promoted by the President‘s Office
and gave a forum for more than 400 participants to formulate what it
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meant to apply the principles of African Renaissance to culture,
education, science, technology, media and telecommunications,
territorial divisions inside the continent. A year later, in 1999, the
thirty best contributions made it to a book entitled African
Renaissance: The New Struggle.45 Beyond the scholastic discussion,
the conference allegedly provided an intellectual foundation for the
broad social movement to ―reawaken‖ the continent. Simultaneously,
the President‘s Office launched the African Renaissance Institute
(ARI) to coordinate the South African Chapter of the African
Renaissance (SACAR), one of many across the continent.
The launch of the Native Club in May 2006 was another
attempt to promote African Renaissance and bring together its major
acolytes. Although initially the Club tried to be elitist and operate
without much press coverage, South African newspapers came to view
the Native Club as an ANC project.46 This view seems to be
warranted: the Club was in part sponsored by the Department of Arts
and Culture (DAC) and lead by Mbeki‘s senior political advisor Titus
Mafolo as its Founding Chairperson and RS Roberts as its media spin45
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doctor. The tasks of the Club were rather extensive: it was supposed to
develop a progressive force to sustain the African Renaissance,
countervail the multiplying domestic critics, shape and define South
African nation and African identity, revive indigenous African cultural
values and spirituality. Mafolo directly asserted that the Club‘s goal
was to stimulate those discursive resources, which would reflect the
notion of indigenousness and embed it among wider audiences:
[The Club] …aims to mobilise South Africans to ensure
that the ideas, philosophies, values and knowledge that
propel society in a particular direction reflect the
indigenous (italics added.—VK) identity of our people. We
seek to strengthen our democratic order by interrogating
the philosophical framework within which we produce
knowledge and within which certain ideas have become
entrenched and dominant in our society. This is particularly
critical because today, blacks in South Africa are
responsible for around only 15% of knowledge
production.47
Predictably, the ANC-sponsored journal Umrabulo favorably
covered the Club‘s mission and agenda for action. Yet the mainstream
post-colonial intellectuals and mass media brutally clobbered it as
47

Mafolo, Titus. 2006. The Third Pillar of Transformation. Umrabulo 26 (2).

243

divisive and shallow.48 Overall, by the late 1990s and early 2000s
talking and writing about the African Renaissance became an industry
in itself, as it included numerous conferences, publications, and special
journals [most notably African Renaissance, Rootz].49 The Cabinet
also used the services of some domestic spin-doctors: most notoriously
Ronald Suresh Roberts with his Fit to Govern: The Native Intelligence
of Thabo Mbeki. Similarly, the Office of the President helped create
the Moral Regeneration Movement (MRM) to mobilize a broad mass
movement on order, propagate the spirit of ubuntu, restore the moral
fiber of the society, and preserve South African national heritage.50
In as much as they tapped into very broad and malleable principles,
these initiatives signal that the process of embedding was successfully
triggered. On balance, however, Mbeki and his supporters failed to
dominate domestic media and turn them into the effective propagators
of their vision of common good. The elite‘s bitterness toward the nonsupportive media is best captured in the 2007 ANC discussion
document entitled ―The RDP of the Soul:‖ ―The transformation of our
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country can be inhibited by the negative attitudes, news items, editing,
illustrations and advertisements in the media. The media can be
subjugated to portraying western oppressive values, instead of the
liberating values of ubuntu thinking.‖51 As a result, despite the fact
that articulated audience turned the African Renaissance into a
noticeable and well-received notion in general, they failed to explain
the ensuing political benefits.

Indigenousness: return to the roots
The 2002 National Conference in Stellenbosch specified various
aspects of indigenousness and promoted it for the further political
development. It resolved to develop indigenous sports as part of nation
building and the African Renaissance, protect cultural heritage as part
of a major contribution to the South African national identity, develop
heritage sites to enroot historical memory at local level, promote the
Indigenous Knowledge Systems as a part of the national
transformation process and as an integral part of continental
solidarity.52 September 2007 was named the Heritage Month. 53
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Another way to stress indigenousness as a core component of
social purpose was in the creation of national parks as natural wonders,
cradles of the humankind, representing a deep connection to nature
that Europeans have lost long time ago.54 Newly created collective
spaces of memory stood for South African indigenousness and visibly
represented its inherent values for every inhabitant of the country.
Promoting education and business tourism was envisioned as yet
another way to reach out to wider audiences and popularize African
traditional culture. Among all these activities, Moral Regeneration
Movement (MRM), first led by Deputy President Zuma and then by
his successor Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, overtly aimed to create ―a
national consciousness‖ and national identity compatible with the
value of indigenousness.55
While there is a strong identity connotation inbuilt in all three
components of national purpose, indigenousness is of special
importance. This component of common good is pinned on the
worthiness of creative and unique self, and stands in opposition to the
53
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Settler Other, who does not believe that [South] Africa can offer
anything of significance and value to the world. The common theme
revolves around the thesis of two irreconcilable nations, each
embodying the opposite values. In this context, indigenousness got
treated as the core marker of South African ingenuity, a major defining
characteristic of [South] Africans, and a corner stone of their
identity.56 The general sense of the Other as an Afro-pessimist is
captured in Mbeki‘s diatribe against distant, aloof and cynical
observers, ―laughing‖ at the prospects of an African Renewal.57
Presidential spokesperson Mukoni Ratshitanga in 2007 argued that
despite the efforts of successive colonial and apartheid regimes to
obliterate the African cultural milieu, the values of traditional culture
―served both as a shield and weapon of struggle.‖58 Yet the Other is
constantly on the offensive. According to Pitika Ntuli, the Director of
the African Renaissance Institute at the University of DurbanWestville, the Eurocentric knowledge not only continues to dominate
in the African sciences, culture and education, but also keeps
suggesting that African is incapable of formulating its own knowledge
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systems.59 Importantly, indigenousness is cast not in ethnic or racial
terms, but rather as a conscious cultural choice based on learning and
commitment:
...Africanness in neither a pure matter of pigmentation, nor
a question of geographical or ethnic belonging. ...it is a
cultural choice and commitment, something which is
acquired, gained, a matter of deep feeling and concrete
behaviour ...everybody who feels our continent in the depth
of her or his soul and in each beat of her or his heart, can
legitimately be considered an African.60
Yet, at least until 2003 the official rendition of self/other
dynamic remained rather ambivalent in terms of who can be
included/excluded. Obviously, not everybody was convinced with this,
yet the major themes were articulated and promoted in a very clear
manner.61
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Marketization as the economic empowerment
There were a lot of intentional activities to make marketization
publicly legitimate and popular. According to Maloka, various talks
and discussions revolving around the notion occurred very regularly
on the radio stations, television, newspapers and magazines. The highranked Professional Managing Review (PMR) bestows an ―African
Renaissance Award‖ to businesses supposedly successful in
contributing to the black economic empowerment.62 More generally,
the corporate sector widely uses the notions of African Renaissance
and ubuntu in order to make products more attractive and to embed
marketization strategies as the way of doing business. Two astute
observers of South African economy Hein Marais and David
McDonald provide crucial evidence that academics and business
leaders in South Africa have been aggressively promoting ubuntu as a
home-grown management philosophy since the early 1990s, arguing
that it leads to better corporate governance and social responsibility
while at the same time safeguarding market economy. Marais noted
―[m]otivational speakers and consultants, corporate human resource
planners and advertising agencies eagerly assimilate[d]‖ the
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authentically African concept of ubuntu and African Renaissance to
talk about South African capitalism.63
There is a strong identity connotation inbuilt in marketization
as well. As a core component of national purpose, marketization is
pinned on self, who can provide for himself/herself, and rejects both
exploitation and redistribution as practices, which deny a South
African the well-deserved subjectivity and autonomy.64 The Other
claims that a South African is hostile to market principles and is
unable to sustain himself/herself economically. 65 The Afro-pessimists
want the government to deliver, thus implying that African people
themselves are incapable of dealing with the pressing local problems.
Mbeki mocked the proponents of these ideas as follows:
…they join the chorus which reinforces that notion that
government has legitimacy only to the extent that it
delivers. We have a place in society only because we have
the miraculous power to deliver. … I am the Deliverer and
none exists but I. Cursed are those who worship at the feet
of idols, because it is I and only I, the democratic state, that
will deliver you from your misery! And so you and I can
63
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see these masses at the feet of the Deliverer, hands held out
in supplication, incarnating in unison - Deliverer, deliver!
…magnanimous Deliverer who has an exclusive obligation
to see to the improvement of the conditions of life of the
passive recipient whose only task is to say - give me more!
Give me more!66
Recently Pretoria continued its efforts to embed marketization
among wider audiences and pitched itself as an inventor of the unusual
and morally superior business practices. Most notably, many highpowered politicians such as Mlambo-Ngcuka and Jordan explicitly
claimed that South Africa became fully committed to stable and
market-friendly values. 67 This type of embedding marketization was
also used by the lower-level bureaucrats as well. The Minister of
Environmental Affairs and Tourism Marthinus van Schalkwyk pushed
this line of argumentation further, asserting that South Africa ―fused
African wisdom with Western business, to offer Business Unusual to
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the world.‖68 The link between ubuntu and marketization allegedly had
an impact on the ways South African corporations and private sector in
general conducted business in the country. 69
In sum, with Mbeki‘s ascension to the presidency, promoting
marketization in the context of traditional African values became a
clear political trend and overall contributed to the growth of neoliberal
thinking in South Africa.70 After some of these aggressive and visible
leftist forces were sidelined and some of them actually converted to
marketization, the resistance to marketization significantly
weakened.71 However, there are a lot of the leftist academics and
journalists, who continue a heated attack on the public commitment to
marketization. They keep predicting economic collapse and broad
social distress, caused by the commitment to economic orthodoxy and
economic globalization for South Africa.72 Although the government
chose to play serious attention to this critique, in the long-term period
this may undermine the degree to which marketization is imbued in
South African policy environment.
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Ubuntu in the context of globalization
Publications streamlining and valorizing the African intellectual
traditions contributed to the popularity of ubuntu as a legitimate
notion. Notably, these publications treated any authentic tradition,
produced in other African countries and historical periods as an
equally important, of not integral, part of South African heritage. This
way of embedding included newly produced discourses about the
canonic cultural landmarks for African Renaissance, including The
Subtle Power of Intangible Heritage (2204), The Meaning of Timbuktu
by Jeppie and Diagne (2008), The African Intellectuals in the 19 and
20th centuries, as presented by Mcebisi Ndletyana (2008), and The
Deaths of Hintsa by Premesh Lalu (2009), among others. The Human
Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and the Council for the
Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) were
the most important centers propagating continental solidarity and
common intellectual tradition as part of African Renaissance. Their
publications can be seen as inventing the tradition and reappropriating
history--creating the image of incredibly rich and resourceful yet
untapped past, similarly to what the Renaissance Europe did to the its
Greek antiquity.
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In all this, one common theme contrasted European and
African programs of Renaissance. In Europe the development of the
Renaissance knowledge and technology was employed as means of
subjugation and allowed Europeans to conquer Africa. Moreover,
today‘s continuing Western superiority in technology and economic
development perpetuates the new Global apartheid. In contrast,
African Renaissance is based ubuntu and embraced human solidarity.
In his September 2007 lecture delivered on the occasion of the 30th
anniversary of the death of Steve Bantu Biko, Mbeki actively built on
Biko‘s anti-western Pan-Africanism and extensively quoted him.
Mbeki borrowed Biko‘s core point about the irreconcilable differences
with the West:
We reject the power-based society of the Westerner that
seems to be ever concerned with perfecting their
technological know-how while losing out on their spiritual
dimension. We believe that in the long run the special
contribution to the world by Africa will be in this field of
human relationships. The great powers of the world may
have done wonders in giving the world an industrial and
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military look, but the great gift still has to come from
Africa – giving the world a more human face.73
This theme essentially revealed the self-other dynamic. In this
context, ubuntu was pinned on mentally and spiritually liberated self,
whose Other crusaded for the ―mental colonization‖ and acted on the
inherent racism. The external Other have perpetuated the negative
construction of a South African and denies him/her a human dignity
and subjectivity. According to Mbeki, ―frightening images of
savagery that attend the continent of Africa‖ span over millennia and
had to be confronted head on.74 Pretoria presented political turmoil in
the continent, its violent conflicts, and even the scourge of HIV/AIDS
and various natural disasters as obstacles to be overcome, much like
European Renaissance rose above political fragmentation, armies of
mercenaries, Black Death and climatic instabilities. 75
The more assertive formulation of acting on ubuntu in the
context of globalization implies South Africa‘s role in fighting western
neocolonialism (liberal imperialism) as its principal Other. The new
South Africa has to be protected by exposing the legacies of racialism,
73
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oppression and domination, continuing to thrive in the global arena.
One particular policy implication, which damaged Mbeki‘s
international reputation, was Pretoria‘s support and regional solidarity
with Robert Mugabe‘s Zimbabwe. His disastrous land reforms were
interpreted as a bold opposition to the new global apartheid
unwelcomed by the former colonial powers. The most warranted
argument indicates that the South Africa support of Mugabe was
prompted by falling for Harare‘s duplicitous discursive resistance
against the legacy of colonialism, in which context the Western
critique was no more than a typical imperialist double-faced
opprobrium for daring to confront the enduring inequalities of the
colonial era and the continuing Western presence in Africa.76
The sense of historical proportions and the value attached
to the continental solidarity is best demonstrated in Mbeki‘s then
political adviser Vusi Maviembela‘s article, which described the
―African Renaissance‖ as a defining ―third moment‖ in Africa‘s
post-colonial history comparable with decolonization and the
democratic transitions as the first and the second moments,
respectively.77 As Mavimbela explained:
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The raison d‘être for a renaissance in the African continent
is the need to empower African peoples to deliver
themselves from the legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism and to situate themselves on the global stage as
equal and respected contributors to as well as beneficiaries
of all the achievements of human civilization. Just as the
continent was once a cradle of humanity and an important
contributor to civilization, this renaissance should
empower it to help the world rediscover the oneness of the
human race.78

AFRICAN RENAISSANCE IN COLLECTIVE ARTICULATIONS
Examining collective articulations is the third step in ascertaining
whether or not a certain conception of common good becomes truly
legitimate and embedded among the wider domestic audiences. For
the strong and consolidated social purpose it is essential that the elitedriven notions of indigenousness, marketization, and ubuntu are
congruent (or compatible) with the imageries spread in popular
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culture. In this section I spell out how public culture discursively
supported the core components of South African social purpose.
I have selected fiction as the source of recovering the collective
level of articulation. First and foremost, South African popular fiction
has long operated in what can be described as a ―politically demanding
milieu‖ and thus is well-suited to deal with restructuring of African
identities, as Michael Chapman claims in his very important and
multidimensional treatise of the contemporary state of popular culture
in South Africa.79 Historically, the importance of South African
literature for politics is based on a strong and acclaimed tradition of
JM Coetzee, Nadine Gordimer, André Brink, Breyten Breytenbach and
others, who purposefully concentrated on exposing the inhumanities of
apartheid. With the end of apartheid, the literature of South Africa
became more diverse and is not organized around a single overarching
narrative and one explicit set of political goals. The lack of a single
political focus in the post-apartheid fiction justifies treating the South
African writing as a good expresser of independent public culture,
rather than a set of conscious attempts of influencing the policy
environment. The new wave of politically concerned prose billowed
with an abundance of the post-apartheid communal, autobiographical,
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and confessional writing.80 The authors came from all walks of life,
ranging from the former victims Nelson Mandela (Long Walk to
Freedom) and Mamphela Ramphele (A Life, 1995) to the former
―oppressors‖, including a prison warden James Gregory (Goodbye
Bafana: Nelson Mandela, My Prisoner, My Friend) and a security
police spy Mark Behr (The Smell of Apples, 1995).81 Memoir as a
genre in often said to have both the healing, therapeutic,
transformative role and the one capable of bringing the nation to the
roots, grappling with legacies of oppression and imagining new
political and cultural identities.82 Memoires, however, are outside the
scope of my inquiry here.
The biggest objection for using South African literature as a
truly collective articulation of social purpose and identity can be
leveled by those literary critics, who argue that only the original
writing styles and indigenous languages—yet not codified and
developed for the desired scientific and cultural revival—can be true
expressers of the indigenousness and Africanness.83 The most rigorous
proponents of African Renaissance infallibly claim that ―by default
80
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privileged English‖ should be abolished as Africa‘s lingua franca as it
sneaks in the colonial consciousness, heritage of imperialism and
domination, and thus fosters ‗parrot culture,‘ not genuine creativity. 84
Yet iconic Ngugi wa Thiongo, Chinua Achebe, Zakes Mda and others
write in English. Ironically, literatures written not in the indigenous
languages can transcend the artificially imposed divisions among
ethnic groups and languages, thus truly contributing to the African
renewal.85
Others might extol the rich oral tradition, the indigenous
African theatre, and celebration and festivities customs to suggest the
pathways for the African post-colonial reconstruction and indigenous
revival.86 Githae Mugo approvingly recalls Kenyan experiment in
removing the English (British colonial) literature from the curriculum
and replacing it with studying African orature. 87 These two genres,
however, are typically best operating inside smaller local communities,
rather than imagined ones.
In general, because the contemporary South African literature
is highly politicized and has stimulated a significant body of political
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commentaries it fits the purposes of my discussion. The way literary
masters portray politically sensitive themes attracts a lot of attention in
the South African literary commentary. Thus, South African fiction
has stimulated a significant body of public interpretations, often
spilling over to the academic journals (Cultural Critique, Modern
Fiction Studies, Research in African Literatures, Journal of Southern
African Studies, Journal of Modern Literature, African Studies, and
Third World Quarterly, to name the main ones). This dissertation
judiciously uses secondary commentaries as evidence of how wider
audiences reflect major political themes, as opposed to relying solely
on my own rendition.

Indigenousness: return to the roots
The stress on indigenousness is perhaps best captured in the revival of
the previously subjugated literary forms, including praise poetry, and
incorporating some forms and themes from African oral traditions of
fairy tale-telling —purportedly standing in a stark contrast to what the
Western fiction writers consider appropriate. The second stress is to
give voice to the previously silenced people.
First, the academic literary criticism often claims that the
resurgent genre of fairy tale-telling (under the more common title
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―magical realism‖) and its growing popularity are crucial
characteristics of contemporary South African writing. The rise of
magical realism in the present-day literature ostensibly returns the
country‘s westernized (and hence colonialist) fiction to the authentic
oral tradition of African story-telling practices and also compensates
for the lack of fiction in the native languages. (This perhaps alleviates
concerns of the wide-spread use of colonial English as lamented by the
African Renaissance purists).88 The South African fantastic tales are
decidedly unique and by no means simply emulate of the western-style
fantasy a-la JRR Tolkien, Poul Anderson, Robert Howard, or George
Martin—with their highly stylized European pre-Renaissance setting.
On the contrary, the genre is imbued with very distinct African values
and sensibilities, including the resistance to colonialist assertions of
possessing the ultimate truth and knowledge. Among many authors
writing in this genre, the work of Brink is viewed especially
favorably.89 While Brink used the elements of the genre in the 1980s
(consider for instance his The Chain of Voices and On the Contrary),
he fully committed to the magic realism in his post-apartheid writings.
Second, Andre Brink defined the purpose of post-apartheid
fiction as to imagine and represent those private historical experiences
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and public ―regions of the past,‖ which had been silenced before and
yet remain pivotal to the future of the nation.90 Establishing the
continuity with the pre-apartheid past and giving the voice to the
previously silenced people (natives) helps restoring the worthiness of
creative and unique indigenous self. The metaphor of being silenced
previously was best expressed in Coetzee‘s Foe—the postmodern
remake of Robinson Crusoe—in which the white settler cuts out
Friday‘s tongue to keep his subjugated native mute. On a side note,
mutilation is a common trope of subjugation in Brink‘s The Other Side
of Silence.
In the post-apartheid writing, characters tend to act on the
notion of going back to the roots in order to heal themselves, as well as
immerse into the recollection of history -- along very personal lines.
Often the focus is placed not the nation on the whole, but rather on a
particular community or individuals (KhoiKhoi in Brink‘s case, Xhosa
and Zulu in Mda‘s writings). Most whites, males or females, young or
elderly, are doomed without this return. The list of ―doomed‖
characters includes Reuben Olivier in The Rights of Desire, Ouma
Kristina in Imaginings of Sand, semi-fictional Coetzee in Boyhood,
delusional David Lurie of Disgrace, and depressed Adam Napier of
The Impostor. Even if the characters are not ―doomed,‖ they retreat in
90
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self-absorption, soul-searching, and gloomy reflexivity. Disgrace‘s
protagonist David Lurie escapes realities of everyday by writing about
Lord Byron‘s life on an Italian villa, Ouma Kristina is tracing their
Afrikaner family‘s genealogical lineage through the centuries and
totally immersed in remembering, Galgut‘s Dr. Frank Eloff retreats to
the rural South Africa, while disillusioned about the purpose of life.
It underscores those personal experiences which transcend the
divisions of defined by any rigid political, cultural and social
boundaries.91 Brink‘s Imaginings of Sand and The Other Side of
Silence (2002) offer a rich and multidimensional view of settlers‘ story
plentiful of hardships and injustices. In his novels, settlers do not
travel the mythologized Boers‘ Great Trek to glory, prosperity and
political power. Instead, subjugated women in South-West Africa tread
a miserable passage to more hard labor, aggravated by cruelties
inflicted on them by other settlers. Once truly transplanted into the
local ways of life, the settlers obtain psychological strength to counter
the injustices inflicted on them. Africa gives prospects of liberation
and finding a new home to all oppressed. In this word, indigenous
medicine generates miracles and heals the impossible terminal
wounds, brings back to life a mutilated protagonist and gives her
powers to fight back.
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This rendition support the idea that it is not the race, or place of
birth that defines who is native and who is settler. The principal theme
asserts a clear articulation of deep human solidarity and the profound
sense of belonging that transcends the rigid political boundaries. Many
popular novels register the uneasiness of relationship between different
races and ethnicities, both in historical and contemporary perspective.
According to Rastogi, this pessimism stands in a stark contrast with
the writer‘s apartheid-era anticipation for racial harmony and cultural
reconciliation to be achieved after the successful liberation struggle.92
At the same time, many commentators contended that the central
question of the white writing concerned the role that whites must play
in the new nation, suggesting the mutual responsibility for the national
destiny and the mutual responsibility for its past.93 Thus, on balance,
the literature eschews direct politicization of race, class or ethnicity
and instead enables more creative and subtle ―refashioning of
identities.‖ 94 South African fiction seems not to base true nativism
simply on the pigmentation of the skin, but rather link it to the distinct
sensibilities and the ability to reflect on the meaning of the past. No
person can be automatically considered a native as perhaps the idea of
the Rainbow Nation for the inclusive national identity did.
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The vices of marketization in South African writing
In The Heart of Redness Zakes Mda uses the image of Casino as a
symbol of marketization, global capitalism and a threat to the
traditional way of life. This is one of the commanding illustrations that
popular culture reflected the notion of marketization in a very
unfavorable manner.95
In the previous subsection I mentioned that Mda represented
historical breakdown of the Xhosa community in relation to their
attitudes to Nongqawuse‘s prophesy. In today‘s context, the challenges
to the Xhosa survival, unity and distinctiveness are embodied by the
spread of global capitalism and its adoption in the form of an
international casino and resorts in South Africa. Schatteman explains
that ―the opposing camps are resurrected in the conflict between those
who see the casino as a threat to traditional life and culture and those
who welcome the move towards progress and western capitalism.‖96
This, this disagreement and conflict about marketization is essentially
a marker of new identity conflicts, which potentially can undermine a
building of a new South Africa. Contrary to the official rendition of
ubuntu-inspired marketization in the post-apartheid setting, their
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dismissal of native customs disempowers the local community and
may revive neo-colonialism.97
In Slaves, Rings and Rubbish (1995), Martin Hall bluntly
thickens the negative representation of capitalism. His plot contrasts
two characters, whose clash demonstrates the profound gulf between
the value of nativism and marketization, and even the overt danger
marketization presents to indigenousness. One main character (John
Berg) is interested in historical artifacts and historical sites both for
their own artistic sake and as the way they reconnect him to his
family‘ past in particular and the country‘s heritage in general. To him,
valuable artifacts become a source of pride, emotion and stimulate a
strong sense of belonging. Another character (Sterling Wolff) simply
treats historical artifacts as commodities to acquire a personal wealth
and status—all this ―decontextualizes these artifacts and strips them of
their connections to individual family histories.‖98 His unscrupulous
decorum and obsessive profit-seeking end him up in jail.
The author, no doubt, implies a very negative attitude to the
principle of marketization. Of course, it would be warranted to like
Berg and dislike Wolff as particular individuals with particular set of
personal characteristics, just as the author intended. Yet the broader
97
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message gives no clues how to delineate between successful, hardworking entrepreneurs and dishonest businesspeople, while blending
these two distinctive images together. Perhaps, the author shows that
the profit-seeking behavior always results in the predatory, neocolonial disrespect for the native customs and heritage.
More generally, probing the place of the wealthy in South
African writing is often imbued with the suspicion and revile towards
those who had achieved personal financial success of major
proportion. The work of Ahmed Essop, for instance, reveals the
popular suspicion against the wealthy entrepreneurs, especially of
Indian origin. Commentaries of Essop‘s stories contend that Indian
success and wealth is portrayed as being built on the exploitation of
black people. 99 The financial success of the fictional Mr. Khamsin is
perpetuating both the class-based structure of society and the
apartheid-era stereotypes of what it means to be an African (indolent)
and an Indian (hard-working).
The goals of personal enrichment have strong negative
repercussions to the democratic of the new South Africa. Essop‘s
protagonist courts democratic leaders only to rip greater profits from
this connection, just as he had done under the apartheid rule. The
imperative of economic success at any cost implies that the wealthy
99
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elude any strong circles of allegiances, even loyalties to their own
(Indian Muslim friends in Mr. Khamsin‘s case). More alarmingly, in
The Third Prophesy Mr. Khamsin is anticipated to become the next
President as opposed to his more likeable friend, Mr. Khan, who was
demoted from being in charge of the Ministry of Education to be in
charge of prisons.
On balance, contemporary South African literature writing
develops the notion that the political stress on marketization empowers
wrong people and is not conducive to the empowerment of all South
Africans as officially intended. In the popular literature marketization
is used as marker not of economic empowerment, but rather as one of
the most profound factors, stimulating the further rifts among South
Africa‘s multiple ethnic groups, between privileged few and alienated
many. Thus, the commitment to marketization may endanger the
national future.

Ubuntu in the context of globalization
As I have argued in the first section, the South African political elite
considered ubuntu —the third component of the African
Renaissance—in two particular segments. First, the contemporary
South African writing directly exposes the incompatibility of the
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Western and Native ways of life and strongly implies the necessity of
rejecting the western values for the personal liberation. Second, the
South African commitment and openness to the human solidarity is
also expressed in the detailed and highly emotional accounts of the
moral regeneration achieved against the backdrop of the untamed
wave of crime. Authors demonstrate the strong human potential to
emphasize and combat the profound moral decay.
The general theme demonstrating the incompatibility of South
Africa and the west has abundant coverage in the contemporary South
African literature. In Brink‘s novels the encounters between the native
(Khoi) self and the Other (alien Portuguese, English, German travelers
and settlers) generate linguistic, religious, and physical conflicts. In his
Cape of Storm: The First Life of Adamastor (1993), it is not only the
different languages that drive the native and the settlers apart, but the
physical differences as well. The whole story revolves around the
African chief T‘Kama‘s lust towards a Portuguese shipwoman, which
he is not able to consummate. None of the traditional healing practices
and medicines proved even remotely helpful; they inflicted more
physical pain. Thus, this incommensurable relationship remained more
of a notion than actuality, as the physical contact was facilitated by an
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artificial organ.100 From the plot it is not even clear whether the
Portuguese woman was remotely interested in connecting with the
African protagonist, while the native chief definitely tried to make an
effort throughout the whole narrative. This suggests indigenous
openness to universal human solidarity, as well as its undesirability
and impossibility for West.
The difference in destinies of the western invaders/settlers and
the natives is demonstrated by their involvement in religion.
Religiosity is the focal point of the life of Cupido Cockroach, the main
protagonist of Praying Mantis (2004), a fictional KhoiKhoin of the
XIXth century with some real historical prototype. 101 Once his luck in
hunting the elephants wanes, he abandons the local god Heitsi-Eibib
and becomes an ardent follower and aggressive proselyte of the
Christian faith. He sees the Western God as compatible with and even
superior to the gods of his own. For a considerable portion of Cupido‘s
life, his religious conversion reconciles him with settlers and makes
him a respected member of Christian community. Yet, despite his
extended self-sacrificing service in the harshest desert, he got relieved
of his ministerial duties immediately after the traveling inspector had
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realized Cupido‘s useless in his narrow instrumental function in
converting other natives. As he belongs to a different race, white
preachers suspect that Cupido has not fully abandoned the gods of his
past and reject him. In the end he switches back to Tsui-Goab,
Gaunab, and Heitsi-Eibib and spiritually reconnects to the native way
of life. Just like Adamastor, this story suggests the possibility of the
utilitarian and transient coexistence between natives and settlers, rather
than productive Western impact on the South Africa.
It appears that the penetration of the West not only imposes the
injustices, but also brings the worst out of the local individuals, and
profoundly splits South African communities along various lines.
Karen Press‘s Hidden Histories and Zakes Mda‘s The Heart of
Redness both center on the major traumatic event in Xhosa history. In
the XIXth century, Nongqawuse gave a prophesy that the massive
cattle-killing as an offer for the Xhosa ancestral spirits would be an
appropriate way to defeat the British colonial order. Hidden Histories
implied that while prophesies were normal and authentic, British were
able to abuse it as a war trick, causing major famine among the Xhosa.
As many Xhosa today share this explanation, this account of the events
is more congruent to the official stress on the role of the Western

272

influence.102 In The Heart of Redness, the prophesy generates a deep
gulf between the Xhosa who believed in the traditional practices (the
Believers) and those who rejected them outright (the Unbelievers). As
the story goes, the split between the two factions would remain
unabated through the present day, reinforcing the conflicts and
misunderstanding in the community. 103 The Unbelievers become
ultimately a brooding and negative faction:
Unbelievers are reputed to be such somber people that they
do not believe in those things that can bring happiness to
their lives. They spend most of their time moaning about
past injustices and bleeding for the world would have
been…104
Another broad discursive formation of the South Africa‘s
fiction explores the untamed wave of crime and post-apartheid
violence, overwhelming the country. Damon Galgut‘s The Quarry
(1995), Zakes Mda‘s Ways of Dying (1995), Mike Nicol‘s Horseman
(1996), Sindiwe Magona‘s Mother to Mother (1998), and Mandla
Langa‘s The Memory of Stones (2000), are the prime examples of this
discursive stream. The Memory of Stones described the emergence of
102
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new solidarity in response to violence among black South Africans in
KwaZulu-Natal, gangster crime, and political terrorism (from all sides)
during and immediately after the apartheid.105 Similarly, Mother to
Mother explores how to survive the violence and abuse during the
transition years.106

Some literary critics still accuse the white writing

of racial stereotyping and depicting violence in such a way that
relieves whites of responsibility for their apartheid crimes. Disgrace
and Horseman are often cited as prime examples of this stream. Chait
asserts that Nicol suggests the universality of evil and thus ―the very
banality of South Africa‘s particular white brand of horror.‖107 The
apartheid ―apocalypse‖ is predetermined and reflects the will of God
and is not so different from other historically recorded genocides.
Acknowledging these specific claims about the pessimist
politics of white writing, and the fact that this topic warrants a very
pessimistic rendition of the role of ubuntu in contemporary
circumstances, writers‘ strong emphasis is on the mourning, which is
depicted as a unique method of demonstrating the humanness,
compassion and therefore a fundamental commonality of all people.
Ways of Dying is a case in point. The book received a sharp
politicized critique for making intra-ethnic violence and the crime
105
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wave a focal point of critical scrutiny, as opposed to showing how
local white and multinational capital created the black bourgeoisie and
perpetuated the subaltern black underclass. 108 Yet Mda‘s central point
is about the healing function of mourning as a form of showing
empathy, a form of practicing ubuntu. According to Durrant,
…the kind of communion produced by death might bind us
together not by the operation of ideology, not by an
exclusionary appeal to sameness of race, nationality or
class, but by an appeal to our own otherness, to our own
difference from ourselves. One might say that we are
bound together by our recognition of our own death in the
death of others: their death performs, enacts or even mimes
our own death. At a basic level, funerals perform a mimetic
function: the body to be buried or burnt or left to rot mimes
what will eventually happen to our own bodies.109
There are also some stand alone examples of ubuntu in South
African fiction. Coetzee occupies a special place in this context, as his
writings often defy an easy interpretation and provide a difficult read.
Elizabeth Costello—a character appearing in his several novels— is a
chief protagonist in The Life of Animals. She takes the notion of
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ubuntu one step further as she asserts very primal sense of belonging
and extends the notion of humanness to animals. In her fictional
lectures she critiques our innate feeling of human superiority over
animals and even the notion of ecology as the science of domination
over the non-human life.110 Coetzee depicts Costello as always
travelling, always trying to disseminate her sensibilities across the
globe, which shows the universal appeal and moral fiber of ubuntu.

CONCLUSION: RANKING NATIONAL PURPOSE
South African political elite strongly expressed its commitment to
African Renaissance as the conception of common good, while
domestic articulated audience was very active in outreaching its
components to wider audiences. At the same time, public culture
strongly supported a dominant articulation of common good, including
two out of three substantive components (excluding marketization).
On balance, throughout Mbeki‘s presidency, at the very least, oneparty dominance suggests a power-based consensus, which may be
more temporary in nature, but nevertheless very informative for the
study how the domestic policy environment underpins certain kinds of
policy choices. This type of consensus emerges when one sub-elite
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group strongly espouses a conception of common good and is able to
act on and enforce it. At the same time, wider audiences might
inherently disagree with the promoted conception of common good,
but for a variety of reasons might conform to it and if chooses to
dispute it publicly, does so in a very subdued manner. At the margins,
other sub-elite groups and political parties keep advocating radically
different set of political obligations, engrained in a different set of
values. The summary characteristics of South African national
purpose are provided below:
Table 5.1 Indicators of national purpose
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CHAPTER 6. HIV/AIDS POLICY IN RUSSIA

In the early 2000s in Russia the rates of the HIV infection grew
exponentially, exacerbating the perceived demographic crisis. At the
same time, an incredible success in curbing the pandemic across the
globe proved that the international take on the HIV/AIDS treatment
policy was indeed effective. In 2006 President Vladimir Putin
discussed the issue of HIV/AIDS at the State Council.1 Subsequently,
Russian political elite actively responded to the challenge. Many
domestic and international observers publicly lauded Putin‘s
acknowledgment of HIV/AIDS as a serious threat to the country. Yet,
in spending significant amount of efforts and resources to mitigate
HIV/AIDS, the Kremlin chose to follow the international
recommendations only selectively. In general, governmental actions
were marred by only partial, or inefficient, implementation, and
sometimes by open resistance to critical elements of international
guidelines and recommendations.
This chapter argues that Russian HIV/AIDS policies were
shaped by the deployment of the Sovereign Democracy--the
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historically contingent and country-specific content of social purpose.
The most important outcomes of this impact include three broad
clusters of effects. First, in accordance with the strong state component
of national purpose, it affected the general political understanding and
framing of the domestic epidemic and linked it to the highly desired
demographic security as the major tool in having a strong state; it
impinged on the human rights principles in providing ARVs to the key
vulnerable populations as these principles were seen as undermining
the strong Russian state; politicized and filtered the desirable pool of
partners, as well as shaped the permissible role of civil society in their
combat against HIV/AIDS. Second, in accordance with the social
responsibility component of national purpose, it led to the significant
increase in public spending for healthcare and infectious diseases and
efforts at universal and free medical coverage, and shunning the
private sector as a potential partner. Third, in accordance with the
great power component of national purpose, it stimulated the Kremlin
to act like a donor/leader on the international arena, fend off the
expertise and resources of well-established international health
organizations, and attempting to revamp the country‘s position in the
pharmaceutical markets.
While there some compelling accounts of Russian HIV/AIDS
policies, the emphasis on the politically contingent conception of
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common good as the intervening variable helps providing a more
encompassing account of adopting international health
recommendations. The effects of deploying social purpose on the
domestic HIV/AIDS policies are summarized in the Table 6.1 below.
Table 6.1: Summary of the HIV/AIDS policy in Russia

TREATMENT
Indicator 1a: Epidemic in the context of state weakness
Russian government did not emphasize the need to respond to the
epidemic as a serious public health crisis in its own right, instead
viewing the epidemic in the context of two broader socio-political
issues. First, HIV/AIDS was linked to the looming demographic
decline, which was perceived as threatening the power and survival of
the state.2 Second, the Russian government linked the spread of
HIV/AIDS as a secondary factor almost exclusively to the intravenous
drug users (IDUs), which legitimized ruling out the human rights
component of the governmental response.
The spread of HIV/AIDS was framed in this context as the
issue of demographic decline and state weakness, rather than an
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alarming public health crisis in its own right. In the 2003 address to the
Federal Assembly Putin directly linked the impending consequences of
the epidemic to the challenges to achieve the strong state. Following
this address, several high-ranking members of the government,
including Igor Ivanov (then the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and
Aleksandr Zhukov (then First Deputy Prime Minister), warned about
the negative effects of HIV/AIDS on national security and survival.
On March 30, 2005, Zhukov indicated that ―[t]he HIV epidemic is far
more than just a health issue: in the light of [Russia‘s] on-going
demographic decrease, it presents a serious threat to Russia‘s strategic,
social, and economic security.‖3
The notion of the strong state required a strong state solutions.
In 2005 the Kremlin announced its decision to create a new
governmental institution under the direct patronage of the President -the Council for the Implementation of National Priority Projects and
Demographic Politics (CNPPDP). The Council was supposed to
reverse the adverse demographic tendencies and smartly invest money
in several critical areas, including health.
By 2006 Russia got obsessed with pending demographic
collapse. Even Mikhail Khodorkovsky, writing to the popular
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newspaper Kommersant-Daily from jail, imagined strong Russian state
inhabited by 220-230 million people, which meant an increase by 90
million.4 A notable demographer Anatoly Vishnevsky indicated that
Russian political elite did not perceive the unfolding demographic
crisis as a long-term consequence of the socialist-era economic
disproportions. Instead, the mainstream political elite, in accordance
with the formula of the ―wild 1990s,‖ viewed the demographic decline
either as the outcome the neoliberal ideology and the state weakness,
or even as a consequence of purposeful subversive strategies, aiming
at the reduction of the ―indigenous‖ populations across the globe.5
More radical politicians and activists made claims that the diminishing
population of ethnic Russians and the increasing influx of various
immigrants would undermine the unity of the country and signal its
end as an autonomous political organization.6
Mikhail Grishankov was one of the most highly visible
political leaders involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS and publicly
tying the extant views on national purpose with HIV/AIDS policy. He
had a KGB background, served as a Deputy of the State Duma, Fist
Deputy of the State Duma Committee on Security, and later he became

4

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Levyj povorot-2, Kommersant-Daily № 212(3296);
11.11.2005
5
Vishnevsky 2004
6
Alexseev 2006: 95—147
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Fist Deputy of the Committee on Corruption. In one of his interviews,
he claimed that AIDS was not only threatening the strength of the
state, but could have been prevented by maintaining the great power
status. He offered an instructive phrase that
…had we foreseen the advent of HIV/AIDS, somebody
would have thought <about its future repercussions>,
would not have destroyed the USSR, would have
maintained the Iron Curtain, and <then> we would have
had neither narcotic abuse, not AIDS.7
The official statistical data always downplays the rate of HIV
infection in the country. According to the official estimates, the most
recent number of people registered as HIV positive reached 370, 000.8
The majority of the estimates provided by the independent from the
state bureaucracy organizations and experts strongly suggested that the
actual number of HIV infected population could be as much as 1
million people or even approaching 1.5 million. 9 This discrepancy has
been always duly noted in the relevant literature, even though not
given an adequate interpretation.10 In essence defending these low
numbers feeds the unwarranted conviction that the epidemic would
7

Mikhail Grishankov, Rasprostranenie SPIDa v Rossii: sposobno li gosudarstvo ego
sderzhivat'. Interview for radio station ―Ekho Moskvy,‖ 12.01.2005.
8
Gennady Onishchenko, VICh-politizirovannyj, Rossijskaja gazeta, №3719;
03.15.2005.
9
UNAIDS 2004 : 4 (UNAIDS/04.18E).
10
Twigg 2007: 2—4, CIRA 2004.
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remain limited to some marginalized groups, which in turn gives the
necessary justification to deploy harsh and repressive measures in
treating the IDUs.
As late as in 2009 the majority of state officials,
acknowledging the unprecedented growth in reported HIV infection,
failed to learn that it was very likely that the epidemic would soon
become generalized. Once reaching more than 1% of the general
population, the epidemic affects a variety of groups. The references to
the feminization of the epidemic—as the first signal that it traveled
beyond the marginal and negatively constructed populations—were
made only once by the President, and once by the junior member of
the Federation Council, responsible for health education. In essence,
Russian policy-makers remained entrenched in old perceptions of the
pandemic, which associated the disease with the IV drug-users and
prostitutes as the only vulnerable group. It is not by coincidence that
Grishankov explained his original motivation behind an aggressive
bringing of the disease to the fore as follows:
Working in the commission in my own region, Chelyabinsk
oblast, I really saw that the problem of drug abuse is very
closely linked to the problem of HIV/AIDS. And we have to
acknowledge that today the majority of HIV/AIDS positive
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people in the country are heroin addicts. Thus, dealing with the
problems of narcotics, we cannot but deal with the problems of
HIV/AIDS.11
This dominant theme was extended in the series of official
assertions that the domestic epidemic was mostly a result of the
increasing domestic abuse of narcotic substances related to the
increased harvest of opiates in Afghanistan since the US invasion.
During the State Duma‘s hearings ―On the causes and consequences of
the Afghan narco-traffic for the Russian Federation‖ its Speaker Boris
Gryzlov claimed that Russia entered in the state of war with those who
spread opiates from Afghanistan as a deliberate strategy to destroy the
Russian gene pool.12 As I will discuss shortly, the top political
leadership delegated the rights to formulate and implement AIDS
policy to the law enforcement agencies, most notably to the Federal
Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation (FSKN).
In general, sorting the meaning of epidemic through the narrow
state-centric lenses inhibited the political urgency to combat
HIV/AIDS as a public health crisis. Russian president Dmitry
Medvedev, for instance, failed to mention HIV/AIDS as a national
health crisis even once in all his multiple newspaper and on-line
11

Mikhail Grishankov, VICh/SPID: Uroven' Opasnosti, Interview for radio station
«RADIO ROSSII», 14.04.2006
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Information available at <http://russianews.ru/second/21815/>
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interviews, as well as speeches addressed to the members of the NPP
Council. This seems especially strange since in his capacity as First
Vice Prime-Minister Dmitry Medvedev was de facto in charge of the
National Priority Projects, including Health.

Indicator 1b: Standardized protocol in treatment
The Russian government never rejected the life-saving role of ARV in
fighting HIV/AIDS and in this context its response did not deviate
from the international consensus on the antiretrovirals. In the early
2000s Russia used monotherapy (AZT), yet after 2006 the Russian
government switched to the triple therapy and started its universal
disbursement.
Standardized protocol also means the strict adherence to the
medically prescribed regimen.13 The best way to guarantee it is to
institutionalize orderly and uninterrupted purchase of the appropriate
line and combination of pharmaceuticals. On the one hand, Russian
officials tried to enforce a more centralized and transparent mechanism
of procuring the necessary pharmaceutical products. The centralized
system of drug procurements and disbursement is consistent both with

13

Breaching the standardized protocol is dangerous for both HIV-positive patients
and the general population, as it may lead to the wide-spread resistance to the older
medicines and the virus mutation.
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the kind of political environment the social purpose underpins and
with the international policy consensus. On the other hand, the
government failed to enforce it. Purchasing the insufficient number of
therapy components, delays in the drug tenders, intergovernmental
coordination, and institutional reshuffles endangered the enforcement
of the standardized protocol.
In 2005 the Ministry of Health and Social Development (often
referred to in an abbreviated form as Rosminzdrav, or
Minzdravsocrazvitija) and its head Mikhail Zurabov became the
―favorite‖ target of public scrutiny and criticism. The inefficiency of
his Ministry was so pervasive and evident that many newspapers
imbued the reporting on domestic health issues with profuse
reflections on Zurabov‘s prospective sacking. 14 Since in 2006 the state
became more proactive in public health, all these problems became
obvious. These and other scandals attested to the state‘s low efficiency
in procuring the lifesaving medications and perhaps some elements of
corruption, even though the criminal charges were not pressed.
The biggest political scandal erupted in late November 2006,
when Rosminzdrav single-handedly ordered to replace the less
14

Anastasija Makrjashina, Umirat' ot SPIDa stanet deshevle, Gazeta.ru, 30.03.05;
Andrej Stenin, Jelja Vermisheva, Minzdrav podvergsja VICh-atake, Gazeta.ru,
14.05.05; Ada Gorbacheva, Poluchilos', kak vsegda: V regionah zhdut lekarstvennyh
buntov, Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 11.02.2005; Marija Bondarenko, Zurabov pokinul
blindazh, Nezavisimaja Gazeta,16.02.2005
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expensive first and second-line drugs with a very costly newer
pharmaceutical product. The executive order № 785, which excluded
first-line Combivir, as well as Trisivir, Teataz and Fusion (all secondline), and replaced with the third-line Darunavir. Subsequently, the
Deputy Minister Vladimir Starodubov signed an executive order №
786, amending the medical standard of HIV treatment. It prescribed to
treat 50% of adult patients and children with this new medication, even
though the benefits and adverse effects of darunavir on children had
not yet been studied (some still argued it should have been considered
as an experimental drug). As the outburst of the Russian epidemic
stated in the late 1990s and the majority of patients began receiving the
ARV treatment only recently, the resistance to the prescribed
combination of drugs was not widespread. Thus, darunavir should not
be included in all treatment plans, which made prescribing any
individual appropriate ARV combination (―cocktail‖) of drugs very
difficult. One of the leading Russian epidemiologists Vadim
Pokrovsky estimated that that among 30,000 patients receiving
treatment only 300 could have really benefited from the new
pharmaceutical, while not more than 3,000 could be treated with it
overall. This decision did not make sense from the financial standpoint
either, as the cost of treatment was projected to increase by 30 percent
(in absolute numbers the cost of darunavir was about $14, 000 a year).
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15

In the context, the decision was highly inadequate both from

medical and financial standpoints. Moreover, according to the new
standard, the new drug had to be administered in hospitals rather than
disbursed for individual treatment at home. These orders were signed
without any consultation with other AIDS bodies, which traditionally
were in charge of developing standards of HIV treatment.16
After an outburst of public criticism, Zurabov called the
decision ―a statistical error.‖ His deputy Starodubov retorted that this
decision was supposed to diminish the price on the medicines though
the support of those foreign companies, including Janssen-Cilag and
Makiz-Farma, which were willing to manufacture pharmaceutical
drugs on the Russian soil.17 These justifications sounded like an
intentional cover-up of inefficiency, furtiveness, and corruption.
Grishankov raised the issue about the incompetence and corruption in
the Ministry:
The standard has been developed for the particular company
and for the particular winner of the request for tender. This can
destroy the whole presidential campaign for HIV treatment.
We addressed to the presidential administration and Dmitry

15
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Medvedev with the request to sort out the secret tendering of
Minzdravsocrazvitija. Additionally, the group of State Duma
deputies, including myself, sent an address to President
Vladimir Putin, retelling all the ―achievements‖ of
Minzdravsocrazvitija, machinations with financial assets,
including the executive order on the new standard of HIV
treatment.18
This incident of purchasing quite expensive and relatively
inefficient drugs was not single. Seven month later, in June 2007, the
WHO informed about the global recall of a protease inhibitor
―Viracept,‖ some batches of which contained a high level of cancercausing substance.19 This recall brought on the spotlight yet another
staggering case. In essence, the government purchased enough of this
drug to treat as much as 15 percent of patients. For some unclear
reason, Viracept cost a lot more for the Russian government than to
others. Furthermore, from the same recall statement it turned out that
the WHO had already recommended using different protease
inhibitors, especially in post-exposure prophylaxis packs. As the
representative of the Russian PLWA community put it:

18

Julija Taratuta, Dmitrij Krjazhev, Minzdrav ne nashel u sebja simptomov
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WHO statement on ROCHES‘s Viracept recall, 14 June 2007, available at
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The bureaucrats follow a strange logic, purchasing the least
effective pharmaceuticals for the most expensive price. This
logic undercuts patients‘ interests, as opposed to the
commercial interests of <trading> parties.20
Another endemic problem was in recurring flaws in
streamlining the procuring and disbursing the necessary
pharmaceutical products, causing unintended interruption of HIV
treatment. In June—July 2006, for instance, the AIDS-centers
disbursing the antiretrovirals on the ground in Moscow oblast, Rostovon-Don, Bashkortostan, Voronezh and Khabarovsk had to interrupt the
standardized treatment protocol for many patients as the governors
decided to cut the regional health care budgets and rely on the federal
government to supply their regions with the necessary
antriretrovirals.21
At the same time, in March 2006 the Ministry of Health, while
having spent more than $13 million on the ARVs in general, failed to
procure 10 out of 15 essential pharmaceuticals to be used in the
combination treatment. The regional disbursement was delayed by two
month (from March to May), and in the meanwhile the only regions
covered by the nongovernmental sector (GFATM‘s Globus program)

20
21
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had enough supplies to cover the gap of disbursement. High powered
health officials acknowledged the ―difficulties‖ and lamented about
their consequences.22 Similarly, in 2007 the government committed
more than $25 million (the sum almost doubled since the previous
year), yet both the tender to procure the treatment and its disbursement
was delayed by six month.23 In effect, the HIV treatment had either to
be reduced to two drugs instead of three, or to be postponed for those
who already had started it. This meant a complete failure of enforcing
the standardized protocol in treatment by the federal government.
To deal institutional inefficiency, Medvedev initiated moderate
organizational reshuffling. The Federal Agency on Health and Social
Development (Roszdrav) was no longer in charge of purchasing the
ARVs, while these function were transferred to Rospotrebnadzor, the
agency primarily responsible the surveillance of health safety and
consumer rights.24 While Aleksandr Goliusov they key official in
HIV/AIDS surveillance at Rospotrebnadzor was pleased with this
change, many observers and journalists remained confused what
agency exactly would be in charge of public procurement of the
ARVs. In fact, the functional distinctions between these two
22

According to the other data provided by NPP, in 2006 the government failed to
procure 13 out of 26 necessary; see <
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23
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surveillance agencies remained overlapping and their mandates
excessive.

Indicator 1c: Check on prices and the availability of generics
Prior to 2006 the government did not propose any specific and
coherent policies how to ensure the continuous flow of cheaper
pharmaceutical products into the country. After 2006 the situation
turned around. The government increasingly resorted to protectionism,
mandatory state purchases of the domestically produced drugs, and
even developed an ambitious plan to build a strong and innovative
domestic pharmaceutical industry almost from scratch. This kind of
policy choices was clearly underpinned by perceived role of state as
the initiator and implementer of economic policy and is consistent with
the second core element of Russian social purpose.
In 2000-2004 many developing countries negotiated ARV
treatment at significantly reduced prices.25 While costs of ARV
therapies in Russia remained very high (about $12,000 per year per
patient), Russian government did not formulate any coherent policy
towards the pharmaceutical companies in order to decrease prices.
25

Using or threatening to use the compulsory licensing, and emphasizing the
domestic development of generic version of brand-name drugs. These three
components are the principal ways of ensuring appropriate access to treatment are
discussed at length in Chapter 2.
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Moreover, antiretroviral generic drugs were simply not registered in
the country, despite massive civil society and PLWA campaigns.26
Things soon changed. In Mach 2005 the Ministry of Health and
Social Development for the first time negotiated the reduced prices on
ARVs, which slashed the cost of treatment to about $3,000 a year. In
2005 Zurabov announced the further decreases in prices.27 Since
December 2008, according to the executive director of the Association
of Clinical Trials Organizations (АOKI) Svetlana Zavidova, Russian
health agencies pressed the Western pharmaceutical companies to
reduce prices by additional 15 percent as a precondition for signing
trade contracts. At the same time, Russian pharmaceutical companies
got preferential treatment and got the governmental discounts.28 Today
this strategy might no longer work since Russia became a ―donor‖
country and is no longer qualified for getting antiretroviral drugs at
reduced prices.
The new grand strategy was proposed in October 2008, when
the Kremlin chose import substitution as its principal pharmaceutical
strategy (sometimes referred to as ―pharmaceutical security,‖ or
―pharmaceutical sovereignty‖). The Kremlin set up the Council for the
26
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Development of Pharmaceutical and Medical Industry. The principal
objective of the Council was to devise measures to spur the domestic
biomedical industry and help other governmental agencies to achieve
partial import substitution by 2020. Roszdravnadzor, for instance,
recommended substituting as much as 5351 foreign drugs with
domestic ones in the first half of 2009 alone. Also, the objective was
to increase the capital volume of domestic pharmaceutical market from
306 billion rubles in 2008 to 1.5 trillion rubles in 2020. Not by
coincidence, the Vice Prime-Minister Igor Sechin, believed to be the
informal leader of siloviki clan, became the Council‘s supervisor. He
called for stricter law enforcement measures in controlling the
pharmaceutical procurement in the regions.29
To lay down more specific stages in achieving the
―pharmaceutical sovereignty,‖ the Ministry of Industry and Trade
(Minpromtorg) developed a long-term doctrine and specified five
ambitious goals to be achieved by 2020. They included
1.

to increase the overall domestic drugs price share in the internal
market by 50% (comparing to 19% in 2009);

29

Dar'ja Nikolaeva, Farmacevty vyzvali konkurentam doktora, Kommersant-Daily
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2.

to increase the number/variety of the available domestic brandname (―innovative‖) drugs and their percentage in the
manufacturers‘ portfolios;

3.

to increase exports 8 times compared to 2008 levels; 4) to
achieve the pharmaceutical security of the country; and

4.

to stimulate the domestic production of the pharmaceutical
substances.30
In general, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not this strategy

was oriented towards the decreasing the prices of pharmaceutical
products for domestic consumers. The doctrine did not directly discuss
the necessity of the decreasing the prices as a strategic objective,
perhaps it was assumed that domestic medicines would be cheaper by
definition, especially in the context of a massive replacement of the
foreign brand name drugs. Yet the doctrine formulated its objectives in
terms of price-share, rather than total increase of domestic vs foreign
drugs. The major point that bears emphasis is that this state-led
strategy intended to check the power of the foreign industry and
trigger domestic production.
Besides ―pharmaceutical sovereignty‖ the government
remained a generous spender and supported a whole range of research
and development activities. In 2008 the federal budget allocated about
30

Minpromtorg 2009 (Section 1)
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$5.7 million to the State Centre of Virology and Biotechnology, about
$614,000 -- to the Ivanovsky Institute of Virology, about $1.2 million
to the St. Petersburg State University, and about $8.7 million to the
Federal Medico-Biological Agency (FMBA). 31 More generally, the
2008-2010 federal budgets allocated $41 million for HIV/AIDS
vaccine research and for the improvements of the HIV/AIDS
monitoring and control centers.

UNIVERSALITY
Indicator 2a: Providing the ARVs to key vulnerable groups
Treating the key vulnerable populations is imperative as it helps
preventing the spillover of the epidemic to the generalized population.
In Russia the main bridge population consisted primarily of the
intravenous drug users (IDUs). At the same time, since treating the
bridge population was in large part based on observing of human
rights, which was at odds with Russian version of national purpose. As
a result, Russian government pursued policy initiatives inconsistent
with the mainstream international recommendations and practices.
In Russia key vulnerable populations include (1) 0.5 to 3.5
million injection drug users and 9 million sex partners of IDUs; (2)
31
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500,000 to 700,000 commercial sex workers;32 (3) 1.3 to 2.5 million
their clients; and (4) about 1 million prison inmates, often injecting
drugs intravenously. The other groups include 2.7 million men who
have sex with men (MSM) and migrant workers from Central Asia [no
official estimates found]. From the public health perspective, these
seemingly isolated, but often overlapping groups in the later stages of
the epidemic typically transmit the disease to the generalized
population. In Russia, this trend becomes evident with the rapidly
recently increasing numbers of HIV incidence among women and
heterosexual population. Many Russian health care professionals, as
well as domestic and international civil society clearly saw the value
of harm reduction and tried to promote it as part of the international
medical consensus.33
Domestic arguments against harm reduction programs reflected
national purpose‘s state-centrism. The head of FSKN Victor
Cherkesov rejected decriminalizing HIV/AIDS policy as
inappropriate. In his view, promoting OST was strongly tied to
domestic criminal and international lobby‘s purposeful activity to

32
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undermine the strength and sovereignty of the Russian state.34 A
Deputy Head of FSKN Aleksandr Mikhailov in his 2005 interview on
the pro-liberal radio ―Ekho Mosvy‖ offensively argued against harm
reduction measures because they were enrooted in the
―incomprehensible reflections related to human rights.‖ 35 Similarly,
Victor Ivanov (the head of the State Anti-Narcotic Committee (GAK)
and the new director of FSKN) rejected human rights aspects of
treating the IDUs as it was associated with liberal ideology and was
incompatible with conception of common good. 36 Siloviki argued that
the spread of HIV/AIDS was not curbed because the government had
been way too liberal in prosecuting the IV drug users and dealers, as
well as being unable to stop the production of opiates in Afghanistan.37
Since the FSKN and siloviki in general perceived themselves
as the major champions of common good, they acted as domestic
policy entrepreneurs. Besides multiple interviews, they spread
brochures and information compatible with the official views of

34
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FSKN. For instance, in 2007 FSKN distributed to all of its regional
branches Hegumen Anatoly Berestov‘s a book-length diatribe against
the western approaches to treating the IDUs. 38
Siloviki spearheaded punitive rather than rehabilitative
measures in dealing with the vulnerable groups.39 Domestic policy
environment also rejected harm reduction and human rights as the
kinds of action inappropriate for public policy. Moscow mayor Yuri
Luzhkov, for instance, claimed that Russian approach to IDUs and
MSMs should not be borrowed from the western democratic
standards.40 Some health care professionals and medical doctors
surmised that harm reduction programs aggravated the contemporary
demographic problems in the Russian Federation. In this
interpretation, the GFATM‘s and the World Bank‘s humanitarian
rhetoric disguised their furtive subversive agenda.41
In any case, the proponents of the harm reduction programs
and human rights watchers (pravozashitniki)—since they were
associated with the liberal ideology and the dissident movement-- were
rendered more dangerous than HIV/AIDS itself. Andrey Leonov of a
Moscow network TV station accused them of building societal
38
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tolerance to these sins and sneaking destructive ideas into the Russian
laws. Also, he referred to the repressive Soviet policies as a highly
commendable practice:
In the USSR there were 2-3 human right watchers and no
more than two hundred thousand narcotic addicts. Today in
one Russia by different assessments there are several
hundred human right watchers and from 4 up to 10 million
addicts… They carry out the same function, as goats which
were held at slaughterhouses to lead the whole herd to
death. One such animal was enough to kill hundreds of
thousands without any problems.42
Similarly, Alexei Nadezhdin (in 2005 the chief of the division of
adolescent narcology of the National Scientific Center at Ministry of
Health) lashed out against the foreign-sponsored actors as follows:
… ―human rights observers‖ (pravozashitniki) and ―humanists‖
shift the vector of public perception from the interest of the
majority… to the pathological minority. And, supporting this
minority, crudely impinge on the interests of the healthy
majority, threatening the security of the state.43
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As a result, the Russian government systematically
underpromoted the necessary health services for the IDUs as a main
vulnerable population. First, IDUs were given a low priority on the
treatment waiting list. Judith Twigg noted that the regional AIDS
centers treated IDUs without proper guidelines to support treatment
adherence.44
Second, the official position on the long-term sustainable
HIV/AIDS policy for the generalized population was dissociated from
the harm-reduction strategies and treating the IDUs.45 Sometimes the
harm reduction therapy was opposed to and rejected on the purely
technical grounds. Russian chief public health official Gennady
Onishchenko, the long-time director of Rospotrebnadzor for instance
went on record against opiate substitute treatment (OST) and needle
and syringe exchange programs (NSP) as ineffective.46 In 2009
Onishchenko defended the view that IDUs simply walked away from
treatment, thus making the provision of treatment irrelevant and even
harmful in terms of drug resistance. Clearly, the blame was placed not

44
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on the inefficient and punitive withdrawal programs at governmentally
funded narcological institutes, but on the victim.47
Third, the government often relegated the funding of harm
reduction services to the international and domestic non-governmental
organizations, rather than providing the necessary services with the
state health care infrastructure. As a result, the number of NSPs
increased very slowly up to only 75 SEPs programs by 2003, which
was absolutely inadequate to the scope of the epidemic. The modest
progress in harm reduction programs was almost always associated
with the civil society‘s initiatives, rather than governmental programs.
According to numerous newspaper and advocacy reports, states
officials continuously harassed the nongovernmental programs, using
substitute treatment and harm reduction techniques.48 Today the
majority of the IDU-related programs are in danger, as Russia may no
longer qualify for the international assistance and thus will fully
depend on the governmental funding.
Fourth, the 1998 Federal Law on Narcotic and Psychoactive
Substances was amended in 2003 in order to allow some flexibility in
the policy towards the IDUs. The 2003 amendments to the Criminal
Code were relatively liberal and seen as a major step in
47
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decriminalizing key vulnerable populations. However, the moderate
liberal changes were quickly repealed in 2006. The 2005–2009 federal
anti-drug programs stressed the primacy of the law enforcement
agencies in carrying out a series of comprehensive measures, including
projects aimed at prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation.49
According to Alexandra V. Orlova, ―most of the federal funds for antidrug efforts still go to law-enforcement agencies rather than to
financing preventative measures.‖50 Yet in certain respects the law
remained vague and was not universally enforced. Thus regional
governments and civil society, despite regional freeze of these
services, can develop more or less adequate treatment programs for
IDUs and sex workers.51

Indicator 2b: Scaling up as a proxy for universality
The federal government continuously advocated the universal
treatment coverage. This commitment fully matched the international
best practice, and reflected the governmental imperative of attaining
social obligations, as expressed in national purpose. Providing the
universal coverage, especially in the context of the generalized
49

For detailed analysis see Orlova 2009: 27—29.
Orlova 2007: 28.
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HIV/AIDS epidemic is very costly for the public sector, as it demands
funding treatment, education and care programs, as well as
maintaining and improving the health care infrastructure. Despite
these complications, the Russian government embraced the political
obligation to be a provider of resources and social services and placed
a strong priority on the rapid increase of funding allocated to treatment
among other important components of HIV/AIDS response.
In principle, the federal laws guarantee the free and universal
access to ARV therapy. Russia‘s first comprehensive legislation
concerning HIV/AIDS directly called for universal access to HIV
medication and comprehensive public education.52 Subsequently, in
November 2001 the federal government approved program
―Preventing and combating the socially significant diseases (2002–
2006),‖ including the HIV/AIDS, which included a specific provision
for purchasing and disbursing the ―most effective‖ ARVs. 53 The socalled Moscow Declaration, which that was adopted in April 1 st, 2005
at the ministerial meeting of governmental officials, representatives of

52

Federal Law 38-03 of 1995
For the detailed discussion of the law and its historical context, see TPAA 2004:
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the civil society, and health care practitioners, also called for scaling
up responses to the HIV/AIDS. 54
In September 2005 Vladimir Starodubov, the Deputy Minister
of Health and Social Development, claimed that the budget would
cover all mothers to prevent transmission of the virus to children
(MTCPT, 6253 people), as well as all those who need treatment (up to
15000 people).55 By 2008 most regions covered more than 70% of
people who needed treatment. By 2007 more than 30,000 patients
received therapy. To put these numbers in comparison to 2002, when
the ARVs were available for fewer than 2,000 patients, the progress is
truly staggering. 56 The official statements gave a strong impression
that the universal treatment was fully achieved. However, the official
data sometimes become the source of controversy and public
discussion.
Many independent observers noted, however, that the neartriumphant governmental declarations fell short of the meaningful
targets, even though the general spending on HIV/AIDS became quite
sumptuous. According to Michel D. Kazatchkine, Executive Director
of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, by the end of 2009 only 23% of
54

Morrison and Kates 2006; the text of the Moscow Declaration available at
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HIV-infected population received treatment. Other independent
experts and observers estimated that ARV treatment is available and
accessible to only 6 to 15 percent of people who need to even as low
as 2% to 4% of the infected population, according to more pessimistic
numbers.57 Comparing to the average of 40% among other nations, this
was definitely an underachievement. Moreover, the treatment is
received only by a small fraction of the populations.
The ambiguity might arise from the fact that the number of
HIV-positive population in Russia might be significantly higher than
the official statistical data recognizes. Also, the Russian government
accepted the model of treatment, which recommends providing
treatment after the specific viral load, and not since the infection is
detected. The WHO recommends that treatment should be started if
the CD4 count goes below the certain threshold, which estimated by
the availability of CD4 and viral load testing. 58 In any case, despite
some ambiguity and discussion revolving around numbers, it would
not be warranted to accuse the Russian government of an intentional
policy to resist scaling-up treatment. The figures in the Table 6.2
demonstrate that NPP Health funded not only treatment, but also
diagnosis which included the viral load testing.
57

<http://www.physorg.com/news175964193.html>
WHO 2006: 11—15. Generally, treatment should be considered if CD4 count is
below 350 cells/mm3 and must be started if CD4 count drops below 200 cells/mm3.
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Indicator 2c: Treatment as an integral part of prevention
In general, the evidence whether or not government accepted the
international consensus on treatment is dubious.
There is a significant variation in regional responses to
HIV/AIDS, in which the Moscow government continuously advocated
prevention as more important than treatment. In 2003 the Moscow
government openly argued that money should be spent on prevention,
understood as the war against consumption of narcotics and
prostitution, rather than on treatment of the HIV-positive persons.59
Even when HIV/AIDS was framed as a matter of national emergency,
Liudmila Stebenkova (the chair of the Moscow Duma committee on
the protection of medical and social health) insisted that the epidemic
could be curbed by promoting healthy lifestyles, enforcing the moral
sexual behavior, and restricting the outreach of the nonstate
educational campaigns on sexual education.60 These choices reflect
personal views of Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov‘s and his
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entourage‘s idiosyncrasies, rather than intervening effects of social
purpose.
At the same time, contrasting treatment to prevention did not
evolve into cancelling or downshifting of the money allocated to
treatment. In terms of financial commitments, often the financial data
is rather imprecise and the figures of how much money was allocated
and for what exact purposes remain contradictory. Twigg demonstrates
that the Kremlin in 2007 allocated significantly more resources to
prevention than treatment: 4,600.0 million rubles on prevention vs.
3,200.0 million allocated for treatment.61 Twigg‘s figures for NPP for
2007 are very different from the official numbers. In any case, as the
post-2006 evidence demonstrates, the spending on treatment was
significant and undeniably important in curbing the epidemic in Russia
(see the Table 6.2).
Table 6.2: Summary of the HIV/AIDS budget

A) Source of financing: National Health Project, National Priority
Projects, Millions of rubles, $1 = 27 RUB62
Diagnosis Prevention Treatment Research Construction Total

61
62

Twigg 2007: 12--13.
Data available at <http://hivpolicy.ru/publications/index.php?id=469>
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2006

1,200.00

200.00

1,700.00

0.00

0.00

3,100.00

2007

2,277.50

200.00

5,322.50

0.00

0.00

7,800.00

2008

2,799.32

200.00

4,800.00

0.00

0.00

7,799.32

2009

3,400.00

400.00

5,500.00

0.00

0.00

9,300.00

2010

3,404.74

400.00

8,143.30

0.00

0.00

11,948.04

Total

13,081.56 1,400.00

25,465.80

0.00

0.00

39,947.36

32.75%

63.75%

0.00%

0.00%

% of
NPP

3.50%

B) Source of financing: Federal Targeted Program, Subprogram
HIV, Millions of rubles, $1 = 27 RUB63
(Department of State Targeted Programs and Capital
Investments, Ministry of Economic Development of the
Russian Federation (Mineconomrazvitija)

Construction Research Various

Prevention Treatment

Total

2006

107.90

16.10

0.00

56.80

194.50

2007

249.40

25.59

95.20

13.70

370.19

63

Federal target program ―Prevention and Treatment of the Socially Important
Diseases,‖ subprogram HIV, data available at <http://fcp.vpk.ru/cgibin/cis/fcp.cgi/Fcp/ViewFcp/View/2010/218/>
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2008

372.29

27.50

63.73

463.52

2009

221.76

0.00

75.28

297.04

2010

415.34

3.62

8.86

427.82

Total

1,366.68

72.82

243.07

56.80

13.70

77.96%

4.15%

13.87%

3.24%

0.78%

1,753.07

% of
FTP

PARTNERSHIPS
Indicator 3a: Public-private partnerships
The intentional efforts to implement public-private interaction
mechanisms and contract from private sector for the public needs
(PPP) are pivotal to increase the capacity of the public health care
sector.
Evidence strongly suggests that the Kremlin overcommitted to
act as the sole provider of finance for health sector, while shying away
from meaningful engagement of the private sector. Rapid expansion of
the state sector of health care was prompted by not only newly
available money from the hydrocarbons, but also by an intentional
commitment to state-led development (the government as an economic
deliverer). It is debatable whether or not NPPs had adverse
implications for public health. At most, the overextended economic
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obligations exacerbated by the weak state capacity, inefficiency, and
corruption lead to the inefficient allocation of resources. Throughout
all the described period the government remained willing to cover the
costs of treatment exclusively from its budget.64 Not surprisingly, even
the dramatic increase of the budget surplus based on the high prices of
the hydrocarbon products, might not be sustainable in the longer term.
Since the state came to control all the spending, the government was
able to dictate priorities in spending and inhibit alternative
recommendations from civil society.
In Chapter 4 I discussed how the National Priority Projects
(NPPs) related to the national purpose. NPPs were created as the statecentric tool in initiating and implementing national economic
improvement. More specifically, National Priority Projects were
created as a mechanism of an intense and ―smart‖ investment to
prompt economic development in certain areas and improve certain
social services.65 In essence, NPPs provided funding to upgrade the
public health sector. By the Russian standards, the spending turned out
to be truly colossal and historically unprecedented, especially as
compared to the 1990s. In general the state funding for HIV/AIDSrelated programs grew exponentially from 2005. In 2007 alone the
64

TPAA 2003: 23
See especially Dmitry Medvedev, Nacional'nye proekty: ot stabilizacii - k
razvitiju, Kommersant-daily № 9 (3585), 25.01.2007
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government spent $444.8 million to fight HIV and additional $105
million went to GFATM. In 2009 Russia has pledged about $392
million for various HIV/AIDS initiatives.
The total funding through NPPs in 2006—2010 amassed to
more than $1 billion. The funding for HIV/AIDS went primarily
through NPPs and by far surpassed other sources of governmental
funding of AIDS, including the Federal Targeted Program, World
Bank project, Globus project, Global Fund disbursements, as well as
regional budgets. In 2006—2010 the overall health-related spending in
the framework of NPPs reached 400 billion rubles (which was
approximately $13.5 billion). In April 2010 Putin, now PrimeMinister, announced additional 460 billion rubles to be invested to
modernize the health care infrastructure and increase its capacity
inside next several years (approximately $15.5 billion).66 The Council
primarily oriented NPP Health to rebuild the public health care
infrastructure, to raise the salaries of doctors and nurses; to increase
the number of broadly trained health care practitioners, as opposed to
the narrow specialists, among others. According TPAA/GBC analysis,
as much as 86% of the committed resources were channeled to

66

Na modernizaciju zdravoohranenija planiruetsja vydelit' 460 mlrd rublej,
Kommersant-Online 23.04.2010
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building the physical infrastructure, while the provision of treatment
and palliative care received only 14% of resources.67
The 2006 collective report, compiled by the well-known
domestic liberal economists and health care practitioners, by and large
evaluated the general NPP approach to the reforms in health sector
positively.68 At the same time, this report indicated that the Kremlin‘s
picked up too many social obligations. However, many liberal
economists did not recognize the NPP as a meaningful vehicle of
economic transformation.69 The lack of state efficiency and capacity
plagued this massive spending, significantly undermining the whole
purpose of upgrading public health care. Judith Twigg noted that
―even in a resource-rich environment, Russia‘s capacity to spend
money effectively and without unintended negative consequences
remains uncertain.‖70 Putin himself acknowledged that despite the
overall increase of invested resources, only 33% of patients were
satisfied with the provided health care services. 71
While the government rapidly expanded public sector, its
partnerships with the private sector stalled, if not overtly deteriorated.
67

TPAA 2006b:
See, for instance, collective report Vishnevsky et al 2006.
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See for instance, Larissa Popovich from the High School of Economy (State
University), reported in Vadim Visloguzov, Dar'ja Nikolaeva, Dmitrij Butrin,
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In March 2003 the representatives of high-powered business circles
including Arkady Volsky and Fedor Prokopov of the Russian Union of
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) lamented that they cannot
meaningfully participate in the fight against HIV/AIDS as long as the
government did not formulate a clear strategy how private sector could
fit in the governance of HIV/AIDS.72 Furthermore, the government
chose to increase taxes: In spring 2010 Prime-Minister Putin
announced that in 2011—2012 the private sector would be taxed an
additional 2% to cover the governmental failures of the public health
care sector reform.73 The money--460 billion rubles-- was to be
allocated to reconstructing the hospital buildings and clinics,
increasing the quality of the health care services, and some unspecified
additional help for pensioners.74 This decision effectively disregarded
the multiple pleas of the RSPP members, as well as the representatives
of general business circles.
Thus, while the Kremlin poured more and more money to
upgrade the public sector, its partnership with private sector remained
far from productive. At the same time, the government was not able to
increase the capacity and efficiency of its public sector. From the
72

See Natalija Mustafina, Rossijskuju jekonomiku pogubit SPID, Kommersant-Daily
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liberal standpoint, building the universal free public health care
without private sector was criticized as harmful to the health care
services and perpetuating endemic and increasing inefficiency.

Indicator 3b: Partnerships with international health organizations
Russia collaborated with various international health organizations,
living up to best international practices. At the same time, the Kremlin
used partnerships with international health organizations to play a
great-power role.
First, Russian government decided to act like a donor rather
than like a recipient of international health organizations, despite the
fact that its domestic federal and regional disbursements never reached
satisfactory levels. In 2003, after two years of protracted negotiations
and resistance, Russia signed the $48 million loan with the World
Bank to improve the regional HIV/AIDS services, including treatment.
In 2004, for instance, the international funding for Russian HIV/AIDS
prevention was more than $13 million, comparing to approximately $4
million domestic funding coming from the federal budget. In 2003—
2008 the EU committed more that €16 million for various transborder
and internal projects to combat HIV/AIDS. The United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) budgeted $106 million in
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2004 and $61 million in 2007. Yet later, after the GFATM‘s grants in
aggregate reached over $250 million, Russia has promised to
reimburse the Fund for all $270 million of its grant funding, and even
pledged to contribute additional up to $100 million to the Fund. 75 To
put Russia in comparison: Brazil, for instance, preferred to use
international resources to build strong domestic programs and achieve
the universality of treatment, rather than overextended commitments
and overstretched much needed resources.
Even the federal revenues from the steeply increased prices on
the hydrocarbon products, could not be turned entirely to cover all the
domestic ARV expenses. On several occasions Medvedev proudly
stated that Russia became ―a creditor, not a debtor,‖ like it was in the
1990s. To a large degree, Russia remained dependent on the
international resources, expertise and logistical help. More realistic
and cautious practitioners revealed their concern for the scenario when
Russia would not be able to qualify for the international grants. In
2008, however, GFATM‘s Executive Director Michel
Kazatchkine proposed to continue the funding of ―increasingly
wealthy countries that do not yet have the infrastructure to effectively

75
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fight HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria‖ and perhaps including loans in the
Fund‘s work.76
Second, Russia pursued a more assertive international role by
sponsoring and organizing several regional HIV/AIDS initiatives,
reinventing its role as a leader in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). In 2005, for instance, the Russian government hosted a
ministerial meeting, attended by CIS governmental officials,
representatives of civil society, health care practitioners from the
public and private sectors, as well as the officials from the UN
specialized agencies.77
Starting from 2006 Russia hosted three regional Eastern
Europe and Central Asia AIDS Conferences (EECAACs) on
HIV/AIDS, organized by Rospotrebnadzor. According to its declared
objectives, the First conference was ―gathered to strengthen and
consolidate a large-scale response to HIV in the region through high
level political commitment and leadership and create partnerships with
civil society and people living with HIV/AIDS.‖ 78 The Second
conference was intended to accelerate access to HIV prevention,
treatment and care. The self-evaluation reports claimed strong success,
76
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but this conclusion does not seem fully warranted.79 The stated grand
objectives were clearly not achieved.
The evaluation paper proudly claimed that 2,056 participants
from 52 countries attended the conference, while the overwhelming
majority of participants came from Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Many participants were only loosely related to the issue area, and
some of those had questionable expertise credentials. These gatherings
most definitely were not designed to serve as policy arenas for
fostering international cooperation. Different civil society actors were
not able to voice their concerns and could not articulate their
organizational positions on the national policies. Less sedately put,
especially if compared to such gatherings as International AIDS
conferences, these regional initiatives did not perform any meaningful
political or technical function.

Indicator 3c: Partnership with civil society sector
For the Russian government fostering partnerships with civil society is
not just a technical necessity in diversifying the ways of providing
treatment, but also a political choice whether to help civil society
sector bringing changes in public health policies and implementing

79
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new practices according to the internationally prescribed standards.
However, the Russian government was reluctant to engage civil
society as the independent advocacy and political actor, even though
the Kremlin was willing to accept the civil society as a subordinate
―technical‖ provider of some AIDS-related services. This policy
towards nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) became possible
since Sovereign Democracy implied that acting on the alternative
conception of common good and proliferating alternative spheres of
authority was absolutely subversive and inappropriate. According to
this, the independent civil sector and especially externally funded nonstate actors involved in politics and advocacy were not perceived as
fully legitimate.
In his May 2004 address to the Federal Assembly, President
Putin belligerently accused non-profit sector in receiving money from
abroad, while not taking part in solving any pressing domestic
problems.80 In 2005—2006 Putin suggested the infamous law
significantly increasing bureaucratic control over civil society in
Russia as a part of the sweeping changes in domestic political
system.81 All the NGOs working in Russia were forced to undergo
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320

additional complicated registration procedures, submit very frequent
reports, and so on. According to the report of the Moscow Helsinki
Group, while some NGOs were specifically chosen for public closure
and even televised harassment; as a direct result of this legislation
2300 NGOs were simply shut down by the end of 2007.82
In 2008 Putin extended this legislation to the remaining nongovernmental organizations receiving grants and funding by the
foreign sponsors. This legislation burdened the majority of NGOs with
an excessively heavy taxation. According to some calculations, the
number of tax-free NGOs was cut by 90 per cent. The Global Fund
was among one of the internationally funded NGOs which were
included on the heavy tax list (25%). Heavy taxation and arcane red
tape effectively constrained the role of NGOs in Russia. 83 The trend to
develop additional restrictive measures against civil society sector
peaked by January 2007, when the draft legislation proposed to shut
any NGO down if it ―creates a threat to the sovereignty, political
independence, territorial integrity, national unity and originality
(samobytnost‘) cultural heritage and national interests.‖ However, in
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July 2009 Medvedev proposed some cosmetic amendments to the law
and slightly relieved the bureaucratic pressure on civil society.84
The public reaction to this legislation neatly reflected the split
between the Kremlin-sponsored articulated audiences and their liberal
opponents. For liberal observers and commentators, these legislative
restrictions were an example of the autocratic turn. The proponents of
the sovereign democracy praised these restrictions and regurgitated the
core arguments about the necessity to curb the western involvement in
the domestic affairs and the general uselessness of many civil society
organizations. In essence, international organizations were perceived
as a potential threat for the state‘s strength and agents of pernicious
ideological influences at the broader levels of collectivity as well.
Some public figures spoke of transnational civil society sector with
unqualified and unconcealed suspicion.
Right before the issue of HIV/AIDS was discussed at the State
Council in 2006, Liudmila Stebenkova, the Deputy of the Moscow
City Duma, claimed that ―Under the guise of prophylaxis (prevention)
the Western Foundations advertise pedophilia, prostitution and
immoral behavior.‖85 She petitioned President Putin to further restrict
the Western NGOs‘ activity in Russia. Some commentators went as far
84
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as claiming that transnational HIV/AIDS programs, including
GFATM, Open Health Institute (OHI), Soros Foundations, AIDS
Foundation East-West (AFEW), and Population Services International
(PSI) aim to ―create and consolidate the socially harmful and
dangerous for the rest of the population elements—homosexuals,
prostitutes, narcotics users.‖86 Nikolay Kakliugin also claimed that the
US government covertly supported these organizations‘ subversive
activities to turn Russia into the liberal democracy. 87
James Richter described the way Kremlin interacted with the
civil society in conjunction with the discussion about the Public
Chamber, purposefully designed to to organize and supervise the
―messy‖ civil society sector. Richter captured the conditions under
which President Putin personally viewed civil society as benign:
The Kremlin even tolerated organizations dependent on
foreign funding so long as they pursued projects that did
not contradict state interests: organizations that helped
educate society on domestic violence or prevent the
trafficking of women for prostitution, for example, or
environmental organizations that sought to preserve and
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protect existing natural areas. By contrast, those
organizations that actively challenged the state‘s position,
that criticized the construction of oil pipelines, the
dumping of chemical or radioactive waste by defense
industries, or human rights violations in Chechnya were
portrayed as alien and even harmful to the interests of
society.88
On the other hand, the Kremlin pledged to fund the charity and
socially important organizations. In other words, while not ruling out
the need to collaborate with the civil society sector as a subcontractor
in social service delivery, the Russian government detested the idea of
civil society as policy advocates and norm entrepreneurs. For instance,
in 2006 and 2009 the government included a number of civil society
representatives in the Governmental Committee on HIV/AIDS, which,
at least in theory, was supposed to formulate the consolidated national
health strategy. Unfortunately, this special multisectoral Committee
remained by and large defunct since its inception.
To be fair, many elected politicians demonstrated willingness
to work closely with the civil society sector. In addition to the State‘s
Duma Health Committee, Artur Chilingarov, Tatiana Yakovleva, Olga
Borzova, Nadezhda Gerasimova, and Aleksandr Chuhrajov among
88
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others, were active participants in the newly organized the State Duma
Commission on the prevention of HIV/AIDS and other socially
important diseases. In 2004—2008 their cooperation and commitment
empowered the most prominent organization in Russia--Transatlantic
Partners against AIDS/Global Business Coalition (TPAA/GBC),
despite its external sources of funding. The Chairwoman of the Duma
Health Committee Tatiana Yakovleva, for instance, defended NGOs
underscoring their important role in educating wider audiences on
prevention and increasing trust to the domestic health care sector.
Even this modest level of partnerships is under suspicion. According
to Judith Twigg, the mentioned partnerships were strategically
initiated by HIV/AIDS-related organizations to secure themselves
politically, rather than state officials out of the genuine commitment to
the cause of curbing the pandemic.89 Despite of increasing the level of
individual-level partnerships between the governmental and nongovernmental sectors, the overall governmental strategy was to
exercise surveillance and control over independent NGOs. 90 As only
few Russian NGOs have true financial security, are experienced in the
competent advocacy, and possess requisite capacity to implement

89
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health services independently from the state, the civil remains very
vulnerable.91
Despite these tensions and uncertainties, civil society continues
playing an important part in curbing the Russian governance of
HIV/AIDS. According to different estimates, there are between 100
and 300 smaller non-governmental AIDS service organizations,
working as subcontractors for the bigger NGOs and the regional
governments. Among the most active NGOs working in the country
are Family Health International (FHI), International HIV/AIDS
Alliance (IHAA), Partners in Health (PIH), AIDS Foundation EastWest (AFEW), and the American International Health Alliance
(AIHA). Five transnational organizations formed a NGOs consortium
to curb AIDS in Russia. This consortium included the Open Health
Institute (OHI) as the principal recipient of international funding and
the leading force in the GLOBUS Project, funded by the Global Fund.
Transatlantic Partners Against AIDS (TPAA), the AIDS
Foundation East-West (AFEW), and the Global Business Coalition
against AIDS (GBC) formed a very strong inter-organizational
alliance, which quickly became prominent in the country. TPAA
which was able to forge closer connections with the regional
91
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governments and public health care officials in Tatarstan, Orenburg,
Samara, Krasnoyarsk, St-Petersburg, and Tomsk. In 2007, TPAA
expanded their activities by implementing ―an educational course for
the regional governmental officials on effective strategies to develop
and implement regional HIV/AIDS programs.‖ 92 TPAA was especially
active in raising awareness, engaging in advocacy, providing treatment
and various services both for PLWA and general public in Russia. It
has the broader public outreach though Online Policy Resource Center
on HIV/AIDS (OPRC) and high-level policy conferences. TPAA‘s
policy annual reports, policy briefs, analysis of regional health
programs, and advocacy of certain health issues remains the principal
(if not only) nation-wide alternative source of information on the
epidemic and governmental policies.

CONCLUSION
Russian consensus about the new conception of common good shaped
the general response to HIV/AIDS crisis as an existential threat to the
polity and made possible certain policies not devised before.
Generally, political elite elevated the issues of HIV/AIDS high on the
national policy agenda, as it understood the growing rates of infection
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to become an additional factor contributing to the declining
population, thus impinging on the much desired strong state.
On balance, I do not claim to explain all nine indicators of the
global consensus, yet the provided analysis both contributes to the
existing explanations and covers important elements of the domestic
HIV/AIDS politics not covered before. For instance, the continuous
problems with treatment procurement and delays in tenders should not
be attributed to the impact of national purpose, but rather to
corruption, lack of state capacity and efficiency (indicators 1b and 2c
in the table below). For other components of the policy (indicators 1c
and 2b), Russian national purpose can be used as a partial explanation.
In regard to the first core component of HIV/AIDS policy,
Russia subsumed the issues of HIV/AIDS under the looming
demographic crisis and generally linked it to the growing consumption
of narcotic substances, rather than addressing the epidemic as a public
health crisis in its own right (Indicator 1a). The standardized protocol
(in terms of what line of products should be purchased reflecting
Russian state of epidemic) was often breached, despite the broad
acknowledgement of the life-saving role of the ARVs. The consistent
supply of the pharmaceuticals to the patients almost every year was
punctuated by month-long delays (Indicator 1b). Although neither the
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Kremlin, nor the public health officials overtly questioned the
importance of generic medicines for the check on prices and increase
of coverage, the whole issue was downplayed in favor of developing
and import-substitution pharmaceutical industry (Indicator 1c).
In the context of the Russian epidemic the most vulnerable
group was the intravenous drug users (IDUs), which in the 2000s
became the principal driver of spreading the epidemic into the
generalized population. The vulnerable populations definitely were
disadvantaged, as the federal legal provisions stimulated
criminalization of IDUs and put this group at the mercy of the lowerlevel bureaucrats and officials from the so-called power ministries
(Indicator 2a). The government accepted the necessity of the
universality of access to treatment and consistently worked to scale up
the treatment access as evident in massive financial commitments to
procure these medicines (Indicator 2b). At the same time, many highly
visible representatives of Russian political elite and public health
officials aggressively advocated very narrow prevention strategies,
confined to abstinence, family values, and health lifestyle.
Simultaneously, such legitimate prevention strategies as the substitute
treatment and syringe exchange was by and large excluded from the
preferred measures in protecting population‘s health (Indicator 2c).
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The Kremlin generally overemphasized the role of the
government in curbing HIV/AIDS and intentionally downplayed the
significance and desirability of partnership with other sectors. There is
strong evidence to suggest that the National Priority Projects—
framework of disbursing resources and transforming the health care
sector—was designed to fend off the potential role civil society and
private sector could have played in domestic health policies. In the
context of the expansion of the public sector and massive financial
inflows into health care projects, it shied away from any meaningful
engagement of the private sector (Indicator 3a), and forcefully
imposed strict legal boundaries under what conditions nongovernmental organizations can participate in curbing the epidemic
(Indicator 3b). At the same time, Russia embarked on and even
initiated a number of international AIDS initiatives, which are
typically seen as commendable from the vantage point of international
health community (Indicator 3c).
Table 6.3: Summary of the impact of national purpose on HIV/AIDS
policy
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CHAPTER 7. HIV/AIDS POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA

By the beginning of Thabo Mbeki‘s presidency, the global consensus
on ARVs became not only fully articulated as a broad political
commitment, but also was supported by the undeniable practical
success as evident in multiple national HIV/AIDS health care
interventions around the globe. Despite all this, Mbeki immersed
himself in the public discussion on the HIV/AIDS-related issues,
eventually making himself an easy target for the global opprobrium
and the wide-spread domestic animosity. The Cabinet devised the
gamut of governmental policies and initiatives to respond to the
epidemic, which not only went against the global consensus on
HIV/AIDS, but sometimes were very unique. In general, the
governmental approach to the HIV/AIDS issue-area and its resulting
policies were more complex than a simple denial and rejection, as
typically claimed by the infuriated domestic health activists.
This chapter argues that South African HIV/AIDS policies
were shaped by the deployment of the African Renaissance--the
politically contingent and country-specific content of national purpose.
The most important outcomes of this impact include three broad
clusters of effects. First, pursuing indigenousness (nativism,
331

Africanism) impinged on the standardized protocol in treatment,
stimulated the production of traditional medicines, and subsequently
institutionalized their national governance. It also contributed to the
politicization and filtering the desirable pool of partners, as well as
shaped their permissible role in curbing HIV/AIDS. Second, the stress
on marketization (economic neo-liberalism) undermined the universal
rollout of the antiretrovirals in public health sector, and protected the
private sector from sharing the burden of health response. Third, the
commitment to exceptionalism (ubuntu) politicized the domestic
epidemic and put it in the global context of colonialism; contributed to
the pursuit of the national pharmaceutical product at the expense of
procuring generics; and empowered the counter-epistemic community
of AIDS dissidents.
The aim of attaining the specific conception of common good
as captured in the notion of African Renaissance points up to the
profound effects on the general content of the domestic ARV policies
in comparison to the global ARV consensus. These effects are
summarized in the Table 1 below. The more nuanced arguments are
provided in relation to each component and indicator of the ARV
policy in the appropriate subsections.
Table 7.1: Summary of the ARV policy in RSA, 2000—2008
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TREATMENT
Indicator 1a: Common epidemiology in understanding the pandemic
The South African government claimed that the nature of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in the country was very different and unique from
the pandemic in the rest of the world, including other African countries
and especially the West. This claim was consistent with the notion of
exceptionalism as the one of the core components of social purpose
and was the first step in staking a claim about the inapplicability of the
Western solutions to the South African epidemic.
According to Pieter Fourie, the Mbeki administration‘s
response to HIV/AIDS epidemic was an ongoing attempt to reappraise
the structural variables that drove the epidemic.1 There are several
general themes, variations of which the Cabinet, Mbeki, and his
supporters articulated throughout his presidency. First, Pretoria
claimed that the majority of the diagnoses made in rural areas was
inaccurate, unreliable, and led to overestimating the number of the
HIV-positive in South Africa. This formulation went against the global
consensus that the estimates from the pre-natal clinics and mortality
data in South Africa were by and large accurate.
1

Fourie 2006: 141.
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Second, the outbreak of the disease in the West was often
attributed to the overuse of prescription drugs, abuse of narcotic
substances, as well as to the alternative lifestyle issues (the HI virus
then was simply a carrier of the Western drug-related diseases). In
Africa, it was extreme poverty and malnutrition triggered the outbreak
of HIV/AIDS. According to Feinstein, in his address to the ANC
parliamentary caucus in 2000 Mbeki claimed that 90% of death
attributed to AIDS was the result of poverty. 2 Others emphasized the
poverty alleviation as a precondition for disease eradication (Prof. Sam
Mhlongo, Head of the Department of Family Health and Primary
Health).3 While such bodies as the World health Organization (WHO),
Southern African Regional Poverty Network (SAPRN) and other
international and domestic health organizations name poverty and
malnutrition as factors exacerbating the effects of the epidemic and
even making the ARV treatment less effective, yet they hardly
pinpoint these factors as the root causes of the spread of the HI virus in
South Africa.4
Third, the neo-colonial and racially skewed Western science in
general used an African as an object of negative construction, denied

2

Feinstein 2009: 112.
An interview with Samson Mhlongo available at <
http://www.virusmyth.com/aids/hiv/jsinterviewsm.htm>
4
See, for instance, Butler 2005; Schneider and Stein 2001
3
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him/her a human dignity, and treated him/her like a child. The
outbreak of HIV/AIDS gave an ideal opportunity to represent an
African as the Other, ―natural born promiscuous carrier of germs,‖
thus reinforcing the Western imaginings of Africa.5 Mbeki argued
against pointing fingers at the sexual immorality of African people,
who were ―prone to rape and abuse of women‖ and upheld ―a value
system that belongs to the world of wild animals.‖6 Nkululeko Nxesi,
in 1999—2004 the National Director of National Association of
People Living with AIDS (NAPWA) echoed this theme. He claimed
that the nature of the epidemic in South Africa was different even from
the rest of the continent because of the very specific legacies of the
apartheid, forced labor migrations, and the stifled discussions of
sexuality.7 NAPWA, along with the government, sought to resist the
derogatory and disempowering stigmatization African people living
with AIDS as ―sufferers‖ and ―victims.‖8
The last theme fell on a rich soil of more radical and
conspiratorial formulations, which in the 1990s-early 2000s were in
broad circulation. These collective articulations ranged from beliefs
that the HI virus was created artificially to undermine African

5

See also Wertheimer 2007: 29, 31, 33 in Falola and Heaton 2007.
Cite taken from Castro Hlongwane.
7
See Helen Epstein‘s interview with Nxesi in Epstein 2007: 170-171.
8
For NAPWA‘s official website, see http://www.napwa.org.za.
6
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population growth9 to popular perceptions of AIDS as an American,
or sometimes Afrikaner, Invention to Discourage Sex (hence the
acronym). Other perceptions ranged from conspiratorial notions that
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) propagated the belief that HIV
causes AIDS to the imageries of witchcraft with white doctors,
treatment activists and representatives of Western pharmaceutical
sector as reinvented ―sorcerers.‖10
Mbeki set in motion a broad campaign to substantiate more
specific assertions of racialism and neo-colonialism dominating the
research on HIV/AIDS. The important ―Castro Hlongwane‖ report
(most likely co-written by Mbeki and Peter Mokaba) heavily borrowed
from the early literature on the impact of racism and prejudices in
collecting the evidence on AIDS in Africa in the 1980s. By and large it
repeated the accusations of Zimbabwean scholars Richard and
Rosalind Chirimuuta, the authors of Africa, AIDS and Racism
(1987).11 Later on, Robert Suresh Roberts tried to locate Mbeki in the
tradition of ―pro-native‖ and anti-colonialist thinking of Frantz
Fannon. He linked Mbeki‘s views to Harriet A. Washington‘s Medical
Apartheid: the Dark History of Medical Experimentation on Black

9

van der Vliet 2004: 73, 85.
Ashforth 2002: 124; Ashford 2005; also van der Vliet 2001
11
For the detailed analysis of this document as an anti-colonial statement, see Wang
2008
10
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Americans from Colonial Times to the Present (2006) and Celia
Farber‘s Serious Adverse Events: An Uncensored History of AIDS
(2006). Roberts insisted that global science was ridiculing the native
quest for African solutions and thus was skewed by racial politics. In
essence, these books over-exaggerated certain policy blunders of the
1980s out of proportion.
Mbeki‘s April 2000 letter to world leaders on AIDS in Africa
is a well-known and often-cited document. It illustrated the deep
distrust in the Western science.12 This important letter provided direct
evidence that placing a strong emphasis on the indigenous, native
medicines was an intentional commitment, rather than a mere policy
blunder. The letter stated that,
… as Africans, we have to deal with this uniquely African
catastrophe... It is obvious that whatever lessons we have to
and may draw from the West about the grave issue of HIVAIDS, a simple superimposition of Western experience on
African reality would be absurd and illogical. Such

12

For the detailed analysis of the content and context of the letter, see Eboko2005:
40—45 in Patterson 2005. For the international response, see Milan Vesely, Thabo
Mbeki ignites AIDS inferno, African Business, 06.01.2000
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proceeding would constitute a criminal betrayal of our
responsibility to our own people.13
This letter was helpful in neither justifying, nor explaining the
South African position at least for international audiences. Soon, the
South African government became more defensive about their policies
and started talking about the pandemic in the regular terms. Although
questioning the epidemiology of the disease and the uniqueness of
epidemic in the country by and large disappeared from the official
discourse, the government stayed committed to the kinds of actions
underpinned by African Renaissance.
At the same time, domestic spin-doctors tried to gloss over
Mbeki‘s prior record, claiming that he had never been an AIDS
dissident, never questioned the value of ARV treatment, and even was
able to point out the shortcomings of the global biomedical science
before they became apparent to the Western scientists.14 Unwilling to
discuss his biomedical views openly, in a private letter to a member of
his politico-intellectual entourage, Mbeki still clung to the view that
the Western neo-colonial science dictated its will to the champions of
native (traditional) knowledge:

13

Thabo Mbeki, Letter to the World Leaders, April 03, 2000. The full text available
at < http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/aids/docs/mbeki.html>
14
Roberts 2007: 186-191
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Not surprisingly, the most virulent of the debates, about
knowledge, has been the contest concerning the science
that informs the global and our own programmes on HIV
and AIDS. It is most interesting that the most vocal in this
contest centered their argument… on the demand that all
the discussion must be terminated, and that all that had to
be done was to implement what directly and indirectly, the
pharmaceutical companies said should be done to dispense
the drugs they produce as widely and as quickly as
possible.15

Indicator 1b: Standardized protocol in treatment
In 2004—2008, the Cabinet placed the strong emphasis to promote
native medicines, which was consistent with indigenousness as the
core component of national purpose.16 At first, Pretoria briefly
emphasized the use of complementary and alternative medicine
(CAMs) and later promoted the value of various African traditional
15

Roberts 2007: 181 (letter dated 1 January, 2006).
On the distinctions among different types of traditional healers, see Gumede 1990;
Ashforth 2005: 52—57; on the place of indigenous medicine practitioners in select
African states, see Marlise Richter, Traditional Medicines and Traditional Healers in
South Africa; Discussion paper prepared for the Treatment Action Campaign and
AIDS Law Project, 27 November 2003; Kibuka-Sebitosi 2008; on relationship
between ―traditional authorities‖ and the ANC, see Koenane 2008. For the overview
of traditional healing of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and AIDS in the
country prior to Mbeki, see Green 1994: 135—178.
16
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medicines (ATM, muthi) for the treatment of both HIV and the
number opportunistic diseases. While the notions of the ARVs‘
toxicity and inefficiency were only briefly entertained, this
commitment to indigenous solutions proved to be more robust and
resilient to both internal and external criticism.
According to Anthony Brink of the Treatment Information
Group (TIG), his 1999 book draft ―Debating the AZT: Questions of
Safety and Utility‖ led Mbeki to begin inquiry into the safety of
AZT.17 Whether or not this book was the exact trigger, Mbeki accused
multiple international actors of concealing the scientific evidence
about AZT inefficacy.18 The semi-official position stated that the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) could not solely cause the
whole syndrome of opportunistic diseases (AIDS), thus the links
between the human immunodeficiency and AIDS-associated diseases
to be discarded. Moderate voices in the Cabinet insisted that AZT
treatment was simply not helpful in curbing the pandemic, because it
treated people who are already sick (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma,
Minister of Health 1994—1999, Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1999—
2009). Because the ARVs would neither cure a set of opportunistic

17

http://www.tig.org.za; Brink 2000.
Mbeki letter to Leon, published in Sunday Times, 07.09.2000. Such a statement
dismissed the results of the domestic SA trials of AZT and nevirapine treatments in
Chris Hani Hospital during 1996-2000, see d‘Adesky 2004: 183.
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diseases, nor alleviate the root causes of poverty and malnutrition, the
antiretroviral treatment was at best useless. The most radical anticolonialist position surmised the Western conspiracy in cramming the
toxic drugs into African nations. This discourse revealed the desire to
suspend the domestic distribution of the internationally approved
medicines and replace it with something else.
The above sentiments culminated in the unprecedented interest
to integrate indigenous herbal medicines and potentially commercially
valuable genetic resources into national healthcare systems.19 The
point of the revival of indigenous knowledge systems was to demonopolize neo-colonial science and refute the Afro-pessimists‘
claims that natives are unfit to produce original knowledge. 20
According to Mbeki, one of the primary objectives was to ―defend,
uphold and promote our culture in the face of strong encroachments of
alien cultures some of which seek deliberately to destroy our
indigenous cultures.‖21 Similarly, in 2006 during the Toronto
International AIDS Conference Dr. Mantombazana Edmie TshabalalaMsimang (MTM, Health Minister in 1999—2008) attacked the
Western cultural imperialism, criticizing its negligent attitude towards
19

Reihling 2008
See, for instance, Roberts 2007: 215-222.
21
Cite taken from Response of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, to the
debate of the National House of Traditional Leaders, Tshwane Municipal Chambers,
04.02.2008
20
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the traditional medicine. The Health Ministry infused these views with
additional value: native ―scientific methodologies that stretch back
thousands of years‖ are ―essential and irreplaceable component of the
comprehensive care.‖22
Although these formulations may seem very similar to the ones
formulated at the international arena, no international guideline
actually prescribes preserving and fostering indigenous knowledge as a
core substitution for the standard biomedical products. Thus, Pretoria
came dangerously close to rejecting the standardized protocol of the
anti-retroviral treatment.
The South African leadership undertook a massive set of
practical measures to promote native medicines and institutionalize
their governance. The Cabinet invested resources in researching the
efficacy of ATM, elevated the status of traditional healers under the
Traditional Health Practitioners Bill (2004), reserved the right to
define the standards of traditional healing, drafted National Policy on
African Traditional Medicine to provide a legal framework to rollout
native medicines in the public healthcare system (2008).23
More specifically, to throw some institutional support behind
these initiatives, in 2006 the Cabinet established the Presidential Task
22
23

MBewu and Simelela 2003: 86
The draft is available at <http://www.doh.gov.za/docs/policy/atm.pdf>
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Team on African Traditional Medicine in South Africa and the
Directorate of Traditional Medicine within the DOH. 24 These bodies
were supposed to alleviate the differences among traditional healers‘
group and to offer policy recommendations for the government. They
had to decide 1) whether to incorporate traditional healers into the
dominant health care system or to make the indigenous system of
health care fully separate and grant it an exclusive status; 2) whether
the ARVs were toxic and should be replaced by traditional medicines;
3) whether alternative treatment should be offered as complementary,
or even as a full substitute to the Western biomedicines.25
Other organizations involved in the promotion of native
science included the South African Traditional Medicines Research
Unit in Medical Research Council (MRC), National Reference Centre
for African Traditional Medicines (NRCATM), and African Health
Care Systems Research Network (AHCS). The National Research
Foundation (NRF) managed the governmental funds directed to the
study of indigenous knowledge and traditional healing practices.26 In

24

Department of Health, Government Gazette, 25 July 2005, No 31271, General
Notice No 906
25
For the overview of different views on the epidemiology and ARVs among various
traditional healing organizations, see Richter 2003, Working Papers of the Centre for
Social Science (CSSR) Nos. 153, 170, 209, 210. On the official position on the
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2005.
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2006 the Department of Science and Technology (DST) sponsored the
study of the local knowledge as an alternative (and better) foundation
for the local decision-making as opposed to the international
knowledge.27 DST‘s Indigenous Knowledge Unit linked the
development of indigenous knowledge to the resistance to the Western
neo-colonial domination in devising the health care models and called
for the protection of native science as intellectual property collectively
owned at the local level.28 In 2009 DST and NRF made a research call
for The South African Research Chairs Initiative (SARChI) pursuing
to demonopolize the Western knowledge and making South Africa a
strong contender to the global knowledge as formulated by the
North.29
The evidence suggests that ATMs became deeply enrooted at
the local (provincial) level as well. In KwaZulu-Natal (KZN)
traditional healers were integrated into HIV treatment and care in
2005. In 2006—2008 Member of Executive Council (MEC) Peggy
Nkonyeni forged strong connections with the already established
native organizations and she hosted an information workshop featuring
thirty prominent anti-treatment advocates, who condemned the use of
ARVs. She also courted such outspoken opponents of ARVs as Dr
27

DST 2006
Mosimege 2005
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Cyril Khanyile (Medunsa University) and Nhlavana Maseko (the
president of THO), who were vocal against the rollout of ARVs and
spending money on the biomedical research. Simultaneously,
Nkonyeni tried to roll out herbal remedies for treating HIV/AIDS
patients at public hospitals.30 Similarly, Mpumalanga Health MEC
Sibongile Manana, frequently ordered doctors not to prescribe the
ARVs.31
Besides intentional efforts to promote traditional medicines, the
Cabinet allowed people of different walks of life (but with highly
questionable medical qualifications) to sell a variety of herbal mixtures
as genuine alternatives to ARVs. Medical reports and the media
typically described their product as brown liquids of suspicious origin,
having no benefits for the health of the patients. Consider some telling
examples.
In 2000 a local inyanga (healer) Lulu Ngubane claimed to treat
and/or reverse the HIV virus with the recipe which came to him in a
dream. In 2001 Phyto Nova produced immune-boosting Sutherlandia,
potentially useful for the people with HIV. In 2001 Siphiwe Hadebe
amassed a fortune by treating about 600 patients with ―umbimbi.‖
30

Kerry Cullinan, KZN Health minister mimics Manto and punts herbal remedies for
Aids, Health-e News Service, 11. 23, 2006; Kerry Cullinan, MEC keeps up pressure
on Manguzi, Health-e News Service, 24.06.2008
31
Anso Thom ‗Tyrant‘ Manana made to pay doctor, Health-e News Service,
22.10.2008
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Among his high-powered patients was Mbekis‘ loyalist Peter Mokaba,
who soon died from the lung infection, most likely AIDS-related. In
2003 the Health Minister gave permission to the former nurse Tine van
der Maas to conduct trials of her ―African solution‖ in public hospitals
and clinics.32 In 2005 another traditional healer and a former truck
driver Zeblon Gwala offered a mixture of 89 herbs ―uBhejane‖ to be
taken simultaneously with ARVs. Gwala‘s product have been
marketed and sold extensively over the years with an active support of
various provincial and national health officials.33 In 2007 lawyer
Christine Qunta of Comforter‘s Healing Gift produced the extract of
sonneblom —yet another untested nutritional supplement to cure
AIDS. 34 These and other healers often persuaded patients to stop
taking ARVs, while asserting that their treatment reversed the course
of the disease or killed AIDS. Yet the government intentionally kept
the window of opportunity open for them.

Indicator 1c: Check on prices and availability of generics
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33
Ndaki in Cullinan and Thom 2009: 149—153.
34
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The universality of treatment crucially depends on securing the
uninterrupted supply of medicines at the cheaper price. One realistic
option is to negotiate discounts with the international pharmaceutical
companies and use generics. Yet Pretoria refused either negotiating the
discounted prices, or using generics as a leverage tool.
Purchasing ARVs from the pharmaceutical giants even at the
reduced price was nailed as reinforcing the predatory power of
―pharmaceutical colonialism‖, bringing by far more problems to South
Africans than solutions. The member of government argued that ―price
reductions negotiated with manufacturers were neither substantive not
a permanent solution.‖35 Pretoria turned down the pharmaceutical
companies‘ offer to enter talks on price reduction to the poorest
African nations, refused to accept the Boehringer Indelheim‘s offer of
free Nevirapine for the pregnant women in the mid-2001, and refused
Glaxo‘s offer to buy AZT at a 70% slashed price.36 In 2000 the
presidential spokesperson Parks Mankahlana asserted that
pharmaceutical companies and their propagandists were profiteering
from the epidemic being uncurbed. In his presentation, the
pharmaceutical sector was misusing the information about the
pandemic and exaggerating the positive effects of their medicines:
35
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HIV/AIDS is not going to succumb to the machinations
of the profiteering pharmaceuticals and their
propagandists. Like the marauders of the military
industrial complex, the profit takers who are benefiting
from the scourge of HIV/AIDS will disappear to the
affluent beaches of the world to enjoy the wealth
accumulated from humankind ravaged by a dreaded
disease. And we shall continue to die from AIDS.37
All this was very surprising as, in 1997—1999 South African
government seemingly followed the global consensus by challenging
big transnational pharmaceutical corporations. The South African
Medicines Act of 1997 allowed the domestic production of the generic
drugs, parallel import and compulsory licensing. In defending the Act,
the government resisted Vice President Al Gore‘s and the United
States Trade Representative‘s (USTR) pressures to accept the rules for
pharmaceutical production as formulated by the international
pharmaceutical sector.38 Despite the media portrayed this resistance as
a big success of pro-treatment and anti-globalization forces, the
relevant literatures soon noted the furtiveness of the Medicines Act. As
it turned out, the hidden purpose was to manufacture local

37
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Mankahlana, 23 March 2000.
For the details see Behrman 2004: 142—148.
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pharmaceutical alternatives to ARVs, independently from the
international pharmaceutical sector.39 Neither acquiring the cheaper
ARVs, nor pressing for the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) safeguards, was on the real agenda.
Most strikingly, believing in the inevitable success of the domestic
medicine, the South African government lost an interest in legal action
against foreign pharmaceutical sector. As a result, the government at
some point decided to accommodate pressures of the pharmaceutical
companies, neglecting to enact the compulsory licensing safeguard.
The Cabinet‘s put all its bets on the development of Virodene®
PO58 (1997—2002).40 This controversial, but genuine, passion for the
local drug stared in 1997, when three physicians from the University
of Pretoria announced the invention of a cheap and effective antiAIDS drug on the basis of an industrial solvent used in
cryopreservation. From the outset this discovery was under suspicion
as it had been neither peer reviewed, nor published in respected
scientific journals, while its inventors hardly possessed relevant
medical qualifications. Not surprisingly, in February the MCC banned
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the drug and stopped its testing.41 However, the inventors skilfully
deployed an argument against the Western pharmaceutical neocolonialism, which in turn generated a firm political and financial
backing.42 Despite the alleged continuous support and financial
involvement of some senior members of the ANC, this attempt to
produce a local pharmaceutical product failed.
The failure of the original domestic pharmaceutical product did
not abate the specious drug-colonization rant. As Rath vitriolled,
At their 2007 conference in Heiligendamm, Germany, the
G8 heads authorized the largest genocide program in
modern history - the promotion of toxic ARV drugs across
Africa and the developing world. …this plan provides the
blueprint for the economic and political subversion and
control of the African continent by the former colonial
empires…Under the terms of implementing human rights,
fundamental freedoms, peace and democracy, this plan is
an outline for the recolonialisation of the African continent
on behalf of the pharmaceutical drug cartel. Under the term
of universal access to ARV drugs and improving the health
41
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of African people, the $60 Billion attack plan with
―chemical weapons‖ called ARV drugs is specified in
detail.43
In this context, advocating generics was pinned down as a part
of a plot to undermine President Mbeki‘s and the ANC‘s authority,
threaten the black lives and turn the country into a banana republic.
Roberts, for instance, politicized the treatment activism as the AIDSdrug promotion conspiracy. Using defamatory language, he lashed out
against ―the elite media and its anti-ANC AIDS-drug agitation,‖ as
well as ―the AIDS-drug lobby lore‖ of David Cameron, Tony Leon,
Zackie Achmat, Mark Heywood, Kerry Cullinan, Nicoli Natrass, and
even ―celebrity colonialism‖ of Nadine Gordimer.44 Rath-sponsored
End AIDS: Break the Chains of Pharmaceutical Colonialism was a
book-long accusation of multinational pharmaceutical industries of recolonizing the continent. In this diatribe, the global pharmaceutical
neo-colonialism was infiltrating the county via civil society, which
castigated Mbeki‘s take on the multinationals only to promote the
multi-billion dollar ARV business in South Africa.45 In this
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presentation, civil society simply detracted Mbeki from opposing the
mass import of toxic ARV drugs. 46
In 2002/2003 the SA government responded very negatively to
the domestic activist groups‘ efforts in smuggling generics to the
country. The local production of generics begun as late as in 2003,
when its role as a tool in cutting deals with the pharmaceutical sector
decreased.47 Some policy analysts noted that advocates of the generics,
such as The Clinton Foundation, were quietly pushed aside. 48
According to one report, ―[M]any generic companies complained of
being shut out of the process — which mostly seemed tailored to
favour the Western pharmaceutical industry and/or possibly, the
development of South African sources.‖49 By 2006, the South African
government failed to secure licenses for the generic manufacture and
production of second-line drugs.50
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Indicator 2a: Providing ARVs to key vulnerable groups
The international policy consensus underscored the critical importance
of treating key vulnerable groups, which might become bridge
populations. The provision of the ARVs to mothers is viewed as a high
priority, as mothers constitute the key target vulnerable population, in
which the transmission of HIV is highly preventable. In South African
case, despite the decreasing prices and increasing efficiency and safety
of the drugs, the Cabinet was reluctant to offer mother to child
prevention transmission (MTCTP) programs. However, once
international funding became available, the Cabinet reversed its
decision. This evidence is consistent with the strategy of marketization
as the core component of African Renaissance.
The following policy choices attracted most attention in the
South African mass media. In October 1998 the Health Minister Dr.
Dlamini-Zuma, along with the various provincial Members of
Executive Council for Health (MECs), decided not to make AZT
available to MTCTP and discontinue the pilot projects.51 In 2000
Phakamile ―Parks‖ Mankahlana indicated that the MTCPT policy, if
fully implemented, will result in dramatic increase of orphans and
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vulnerable children (OVC), which would deplete the state resources.52
Dr. Nono Simelela (Chief Director for HIV, AIDS and STDs in the
National Department of Health) argued that implementing MTCPT
would imperil the other vital health needs of all South Africans. This
argument continually translated into attempts to stop and then delay
the universal rollout of drugs as related to the most vulnerable
population.
Calculations made by the prominent domestic health
economists had no impact on the DOH‘s position, ―despite medical
and economic research showing that the costs of MTCTP were more
than offset by the cost-savings associated with reduced numbers of
HIV-related paediatric cases.‖53 According to James Myberg, the
funds were diverted to other way less critical goals ―The R80m it
would have cost to roll out this programme was to be spent instead on
an anti-AIDS advertising campaign. This was launched on October 9
1998 by Mbeki in a nationally televised address.‖ 54 While the
provinces of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape were
able to start more or less decent MTCTP, the national officials
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obstructed the logistical support and planning of the rollout in the rest
of the provinces.55
This policy was promoted against the backdrop of strong
public criticism and pressure from the ANC‘s traditional allies. 56
Prominent political figures, including Nelson Mandela, Desmond
Tutu, and Mbhazima Shilowa joined the set of ―traditional‖ critics of
the cabinet and Ministry of Health. According to Patrick Furlong and
Karen Ball, ―state response to criticism from traditional supporters was
the cabinet‘s dramatic recommitment on 17 April 2002 to fighting
AIDS…the cabinet also asserted that universal rollout of PMTCT
drugs and supportive programs for rape survivors were on track.‖57
Yet the real change in the policy did not come until generous
financial aid from international sources became available. According
to Theo Smart, ―given South Africa‘s history on the issue, without
pressure from PEPFAR, it is not clear how far those efforts would
have favoured the roll-out of ART.‖58 Since the beginning of PEPFAR
disbursements:


3,045,400 pregnant women began receiving HIV counseling and
testing services for PMTCT ;
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462,400 HIV-positive pregnant women receiving antiretroviral
prophylaxis for PMTCT ;



528,100 orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs) were served by
the program in FY 2008 alone.59

Indicator 2b: Scaling up as a proxy for universality
The rapid improvement of biomedical technology, the fast-growing
generics industry in the developing world (India, Brazil, and
Thailand), and subsequently steadily decreasing prices on
pharmaceutical products at least in principle made ARVs affordable
for the national rollout. Yet the South Africa put forth unaffordability
argument, which stemmed from marketization as the core component
of African Renaissance. In essence, it prescribed to curb the spending
in the public sector. However, once international funding became
available, the Cabinet was willing to comply with the global consensus
of scaling up.
The extant elite‘s commitment to marketization prompted the
Cabinet to keep the HIV treatment programs down or discontinuing
the modest AZT treatment programs, which were available at that
juncture in time. Pretoria stayed committed to the argument of
59
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unaffordability in the context of continuous public outcry against these
policies headed by the strengthening pro-treatment coalition in
particular and the leftist critics of neo-liberal economic principles in
general. Scholars and practitioners describe a variety of high-profile
activities, including meetings and conferences, civil disobedience
campaigns, litigation campaigns, as well as negotiations and talks at
key ―consensus-seeking institutions.‖ The special attention is paid for
the Durban Declaration (2000), Framework Agreement on a National
Prevention and Treatment Plan for Combating HIV/AIDS (the
National Economic Development and Labour Council, NEDLAC
2002), and ―Dying for Treatment‖ campaign (2003). 60 As a result of
this pro-treatment mobilization, the Cabinet gave in to the scale-up
demands and announced the new Operational Plan for Comprehensive
HIV and Aids Care, Management and Treatment for South Africa (19
November 2003). This plan officially stipulated the universal
antiretroviral treatment provision in the framework of the public health
care system. This plan also arranged for a significant increase of
AIDS-related funding and set up numbers of a steady raise of the
patients to be covered by the ARVs.61
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However, according to the more cautious assessments, the
victory of the pro-treatment coalition over the absenteeism of the
South African government was marred by the palpable governmental
reluctance to scale-up the ARV roll-out as required. Although the
number of treated patients in the public sector constantly rose almost
to the targets set in the Operational Plan, further reports suggested the
inherent problems with the government‘s commitment to the
universality of treatment. Generally, after November 2003 Pretoria
continued to stall the scale-up efforts. 62 In 2003—2005 such
prominent think tanks as the South African Health System Trust
(HST), International Treatment Preparedness Coalition (ITPC) and
Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) expressed some
concerns with the implementation of the Operational Plan.63 Their
reports indicated, first, that the government designated much less
money for the full implementation of the announced targets than
required. Second, the national and provincial health departments
delayed the procurement of drugs, for a variety of reasons not able to
use the significant portion of resources allocated by the Treasury for
the comprehensive rollout. Most importantly, by 2005 there was only
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23% ARV rollout countrywide, comparing to 85% in Botswana.64 In
the province of KwaZulu-Natal the problems with ARV provision
persisted until 2009; in the Free State the department of health
imposed a moratorium to stop initiating ARV treatment for new
patients, which was not lifted after a as four-month period as first
planned.65 All this, of course, can be viewed as simply logistical
challenges, related to the state‘s low capacity and efficiency.
These logistical difficulties plague the country‘s anti-AIDS
battle today as well. Yet in 2000s the lack of any extensive or
elaborate plan for ARVs disbursement aggravated these problems.66 It
mentioned treatment in a very generic way (not even antiretrovirals,
but treatment of opportunistic diseases, along with care and support),
while limiting the use of ARVs only to the post-exposure situations
(such as sexual assault and occupational exposure in public health
facilities). It was recommended that the research on the use of ARVs
to be reviewed and re-evaluated.67 Thus, to a certain extent the
Cabinet turned logistical difficulties into an excuse not to scale up the
treatment.
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In all this, Pretoria pitched itself against the WHO‘s 3X5
initiative by the target year of 2005. The Health Minister directly
challenged the initiative, saying that she did not ―…want to be pushed
or pressurised by a target of three million people on antiretrovirals
(ARVs) by 2005. WHO set that target themselves; they didn't consult
us. I don‘t see why South Africa today must be the scapegoat for not
reaching the target.‖68
Finally, since the South African government received a
generous PEPFAR funding, it changed its strategy and decided to
scale-up the ARVs. This funding significantly mitigated the resource
scarcity to achieve the universality of treatment. According to
Nattrass, inflow of the external funding and support provided by
PEPAFR and GFATM was fundamental to the increase of the
universal ARV coverage in South Africa and quicken the rollout
speed. Thus, the PEPFAR funding significantly contributed to the
scale-up as indicated in the following Table 2.
Table 7.2: PEPFAR‘s funding for treatment in RSA69
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In 2006—2007 the volume of general criticisms against the
domestic health policy and specific calls to dismiss TshabalalaMsimang peaked, along with the more general process of crumbling
support for Mbeki as a national leader. Subsequently, NSP 2007—
2011 shows a remarkable breakthrough: it sets forth expanding access
to appropriate treatment as a key priority area, while downgrading the
research on the efficacy of traditional and complementary medicines
for HIV treatment and OI prophylaxis as a secondary concern. This
NSP for the first time clearly set the targets for scaling up care and
support (80% of all HIV-positive people and their families by 2011). 70

Indicator 2c: Treatment as an integral part of prevention
The South African government chose not to use treatment for the
purposes of prevention. First, the Cabinet resisted the policy of
providing nevirapine as a central component of vertical prevention
from mother to child.71 Until 2007 it continued to obstruct particular
plan for mother to child transmission prevention (MTCTP) protocols.
Second, until 2004 the government was resolute to use complementary
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micronutrients and nutritional supplements as products preventing the
development of AIDS.
The central component of vertical prevention is to roll out
nevirapine—the essential drug for mother to child prevention
transmission (MTCPT). Nevirapine significantly reduces the chances
of HIV transmission to infants and significantly alleviates the burden
of the palliative/paediatric care to be carried out in the public health
sector. The South African government, however, resisted this policy
component by referring both to the drug safety issues and broader
economic reasons of the treatment rollout. Pretoria even tried to
―debunk‖ the results of Uganda-based study (HIVNET012) and
deregister nevirapine.72 Later on, after nevirapine was made available
to South Africa free of charge, the official position stated that ―the
costs of testing all pregnant women for HIV, of introducing necessary
counselling service, and of providing infant formula (to prevent
transmission of HIV through breast milk) were too high.‖ 73
The argument against separation of prevention and treatment
became very important in the advocacy efforts of the pro-treatment
groups. Over the period of several years, Treatment Action Campaign
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(TAC) activists argued that treatment was an indispensable part of the
prevention strategies and it should be universally provided within the
public health care system and that the separation of the two policy
components was unacceptable. At the XV International AIDS
Conference, TAC decisively brought the issue of the role of treatment
in prevention at the international arena (Thailand, 2004). Backed by
Dr. Jim Yong Kim (WHO director for HIV/AIDS) TAC chairperson
Zackie Achmat exposed the SA health department‘s position on the
resistance to the use of nevirapine for MTCPT as a ―vertical
prevention‖ measure.
Even after the Constitutional Court ruled to administer
nevirapine in the public health sector, the resistance continued. In 2002
Mpumalanga‘s MEC Dr. Sibongile Manana did not comply with the
order.74 In August 2003 Medicines Control Council (MCC) withdrew
the license for the use of nevirapine, ignoring both the domestic
studies and trials, as well broad international practice of administering
the drug.75 In essence, the pro-active vertical prevention measures
were announced as late as in November 2007, only when the
governmental resolve to resist the pro-treatment coalition significantly
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weakened. In 2007 Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka
chaired a meeting with South African National AIDS Council
(SANAC) and announced a new PMTCT protocol consistent with the
global prescriptions.76
While stalling the vertical prevention, the government actively
promoted the idea of prevention through nutrition. In 2000-2004, the
Cabinet actively promoted the ―immune-boosting‖ concoctions and
various nutritional supplements as the major alternative to the
internationally sanctioned medicines. In 2003 Dr. Manto TshabalalaMsimang publicly suggested several variations of the so-called
nutritious recovery regimen and the ―Mediterranean diet,‖ consisting
of garlic, ginger, beetroots, and olive oil. There is no doubt that an
adequate nutrition is a part of generic healthiness, yet from the
standard medical viewpoint should not be adopted as the primary and
exclusive preventive measure against AIDS. Roberto Giraldo, the
Health Minister‘s official nutritional advisor was a strong advocate of
complementary and alternative treatment programs, notorious for
making some outlandish claims to about the near miraculous results
associated with alternative medicines:
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The use of food, micronutrient/antioxidant
supplements, and herbal remedies can reverse the
effects of AIDS and can prevent the progression of
HIV-positive individuals to AIDS. Their use can avoid
the ―transmission‖ of what is known as HIV from
person to person and from mother to child during
pregnancy, delivery, and breastfeeding. Their use can
arrest ―HIV viral loads‖ and can reverse AIDS
dementia… Food, nutritional/antioxidant supplements
and indigenous herbs are an effective and inexpensive
alternative for the prevention and treatment of AIDS.
Testimonies explained that it could cost as little as US
$7 per month.77

PARTNERSHIPS
Indicator 3a: Public-private partnerships
The intentional efforts to implement public-private interaction
mechanisms and contract private sector for the public needs (PPP) are
pivotal to increase the capacity of the public health care sector, where
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the ARVs are rollout to anybody who needs them. The critical
evidence suggests that the South African government opted to protect
private sector, while keeping the expenditures in the public sector as
minimal as possible to prevent the undesired overspending. This
evidence is consistent with the strategy of marketization as the core
component of African Renaissance.
Prior to 2001 90% of the seropositive patients were treated in
the private sector (yet overall it was just a fraction of people who
needed treatment at heat time). In 2004 only 11,000 HIV-positive
people received treatment from the public health system, which was 1
out of every 50 AIDS patients who were medically ready for ARVs. 78
After 2004, however, the government did not resist to PPP overtly, but
avoided decisive policies in transferring risks to the private sector in
achieving the universality of treatment. More specifically, in 2005—
2008 the annual editions of the South African Health Reviews
emphasized the continuing accumulation of resources and expertise in
the private sector, the absence of public-private interaction
mechanisms, and, with a few exceptions, the governmental reluctance
to contracting private sector for the public needs.79 As one chapter
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from the 2005 Health System Trust (HST)‘s South African Health
Review (SAHR) report put it,
The financial disparity in health spending between
the two sectors has widened, with the private sector
spending approximately seven times more per capita
than the public sector, on less than 20% of the
population. The public sector serves 84% of the
population (mainly the uninsured and poor), spending
approximately 41% of total health funding.80
Once again, the missed targets indicated Pretoria did not
consider the possibility of sacrificing the empowerment of
marketization in order to implement more redistributive, socialoriented programs. In the most outspoken form, the claim that the
universal access in the public sector was not sustainable in the long run
lasted from 1998 to 2003.81 In 2001 Dr. Ayanda Ntsaluba (in 1998—
2003 Director-General for Policy and Planning in the National
Department of Health) underscored the logistical challenges behind the
universal rollout in the public sector, which would hamper its
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implementation.82 In 2003 Dr. Tshabalala-Msimang argued that the
provision of treatment would be sustainable only if the government
adequately tackled the problem of improving the domestic health care
system infrastructure.83 While a large-scale AIDS intervention with
HAART was estimated between 1 and 3%, these arguments were but
exceeding rationalization of why the universal rollout in public sector
was undesirable.
The budgetary financial constraints got alleviated at the
moment when external donor assistance programs amassed to the half
of the money for the universal antiretroviral rollout. The availability of
resources, however, did not change the domestic stress on
marketization. According to several domestic reports, the South
African government continued to view the provision of ARVs in
public sector as an ―additional to, and not a replacement for, existing
ARV access through managed private sector care schemes.‖84 Nicoli
Nattrass argued that the external finial inflows to South Africa had an
adverse effect on public sector, as they essentially had taken all the
pressure off the national Department of Health to use available
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domestic resources.85 This means that the Cabinet government used
the influx of foreign resources not to strengthen its public sector, but
rather to protect its private sector. Subsequently, the Cabinet critics
became concerned about the potential effects of donor dependency,
locking in the weakness of the public sector, as it happened in some
other African countries as well. The Cabinet chose not to be engaged
in this discussion.
The second part of the story is the Cabinet‘s strategy to
decrease the policy-making capacity of the public sector, including
health agencies, medical research units, health regulatory bodies, and
prominent individuals, while putting them under the direct control of
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang. In the late 1990s the SA government
undermined the authority of the MCC by reversing its decision on
Virodene as toxic and unsafe (see the previous subsection), and
disputed the safety of nevirapine. MMC, however, reaffirmed its
independence as it kept refusing to sanction its clinical trails.86 The
Cabinet went as far as firing Peter Folb, then director of the MCC and
the ANC member. In 2004 the government-backed Dr. Rath
Foundation published a petition to disband the MCC, calling it ―an
agency whose members are directly or indirectly dependent on the
85
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international pharmaceutical industry, and whose decisions have
consistently served these foreign interests at the cost of the health and
lives of the people of South Africa.‖87 In 2008 Tshabalala-Msimang
promoted the legislation to replace ―the ineffective and slow‖ MCC
with Regulatory Authority for Health Products (RAHP), which was
intended to ―close loopholes by covering traditional and
complementary medicines‖ and command more staff and resources.88
Other examples include the governmental restrains on the
Medical Research Council (MRC), as well as its president Malegapuru
Makgoba, the prominent epidemiologists from the University of
Witwatersrand, once Mbeki‘s supporter. Makgoba‘s objections to the
governmental stance on the ARV policy were dismissed by Mbeki
himself, which in effect ended their partnership. The Cabinet put
constraints on MRC‘s mandate, censured the body‘s research findings,
and accused it of being hostile to the government.89 The apparat
games permeated the Department of Health as well. In 2007 Deputy
Minister Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge was fired after having
participated in the International AIDS Conference in Barcelona. While
the official reason was her failure to secure a direct presidential
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approval, the media attributed the firing to her mainstream beliefs
about the role of ARV treatment.

Indicator 3b: Aid and expertise of international health organizations
Today international recommendations have become almost universally
recognized as important tools in improving domestic policies,
including public health. This implies that following the guidelines and
recommendations provided by international health organizations, such
as the WHO, UNAIDS, and others is indispensable in developing
adequate domestic health policies. In 1994—1996, the government
explicitly embraced partnerships with international governmental
organizations, private sector and civil society. 90 In the late 1990s, the
stress on exceptionalism and continental leadership as elements of
common good prompted the Cabinet to establish an alternative forum
of the HIV/AIDS-related biomedical expertise and later claim that the
international health organizations‘ prescription and guidelines are
misinformed and ill-suited for South African realities.
Instead of pursuing closer partnership with international health
organizations, in the early 2000s Pretoria turned to the AIDS
dissidents as chief partners in formulating the appropriate policies in
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response to the epidemic. This decision went against the grain of the
common biomedical expertise. Most importantly, first, the AIDS
denialist movement was hardly a recognizable and legitimate
international force since 1996, when many dissidents refused to take
the newly available ARV medications and passed away. Second, the
Cabinet valued the dissidents‘ approach as it was believed to be open
to the African knowledge and not committed to the Western science
methodologically. The irony of this commitment was that the dissident
theory had been formulated by the Westerns scientists, as many
political observers snidely remarked. In essence, sponsoring select
biomedical pariahs from across the globe was intended to challenge
the expertise of mainstream international health organizations, as well
as to the medical and pharmaceutical establishment of the Global
North. The public criticism of the dissidents was interpreted as an
orchestrated campaign, using racially skewed science to suppress
Africa‘s independent quest for unique solutions.91
More specifically, South African government and President
Mbeki personally commissioned the Presidential AIDS Advisory
Panel (PAAP, or the Pretoria Panel), of which the dissidents comprised
at least a half. PAAP brought together notable dissidents Prof. Peter
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Duesberg, Prof. Sam Mhlongo, Dr. Valendar Turner, and Dr. David
Rasnik. Their recommendations for South Africa were based on the
claims that AIDS was not contagious, although many of the
opportunistic infections were; AIDS was not sexually transmitted;
AIDS was not caused by HIV; the admittedly toxic anti-HIV drugs
were killing people; the drug-induced toxic effects caused AIDSdefining conditions that cannot be distinguished from AIDS. 92
This counter-epistemic community gave President Mbeki and
his supporters a quasi-scientific vocabulary to refute the conventional
epidemiological wisdom that HIV was the cause of AIDS, and reject
the cost-efficient and safe drugs. As a result, Mbeki created a selfdeceptive possibility to select among a large number of legitimate
health policy options how to deal with the epidemic domestically. In
the summary policy document, PAAP fused two contradictory sets of
recommendations. AIDS denialists recommended suspending all HIV
testing in the country, using no ARVs to treat patients, while
eradicating other infectious diseases, and improving nutrition and
sanitation.
Under the strong pressures applied by international-domestic
pro-treatment coalition, the PAAP was disbanded and never
reconvened again in the same format. The disbanding PAAP, however,
92
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converted neither into the acceptance of the expertise of the
international health organizations, nor in straightforward endorsement
of the mainstream science. After an enormous international and
domestic outcry Mbeki distanced himself from AIDS activists by
asking AIDS dissidents not to use his name for the fundraising
purposes. Yet this distancing remained somewhat duplicitous.93 In
2007 Roberts politicized the public criticism of bringing the dissidents
on the panel. He charged critics being informed by colonial
scholarship, racial stereotypes, and the beliefs in black incompetence
and native unfitness for governance:
But why, upon mature reflection, would anybody be
surprised that a responsible elected official wants to
acquaint himself ―with all sides‖ of a science that
everybody says is central to a massive health crisis under
his watch? It is an elementary intellectual procedure, unless
of course the leader is implicitly denied the right to or
faculty of intellect. He must just shut up. He must just
obey… Mbeki‘s sin was to reject a drug-based intellectual
protectionism in favour of a free exchange of ideas on the
proper solution to the AIDS pandemic…Mbeki‘s
methodical inquiry was recast as native
93
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stubbornness…Mbeki is cast as a heathen, a nonbeliever—indeed as the proverbial Kaffir in that rich and
resonant word‘s original sense.94
After the whole dissident debacle was over, the Cabinet turned
to more subtle ways not to forge partnerships with the international
health organizations. The Department of Health resisted the adoption
of an adequate monitoring and evaluation system, which would have
enabled comparison between the domestic progress and international
guidelines and objectives. In general, the crucial evidence is that the
overwhelming majority of the domestic policy documents either did
not follow these prescriptions, or attempted to reframe them.95
For instance, the first official update report ―Progress Report
on the Declaration of Commitment on HIV and AIDS‖ submitted by
DOH in 2006 was widely criticized in eluding the discussion and
presentation of any tangible data that would allow to compare the
domestic progress with the international guidelines and objectives.
Evading the monitoring and evaluation mechanism was also pervasive
on the provincial level as well. According to the Joint Civil Society
Monitoring Forum (JCSMF) by 2006 the provincial health
departments provided neither disaggregated data on HIV/AIDS
94
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expenditures, nor the information about rollout for the domestic
monitoring agencies.96 Only in 2007, the National Strategic Plan for
2007—2011 making provisions for the large national ARV rollout,
soon to be praised internationally, recommended to follow
international prescriptions in establishing the monitoring and
evaluation framework.97

Indicator 3c: Partnership with civil society sector
In this subsection I argue that Pretoria pursued selective partnerships
with domestic civil society organizations. It refused to cooperate with
those organizations, which the Cabinet perceived as disloyal to the
South African common good, sided with the neo-colonial global
pharmaceutical sector, and used international arena to discredit the
country. The Cabinet preferred to forge connection with organizations
advocating local solutions for the country‘s exceptional problems,
which is consistent with the core components of social purpose.
Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) remained the most visible
and internationally supported AIDS treatment advocacy group. TAC
fully embraced the international consensus on the nature of the
96
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pandemic (and therefore the norm of ARVs as a biomedical solution.
Because of its strong resolve and consistence with the global
consensus on ARVs, by 2004 TAC received an international
recognition and was broadly praised for its efforts to promote the use
of antiretrovirals in the country. Moreover, to a great extent, it was
able to frame the global academic discussion about HIV/AIDS politics
in South Africa and advertised its cause via the eye-grabbing
campaigns of civil protests.
TAC effectively became a linking pin between domestic and
international civil society organizations since its active participation at
the international AIDS conferences, which brought TAC international
supporters. At the XII International AIDS Conference (Durban, SA
July 2000) TAC and Doctors without Borders (MSF) organized a joint
satellite conference ―Improving Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs in
Developing Countries.‖ In 2002, following the Barcelona Conference,
TAC tried to bring together most visible civil society organizations
across Africa to create a unified pro-treatment advocacy network
under the name of Pan-African HIV/AIDS Treatment Access
Movement (PHATAM).98 In 2006 At the XVI International AIDS
Conference TAC co-organized the march for the Global Day of
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Action in Brazil, Canada, China, and South Africa. Thus, the early
2000s the domestic pro-treatment coalition was able to forge the strong
international links.99
As TAC gained more international recognition and credibility,
the members of Mbeki‘s administration became evermore hostile and
unwilling to collaborate with it. According to the ANC member
Andrew Feinstein, who took notes during Mbeki‘s speech at the ANC
caucus meeting in 2000, Mbeki blamed TAC for lobbying the special
interests of the pharmaceutical sector (and thus acting as an agent of
foreign influence).100 According to TAC‘s Secretary-General Sipho
Mthathi, in 2004 the governmental representatives charged the
organization with ―using international podiums to embarrass the South
African government and of not being patriotic.‖101 In 2006, Pretoria
attempted to exclude TAC (as well as Friends of TAC, and the AIDS
Law Project, ALP) from participating in the Review Meeting on the
UNGASS Declaration of Commitment, taking place at the United
Nations in New York in 2006. Ultimately, the Cabinet strongly
99
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disapproved of the domestic civil society‘s participation in
international health conferences and their appeal to the international
arena. This animosity notwithstanding, TAC was gaining political
momentum and domestic prominence.
The Cabinet chose to support organizations, which were hostile
to ―AIDS-drug lobby‖ and backed up the governmental call for the
African solutions for African problems. 102 For instance, the Dr. Rath
Foundation, the SA National Civic Organisation (SANCO), and the
Treatment Information Group (TIG)—for a long time were favored in
the DOH. The official Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and
AIDS Care, Management and Treatment for South Africa went as far
as incorporating Robert Giraldo‘s alternative nutrition-related
interventions in its policy recommendations.103 The governmental
links with these organizations remained quite strong as long as the
Cabinet‘s strategy to promote complementary and alternative solutions
for African epidemic endured. Tshabalala-Msimang maintained
personal relations with Dr. Matthias Rath and Robert Giraldo. The
former proposed treating HIV/AIDS with his multivitamin supplement
VitaCell and claimed that G8 was involved in the genocide and
recolonization conspiracy against Africa; while the latter was the
102
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Minister‘s personal nutritionist.104 The governmental partnership with
persons and groups promoting nutritional treatment flourished until
2008, when the Cape High Court ruled multivitamin trials illegal and
instructed to investigate Rath‘s activities.
Besides these intentional partnerships with these unhinged
nutritionists, the Cabinet was generally supportive of those
organizations and groups, which concentrated on poverty and
malnutrition as deep structural variables driving the epidemic, while
not rejecting the life-saving role of the ARVs. At one point, the
Department of Health became the major donor of the South Africa‘s
National Association of People Living with HIV/AIDS (NAPWA), an
organization boasting 90 branches with estimated 300,000 members,
yet suffering from the lack of funding and the crisis of legitimacy.105
Not surprisingly, domestic AIDS dissidents sought to support
Mbeki‘s AIDS policies and attack his ―drug-lore‖ opponents as well.
In 2007 Treatment Information Group (TIG) drafted a 59-page bill of
indictment for the prosecution of Zackie Achmat at the International
Criminal Court at the Hague on a charge of genocide for his direct
criminal role in the deaths of thousands of South Africans from ARV
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poisoning.106 By that time Mbeki‘s be supporters still were actively
seeking a personal access to the President, since the speculation about
his dissident views had never ceased to circulate in the country. Yet
Mbeki cautiously avoided any public association with these
individuals, and tried to revamp himself as a decision-maker in search
of a specific and sensible policy.
The government became willing to cooperate with the protreatment activist movement only when Mbeki and TshabalalaMsimang lost their expressiveness in the public debate about AIDS
and subsequently loosened their grip in controlling the health-related
agencies.107 In 2005—2006 new Deputy President Phumzile MlamboNgcuka tried to restructure the organizational governance of
HIV/AIDS in the country. The new National Strategic HIV/AIDS Plan
(NSP 2007—2011) intended to return to the South African National
AIDS Council (SANAC) the status of a linking-pin between the
government and the civil society. 108 To fulfill these objectives,
Mlambo-Ngcuka brought on board a number of civil society
representatives, including Mark Heywood of TAC as the deputy chair.
Under her brief leadership, SANAC organized the 3rd National AIDS
Conference in order to resolve the key contentious issues regarding the
106
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HIV/AIDS. 109 Despite these efforts received an international
recognition, they were effectively countered when the Health Minister
returned from a sick leave in 2007. Quickly after her recovery,
Tshabalala-Msimang once more tried to restructure SANAC in order
to counterbalance the growing influence of the civil society
representatives.110 Although her plan to keep only functionaries and
loyalists ultimately failed, SANAC remained stuck between being an
integrative and coordinating body, representative of South African
AIDS community, and a rubber-stamp institution.
Yet these modest elements of cooperation came out of
necessity, and were never accepted as a principled policy. According
to the report of International Treatment Prevention Coalition (ITPC)
one 2006 report, the Cabinet continued ―efforts to inhibit full
participation of civil society.‖111 Roberts, accordingly, once again
accused AIDS activists and pro-treatment movement of generating the
AIDS debate in order to discredit the South African democracy and
gloss over the consequences of the apartheid rule, and perhaps even to
rehabilitate it:
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In the South African political context, it has been easier
and more politically convenient... to blame black
incompetence and even callousness for the AIDS epidemic
that manifested itself immediately after 1994, than to
acknowledge the obvious momentum of history in creating
it. The AIDS debate marks the most notable success of
those who seek to erase apartheid and colonial history from
South Africa‘s present-day self-understanding.112

CONCLUSION
This chapter asserts that in South Africa domestic responses to the
global consensus on HIV/AIDS and the antiretroviral treatment were
based on the deployment of an African Renaissance, the historically
contingent and country-specific content of national purpose. In other
words, the national purpose significantly impinged on the transfer of
the global policy consensus on ARVs, prompting the Cabinet and its
high-power members to challenge this consensus in public. On
balance, I do not claim to be able to explain all nine indicators of the
global consensus, yet the provided analysis both contributes to the
existing explanations and covers important elements of the domestic
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HIV/AIDS politics not spotlighted before(see the indicators 1a, 1b, 2b,
3a, 3b, and 3c in the table below).
South African elites questioned the sameness of
epidemiological trajectory of the disease in South Africa and the rest
of the world. Elite framed the domestic epidemic as a local
developmental problem in opposition to the lifestyle issues and the
massive consumption of various toxic drugs, including the
antiretroviral medications, in the West (Indicator 1a). As an extension
of this reasoning, political elites worked to revive and institutionalize
the alternative/indigenous medicines as either a full substitute to the
―toxic AZT,‖ or an addition to the Western biomedical products in
general (Indicator 1b). In this context, Pretoria for a while was not
quite concerned about the rapid importation and domestic
disbursement of generic pharmaceutical products; in certain cases even
attempting to prosecute the smugglers of generics (Indicator 1c).
In South African epidemiological conditions the most
vulnerable group was mothers carrying the virus giving birth to
children. Despite the decreasing prices and increasing efficiency and
safety of the available drugs, for a while the Cabinet was reluctant to
offer mother to child prevention transmission program as too
expensive and pharmaceutically unsafe (Indicator 2a). To keep the
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expenditures in the public sector as minimal as possible to prevent the
undesired overspending, both Pretoria and provincial health officials
consistently stalled the national roll-out programs on the ground and
tried to block the universality of access to treatment in principle
(Indicator 2b). The South African government was resolute to use
complementary micronutrients and nutritional supplements for
prevention of the development of opportunistic diseases (Indicator 2c).
The critical evidence suggests that Pretoria chose to protect the
relatively successful private sector and did not employ it to improve
the dismal health care conditions in the public sector (Indicator 3a).
The prospects of partnership with civil society sector were tainted by
the latter‘s support of the Western biomedical products. As a result,
the Cabinet preferred to forge connection with organizations
advocating alternative and complementary treatment (Indicator 3b).
Finally, Pretoria legitimized a counter-epistemic community of health
dissidents and worked to make traditional healers to be recognized
internationally. The government seemed to accept partnership with the
international organizations, only when their financial assistance
alleviated the burden of the public sector, which was consistent with
the emphasis on slashing the spending (Indicator 3c).
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Table 7.3: Summary of the impact of national purpose on HIV/AIDS
policy

The consequences of deploying national purpose to HIV/AIDS issuearea as a particularly South African problem were self-defeating
inasmuch as doing so it thwarted adequate, quick and appropriate
response to the country‘s looming health crisis. Pretoria missed the
international targets of curbing HIV/AIDS and failed to acknowledge
how grave the epidemiological situation was.
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CHAPTER 8. PLACING SOCIAL PURPOSE IN THE CONTEXT
OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

Chapters 4 and 5 traced how Russian and South African political elites
constructed and legitimized their new social purposes, which were
respectively labeled ―Sovereign Democracy‖ and ―African
Renaissance.‖ In these chapters, I examined how country-specific and
politically contingent conceptions of common good legitimized certain
kinds of policy actions and inhibited others.
In both countries the advent of new social purpose occurred
simultaneously with the spread of the epidemic of HIV/AIDS. Because
the spread of the pandemic threatens the existence of the state and
hinders the physical survival of population, providing the antiretroviral
treatment becomes a fundamental common good. Chapters 6 and 7
demonstrated how, why and to what extent social purpose politicized
domestic policy responses to HIV/AIDS and prompted the kinds of
actions considered legitimate and appropriate. In this context, the key
decision-makers from these two countries have significantly filtered
the standardized policy prescriptions to the pandemic through the
pursued conceptions of common good.
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The question remains whether or not my emphasis on social
purpose as an intervening variable is robust to major alternative
explanations, which might explain the cross-national deviations from
the international best-cases practices. This chapter places social
purpose in three primary policy transfer explanations, including peer
learning, coalition-building, and external pressures. This move
sharpens my analytical focus and confirms social purpose as a
plausible explanatory variable.

In many cases, norm diffusion explanations provide very
credible models demonstrating the adoption of or resistance to
international, or foreign policies in the domestic arenas. Locating
national purpose within broader explanations of norm diffusion will
help me not only to test my findings from the previous chapters, but
also facilitate thinking about how identity factors into in norm
diffusion processes more generally.
Wade Jacoby‘s classification is a good starting point, as it
delineates among combination of foreign and domestic influences in
the process of transfer, ranging from the uttermost involvement of the
powerful outsiders to their exclusion, and is agnostic about the
underlying normative logic of norm diffusion processes. According to
388

Jacoby‘s classification, the menu of policy transfer includes external
influences, coalition-building and learning.1 One caveat here is that
other scholars might use a different list of diffusion mechanisms,
sometimes including regional competition, normative imitation,
socialization, and so on.2 In this chapter I will not consider those
mechanisms which either employ very specific scope conditions, or
may not be relevant for the regions other than the European Union
(EU), or can be subsumed under the broader norm diffusion models.3
Table 8.1: Summary of the relationship between variables &
explanations

It is conjectured here that to the extent to which learning,
coalition-building, and external pressures cannot explain the filtering
of international policy initiatives in regard to HIV/AIDS, the focus on
social purpose an explanatory variable becomes analytically
warranted. I assert that the strength of domestic commitments to the
formulated social purpose (both among elites and wider audience) may
alter the theoretical predictions of policy transfer, otherwise having a
1
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Elkins 2004.
3
Some specific issues, such as the links between socialization and learning
mechanisms, are addressed n the following sections below
2
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strong explanatory logic of how external prescriptions of change and
innovation are adopted domestically. While I am not claiming that
social purpose is the single explanation of the variation in national
responses to the emerging infectious diseases, on balance it helps us
explain how the deep-seated political commitments shape public
policies.

EXPLANATION 1: LEARNING
A standard account of learning
How does national purpose factor into learning as an explanation of
policy transfer processes? It is hypothesized here that if social purpose
has no impact on learning, than norm-taking elites should consider all
available information and select the best case practices for domestic
adoption. If the benefits of international policy are indeed tangible,
selecting and implementing a ―rival‖ policy is the most straightforward
indicator of the failure of learning. If social purpose does impact
learning, then only a particular subset of the available practices will be
considered and implemented. This, however, does not mean that we
should strongly expect to see an observable deviation from the global
policy consensus. Rather, we should expect to trace how certain
components of common good filter what is available internationally.
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For instance, international policy prescriptions might conform to the
content of the social purpose and even amplify it.
In the learning explanation (sometimes called ―inspiration‖)
policy adoption occurs as a direct result of domestic elite buying into
the foreign norm simply by being exposed to it at the global arena, and
then realizing that an outside norm has significant benefits to improve
domestic public health. More specifically, domestic decision-makers
purposefully initiate the change in domestic policy inspired by a
measurable policy success in other countries, anticipated benefits in its
own country. These choices sometimes get mediated via the existing
epistemic/medical networks, providing and interpreting the necessary
technical (biomedical) information.4 In other words, domestic policymakers are ―inspired‖ by the outside-generated policies, prescription,
and norms and then proceed to implement this policy domestically. In
the best-case scenario, domestic elites screen and evaluate all the
available information.
This model is by and large should have been applicable to
Russia and South Africa—since the availability of more effective,
relatively non-toxic, fixed-dose combination of triple therapy proved
its effectiveness as a policy solution in many other countries. Neither
4
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Russia, nor South Africa have been isolated from the international area
and international health organizations during the time of the pandemic,
which rules out any major domestically-generated political roadblocks
to the policy transfer. In most cases, the technological expertise and
help, especially since the early 2000s, was readily available. There is
plenty of transnational communication about the appropriate
HIV/AIDS policies at various conferences, international organizations,
medical exchange civil society networking, and diplomatic venues, to
name a few. If necessary, argument, reasoning, persuasion,
information access, or even some material incentives may be
employed at these venues to convince leaders to move faster and more
decisively on the issue. Obviously, various social movements, nongovernmental organizations, representatives of the private sector and
several epistemic communities may purposefully facilitate the learning
about the global consensus on the HIV/AIDS policy and the
subsequent adoption of antiretrovirals.
In the learning model the adoption of an innovative foreign
norm is most of the time an advantage. Indeed, quickly adopting the
HIV/AIDS treatment can protecting countries from the potentially
devastating consequences of the pandemic, such as the demographic
collapse, spreading the disease among civil servants, teachers,
increasing number of orphans and so on. However, this model implies
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that the prospective technological success and biomedical information
should be difficult to misinterpret and perceive as irrelevant for
domestic circumstances. Thus, learning model does not account for the
possibilities of the competing interpretations of and contestation
around a given policy. On the contrary, it predicts relatively fast,
smooth, and almost ―natural‖ adoption of ARVs across the globe,
provided some basic level of state capacity. 5 In essence, the learning
model described here is very similar to the ―classical‘ definition of
policy diffusion, used by Everett Rogers‘ followers in sociology:
…policy innovations are communicated in the
international system and adopted voluntary by an
increasing number of countries over time. Diffusion
refers to an international spread of policy innovation
driven by information flows rather than hierarchical of
collective decision making within international
institutions… Diffusion becomes manifest only through
the accumulation of individual cases of imitation or
learning with respect to one and the same policy item. 6
In this context, an important qualification for the learning
model is that it links various deviations from the standard spreading

5
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Compare to Finnemore‘s (1998) notion of norm cascade.
Busch, Jorgens and Tews 2005: 149.
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policy to the particular timing when certain countries are up for
adopting the norm. As HIV/AIDS is an acute health care crisis, it can
be asserted that the sense of urgency prompts governments to act
decisively and adopt the international recommendations when the
infection rates skyrocket. In the context of the generalized epidemic a
country is more likely to adopt the international policy prescriptions as
there is no time to develop radically different health intervention
measures, while the policy solutions to combat HIV/AIDS are readily
available for decision-makers. In the context of contained epidemic
international guidelines can be discussed, debated, or simply ignored
for the time being. Some broader observations point out that quite
often the sense of emergency and the need to respond to pending
health crisis is associated with neither certain epidemiological
threshold, nor international projections of the global spread of
HIV/AIDS. Brazil and Uganda, for instance, took the decisive steps in
the late 1980s—early 1990s, when the very nature and implications of
the disease were hotly debated. Other countries have been rejecting the
state of national emergency, with infection rates estimated to come
close to 20 percent of population. In other words, adopting,
challenging, or ignoring international consensus is likely to be a
function of purposeful governmental choices, and not a function of
seroprevalence.
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As this dissertation was in progress, the HIV prevalence in
South Africa rapidly increased to 20—25% of population, while in
Russia even the most pessimistic estimates hardly exceeded 2 or 3% of
the country‘s citizens. If this conjecture were accurate, Pretoria should
have adopted and strictly observed the international consensus, while
the Kremlin still had time to mull over the set of appropriate
responses. Contrary to this expectation, South African Cabinet did not
follow international recommendations even though the entire country‘s
health collapse was looming large. Russian leaders pursued quite an
aggressive government intervention, even though they believed that
the epidemic would remain contained to vulnerable subpopulations.
Yet qualifying my cases as or simply being laggards will completely
overlook the political component in policy transfer.
Generally, one may argue that cross-national variations in
health policies, as well as ―deviation‖ from the global consensus grow
from the differences in the epidemiological conditions, the HIVinfection prevalence, and the quality of health care sector (structural
variables), rather than domestic policy environments, shaped by
particular conceptions of public good. In both countries the epidemic
of HIV/AIDS impacts different populations (mothers and orphans in
South Africa, drug users in Russia), and while growing in the
magnitude of its impact, contributes to the dissimilarity of
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epidemiologic situation. From the health policy standpoint, individual
countries should adjust their policies to the specific epidemiological
trajectories and characteristics. Policy variations might emerge, for
instance, in relation to at what point antiretroviral treatment should be
provided regarding the decrease of to the specific number of T-cells.
Thus the health crisis will be to be addressed somewhat differently. All
this does not mean, however, that the epidemic should be addressed in
terms other than public health crisis.

Learning in South Africa
While various elements of the global consensus on the HIV/AIDS
treatment were spreading rapidly among African countries, the
opportunities for learning were ample.7 As several policy experts
indicate, prior to 1998 Pretoria was following the international
prescriptions. More specifically, in the 1994 National AIDS Plan
(NAP) was dubbed the ideal policy drafting process and reflected the
majority (if not all) international prescriptions how to curb the
pandemic. Russel noted that in the early to mid-1990s Mbeki publicly
demonstrated a strong interest in spearheading the fight against AIDS,
proactively filling in Mandela‘s lack of leadership on the issue. His
7
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vision was compatible with UNAIDS program,‖ which impressed both
Peter Piot of the UNAIDS and AIDS activists.8 In other words, the
preconditions for learning about the global consensus to emerge after
1996 were all in place. There is no solid way to claim that the country
was simply a laggard case in norm diffusion as an alternative
explanation of learning failure.
In Chapter 6 I argued that South African understanding and
responding to the epidemic was shaped by elite‘s conception of
common good, known as African Renaissance. It made an entry in the
policy environment circa 1998, when the positive achievements of the
previous years in following the global consensus were reversed and the
process of ―unlearning‖ was triggered. The stress of the Mbeki‘s
presidency was placed on medicines developed in Africa for Africa,
which would both strongly reaffirm the capacity of the former
liberation movement to govern, and disprove the Western neo-colonial
stereotypes about the native incapacity to solve their local problems
using indigenous tools. In the early stage of his presidency it the
priority was given to domestic Virodene, in 2004—2006—to
alternative and nutritional medicines of various sorts, and after that the
focus was placed exclusively on the institutionalization of native
medicines. At the same time, the additional opportunities for learning
8
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remained ample: several domestic health agencies, mainstream
scientists, and many concerned members of the ANC fed enough
information to the country‘s political leadership through both formal
institutional channels and informal sources of personal and electronic
communication.9 The general approach to treatment simply dismissed
the results of domestic trials, which proved the efficiency of
antiretrovirals10 and confirmed the adverse effects of abusing
nutritional and vitamin supplements.
Having whipped up these attitudes, Mbeki officially yet
unwillingly withdrew from the HIV/AIDS debate. Pro-treatment
activists attributed this to their protest and litigation campaign;
Richard Calland attributed Mbeki‘s silence to the influence of his spindoctors and aids, more specifically Bheki Khumalo and Joel
Netshitenzhe 2006.11 This silence was prompted by anything but
genuine learning, as since 2002 Mbeki and his entourage tried to
promote the same views, this time in a more secretive manner. The
anonymous report ―Castro Hlongwane,‖ controversially regurgitating
the substandard views on the pandemic and drugs, was attributed to
Mbeki and Peter Mokaba and was traced to a computer in the
presidency. It challenged the very assertion of learning from the
9

Cherry in Cullinan and Thom 2009: 16—35.
D‘Adesky 2004: 183
11
Calland 2006: 191.
10

398

biomedical experts: ―that only scientists and medical doctors are
capable of understanding this medical condition‖ and epidemiology of
HIV and AIDS.12 Later on, Mbeki remained wishy-washy about his
biomedical views when his biographer Mark Gevisser confronted him
with more tough questions while preparing the President‘s biography.
Even after 2007, when the country launched the globally approved
large-scale national ARV program, Mbeki shied away from speaking
in public about the benefits of this treatment.13
More broadly, South African policy environment got primed to
overemphasize the importance of genetic medicinal resources and
traditional healing practices. In this context, the Cabinet and many
provincial health departments did not internalize the global consensus
either. In accordance with prescription to find African (indigenous)
solutions to the specific incidence of AIDS in Africa, in 2004—2008
Pretoria shifted focus to emphasize the indigenous knowledge and
traditional medical practices.14 According to the Health Minister,
African Traditional Medicines (ATMs), apart from their medicinal
values defined South Africans as people, values which some
mysterious forces attack: ―it is this heritage amongst others that we
are simply not going to give away purely because of the humiliation
12
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we get subjected to for the things we believe in.‖ 15 In general, both
public intellectuals and governmental agencies claimed that the
emphasis on the indigenous knowledge was counter-hegemonic and
anti-colonial in nature and thus affirming the values of African
Renaissance.16 Alternative treatments were pursued not as some nice
niche thing to show off the respect for the local cultural heritage, but
rather as a serious replacement of the ARVs. This downplayed the
gravity of the problem of epidemic and demedicalized it by putting it
in the context of poverty. As the solution to the epidemic, it fit in the
African Renaissance as an integral part of the resistance to the
(neo)colonial attitudes to undermine traditional medicine.17
Furthermore, in pursuing this policy, the Cabinet actively
looked for the alternative international health guidelines compatible
with the domestic policy choices on traditional healing. Despite the
WHO‘s and the World Banks‘s international guidelines concerning
preservation of traditional knowledge were by and large vague and
cautious, the South African government tried to elevate these
international guidelines to the prescriptive status, thus trying to justify
the switch from ARVs to ATMs and challenging the Western
15
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medicines with alternative treatment agenda. Pretoria also promoted
ATMs at the international arena. For instance, in 2007 the government
hosted the 3rd Ordinary Session of the Conference of African Ministers
of Health (CAMH3) in the framework of the African Union (AU)
decade on African traditional medicine.18 The Cabinet invented and
began observing African Traditional Medicine Day. The consequences
of not learning about the HIV and ARVs and obscuring the
connections between treatment and prevention were self-defeating in
as much as they made possible the rejection of the safe, efficient and
cost-effective mainstream measures to curb the epidemic. This
rejection resulted in a grim toll with attributable loss of 334,300 lives
with more than 2.2 million life-yeast lost according to the Journal of
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome.19

Learning in Russia
Unlike many other states, Russian government was never in overt
denial of the disease, even in the 1990s, when other numerous pressing
social and economic problems overwhelmed Russian politicians. 20 As
early as in 1990 Boris Yeltsin‘s pledged to donate a part of his
18
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autobiography‘s honorarium to combat HIV/AIDS. 21 The federal
legislature enacted the stream of AIDS-related laws and programs,
including the provision for the free access to treatment, even when the
official number of HIV-infected population was about 1000 people. At
the same time, the constantly growing epidemic (number of the
infected population was at least doubling each year starting the late
1990s) and the rapid increase of IV drug users did not translate in an
acute epidemiological awareness, let alone understanding HIV/AIDS
as the looming public health crisis. In general, prior to 2006 the
government has significantly underfunded the response, spending only
about five million dollars per year, had no streamlined national policy
how to respond to HIV/AIDS, and was vague on acknowledgement
what the spread of the disease actually meant for Russia‘s
development etc. Despite overwhelming financial shortcomings and
perhaps meager state capacities, the preconditions for learning were all
in place. There is no solid way to claim that the country was simply a
laggard case in norm diffusion as an alternative explanation of learning
failure.
In Chapter 6 I argued that Russian understanding and
responding to the epidemic was shaped by national purpose, a genuine
concern for the demographic future of the polity, and a public relation
21
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exploit. The stress on demographic decline was not random. Russian
political elite viewed it as the consequence of the state weakness in the
1990s, thus being at odds with the imperative of attaining the strong
state as the principal component of national purpose. While the
observers correctly praised Putin‘s acknowledgment of HIV/AIDS as a
serious threat to the country, the kind of actions Russian government
pursued was not based on the meticulous screening all the available
technical information, success stories and best cases, On the contrary,
the Kremlin‘s integrated those elements from the global consensus,
which seemed to be appropriate inasmuch as they were consistent with
Sovereign Democracy. As a result, Russia failed to learn in two crucial
respects.
First, technological efficiency and humanity of harm reduction
programs were unambiguously ruled out of the national policy
response as highly inappropriate and illegitimate. For instance, the
western recommendations about human rights standards and efficiency
in treating the vulnerable populations went against the grain of
Sovereign Democracy‘s anti-liberalism. In some radical formulations,
the harm reduction programs were rendered more dangerous than
HIV/AIDS itself, whose spread was attributed to the ―aggressive alien
ideology of the western origin.‖ Human rights advocates, with the
notable exception of the ―domesticated‖ ombudsman Vladimir Lukin,
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were seen as regimes‘ Other. The more repressive policy choices,
characteristic of China and some South-East Asian countries, on the
other hand, were presented—without much hard evidence or even
appropriate discussion—as great examples of a successful fight against
narcotics and the epidemic.22 In the narrow sense, stigmatization can
generically explain the difficulties of reaching out to the key risk
groups [from below] and having them to come forward to discuss the
desired ARV policies. Yet the national strategy should definitely
become more pro-active in providing treatment and legal framework,
as the focal point of public health prevention practices. This filtering
went against various international and domestic biomedical and
epidemiological experts‘ policy recommendations for the government
how to follow the global policy consensus on ARV.
Second, the Kremlin understood the looming epidemic of
HIV/AIDS as a secondary factor, rather than a public health crisis in
its own right—despite the mounting attention and expressive political
urgency attached to the topic globally. Dmitry Medvev in both of his
capacities as the President and previously the person responsible for
the improvement of Russians‘ well-being and health, never mentioned
HIV/AIDS as a national health crisis even once in all his multiple
newspaper interviews, on-line appearances and blogging, of which he
22
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proved to be so fond of. The special multisectoral Governmental
Committee, which in theory was put together to be in charge of
formulating the consolidated national strategy to respond to HIV/AIDS
as a broad public health crisis remained by and large defunct since its
inception. After several year of the initial recognition of AIDS as a
potential threat, it became obvious the Russian government did not
formulate an adequate strategy in accordance to the international
consensus on AIDS.
In general, the overemphasized stress on the law enforcement
agencies and return to very harsh, some would say truly repressive
measures, in many aspects of domestic political and economic affairs,
should be seen as a distinct contribution of Putin‘s administration,
legitimized and propagated by the Sovereign Democracy and
engrained in the newly found passion of the Russian political elite--its
disdain for liberalism and human rights. Scholars tend to explain the
resistance to decriminalization of IDU treatment strategies in general
and SNPs in particular in terms of the deeply enrooted legacies of the
soviet repressive policies.23 Indeed, in the late 1980s the legislation
adopted several severely restrictive and criminalizing measures, which
violated the principle of human rights (including resource-demanding
and ineffective mass involuntary testing, deportation of the foreigners
23
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with HIV, and so on). Yet the overemphasized stress on the law
enforcement was significantly punctured in the 1990s (for instance, by
Yeltsin‘s multiple reorganizations of the state security and intelligence
community). The Yeltsin-era ―quiet‖ on the epidemic, it can be
conjectured here, in case of the ability to dispose the requisite
resources was less likely to imply ignoring the human rights issues in
addressing the pandemic (there are some evidence of pro-active
legislation on this count, including voluntary testing, illegality to fire
infected workforce, etc).

EXPLANATION 2: COALITION-BUILDING
A standard account of coalition-building
How does national purpose factor into coalition-building as an
explanation of policy transfer processes? If social purpose does not
matter, then national elites are likely to utilize international norm in
order to broaden their support, or reach out to additional would-be
supporters, and cement the prospective support groups together. In
case if elite can capitalize on the constituents‘ negative attitude of the
norm, we should expect a consistent effort of providing various
resources (financial, logistical etc) to mobilize them into broader antinorm coalition. In case if the strong coalitions with a ―positive‖ take
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on the international norm are already formed, domestic elites are
expected to bandwagon them. If social purpose does matters, we
should expect domestic elites to stick to the localized interpretation of
the policy, and pursue the selective policy promotions even with the
danger of losing some political support. In other words, the value of
pursuing coalitions and partnerships is likely to be determined on the
basis whether or not sub-national groups share elite‘s commitment to a
certain conception of common good, rather than their generic utility in
reaching out to those constituents that do not support the contents of
social purpose in principle.
According to Jacoby, coalition-building is the most common
way how foreign norms and practices achieve domestic prominence. In
general, more or less powerful outside norm-givers achieve domestic
change by empowering, sponsoring, or simply encouraging existing
minority traditions, which become their allies in injecting international
norms in domestic contexts and building their general attractiveness.
Minority traditions are defined as ―domestic movements, parties, or
sub-sets of state officials who have pursued, but never achieved a
particular institutional solution to an important political problem.‖
This account focuses on how minority entrepreneurs can sway
otherwise recalcitrant governments in changing their policies. Even if
the government strongly opposes the proposed international policy for
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domestic adoption, if the minority tradition is gaining a momentum,
especially if backed up the powerful foreign actors, it is more likely to
give in to it.
Similarly, a number of constructivist scholars—especially
under the rubric of ―boomerang model‖—have discussed this kind of
international interactions, including a wide range of relationship
between norm-takers and norm-givers in terms of networks, social
movements, and transnational coalitions.24 Even if there are many
domestic norm entrepreneurs, the one with stronger international
endorsement, more effective organizational capacities and broader
popular appeal, is likely to get an advantage in the contestation.25 In
the context of multiple contending norm entrepreneurs, the
internationals become a factor helping minority traditions to get an
upper hand in the contestation around the principles of policy change.
Indeed, a potent transnational network is very important, as it can
significantly empower the domestic agents of change and put
significant pressures on state governments.26 Here the process of norm
diffusion commences with tactical concessions norm-takers
(governments) being made to entrepreneurs, which slowly turns into
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adopting a new norm. In this case, even if governments strongly reject
the instrumental utility and principled value of the incoming norm,
they still might adopt a policy in question for a number of any strategic
reasons. In reverse, the governments might side with domestic forces
opposing the global consensus, especially if society is split in its
reaction to the incoming policy. Ultimately, this explanation
underscores that it is the calculation of specific political gains, rather
than a technical value of the policy, that drives the policy transfer.
The caveat is that in examining some empirical cases of
coalition-building, the power of individual leaders is often deemed
pivotal, if not incredibly exceptional. Particular coalition-building
instances in the process of policy transfer may reflect leader‘s
principled beliefs, his/hers personal political tastes, ideological likes
and even some deeply engrained idiosyncratic convictions. Political
leaders might empower some marginal and radical domestic and
international actors to express, promote, and apply their substandard
[in my case biomedical] convictions in the country. Thus, some
deviations in anticipated course of how the process of coalitionbuilding occurs may be attributed to the leadership factor, making the
partnership choice seemingly contingent and singular. In the context of
this project, political leaders do not stand alone: they belong or even
spearhead domestic elites, which generate and propagate a certain
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conceptions of common good. Thus, political leaders as individuals are
expected to act on this conception to promote their self-efficacy and
self-esteem. In other words, powerful leaders should be analyzed in
conjunction with domestic level of analysis.

Coalition-building in South Africa
The relevant literatures suggested that instrumental coalition-building
around HIV/AIDS policies in South Africa was hardly possible. In the
context of post-apartheid state the conflict around AIDS was ―a battle
between certain state and non-state actors to define who has the right
to speak about AIDS, to determine the response to AIDS, and even to
define the problem itself.‖27 In other words, the governmental
strategy of coalition-building clearly was not driven by the anticipated
value of political gain.
Prior to Mbeki administration, the government purposefully
cooperated with major domestic health-related actors to formulate and
implement the appropriate responses to the epidemic. In the early
1990s, the National AIDS Coordinating Committee of South Africa
(NACOSA) developed a national AIDS strategy, bringing on board a
diverse group of consisting of NGOs, AIDS-service organizations
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(ASOs), government officials, business representatives, private sector,
political parties, individual AIDS activists, and trade unions. They all
played a major role in drafting the 1994 National AIDS Plan. 28 During
the Mbeki presidency, the broad pro-treatment coalition included
increasingly influential and diverse groups, such as the Treatment
Action Campaign (TAC, founded in 1998), The South African
National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO, an umbrella body of South
African NGOs consisting of provincial and sectoral affiliates,
operating since 1995), the Nelson Mandela Foundation, the Congress
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU, operating since 1985), the
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC, the
peak-level representative and consensus-seeking body, providing
negotiation arena for business, labor, government and domestic
community-level organizations).
In Chapter 6 I argued that South African understanding and
responding to the epidemic was shaped by the conception of common
good known as African Renaissance, while TAC spearheaded the
movement to bring Pretoria to compliance with the global consensus.
It is really puzzling that despite long-standing and increasingly
powerful and angry ―pro-treatment‖ coalition in South Africa
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combined with an obvious governmental oversensitivity to the
criticism of their HIV/AIDS policies, South African elites were
reticent of any links and relationships with TAC. The TAC‘s domestic
and international popularity, prominence, and legitimacy strongly
suggested the rapidly decreasing instrumentality of using the resistance
to the norm of ARVs in order to seek broader domestic coalition. By
2004 not building coalitions with AIDS activism was counterintuitive
given that such an alliance could have been instrumental in building up
[or at some later point restoring] governmental credibility in the
international arena.29
In essence, TAC was a domestic minority tradition, which in
the end was able to achieve its own programmatic goals. The newly
made international icon Zachie Achmat and other TAC‘s leaders
toured the United States to celebrate their victory and appeared in the
glamour magazines. Although the government made significant
tactical concessions, they signalled changes in neither what kind of
actions Pretoria considered appropriate, nor how government
evaluated the benefits of various domestic groups to ally with. Pretoria
remained very hostile to health activists pushing for the universal
access to ARVs, accusing them with disloyalty to South African
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transformation process.30 The independent AIDS dissident Andre
Brink (not to be confused with a prominent writer!), at some point
being on the payroll of the Rath Foundation, claimed that the
presidency secretly put him in charge of building an organizations
counterweight to TAC, which was supposed to express the dissident
viewpoint.31 Thus, Pretoria did not adopt the global consensus on the
ARV treatment politically as a resource to broaden its own support and
win its increasingly influential opposition.
Second, Pretoria directly supported domestic and international
health-related organizations, which revised or resisted the international
definition of epidemiology, despite their relative organizational
weakness in garnering popular support and financial liability. The
Cabinet empowered multiple domestic and international actors to
express their radicalized political views, as well as promote and apply
their substandard biomedical convictions in the country. The Cabinetsponsored strange alliance of the dissident Treatment Information
Group (TIG, Andre Brink), the vitamin-peddling Rath Foundation, the
Traditional Healers Organisation of South Africa (THO, Nhlavana
Maseko) with its stress on the native medicines, the South African
National Civic Organisation (SANCO, Mlungisi Hlongwane), the
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South Africa‘s National Association of People Living with HIV/AIDS
(NAPWA), and soon to become universally reviled Mbeki‘s
biographer and spin-doctor Robert Suresh Roberts, whom media
scorned as the permanently pouting Caribbean clown, aka Ron the
Con.32 This type of coalition-building lacked any obvious political
benefits and was by and large counterintuitive, as most of the
organizations named above either had been marginalized
internationally, or were simply very weak and needed the strong
support and sponsorship themselves. Giving these organizations both
direct and indirect support looked counterproductive and did not
conform to the political calculations to win uncommitted or broaden its
political base.
The government began to support alternatives to ARV
treatment, despite its decreasing benefits for garnering domestic and
international political support and the apparent lack of instrumentality
in coalition-building with traditional healers. Although the estimated
number of on the ground healers fell somewhere in 200,000 to
350,000, they had neither a strong organizational structure, nor
international support, nor consistent (permanent) and active clientele.33
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Although the official statistics claimed that up to 70 or 80% of South
Africans used the services of traditional healers, independent studies
projected the majority of South Africans to have a good understanding
of ARVs by 2005.34 On the other hand, it is true that even skepticallyminded reporters, which were highly uncomfortable with unscrupulous
people profiteering from the desperate people‘s hope to get cured from
AIDS, often were not ready to question muthi. Genetic medicinal
resources and healing practices were described as a legitimate part of
their culture, ―something that always been there, a familiar belief,‖ not
to be simply discarded.35 Wider audiences viewed ATMs and ARVs as
equal, and kept purchasing the expensive native medicines even after
the ARVs had been made free in the public sector.
While the tangible political benefits of resisting the norm of
treatment were far from obvious, the Cabinet kept sending mixed and
confusing messages to its constituents.36 Government decision to
allow the partial rollout of the ARVs in November 2003 it by and large
undermined the value of pursuing the closer alliance with traditional
healers. At the same time, traditional health organizations did not
overcome the differences in outlook on the value and appropriate
regulation of traditional medicines, bringing on organizational
34
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rivalries, personal skirmishes, and conflicting biomedical views. At
one point, the Department of Health became the major donor of
NAPWA, an organization boasting 90 branches with estimated
300,000 members (the numbers are highly questionable). 37 The
Cabinet remained NAPWA‘s donor, despite their lack of legitimacy
and coherent and inconsistent outlook on traditional versus western
biomedicines. 38
Third, South Africa reinvented itself as a global champion of
anti-colonialism. In this context, an optimal option would have been to
forge coalition with Brazil, India, and Thailand as they were rising as
the principal challengers to the pharmaceutical sector. These countries
would have been the natural ally for the South African government in
widening its international coalition legitimacy and prestige in the
Third World. At the same time, the government chose to play no active
role in the creation of the new generation of AIDS organizations.
Although the relevant literature acknowledges the South African
contribution to the foundation of UNGASS and GFATM, this
37
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contribution was very modest, especially comparing to the support
provided by other countries.39 The choice of not building any
international coalitions proactively was counterintuitive, as the
members of this coalition widely used the anti-colonialist discourse
and wished to curb the power of the Global North.40 However, joining
any of these global coalitions also implied to promote generics at the
expense of traditional medicines and to give full backing to the free
delivery of the antiretroviral in the public sector at the expense of
marketization. Obviously, Pretoria was not ready to makes these
choices.

Coalition-building in Russia
Russian government pursued two types of coalitions. The first one
with transnational nongovernmental actors, and the second one with
various Eastern European and Eurasian states. In both coalitions
Russia wanted to play a position of a leader, principal, rather than a
follower. In neither case, coalitions were pursued to widen the
Kremlin‘s support base or win the uncommitted. Rather, joining
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coalitions to combat HIV/AIDS helped the Kremlin to deploy its
vision of great power on a very practical level.
In 2003 the experts from the Center of Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) and the Brookings Institute specified the
desired components of partnership between the Kremlin and the civil
society. They called the Russian government to promote policies that
not just tolerate the existence of the non-governmental organizations,
but rather encourage its growth and robustness via giving generous tax
incentives, setting up training programs for NGOs‘ leaders, increasing
financial resources available to them, and, last but not least, creating
trust and predictability in the working relationships between state
officials and NGOs.41 These goals were extensive and ambitious, but
reasonably attainable given the palpable, but brittle, presence of the
civil society in Russia.
At the domestic arena, Russian approach to the coalitionbuilding with the nonstate actors was highly selective: the Kremlin
was willing to accept the civil society‘s role as a ―technical‖ provider
of AIDS-related services, while it was reluctant to engage civil society
as the independent advocacy and political actor. On the one hand,
Putin particularly endorsed a whole range of health NGOs,
strengthened their resolve and even contributed to the building of a
41
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large informal coalition, uniting European NGOs, the EU-sponsored
programs and domestic ―non-human rights‖ organizations.
Transatlantic Partners against AIDS (TPAA), one of the leading
transnational health advocacy organizations, boasted its connections
with the government and the Duma‘s deputies. This evidence is to a
certain degree consistent with the null hypothesis that elites may use
the global norm as a resource to widen a coalition for their political
support and win uncommitted. On the other hand, the Russian
government during Putin‘s presidency purposefully legislated to
obliterate the political and financial independence of many NGOs
through both severe bureaucratic restrictions and making
governmental sponsorship available to the approved domestic
recipients. In general, both sharp liberal critics of the Kremlin and its
conservative supporters acknowledge that the Kremlin‘s approach to
NGOs was definitely connected to the central tenets of Sovereign
Democracy The doctrine prescribed keeping the direct governmental
control over non-state actors involved in politics and advocacy,
preventing the foreign meddling in the domestic politics by curtaining
the foreign funding and sponsorship available to the domestic
recipients.
The Kremlin used the epidemic as a public relation exploit in
an attempt to aggrandize its efforts in response to the epidemic. The
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coverage of the issue-area was meant to be truly impressive The
informational company ―Be in touch with your health‖ was aired on
the national TV in all Russian regions, and supplemented with special
shows and ads, discussing the nature of the domestic epidemic. By
2009, the federal and regional TV channels televised the nine
educational videoclips more than 50 thousand times, while private
channel REN-TV aired 9 films about people living with HIV/AIDS
based on real characters.42 According to Ellen Mickiewicz, the statecontrolled TV channels to a large extent tended to characterize the
epidemic as an outside problem, which has been successfully dealt
with. In her study of the ordinary citizens‘ perception of the official
coverage of AIDS, ―Russians spoke of the state channels as reducing
real and necessary news about HIV/AIDS in Russia by blending it in
with HIV/AIDS as a global problem,‖ and ―alter what they know to be
true to give a false impression of security.‖ 43 Furthermore,
Mickiewicz‘s focus groups felt that the private coverage of the
epidemic was perceived as far more accurate and grave. Not
surprisingly, the compliance to the foreign norm, or even underscoring
the role of international organizations and nonstate sector was not part
of the domestic informational campaign.
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Thus, the Kremlin wanted to convey an image of successful
and unique struggle against AIDS among the global failure to deal
with the pandemic, which is consistent with its imagery of the great
power. At the global arena, the Kremlin tried to establish an extensive
and credible reputation as one of the key norm entrepreneurs in global
health and sought to be a leader in certain coalitions. As Judith Twigg
put it, ―A newly assertive Russia has been determined to reclaim its
position as both regional hegemon and global power. To this end,
Russia has been anxious to cast itself as part of the solution—rather
than part of the problem—when it comes to key issues of global social
and economic development.‖44
Since the early 2000, the Russian government maintained
normal connections with various international organizations, including
the World Bank, the Global Fund, UNAIDS, and the United Nations
specialized agencies. While the increase in cooperation with these
organizations was generally expected in the context of the growing
incidence of HIV infection, certain political choices looked somewhat
less conventional. The imagery of the restored great power status
required Russia to be a donor, not a recipient. Russia was willing to
part with much needed financial resources to buy its way into the
global club. In 2003 Russia rejected $150 million offered by the World
44

Twigg 2007: 10

421

Bank while recognizing that even Brazil—which was viewed as a
model response by the key medical professionals and bureaucrats—
was using its loans. Several years later, in February 2007 President
Putin committed $270 million to the Global Fund. Given the dismal
state of Russian health care in public sector, the quality of its response
to the health crisis, and the capacity to lead at the international arenas,
all these choice look counter-intuitive from the vantage point of
benefits.
There was definitely a strong agenda for the leadership and
coalition-building in the Central and Easter Europe and Central Asia.
Russia pursued a more assertive international role by sponsoring and
organizing several regional HIV/AIDS initiatives, reinventing its role
as a leader in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Starting
from 2006 Russia hosted three regional Eastern Europe and Central
Asia AIDS Conferences (EECAACs) on HIV/AIDS. These gatherings
most definitely were not designed to serve as policy arenas for
fostering international cooperation. Less sedately put, especially if
compared to such gatherings as International AIDS conferences, these
regional initiatives did not perform any meaningful political or
technical function. Russian action in the context of the G-8 Summit in
St. Petersburg attracted most international attention and received a
high approval. President Putin used Russia‘s presidency to elevate
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infectious diseases and global health as one the core priorities of the
summit. Beyond the G-8, Russia tried to take the position of the global
leader for the Health Leadership Forum (G-8 health ministerial
meetings), reaching out to China, India, Brazil, South Africa, and
Mexico.45
In contrast to this described gamut of activities, any
international action was avoided, when the Kremlin felt it would play
the role of the international follower. For instance, Russian
government could have chosen to embark on the global movement to
keep the pharmaceutical sector accountable and pursue closer alliances
with the developing world. Such a form of international action was
important for the strategic coalition-building to pursuing the parallel
importation from Brazil or India, and for the closer alliance with
transnational civil society to keep the issue visible on the global
agenda. Yet doing so would have implied that the status of great power
and domestic sustainability had not been achieved.

EXPLANATION 3: EXTERNAL PRESSURES
A standard account of external pressures
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How does social purpose factor in external influences as an
explanation of policy transfer processes? If national purpose does not
matter, then we should expect national elites to interact strategically
with external entrepreneurs of a certain international norm/policy
based on the calculation of costs and benefits. If the costs associated
with the resistance to the international policy are high, we should
expect domestic elites to comply with the international norm. If the
costs of non-compliance are low, we should expect the domestic elites
to resist international policy initiatives. In case if national purpose
does matter, we should expect a selective adaptation of external
demands filtered through national purpose, and selective resistance
even when external pressures are high and the costs of non-compliance
can be potentially detrimental for domestic elites.
The external pressures mechanism of norm diffusion portrays
policy transfers in terms of powerful external norm-givers being able
to displace domestic norms and policies by the international ones, even
against the strong domestic opposition to it. There is no doubt that in
some cases the outsiders become, to borrow a phrase, ―causal
behemoths,‖ unquestionably dominating what happens in the domestic
policy landscape and determine the process and outcomes of policy
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transfer.46 In this line of reasoning, the mounting external pressures
and incentives from outsiders lead to the substitution of previous
domestic practices.
Observers tend to attribute primacy in norm diffusion to the
powerful outside norm-givers, such as the World Bank, the United
States, and others as they provide much needed financial and logistical
support. Circa 2003 new generation of AIDS health organizations
started providing direct material incentives to comply with the
international consensus on antiretroviral policy by allocating generous
grants both to the governments and local ASOs to curb HIV/AIDS. In
countries, where domestic capacities are lacking altogether, we can
expect that the suppliers of the pharmaceutical products and the
international technical expertise to play an overwhelming role in
domestic HIV/AIDS politics. Recipient states are expected to be
invariably interested in financial influx and not particularly concerned
about challenging the external arrangements for the domestic
governance of HIV/AIDS. This proposition may be empirically correct
for some individual cases such as Zambia and Mozambique, whose
compliance with the global norms depended on the strong external
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presence and support, while implementation depended on some
domestic material factors.
The analytical power of this explanation, however, raises many
questions. First, it is unlikely that external pressures alone displace
local policies, especially in the absence of credible domestic norm
promoters, among others. Scholars constantly remind us that ―external
influences can almost never have any real purchase unless they are
joined together with domestic influences,‖47 or that assigning too much
value to the power of external pressures will bracket the domestic
politics altogether.48 For instance, some smaller countries like
Turkmenistan, Malawi, Swaziland, and Cuba were able to enact
domestic policies at odds with the rising global consensus (even
though it significantly exacerbated the epidemiological gravity of the
epidemic).49
Second, for the nations with relatively meager financial
capacities and infrastructure policy displacement is a function of
foreign pressures mediated by the resource exchange patterns. In this
context, the donor dependency might diminish domestic incentives to
muster a strong HIV/AIDS health care response in the public sector. In
47
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these cases we might expect to observe the compliance with the
external prescriptions, but actually not see it. In this light, it is not
surprising that many pro-treatment health activists start arguing against
the overreliance on the external financial and logistical help.

External pressures in South Africa
In essence, the South African Cabinet did not experience any real
external pressures—separate from the transnational pro-treatment
coalition‘s—as there are really no strong material sanctions for noncompliance with the international donors and health organizations.
Thus, the costs of non-compliance remained low (vague opprobrium,
bad image in mass media, and so on). In Chapter 6 I showed that South
African response to the epidemic was shaped by African Renaissance.
Following the African Renaissance‘s prescriptions, South
Africa showed variation to the externally prescribed models of curbing
HIV/AIDS. While the government picked up a fight against the WHO,
MDGs and UNGASS and tried to put GFATM under its own control
as it could have empower the Cabinet‘s ―AIDS-drug lobby‖ rivals, it
was more willing to accommodate the model of policy approach as
promoted PEPFAR. The simple explanation for this is that using
PEPFAR was able to alleviate governmental concern about
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disempowering the economy for the sake of delivery (marketization),
while the other models had some conditionality inbuilt in their
prescriptions, which went against the grain of the African Renaissance.
In 2000 the presidential spokesperson Mankahlana asserted
that the pharmaceutical sector misused information about the
pandemic, exaggerated the positive effects of antiretroviral medicines,
and benefited from the unmitigated scourge of AIDS. 50 Pretoria
intentionally pitched itself against not only against the international
and domestic ―AIDS-drug lobby,‖ but also against the WHO‘s and
UNGASS‘s recommendations and guidelines.51 According the reports
the country made no progress regarding various international
guidelines regarding the universality of treatment as a part of global
consensus on the HIV/AIDS. The Health Minister was either trying to
downplay the role of Millennium Development Goals reports, thus
clearly shying away from the globally articulated responsibilities.
According to the Resident Coordinator of UN SA country team, ―[t]he
first South African MDG Report was released in September [2005],
but the Government chose to make this a very low-key event.‖52
Second, Pretoria intentionally tried to resist the pressures of the
Global Fund in empowering the local AIDS Service Organizations
50

Mankahlana 2000
ITPC 2006: 40
52
RCAR 2005
51

428

essentially circumventing the government. Instead of simply
disbursing the money to the domestic AIDS service organizations on
the basis of their merit and prior performance, the Cabinet tried to
either control who gets international health-related grants, or seize
them to redistribute as it saw fit.53 In 2002, Mbeki attacked the Global
Fund for ―flouting its own rules by funding AIDS programs without
proper government approval.‖54 The biggest controversy arose when
Mbeki announced that the government would seize a grant targeted
specifically to the province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and add it to the
general South African grant. For more than a year, the government
stalled the influx of international resources, refused to sign the
agreements with GFATM in order to finalize the funds transfers.55 In
result, the South African grant portfolio went almost exclusively to the
country‘s Cabinet-level departments.56 The Cabinet‘s governing of
GFATM‘s Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM), led by Jacob
Zuma and Health Minister Dr. Manto Tshabalala-Msimang (MTM)
was entirely dedicated to this goal. 57 The Country Coordinating
Mechanism (CCM) was not supposed to be another controlling and
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distributive body, a layer between these levels. As late as in 2006 The
International Treatment Preparedness Coalition (ITPC) reported that
the GFATM CCM was not yet functioning [appropriately]. 58
On the other hand, in South Africa both governmental and
nongovernmental programs funded by PEPFAR were running quite
smoothly. PEPFAR worked with South African National Defence
Forces (SANDF), Department of Correctional Services (DCS), and
Department of Social Development (DSD), as well as
nongovernmental organizations, such as Nurturing Orphans and AIDS
for Humanity (NOAH), Hope Worldwide (HW), Society of Family
Health (SPH), Centre for the AIDS Program of Research in South
Africa (CAPRISA).59 Once the government received a generous
PEPFAR funding, it changed its strategy and decided to scale-up the
ARVs, seemingly giving in to the international pressures. This
funding, however, significantly mitigated the resource scarcity to
achieve the universality of treatment. Nicoli Nattrass argued that the
external finial inflows to South Africa had an adverse effect on public
sector, as they essentially had taken all the pressure off the national
Department of Health to use available domestic resources, to protect
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its private sector, and keep its public sector weak. In other words, the
availability of these resources alleviated neoliberal concerns of
diverting too much domestic resources predominantly to ARVs, which
is compatible with the marketization as the core component of the
national purpose. This means that the Cabinet government continued
and gave in to the international pressures very selectively as it saw fit.

External pressures in Russia
In a way similar to South Africa, Russia did not experience any
definitive external pressures as there were really no strong material
sanctions for non-compliance with the global consensus on ARVs. Yet
in Russia we would not expect external pressures to play a significant
part of norm transplantation in a broader sense. While external
pressures definitely occur, they might have played a limited role in
pushing the Kremlin into the partnership with the transnational AIDS
actors. According to Judith Twigg, ―the international community has
played a significant role in shaping the dynamic of Russia‘s response,
and its continued involvement—including a strong bilateral U.S.
presence—will remain an important determinant of Russia‘s
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success.‖60 Yet the role of international community had to be highly
qualified.
There is only some scant evidence concerning international
prescriptions and perhaps very limited pressures, regarding the
domestic distribution of international grant. the Ministry of Health
created the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CMM) to procure the
fourth round of grants from the GFATM. The CCM was not supposed
to be another controlling and distributive body on behalf of the
national governments, but rather a layer between these levels—directly
empowering domestic civil society sector on the grounds of the merit
of their proposals and prior performance on the ground. As the typical
critique goes, the Russian government did not grant the country‘s
CMM an independent political authority, but instead chose to control
the procurement of international resources to combat to HIV/AIDS,
and even highjacked some programs as it saw fit.61 More specifically,
the Global Fund-sponsored harm reduction programs were
geographically limited to 10 out of 86 Russia‘s regions, while the
consequences even in the covered regions became uncertain.62
Highjacking the Country Coordinating Mechanism (CMM) was
60
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stipulated by the sovereign democracy‘s clearly articulated imperative
not to allow the foreign control of the domestic civil society
implemented through the generous and unaccounted foreign financial
influx not controlled by the state authorities.
On the other hand, pursuing highly unique health policies can
be explained referring to the profound institutional legacies of the
communism, which under certain conditions could have been reentrenched again.63 Ambrosio argued that dealing with looming AIDS
crisis for Russia is a precondition to play a great-power role, which its
political elite started craving—as expressed in its national program for
the country. 64 However, before Russia started tackling the issue of
HIV/AIDS more assertively the soviet legacy of the country‘s selfperception as a great power had been notably uprooted. Thus, by no
means it should have over-determined the following ARV policies,
while keeping open a range of potential options and strategies for the
decision-makers in the 2000s. Russia‘s self-image as a great-power-one of the most notable and palpable components of the soviet legacy- did not fully disappear from the national policy environment after the
end of the Cold War. However, it did not manifest itself a relevant
factor in prompting Russian politicians to deal with looming AIDS
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See, for instance, Wallander 2006
Ambrosio 2006: 2
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crisis until it was re-legitimized as a component of a new national
purpose. In sum, it can be said that it was the new conception of
common good--Sovereign Democracy –which reintroduced these
legacies rather than mitigated them.

CONCLUSION
In this Chapter, I located social purpose as a potential intervening
variable in the context of relevant literatures. It also examines whether
or not social purpose as an intervening (and explanatory) variable is
robust to country-specific and individual-level explanations. The
principal caveat to any overarching cross-national argument about
policy transfer is that in the overwhelming majority of the developing
countries the state capacity and state efficiency is extremely limited. 65
This project focuses mostly on political choices that affect AIDS
policies even prior to the implementation stage. On the other hand,
problems that seem to be purely implementational might be inherently
linked with these prior political choices.
Indeed, in any country which lacks the requisite amount of
resources, is plagued with corruption, possesses insufficient technical

65

On the importance of building strong state institutions to fighting HIV/AIDS
effectively see, for instance, Fukuyama 2004.
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expertise and suffers from the shortages of professional doctors and
nurses, a deviation from the global consensus may simply be an
inability to implement the policy appropriately due to the weakness
and inefficiency of the available state institutions.66 Amy Patterson
summarizes these challenges. The state capacity might be undermined
by the interlocking phenomena of the incapacitating role of traditional
patriarchy in Africa, the dependence on international financial
resources, the lack of consistency in political and economic
commitments, the inability to design and implement long-term
treatment and prevention programs, and even the civil society
challenging states‘ authority. 67 This list can be easily expanded to
include regional and national factors. At the same time, state capacity
and efficiency are important, but not over-determining factors. Just
how simply having enough money to throw at a problem may not
mitigate its adverse impacts, strong political commitments in certain
cases may overpower the institutional deficiencies of the state, and
reallocate scare resources.68 In Russian case, for instance, the yearly
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Material argument can be deployed as an excuse for the poor governance and
policy performance: we do whatever they can to the best of the ability in the policy
environment plagued by the multiple constraints.
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For an excellent edited volume, examining the African HIV/AIDS politics from
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Westhuizen (2005), for instance, discusses in details the South African
government‘s largest acquisition of the conventional-weapons in the history of the
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delays in procuring and disbursing the antiretroviral treatment were
clearly a result of endemic corruption, lack of state capacity and
coordination among various segments of bureaucracy. Yet elite‘s
choice to uptake more social responsibilities in providing public
services (as a part of its conception of common good) definitely
contributed to the unintentional failure in the timely procurement and
disbursement of pharmaceutical products. In the following final
Chapter—Conclusion--I summarize my empirical and theoretical
results, focusing on the effects of social purpose on public policy. The
final note here concerns material capacities as an additional alternative
explanation.

country in the absence any direct military threat, while choosing to spend next to
nothing on the looming domestic pandemic (in 1999).
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION

Empirical analysis of data and evidence regarding the content of
national responses to HIV/AIDS crisis in Russia and South Africa
reveals the strong impact of social purpose. Social purpose becomes
causally relevant to the extent it underpins certain kinds of policy
actions and responses, which were not entailed to the same extent in
the absence of social purpose or prior to its emergence. Studying social
purpose is relevant not only to spell out the kinds of actions the ruling
elite considers appropriate, but also to ascertain the kinds of actions
domestic policy environment is likely to stimulate and sustain.
To examine the analytical purchase of social purpose this work
gauges its impact on the externally introduced policy
recommendations, guidelines, and advice. This move also helps to
keep social purpose as the explanatory variable separate from the
subsequent policy choices (dependent variable). Today
intergovernmental organizations and transnational professional
community play increasingly important roles in formulating
sophisticated policies, providing expertise, and assisting in service
delivery. In this context, international prescriptions become almost
universally recognized as instrumental to improve domestic policies,
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including public health. Yet under certain circumstances a strong
societal commitment to the particular conceptions of common good
might politicize international public policy, or even become hostile to
it. I am not claiming, of course, that social purpose can solely explain
the processes of policy transfer and the reasons why some issues get
politicized. Instead this dissertation maps out the empirical ways in
which social purpose does make a difference and summarizes its
effects theoretically.
My findings resonate with prior scholarship on HIV/AIDS
politics. For instance, they speak to Michael Bosia‘s analysis on the
neoliberal reform in France and its impact on the contestation around
the HIV/AIDS policies.1 In a series of academic articles, Bosia
documented how the change in the conception of common good (or,
―moral ambition‖ in his parlance) had an adverse impact on the spread
of AIDS through the blood supply, which resulted in the bitter
contention around the principles of public health. The framework
adopted in this dissertation conceptualizes French transition from an
exceeding government presence to neoliberalism and austerity as a
clear case of the elite‘s attempt to redefine, or alter the public accepted
conception of common good. Cutting social spending, looking out for
the profitable blood products ensued. Activists understood an adverse
1

Bosia 2005; Bosia 2006.
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impact on the blood supply and thus the spread of AIDS in connection
with the ethical mission of the Republic. Since the domestic policy
environment was not shaped or significantly influenced by neoliberal
concerns, social contestation among the participants in public health
followed. Thus, the analysis of socially accepted conceptions of
common good might help find and explain patterns in contestation
around AIDS politics well beyond Russia and South Africa.
At the same time, this dissertation advances the current study
of deep-seated political determinants of public policy, that is, what
guides the politics of policymaking. Using social purpose I can explain
specific types of policy actions governments pursue in order to curb
AIDS. If racial/ethnic boundaries, according to Evan Lieberman, help
explain the aggressiveness and quickness of the response to the
epidemic, the attention to social purpose help us explain governmental
politics of policymaking and the nature of societal contention around it
well beyond this initial timeframe. More generally, bringing social
purpose to the analysis of AIDS complements the abundant
anthropological and sociological approaches to the pandemic.2

2

For the review of scholarly research on AIDS in Africa, see Schoepf 2010; foran
array of sociological and anthropological approaches, see Ndinga-Muvumba and
Pharoah 2008.
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BRINGING SOCIAL PURPOSE INTO EFFECT
How does social purpose emerge and how does it become socially
acceptable? In the previous chapters I traced in details how Russian
and South African political elites constructed and legitimized their
conceptions of common good, which were respectively labeled
―Sovereign Democracy‖ and ―African Renaissance.‖ In this part, my
dissertation expanded traditional academic focus placed on
subnational, smaller identity entrepreneurs and social movements as
the agents of change to the exploration of elite‘s commitment to a
certain conception of common good, which is legitimized via the
perception that country‘s political sustainability depends on providing
it. When successful, intentional and systematic efforts to present
national identities as vital for the existence and survival of the state as
an autonomous political organization in the context of one-party
dominance implied their public acceptance. Thus, both counties met
criteria under which the role of national purpose was expected to
matter most.
This dissertation examined the empirical content of the social
purposes in relation to its political distinctiveness, economic
empowerment, and the imagery of its desired systemic position. This
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dissertation also ranked social purpose in two countries, delineating
between:
1) commitments (more narrow examination of domestic elites linking
their self-efficacy and self-esteem to some specific conceptions of
common good);
2) the extent to which the influence on policy environment (a broader
examination of the kinds of action embedded by elites in a given
political context and considered appropriate and legitimate); and
3) the extent to which the articulated substantive components of a
given social purpose are reflected at the broader level of collective
articulations, mostly popular culture.
The concept of Sovereign Democracy encapsulates three
important themes: the ultimate political value of a strong state power
(vlast, gosudarstvennost) with a special stress on its social
responsibility and economic delivery in the context of state-led
economy, and the necessity to reassert and actively exercise Russia‘s
great power status in global politics. Not only these particular themes
(strong state, state-led economy, and great power complex) clearly
stand out as three most important components in the Russian political
discourse, but they were turned into prescriptions how to protect the
country as an autonomous political organization. An integral part of
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Sovereign Democracy--the discourse of the ―wild 1990s‖--pulled
together various collective articulations together in order to appeal to
broad audiences. The chief proponents of the Sovereign Democracy
pitched themselves against the liberals (the Other), who allegedly
strove to dismember the state, absolve it from any economic
obligations for its citizens, and ―put Russia back on her knees.‖ Except
for its liberal critics, Sovereign Democracy received by and large
positive response in Russian society.
In South Africa, ―African Renaissance‖ at first was received
with criticism and confusion. Some outside observers not involved into
its conceptual development, beset African Renaissance as ―the new
ideology of self-deception, the refusal to acknowledge the current
realities that parameter even our own political space.‖3 This
assessment is too tough and does not give African Renaissance a full
justice. Yet similarly critical or pessimistic kinds of responses for a
while seemed to be pervasive in South Africa. It implied that many in
the country were simply not buying into the notion. Combined with
the limited ability of Mbekiites to influence policy environment,
including press, it implied a significant limitation in deploying the
African Renaissance in society. However, from reading the canonic
texts and supporting publications, three themes stand out very clearly.
3

Mandaza 2001: 137
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African Renaissance prescribed to find and utilize only the local
solutions for local problems (indigenousness), to promote the
economic empowerment of South Africans based on boosting the
private sector and relying on market economy strategies rather than
governmental delivery and redistribution (marketization), and to claim
a moral continental—and perhaps global—leadership (ubuntu). Chief
proponents of African Renaissance pitched themselves against Afropessimists and neo-colonialists, all scheming to keep South Africa
subjugated to the West and denying the country its subjectivity.
Besides some casual interest in tracing domestic debates about
elite, nation, and their purposes, the analytical value of social purpose
might be challenged. To keep separate social purpose as the
explanatory variable with the subsequent policy choices (dependent
variable) I examined the impact of social purpose on external policy
initiatives. In the previous chapters, I broke down the broad notion of
social purpose into several distinct graspable components.
Subsequently, I demonstrated how and why each specific component
of social purpose affected certain indicators of health policy response
(See also Table 1.4 in Introduction). In the following two sections I
briefly summarize the causal impact of social purpose on public
policies.
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THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PURPOSE ON PUBLIC POLICY
What kind of effects does social purpose have on public policy? The
provision of the antiretroviral treatment is a fundamental obligation
domestic elites should carry out in order to ensure the physical
survival of their polities. Very few politicians would deny that having
a healthy domestic population underpins economic development,
human and national security. As the HIV/AIDS policy hinges on the
technological solution (the availability of treatment) it is reasonable to
expect its relatively smooth and comprehensive diffusion. Yet even
purely technical choices that unconditionally follow international
prescriptions may challenge domestic legitimacy and sovereignty,
accountability and influence, thus might become unacceptable for
domestic policy-makers.4 Thus, in some circumstances adopting
international prescriptions could trigger a highly politicized reaction. I
argue that such a reaction is linked to the deployment of social
purpose. This dissertation asserts that social purpose informs the kinds
of actions the ruling elite considers appropriate, and helps ascertaining
how domestic policy environment interacts with international AIDS
initiatives.

4
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In other words, national purpose made possible a range of potential
policy responses, which otherwise would have been either less viable,
or not pursued as a core components of national responses to
HIV/AIDS. For instance, the indigenous turn in South African policy
environment as a part of elite-driven conception of common good
(African Renaissance) legitimized their wider use and aimed to
institutionalize governance of native medicines, or African traditional
healing practices. Otherwise, this kind of actions would have been on
the margins of the national policy response, rather than in its center.
Similarly, in Russia the harsh restrictions of the harm-reduction
approach, syringe and needle exchange programs (SNP) and medically
assisted therapy (MAT), as well as persecution of its promoters,
became possible as a result of as inhibiting liberal values in the context
of domestic policy environment dominated by the value of strong state
(Sovereign Democracy).
My findings indicate that the effects of deploying social
purpose are observable in all three dimensions of HIV/AIDS policy
(dependent variable). Policy-makers evaluate the benefits of
international policy initiatives from the vantage point of their
commitment to a certain conception of common good. This ―sorting
through‖ impacts on defining the guidelines of the provision of a
particular public good (treatment), which populations should benefit or
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be excluded from the consumption of public good (universality of
access), and who gets to participate in shaping public health policy
(partnership). All this does not mean that governments either stop
providing at least some rudimentary services in regard to HIV/AIDS,
or fully reject and deviate from the global consensus. While some
observable variations are very exotic and eye-grabbing, others are
more subtle, the impact of social purpose is quite palpable. I delineate
between five main effects of social purpose in public health policy.
The first effect of social purpose stems from the fact that the
uncurbed epidemic is a direct challenge to the ontological security of a
state a functioning political organization. This implies that elites are
likely to frame and respond to the epidemic as a threat to their
conception of common good. The nature of HIV/AIDS threat in the
global arena is defined as a massive public health crisis. Of course,
Russia responded to AIDS as a health crisis. Yet this response was in
large part a reaction to the perceived weakening of the state. For
Russia the threat of HIV/AIDS implied the weakening of the state
mediated by the looming demographic crisis and the growing
consumption of narcotic substances. For South Africa the threat of
HIV/AIDS implied a challenge to its elite commitment to
distinctiveness. Since South African elites wanted to uphold the
uniqueness of the country, they became less willing to use multiple
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international recommendations and more willing to give support to the
alternative and traditional medicines as either a full substitute, or an
addition to the western biomedical products.
The second effect of social purpose is related to the developed
conceptions of how much (if any) common good should be provided.
Thus the ideally non-exclusive and non-rivalrous provision of public
goods might be challenged by the considerations which populations
should be protected in the first hand, who should benefit or be
excluded from the consumption of public good and why.
In general, Russian government did not question the necessity
of the universality of access and consistently worked to scale up the
treatment access among general populations. Once the nature of threat
was formulated, Russian government committed to a massive domestic
procurement and disbursement of the life-saving medicines. At the
same time, the shortages and yearly scandals about the effective and
uninterrupted provision of the antiretroviral treatment was better
explained by other factor, including state efficiency, pervasive
corruption, lack of coordination etc. In South Africa, the Cabinet clung
to the idea that spending should be limited and thus was reluctant to
provide it as too expensive. The alleged toxicity and unsafeness of the
international pharmaceutically products added to the reluctance to
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ensure the universal access to treatment. The South African
government was resolute to use complementary micronutrients and
nutritional supplements for prevention of the development of
opportunistic diseases. As a result, both Pretoria and provincial health
officials consistently stalled the national roll-out programs on the
ground and tried to block the universality of access to treatment in
principle.
The third effect of social purpose stems from the fact that
conception of common good is pinned on the understanding of who
the contending political actors are. Thus, it helps define which actors
and on what terms get to participate in shaping the policy as
governmental partners. Elites are likely either to exclude those actors
which embrace an alternative conception of common good, or enter
only highly contingent and unstable partnership relations with them.
The Kremlin generally overemphasized the role of the
government in providing services to the population single-handedly,
without any help of private sector or nonstate organizations.
Government shied away from any meaningful engagement of the
private sector, and forcefully imposed strict legal boundaries under
what conditions non-governmental organizations can participate in
curbing the epidemic. In Russian political imagery neither private
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sector, nor nonstate sector were perceived as trustworthy allies: the
former was at odds with the goals of economic development and the
latter was susceptible to embrace the liberal conception human rights.
In South Africa, the Cabinet believed that civil society sector was
tainted by the latter‘s role in an unconditional support of international
(read Western) policy initiatives as related to treatment. The tacit
partnership of November 2003 was soon broken by the government.
As a result, the Cabinet preferred to forge connection with
organizations advocating alternative and complementary treatment,
including a counter-epistemic community of health dissidents, strongly
questioning connections between HIV and AIDS. The government
seemed to use selectively partnership with the ―mainstream‖
international organizations only when they were instrumental in
alleviating the burden of the public sector and thus did not impinge on
the conception of common good.
The fourth effect of social purpose is related to the extent to
which elites are successful in making their conception of common
good legitimate among wider audiences, or the whole nation. If social
purpose becomes truly nationally legitimate, it is likely make policy
choices intersubjectively shared, or simply undoubted. On the other
hand, disagreements about the legitimacy or content of common good
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are likely to prompt societal clashes around the desired principles of
public policy.
At minimum, elite‘s commitment to act on a particular iteration
of social purpose might be supported by pure enforcement. Their
success, especially if matched by the broader level of public
articulation as expressed in the means of popular culture, strongly
implies a public acceptance of the proposed policy responses how to
deal with health crises. At maximum, domestic policy environment
significantly shaped by social purpose can simultaneously empower
various elite-friendly groups, and disempower various
nongovernmental organizations, civil society groups, and social
movements with the set of demands conflicting and inconsistent with
the official policy responses. In this context, alternative behavioral
choices might be advocated either moderately, or not observable all.
Overall, the strength and limits of political mobilization in given
societies is likely to be shaped by the extent to which alternative
behavioral choices become either delegitimized, or simply not
considered as viable in a given domestic policy environment. Societal
disagreements might stem from elites‘ failure to influence domestic
policy environment.
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Since Mbeki was never fully able to dominate domestic policy
environment, civil society sector was able to advocate and convince
many that alternative policy choices were not only practical, but more
humane and morally superior. Putin and his entourage were much
more successful in influencing domestic policy environment. As a
result, the official policy responses in regard to HIV/AIDS received
much less criticism and precluded a broad mobilization of the groups
with conflicting demands in regard to its health policy. Thus, many
observers from the non-governmental sector, including the
representatives of Transnational Alliance against AIDS (TPAA),
repeatedly gave an overall positive evaluation of the Russian response
to the pandemic. In stark contrast, the majority of South African AIDS
initiative continuously received very bad press.
The fifth effect of social purpose is that it prompts a relatively
coherent and elaborate policy response, which pulls together previous
uncommitted domestic health policy initiatives and approaches.
Because HIV/AIDS has many implications, in general it is likely that
domestic policy responses will not have a common denominator in the
absence of strong commitment to a single conception of public good.
As many policy experts indicate, for the most part of the period
following the democratic transitions, Pretoria was following the
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mainstream international policy initiatives. This portrayal glosses over
the fact that the HIV/AIDS policy in the 1990s was far from coherent
and contained somewhat conflicting trends. For instance, the 1994
National AIDS Plan (NAP) reflected the majority of international
prescriptions how to curb the pandemic, the drafting process included
all the relevant stakeholders and was dubbed ―ideal.‖ At the same
time, this period was punctuated by series of grave setbacks: the first
democratically elected President Nelson Mandela did not exercise any
leadership on the issue, the scarce funds were allocated towards very
dubious projects (infamous play Sarafina II, or developing a domestic
substitute to AZT), and so on. Since Mbeki took power, the
government not only publicly demonstrated a strong interest in
spearheading the fight against AIDS, but also began to tackle the issue
exclusively in terms of local socioeconomic problem requiring a set of
unique solutions.
Somewhat similar dynamic characterized the situation with
HIV/AIDS policy in Russia. Not only in the 1990s, when the rate of
the epidemic was low, but even during the years when the infection
rates grew almost exponentially (1999—2006), Russian awareness of
the pandemic and seeming willingness to deal with it remained low.
Yet this inaction did not mean that the government did not learn or
adopt some international recommendations. For instance, the notion of
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the universality of treatment was reflected in several federal laws. In
2006 President Vladimir Putin quickly put the issue of HIV/AIDS high
on the federal political agenda and demonstrated his government‘s
undeniable commitment to deal with the epidemic. Thus, in the
absence of the coherent and consolidated social purpose, different
bureaucratic agencies are expected to pursue their narrowly defined
tasks, not implying any wider social goals.

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL PURPOSE ON POLICY TRANSFER
What kind of effects does social purpose have on policy transfer
mechanisms? To make more specific theoretical claims about the
effects of social purpose on policy responses and fit them in the
relevant literatures, this dissertation locates social purpose in the three
causal mechanisms of policy transfer (see Chapter 8). I do not claim,
of course, that learning, coalition-building and external pressures
become less relevant as causal explanations. Rather, I assert that the
strength and consistency in political elites‘ commitment to the
formulated social purpose may sharpen the theoretical predictions
based on policy transfer mechanisms.
In terms of learning, governments may learn about and adopt
different policies for different reasons and at different speed rates. So
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much is well known. This dissertation generally argues that domestic
decision-makers at the top of political hierarchy and in more modest
policy positions may learn via sorting the core questions of public
policy through the broader set of political obligations they explicitly
commit to. When given international answers how to respond to the
HIV/AIDS crisis, elites are likely to ―filter‖ them to select the
responses most similar to the kind of choices informed by their
conception of common good. Put differently, elites for sure learn about
the content and potential applicability of international approaches. Yet
they do not choose to adopt them without qualifications. Social
purpose is likely to define what kinds of actions will inspire elites to
take action. All this entails a profound impact on many specific
indicators of domestic HIV/AIDS policy.
In both cases, this early policy discrepancy did not
predetermine what political elites are likely to learn and why, the
opportunities for either the wholesale or partial adoption of the
international consensus remained wide left wide open. However, with
the advent of social purpose, elites chose to act in accordance to its
contents and discredit the kinds of actions elites consider
inappropriate. Thus, governments in both countries were not simply
inspired by all the best cases from an externally available pool of
recommendations and best cases. All this gave critical observers the
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solid ground to indicate Russia‘s unwillingness to ―draw on the
successful experiences of many countries around the world that have
met this challenge to ensure the availability of treatment in a manner
that is fair, efficient, and sustainable.‖5
Coalition-building perspective typically gives us a strategic
view of policy transfer: governments may adopt or challenge the
policy in order to broaden their support, or reach out to additional
would-be supporters, and cement the prospective support groups
together. When governed by legitimate social purpose, governmental
choices in policy coalitions are not motivated by the desire to expand
domestic and international political support. In fact, building coalitions
with their opponents presents elites with an additional challenge to
their legitimacy, sense of self-efficacy and esteem. Rather, coalitionbuilding is likely to be conditional on whether or not these coalitions
―fit‖ in and can maximize governmental delivery of the common good.
In this context, it becomes clear why South African Cabinet
remained reticent of any links and relationships with increasingly
powerful ―pro-treatment‖ coalition, without resorting to an individuallevel explanation. Despite the expected value of improving its
international reputation, South African elites‘ commitment to its
conception of common good collided with those actors, which
5
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determined to bring Pretoria to compliance with the global consensus
on the basis of a different conception of common good. Russian
government was aggressive in regard to domestic civil society sector,
especially those organizations actively engaged in advocacy and
protest. Yet the Kremlin accepted the nongovernmental organizations
as somewhat subordinate actors inasmuch as their activity and service
did not impinge on the principles of Sovereign Democracy. In this
context, my research explained limited and conditional partnership
with the groups committed to the different conception of common
good was possible.
In terms of external pressures, or substitution, Jacoby notes that
it ―occurs when external actors attempt to promote and execute
specific reforms on their own… when outsiders intervene directly,
without active insider support, to push a reform they favor.‖ 6 It is
clear, however, that international HIV/AIDS policy initiatives are not
likely to be meaningfully and uniformly enforced by international
actors across the globe. Thus, the wholesale adoption (or the radical
norm displacement, to use constructivist parlance) is not likely to be
observed. Elites can certainly calculate both benefits of conforming to
the external influences and potential costs of challenging them. This
means that elites will adopt certain international policy
6

Jacoby 2006: 630
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recommendations (for instance, in the context of issue-linkage), or
back down in case if the deviation from the global baseline causes an
international opprobrium. Yet elites are less likely to fall for external
pressures policies if this external pressure is challenging their
conception of common good.
It can be reasoned that the sufficient material capacities are
likely to be translated into independent health policies challenging the
global consensus. Although both countries are expected to be sensitive
to the external recommendations and assistance both Russia and South
Africa chose to act as international leaders in response to HIV/AIDS.
Russia and South Africa both attempted to promote specific policy
choices in response to HIV/AIDS on their own, thus pitching
themselves as pro-active policy international entrepreneurs. The
Kremlin wanted to assert itself as a regional rule giver and sponsor.
Pretoria in a similar, but more exotic ways, tried to give international
publicity and empower traditional healing movement, after its
experiment with counter-epistemic community of health dissidents had
collapsed.

EMPIRICAL SUMMARY OF HIV/AIDS POLICIES
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In Chapter 2 I documented how international medical community,
intergovernmental organizations, international financial organizations,
specialized health agencies and AIDS advocacy and service
organizations came to a shared understanding about the best measures
to fight HIV/AIDS. At first, the efforts to promote this understanding
globally were plagued at the international level with such detrimental
problems as the necessity to conduct the permanent fundraising
campaigns, donor fatigue in the developed states, constant squabble
about the appropriate amount of donations as related to the country‘s
GDP, preference for bilateral funding versus multilateral programs,
uncoordinated effort in suggesting health policy guidelines, erratic
supply of very expensive and relatively ineffective drugs, and the
inability of various international actors to overcome their parochial
political goals. However, around 1996 the majority of health-related
global actors finally agreed what the HIV/AIDS treatment policy
should be like and started actively promoting this understanding. This
became possible due to the combined effects of the biomedical
technological breakthrough, steadily decreasing prices of
antiretrovirals, and the simplification of treatment regimen. WHO,
UNAIDS, UNGASS and other influential international actors
combined their efforts to promote this vision of the desirable response
to the threat of HIV/AIDS.
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In the nutshell, the global consensus on the HIV/AIDS
treatment comprises of three identifiable components. First, rolling out
the approved antiretroviral treatment is a core policy prescription.
AIDS therapy shifts what used to be a terminal disease to a chronic
health condition and is absolutely indispensable for the dramatic
improvement of patients‘ health and prolonging their lives as
productive members of society. Questioning the biomedical consensus
of ARVs (and HIV and AIDS hypothesis), and/or enforcing the
substandard protocol at the expense of treatment constitute a
significant deviation from the standardized policy prescription.
Second, the universality of access to treatment is an additional policy
prescription intended to ensure access to ARVs to all the infected
population. Denying the universality of treatment and excluding
principal vulnerable populations will make the containment of the
disease more difficult, if not outright impossible. Third, partnership
with relevant stakeholders is helpful in shaping domestic policy
responses to specific conditions on the ground. Other potential benefits
include diversifying services, improving outreach, and simply
psychologically supporting patients and vulnerable groups. Restraining
partnerships and excluding relevant stakeholders might be conducive
to massive policy failures and create an environment, in which health
issues might not get enough attention.
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In regard to the first core component of HIV/AIDS policy,
Russia subsumed the issues of HIV/AIDS under the looming
demographic crisis and generally linked it to the growing consumption
of narcotic substances, rather than addressing the epidemic as a public
health crisis in its own right (Indicator 1a). The standardized protocol
(in terms of what line of products should be purchased reflecting
Russian state of epidemic) was often breached, despite the broad
acknowledgement of the life-saving role of the ARVs. The consistent
supply of the pharmaceuticals to the patients almost every year was
punctuated by month-long delays (Indicator 1b). Although neither the
Kremlin, nor the public health officials overtly questioned the
importance of generic medicines for the check on prices and increase
of coverage, the whole issue was downplayed in favor of developing
and import-substitution pharmaceutical industry (Indicator 1c).
In the context of the Russian epidemic the most vulnerable
group was the intravenous drug users (IDUs), which in the 2000s
became the principal driver of spreading the epidemic into the
generalized population. The vulnerable populations definitely were
disadvantaged, as the federal legal provisions stimulated
criminalization of IDUs and put this group at the mercy of the lowerlevel bureaucrats and officials from the so-called power ministries
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(Indicator 2a). The government accepted the necessity of the
universality of access to treatment and consistently worked to scale up
the treatment access as evident in massive financial commitments to
procure these medicines (Indicator 2b). At the same time, many highly
visible representatives of Russian political elite and public health
officials aggressively advocated very narrow prevention strategies,
confined to abstinence, family values, and health lifestyle.
Simultaneously, such legitimate prevention strategies as the substitute
treatment and syringe exchange was by and large excluded from the
preferred measures in protecting population‘s health (Indicator 2c).
The Kremlin generally overemphasized the role of the
government in curbing HIV/AIDS and intentionally downplayed the
significance and desirability of partnership with other sectors. There is
strong evidence to suggest that the National Priority Projects—
framework of disbursing resources and transforming the health care
sector—was designed to fend off the potential role civil society and
private sector could have played in domestic health policies. In the
context of the expansion of the public sector and massive financial
inflows into health care projects, it shied away from any meaningful
engagement of the private sector (Indicator 3a), and forcefully
imposed strict legal boundaries under what conditions non461

governmental organizations can participate in curbing the epidemic
(Indicator 3b). At the same time, Russia embarked on and even
initiated a number of international AIDS initiatives, which are
typically seen as commendable from the vantage point of international
health community (Indicator 3c).
South Africa elites questioned the sameness of epidemiological
trajectory of the disease in South Africa and the rest of the world. Elite
framed the domestic epidemic as a local developmental problem in
opposition to the lifestyle issues and the massive consumption of
various toxic drugs, including the antiretroviral medications, in the
West (Indicator 1a). As an extension of this reasoning, political elites
worked to revive and institutionalize the alternative/indigenous
medicines as either a full substitute to the ―toxic AZT,‖ or an addition
to the western biomedical products in general (Indicator 1b). In this
context, Pretoria for a while was not quite concerned about the rapid
importation and domestic disbursement of generic pharmaceutical
products; in certain cases even attempting to prosecute the smugglers
of generics (Indicator 1c).
In South African epidemiological conditions the most
vulnerable group was mothers carrying the virus giving birth to
children. Despite the decreasing prices and increasing efficiency and
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safety of the available drugs, for a while the Cabinet was reluctant to
offer mother to child prevention transmission program as too
expensive and pharmaceutically unsafe (Indicator 2a). To keep the
expenditures in the public sector as minimal as possible to prevent the
undesired overspending, both Pretoria and provincial health officials
consistently stalled the national roll-out programs on the ground and
tried to block the universality of access to treatment in principle
(Indicator 2b). The South African government was resolute to use
complementary micronutrients and nutritional supplements for
prevention of the development of opportunistic diseases (Indicator 2c).
The critical evidence suggests that Pretoria chose to protect the
relatively successful private sector and did not employ it to improve
the dismal health care conditions in the public sector (Indicator 3a).
The prospects of partnership with civil society sector were tainted by
the latter‘s support of the western biomedical products. As a result, the
Cabinet preferred to forge connection with organizations advocating
alternative and complementary treatment (Indicator 3b). Finally,
Pretoria legitimized a counter-epistemic community of health
dissidents and worked to make traditional healers to be recognized
internationally. The government seemed to accept partnership with the
international organizations, only when their financial assistance
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alleviated the burden of the public sector, which was consistent with
the emphasis on slashing the spending (Indicator 3c).

FEEDBACK LOOPS AND IMPLICATIONS
The findings of this dissertation strongly suggested that social purpose
can filter outside norms, guidelines, and policy initiatives. It also
confirmed that both countries of my analysis politicized the epidemic,
often with adverse consequences for public health. It is reasonable to
believe that in the long term domestic social purpose can be
profoundly affected by the public policy outcomes it helped generate.
Studying the feedback loops can be very informative in terms of the
exogenous sources of social purpose change, yet this objective
definitely goes beyond the scope of this research project. In this
section I venture to offer only some cursory remarks.
Overall, in the longer term, given the visible (positive or
adverse) result of the implemented policy, national purpose may be
profoundly affected by the feedback effects challenged and
transformed if the policy turned out to have negative consequences, or
reinforced if the results are positive. The next step in the research is to
extend my dissertation work investigating to what extent, when, how
and why does the success or failure to adopt international policy
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prescriptions trigger a feedback effect on social purpose. In other
words, it would be helpful to probe the conditions under which the
success or failure to adopt international policy prescriptions triggers
changes in the content of national identities and contestation around
them.
South African part of the story is more or less straightforward.
President Thabo Mbeki‘s HIV/AIDS policies definitely contributed to
the discrediting of the African Renaissance. In Russian case, the
adverse effects of repressive measures, and multiple inefficiencies did
not generate a massive retaliation against Sovereign Democracy. New
President Dmitri Medvedev offered a new master-narrative of
―modernization‖ (with 4-I emphasis on institutions, investments,
infrastructure, and innovations), mildly assaulting Sovereign
Democracy. Some political observers believed it to replace the
imagery Sovereign Democracy in Russia, of which Medvedev had
been publicly critical on several occasions. In this context, it would be
informative to examine whether or not new political emphases are
likely to generate any real consequences for changing the current
public health policy.
It is also interesting to examine these variations as related to
the degree to which elite-driven social purposes are embedded at the
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broadest level of collective articulations, that is, popular culture. South
African elites, for instance, failed to embed marketization as a pivotal
component of national identity in the collective articulations. All
Russian political obligations, on the other hand, were strongly
embedded in the collective articulations as expressed in the country‘s
popular culture. The role and importance popular culture plays in
supporting national identity in general has been widely acknowledged
in the relevant literature (Iver Neumann, Ted Hopf). More inductive
work to be pursued in order to ascertain the degree to which
conceptions of common good remain supported because of being
embedded in public culture.

CONCLUSION
In general, my empirical findings indicate that in responding to the
domestic epidemic of HIV/AIDS the key decision-makers in both
countries have significantly transformed the international standardized
policy prescriptions to the pandemic in accordance with the social
purpose‘s content. Rather than treating the epidemic as a pressing
public health issue, the imperatives of Sovereign Democracy prompted
the government to respond to the domestic epidemic as the issue of
demographic survival and criminal drug abuse, subsequently eroding
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the human rights component from the official policy, overstretching
the public financial commitments, and refusing to cooperate with
private sector. The imperatives of African Renaissance reframed the
HIV/AIDS epidemic as a local developmental problem to be addressed
by local solutions only. As a result, the Cabinet supported substandard
biomedical treatments and indigenous healing practices, consistently
resisted the universal and free rollout of treatment in order to avoid the
undesirable governmental expenditures and redistributive strategies. In
both countries, these policy choices resulted in the adverse
consequences for public health and prompted a protracted contestation
among various state and non-state actors around the principles of the
desired public health policies.
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APPENDIX

Table 1.1 Variables and cases
Independent variable
International consensus

Intervening variable
Social purpose

―Sovereign Democracy‖
(Russia)
HIV/AIDS policy as a
public health crisis requiring
biomedical solutions

―African Renaissance‖
(South Africa)

Dependent variable
Domestic policy
demographic and criminal
narcotic abuse, requiring strong
state intervention

local socioeconomic problem,
requiring unique approach often
at odds with the international
consensus

487

Table 1.2 The HIV/AIDS policy baseline indicators
Policy component

Indicators of
standardized policy
response
(Chapter 2)
Indicators of
opposite to the
standardized policy
response
Policy indicators in
the Russian
Federation
(Chapter 6)
Policy indicators in
the Republic of
South Africa
(Chapter 7)

Treatment
Addressing the epidemic as
a public health crisis with
standardized protocol
1a. Public health crisis
1b. Standardized protocol
(ARVs)
1c. Check on prices (
generics)
1a. Any secondary framing
1b. Substandard protocols
1c. No check/excessive
control

Universality
Providing the access to treatment
to everybody who needs it ,
ideally free of charge
2a. Inclusion of vulnerable
groups
2b. ―Scaling up‖ access
2c. Prevention (ABC)

Partnerships
Including all stakeholders in the
policy formulation and
implementation
3a. Public-private partnership (PPP)
3b. Civil society /nonprofit sector
3c. International organizations

3a. Selective engagement
3b. Exclusion from policy-making
3c. Any restrictions and challenges

1a. National security crisis
1b. Breaking the protocol
1c. Import substitution

2a. Any forms of stigma and
exclusion
2b. ―Scaling down‖
2c. No prevention/ or as a
substitute
2a. Criminalization of IDUs
2b. Distribution crises
2c. Alternatives to prevention

1a. Socioeconomic crisis
1b. Alternative medications
1c. Restrains on generics

2a. Limited rollout
2b. Stalling treatment
2c. Alternatives to prevention

3a. Priority to private sector
3b. Exclusion from policy-making
3c. Counter-epistemic community

3a. Expansion of public sector
3b. Exclusion from policy-making
3c. Asserting its own leadership
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Table 1.3 Summary of comparisons and explanations
Social Purpose as an intervening variable (Chapter 3)
Components

Political

Economic

distinctiveness

empowerment

Systemic role

The Russian Federation: ―Sovereign democracy‖ (Chapter 5)
Strong state

State-led economy

Great power

Treatment

1a. Demographic crisis

1b. Breaking the protocol

1c. Import substitution and the

1a. Public health crisis

(strong state should be

(secondary factor: the

desirability of the

1b. Standardized

populous; narcotic

overextended economic

―pharmaceutical sovereignty‖

protocol (ARVs)

consumption crises due

obligations exacerbated

(undesirability of reliance on

1c. Check on prices (

to Russia‘ s weak

weak state capacity,

the foreign pharmaceutical

generics)

position in the world)

inefficiency, and

sector, including generics)

corruption)
Universality

2a. Criminalization of

2b. Scaling up crises

2c. Alternatives to prevention

2a. Inclusion of

drug users (in the

(secondary factor: the

(attempts to ban sexual

vulnerable groups

context of strong state

overextended economic

education as anti-Russian

2b. ―Scaling up‖

being incompatible

obligations exacerbated

conspiracy, which may lead to

access

with human rights)

weak state capacity,

the country‘s international
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2c. Prevention (ABC)

inefficiency, and

weakness)

corruption)
Partnership

3b. Exclusion of civil

3a. Expansion of public

3c. Asserting its own

3a. Public-private

society from policy-

sector

leadership

partnership (PPP)

making

(massive public spending ;

(building redundant

3b. Civil society

(NGOs only as service

creating additional

international and regional

/nonprofit sector

organizations, their

governmental bodies

conferences, asserting regional

3c.

political and advocacy

responsible for public

leadership in curbing AIDS)

incompatible with

policy;

strong state)

tendency to ignore private

International

organizations

sector)

490

Table 1.3 Summary of comparisons and explanations, continued
Social Purpose as an intervening variable (Chapter 3)
Components

Political

Economic empowerment

Systemic role

distinctiveness
The Republic of South Africa: ―African Renaissance‖ (Chapter 6)

Treatment
1a. Public health crisis
1b. Standardized protocol
(ARVs)
1c. Check on prices (
generics)

Universality
2a. Inclusion of
vulnerable groups
2b. ―Scaling up‖ access
2c. Prevention (ABC)

Indigenousness

Marketization

Exceptionalism

1b. Alternative
medications
1c. Restrains on
generics
(both incompatible
with the stress on
indigenous solutions
to local problems)

1b. Alternative medications
(Marketization as an
additional explanation:
bioprospecting of genetic
medicinal resources as
important private economic
activity)

1a. Socioeconomic and
developmental crisis
(more encompassing than public
health crisis, enrooted in South
Africa‘s special historical and
geopolitical circumstances)

2a. Limited rollout to
MTCPT
(incompatible with the stress
on marketization and avoiding
redistribution strategies)
2b. Stalling treatment

2c. Alternatives to prevention
(only partial explanation:
stress on poverty eradication and
healthy lifestyle in relation to
indicator 1a
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Partnership
3a. Public-private
partnership (PPP)
3b. Civil society
/nonprofit sector
3c. International
organizations

3b. Selective inclusion
in policy-making
(exclusion of those
which stressed ARVs,
generics and
universality of
treatment; including
those which promoted
genetic resources)

3a. Protecting private sector
(incompatible with the stress
on marketization and avoiding
redistribution strategies)

3c. Counter-epistemic community
(secondary factor: the desirability of
providing exceptional leadership in
international organization; evidence
strongly suggest individual-level
explanation)
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Table 2.1: Global policy consensus on HIV/AIDS

Policy

1.

Treatment

2.

Universality

3.

Partnerships

component

Addressing the epidemic as a

Providing the access to

Including all stakeholders in

(Chapter 2)

public health crisis with

treatment to everybody who

the policy formulation and

standardized protocol

needs it , ideally free of charge

implementation

Indicators of

1a. Public health crisis

2a. Inclusion of vulnerable

3a. Public-private partnership

standardized

1b. Standardized protocol

groups

(PPP)

policy

(ARVs)

2b. ―Scaling up‖ access

3b. Civil society /nonprofit

response

1c. Check on prices (

2c. Prevention (ABC)

sector

generics)

3c. International
organizations

Indicators of

1a. Any secondary framing

2a. Any forms of stigma and

3a. Selective engagement

opposite to

1b. Substandard protocols

exclusion

3b. Exclusion from policy-

the

1c. No check/excessive

2b. ―Scaling down‖

making

standardized

control

2c. No prevention/ or as a

3c. Any restrictions and

substitute

challenges

policy
response
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Table 3.1 National purpose in Russia and South Africa
Proposal‘s components

Russia

South Africa

0.

Title

―Sovereign democracy‖

―African Renaissance‖

1.

Political
distinctiveness

Strong state

Indigeneousness

2.

Economic
empowerment

State-led economy

Marketization

3.

Systemic role

Great power in the multipolar world

Continental leadership and exceptionalism
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Figure 3.1: Major processes in social purpose
Domestic elites

Global context

Global context

Flow of external health initiatives, including policy recommendations on curbing HIV/AIDS
SOCIAL PURPOSE as a filter

Articulated audiences

General audiences

495

Table 3.2 Ranking social purpose

Absent

Activity

Processes

Hypothesized effects on action

Commitment

 Elites do not commit to any definite
country-specific conception of
common good
 Domestic policy environment lacks
any definite legitimating discourses
 Absence of discernible and
elaborate discursive streams in
public culture

 Elite‘s actions are not shaped social purpose, they do not
imply commitment to a country-specific specific
conception of common good
 Alternative behavioral choices are possible, broadly
advocated, and considered legitimate
 Policy environment shaped by different bureaucratic
agencies are expected to pursue their narrowly defined
tasks

 Contending elites strongly commit
to alternative conceptions of
common good
 All contending conceptions of
common good are strongly
embedded in domestic policy
environment
 Public culture supports a plurality of
contending articulations of common
good

 Only part of the elite is committed to the kinds of action it
considers appropriate due to a specific conception of
common good they embrace
 Alternative behavioral choices are possible, broadly
advocated, and considered legitimate
 Broad conflicts in policy environment with unpredictable
implications for public policy

Influence
Articulation

Commitment

Fractured

Influence
Articulation
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Commitment
Influence
Restrained

Articulation

Commitment
Consolidated

Influence
Articulation

 Elite strongly commits to a certain
conception of common good, while
its potential contender chose not to
challenge it
 This conception of common good is
moderately embedded/legitimized in
domestic policy environment
 Public culture partially supports a
dominant articulation of common
good (or only some of its
substantive components)

 Elite is strongly committed to the kinds of action which
social purpose underpins
 alternative behavioral choices are generally delegitimized,
but might be considered only with serious reservations
 Minor conflicts in policy environment, yet the opponents
of the enacted policy are significantly underprivileged

 Elite is strongly consolidated around
a certain conception of common
good
 This conception of common good is
strongly embedded/legitimized in
domestic policy environment
 Public culture strongly supports a
dominant articulation of common
good, including its all substantive
components

 Elite is strongly committed to the kinds of action which
social purpose underpins
 Alternative behavioral choices are considered
inappropriate and strongly delegitimized
 The enacted policy not disputed and considered
unproblematic, by all segment of society; long-lasting
effects to be observed
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Table 4.1 Indicators of national purpose
Commitment
Consolidated

Influence
Articulation

 Elite is strongly consolidated around
a certain conception of common good
 This conception of common good is
strongly embedded/legitimized in
domestic policy environment
 Public culture strongly supports a
dominant articulation of common
good, including its all substantive
components

 Elite is strongly committed to the kinds of
action which social purpose underpins
 Alternative behavioral choices are
considered inappropriate and strongly
delegitimized
 The enacted policy not disputed and
considered unproblematic, by all segment
of society; long-lasting effects to be
observed

Table 5.1 Indicators of national purpose
Commitment
(section one)
Restrained

Influence
(section two)
Articulation
(section
three)

 Elite strongly commits to a certain
conception of common good, while
its potential contender chose not to
challenge it
 This conception of common good is
moderately embedded/legitimized in
domestic policy environment
 Public culture partially supports a
dominant articulation of common
good (or only some of its substantive
components)

 Elite is strongly committed to the kinds of
action which social purpose underpins
 Alternative behavioral choices are
generally delegitimized, but might be
considered only with serious reservations
 Minor conflicts in policy environment, yet
the opponents of the enacted policy are
significantly underprivileged
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Table 6.1: Summary of the HIV/AIDS policy in Russia
Policy component

Treatment

Definitions

Addressing the epidemic as
a public health crisis with
standardized protocol

Indicators of
standardized policy
response

1a. Public health crisis

Universality
Providing the access to
treatment to everybody who
needs it , ideally free of charge
2a. Inclusion of vulnerable
groups

1b. Standardized protocol
(ARVs)
.

2b. ―Scaling up‖ access

1c. Check on prices

2c. Prevention (ABC)

1a. Any secondary framing

2a. Any forms of stigma and
exclusion

(Chapter 6)

3a. Public-private partnership (PPP)

3c. International organizations

1b. Substandard protocols

3a. Selective engagement
3b. Exclusion from policy-making

2b. ―Scaling down‖
1c. No check/excessive
control

Policy indicators in the
Russian Federation

Including all stakeholders in the
policy formulation and
implementation

3b. Civil society /nonprofit sector

(Chapter 2)
Indicators of opposite
to the standardized
policy response

Partnerships

3c. Any restrictions and challenges
2c. No prevention/ or as a
substitute

1a. State weakness

2a. Criminalization of IDUs

3a. Expansion of public sector

1b. Observing the
protocol**

2b. ―Scaling up‖ access **

3b. Exclusion from policy-making

2c. Alternatives to prevention

3c. Asserting its own leadership

1c. Import substitution
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Table 6.3: Summary of the impact of national purpose on HIV/AIDS policy
The Russian Federation: ―Sovereign democracy‖

Treatment
1a. Public health
crisis
1b. Standardized
protocol (ARVs)
1c. Check on prices
( generics)

Universality
2a. Inclusion of
vulnerable groups
2b. ―Scaling up‖
access

Strong state

State-led
economy

Great power

1a. State
weakness

1b. Observing the
protocol

(strong state
should be
populous;
narcotic
consumption
crises due to
Russia‘ s weak
position in the
world)

(full match)

1c. Import
substitution and the
desirability of the
―pharmaceutical
sovereignty‖

2a.
Criminalization
of drug users (in
the context of
strong state being
incompatible with
human rights)

2b. Scaling up

yet due to state
frequent
interruptions of
regimen and
procurement
delays)

(attempts to ban
sexual education as
anti-Russian
conspiracy, which
may lead to the
country‘s
international
weakness)

3b. Exclusion of
civil society from
policy-making

3a. Expansion of
public sector

3c. Asserting its
own leadership

(massive public
spending ;
creating extragovernmental
bodies
responsible for
public policy;
tendency to
ignore private
sector)

(building redundant
international and
regional
conferences,
asserting regional
leadership in
curbing AIDS)

2c.
Prevention
(ABC)

Partnership
3a. Public-private
partnership (PPP)
3b. Civil society
/nonprofit sector
3c.
International
organizations

(NGOs only as
service
organizations,
their political and
advocacy
incompatible with
strong state)

yet the
overextended
economic
obligations
exacerbated weak
state capacity,
inefficiency, and
corruption )

(undesirability of
reliance on the
foreign
pharmaceutical
sector, including
generics)
2c. Alternatives to
prevention

(full match)
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Table 7.1: Summary of the ARV policy in RSA, 2000—2008
Policy
1. Treatment
2. Universality
component
Addressing the epidemic as
Providing the access to
a public health crisis with
treatment to everybody who
standardized protocol
needs it , ideally free of charge
Indicators of
1a. Public health crisis
2a. Inclusion of vulnerable
standardized
1b. Standardized protocol
groups
policy
(ARVs)
2b. ―Scaling up‖ access
response
1c. Check on prices (
2c. Prevention (ABC)
(Chapter 2)
generics)
Indicators of
opposite to the
standardized
policy
response
Policy
indicators in
the Republic
of South
Africa
(Chapter 7)

1a. Any secondary framing
1b. Substandard protocols
1c. No check/excessive
control
1a. Socioeconomic crisis
1b. Alternative medications
1c. Restrains on generics

2a. Any forms of stigma and
exclusion
2b. ―Scaling down‖
2c. No prevention/ or as a
substitute
2a. Limited rollout
2b. Stalling treatment
2c. Alternatives to prevention

3.

Partnerships

Including all stakeholders
in the policy formulation
and implementation
3a. Public-private
partnership (PPP)
3b. Civil society /nonprofit
sector
3c. International
organizations
3a. Selective engagement
3b. Exclusion from policymaking
3c. Any restrictions and
challenges
3a. Priority to private sector
3b. Exclusion from policymaking
3c. Counter-epistemic
community
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Table 7.3: Summary of the impact of national purpose on HIV/AIDS policy

The Republic of South Africa: ―African Renaissance‖ (Chapter 6)

Treatment
1a. Public health crisis
1b. Standardized protocol
(ARVs)
1c. Check on prices (
generics)

Universality
2a. Inclusion of vulnerable
groups
2b. ―Scaling up‖ access
2c. Prevention (ABC)

Indigenousness

Marketization

Exceptionalism

1b. Alternative
medications
1c. Restrains on
generics
(both incompatible
with the stress on
indigenous solutions
to local problems)

1b. Alternative
medications
(Marketization as an
additional explanation:
bioprospecting of genetic
medicinal resources as
important private
economic activity)

1a. Socioeconomic and
developmental crisis
(more encompassing than
public health crisis,
enrooted in South Africa‘s
special historical and
geopolitical
circumstances)

2a. Limited rollout to
MTCPT
(incompatible with the
stress on marketization
and avoiding
redistribution strategies)
2b. Stalling treatment

2c. Alternatives to
prevention
(only partial explanation:
stress on poverty
eradication and healthy
lifestyle in relation to
indicator 1a
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Partnership
3a. Public-private partnership
(PPP)
3b. Civil society /nonprofit
sector
3c. International
organizations

3b. Selective
inclusion in policymaking (exclusion of
those which stressed
ARVs, generics and
universality of
treatment; including
those which
promoted genetic
resources)

3a. Protecting private
sector
(incompatible with the
stress on marketization
and avoiding
redistribution strategies)

3c. Counter-epistemic
community
(secondary factor: the
desirability of providing
exceptional leadership in
international organization;
evidence strongly suggest
individual-level
explanation)

Table 8.1: Summary of the relationship between variables & explanations

Mechanisms

Predicted behavior (Null Ho)

Potential impact of identity on behavior

Peer learning

Elites consider all technical information and
best cases to develop a policy response

Elites either are highly selective in adopting
particular practices, or disregard all of it

Coalitionbuilding

Minority traditions push elites to employ
the policy to widen coalition and win
uncommitted

Elites disregard the value of coalition-building
as a resource to widen its political support

External
pressures

Elites calculate benefits of external
influence and/or costs of non-compliance

Elites pursue the selective adaptation of
external demands
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